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Abstract 
This dissertation argues for a significant presence of satire within Victorian 
novels from the 1830s to the 1890s - the very decades in which many influential critics, 
from the early twentieth century to the present day, discern a marked, general decline in 
the practice of satire. As early as the eighteenth century, writers valued amiable humour 
over wit and satire; continuing this trend, countless Victorian writers and critics 
attempted (in David Worcester's words) to "pus[h] satire into the dunce's comer" (32). 
Nevertheless, regardless of their theoretic disavowal of satire, many novelists embraced, 
in their narrative practice, its mild Horatian, philosophical Menippean, and even stringent 
Juvenalian possibilities. Charlotte Bronte's words to Elizabeth Gaskell may be applied to 
many Victorian writers: "'Satirical you are - however; I believe a little more so than you 
think"' (Letters 3: 4 7). 
Current studies of satire in the Victorian novel tend to restrict themselves to 
individual analyses of substantially satiric novels such as Martin Chuzzlewit or The Way 
of All Flesh; more generic assessments are deferred. In terms of broader engagements, 
Frank Palmeri' s view that satire is a form of writing that disappears "underground or into 
eclipse" ("Thackeray" 770) in the mid-Victorian period, only to emerge in the late 
decades of the period, is representative. In this dissertation, however, I demonstrate a 
distinctly Victorian satiric focus on society as the source of moral ills by identifying habit 
as a dominant, encyclopaedic subject of novelistic satire. The belief that human character 
is substantially a social creation is exemplified by George Henry Lewes's observation: 
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"To understand the Human Mind we must study it under its normal conditions, and these 
are social conditions" (PLMJ 128). As well, inspired by Athena Vrettos's enterprising 
work on the prevalence of Victorian debates concerning habit and its relevance to 
psychological realism in terms of Dickens's Dombey and Son, I trace the relations of 
culturally embedded discourses on habit to the period's novelistic satire. 
Satirists' preoccupation with habit is strikingly illuminated by Mikhail Bakhtin's 
social-formalist assessment of the novel's steadfast roots in ancient serio-comical 
literature and Menippean satire - a dialogic form that defamiliarizes habit. Cultural 
systems - "all the habitual matrices [ sosedstva] of things and ideas" - are exposed in 
"the menippea" through voracious parody of literary and non-literary genres, and through 
the "creation of ... unexpected connections" (Dialogic 169). Victorian novelists, I argue, 
continued the traditions of satire (as an evolving mode or genre) through an engagement 
with omnipresent theories of habit. 
Although authoritative nineteenth-century discourses (both of natural science and 
of moral/social science) implicate habit in the forces of determinism, contradictory 
theories inveterately identify habit as a locus of moral hope (through habits of sympathy, 
self-control, free will, and free thought). I examine in detail the confluence of satire and 
this dual discourse of habit through close readings of canonical Victorian novels. The 
novels I discuss, from Cranford (1851-53) and Silas Marner (1861) to The Way of All 
Flesh (written between 1873 and 1884, published 1903) and New Grub Street (1891 ), 
demonstrate either Horatian optimism or Juvenalian cynicism with regard to habit as a 
source for good or ill. It is a trajectory encapsulated by Edward Bulwer-Lytton's 
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transition from optimism and faith in habits of sympathy in Pelham ( 1828) to his 
cynicism concerning the assimi1ating powers of habit in The Coming Race (1871). 
Importantly, Dickens's novels of the 1850s and 60s, which target habit in "lines of blood 
and fire" (30) (to borrow James Hannay' s epithet for Juvena1ian satire), foreground the 
theoretical issues be1eaguering satire's relations with the novel. The satura of Bleak 
House (1852-53), Hard Times (1854), and Our Mutual Friend (1864-65) is characterized 
by unrestrained metaphor that targets all forms of institutional (social) and individual 
(psychological) bad habits. Finally, I investigate misogynist theorizations of both satire 
and habit, by analyzing the satiric machinery of Charlotte Bronte's Shirley (1849) and 
George Eliot's Middlemarch (1871-72). With satiric irreverence, both novels pose a 
question that is crucial to historic and Victorian theories concerning female mental 
inferiority: "'[D]o you seriously think all wisdom in the world is lodged in male 
skulls?''' (Bronte, S 328). 
Despite the era's ambivalence to satire, which I explore at length, Victorian 
novelists were profoundly engaged with its literary and social possibilities. Dissociating 
and dissenting from the "habitual matrices" of their culture, and engaging with complex 
moral discourses affirming the "familiar fact, the power of habit" (Mill, Utilitarianism 
10: 238), novelists wrote philosophically probing and culturally critical Menippean, 
Horatian, and Juvenalian satire. 
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Satirizing Habits in Victorian Fiction: Novelistic Satire, 1830s-1890s 
Introduction 
To laugh with Juvenal or with Swift is to feel more of a bitter malignity than of gaiety. 
(Sully, An Essay on Laughter 381) 
So true is it that unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which 
is usual appears natural. (J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women 21: 270) 
Satire theory, an embattled subject from the second century BCE to the present, is 
a literary Dark Tower where errant theorists repeatedly encounter failed generic claims. 
Genre-based assessments of satire lead to such precarious totalizations that one must 
begin by asserting the historical parameters within which to wage even a limited 
theoretical campaign. The canonical "Ages of Satire" in Western literature are Ancient 
Rome of the first and second century BCE - affirmed by Quintilian's claim, "satura 
quidem to ta nostra est" (Satire, at any rate/if nothing else is totally ours) ( qtd. in 
Freudenburg, "Intro" 2) - and the period between 1660-1830, with satire being the 
dominant mode of Augustan literature until 1750 (Rawson x). Critics are habituated to 
the notion that the novel of sentimental, comic realism engulfed satire, if not by the 1760s 
then certainly by the 1830s. After this date, it is customary to say, satire as a verifiable 
genre with distinct formal properties became extinct. Satire is reported to have lingered in 
the novel - yet not very prominently in the Victorian novel - as a tone, attitude, 
perception, or "negative critical element" (Muecke 34) that has been assigned the term 
mode. Michael Seidel speaks for many critics when he argues, following Northrop Frye, 
that "satire" became "a mode rather than ... a generically fixed form" (xii). 1 Further 
complicating matters is the notion that formal Roman verse satire (in dactylic 
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hexameters, originated by Lucilius and continued by Horace, Persius, and Juvenal) is 
widely considered the exclusive generic form of satire. Yet this view not only 
overshadows satire's earlier modal incarnations in the vast system of Greek genres (satyr 
plays, Old Comedy, Stoic diatribe, etc.), but obviates the fact that formal Roman satire, 
even as Luci1ius practiced it, was a "very loose set of formal and thematic characteristics" 
(Muecke 34). Lucilius, who refers to his work as "something thrown together," did not 
settle upon the epic-evoking hexameter for his poetic discourse until his thirtieth satire 
(Muecke 34, 39). Acknowledging this heterogeneity, Alastair Fowler states that satire is 
the "most problematic mode to the taxonomist, since it appears never to have 
corresponded to any one kind" (110). Fittingly, from ancient practitioners such as 
Juvenal, to contemporary critics, it is customary to refer to satire as a cornucopia or 
hodge-podge. Etymologically, satire, from the Latin satura, specifically the lam satura, a 
"mixed" or "full platter" (Griffin 6), is linked to concepts of multiplicity. For Quintilian, 
satire is a "specific set of generic enterprises totaling two in number, formal verse satire 
and the prosimetric or Menippean satire" (Freudenburg, Roman Satire 21) - reputedly a 
genre first developed by the third century BCE Greek Cynic Menippus (Relihan 109). 
Although satire's status as a genre is "cloudy at best" (Guilhamet ix), Leon Guilhamet 
asserts that, at the very least, all satire (formal verse and Menippean satire) involves the 
mixing of forms; he therefore encourages the abandonment of "superficial" divisions 
between prose and poetry (7-11 ). Increasingly, it becomes clear that in light of its varied 
forms, satire eludes overly-narrow formal or structural categorization. Yet, given that 
satire has been evaluated consistently in its Greek and Roman incarnations (and beyond) 
as being "an instrument of reform in the battle against human vice or sin," akin to moral 
philosophy (Hendrickson 40), the ethical positioning of thematic elements seems to play 
a larger role in the identification of satire than stable structural components. 
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Another taxonomically fugitive genre that is similarly (as Freudenberg describes 
satire) "loose in its habits" ("Intro" 14 ), is the novel. David Duff explains that the 
ascendancy of the novel unsettled notions of static generic categories and contributed to 
an increasing awareness of the historical and evolutionary determination of genres (Duff 
4-5). Mikhail M. Bakhtin's sociology of genre (which I discuss in detail in Chapter 1), 
posits the novel's key structural principle as being its receptiveness to literary and non-
literary genres. Importantly, shifts in ideologically-encoded subject matter attend the 
novel's orchestration or mixing of multiple genres. Similarly, satire, as Guilhamet argues, 
is a genre whose definitive structural attribute is also generic hybridization. In this 
dissertation, I hold that satire, predominantly as a mode, but also as a genre in the 
broadest sense (in that it mixes genres and has a moral/critical function), is a larger 
presence in the Victorian novel than has been traditionally accepted. My study examines 
the confluence of satire and the novel from the 1830s (the approximate date at which 
satire is reputed to be substantially subsumed by the novel) to the 1890s (when satire is 
considered to be reinstated). 
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James Sutherland's view (in 1962) that the English Romantic poets except Byron 
"left satire alone," and that "Samuel Butler is the singular satirist of the period" (15, 161 ), 
typifies the New Critical stance towards the fate of satire in the Victorian period. Richard 
Garnett is similarly dismissive: "In no age was the spirit of satire so generally diffused as 
in the 19th century"; so diffuse, in fact, that the term satirist cannot be "properly applied" 
to Dickens, Eliot, or Trollope ( 4 ). The claim that the nineteenth century did not provide 
"a congenial atmosphere" for satire and that the average Victorian reader thought of 
satire as a low, bullying and unsympathetic genre (Sutherland 77, 102) accords with the 
thesis of Stuart Tave's The Amiable Humourist (1960), and is most influentially 
articulated by Ronald Paulson's Fictions of Satire (1967) and its companion study Satire 
and the Novel in Eighteenth-Century England (1967), which chart eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century controversies over the propriety of satire and the "eclipse" of the 
satirist by the (more sentimental) novelist.2 In the Victorian novel, according to Paulson, 
satire is incidental. In terms of critical assessments, surprisingly little has changed since 
the dismissive consensus of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Redressing New Critical oversights regarding early nineteenth-century satire, 
Gary Dyer's 1997 study of Romantic verse and prose satire from 1789 to 1832 attends to 
works neglected by scholars who are "satisfied that satire disappeared in the eighteenth 
century" (I). He, along with Steven E. Jones, views satire as a kind of generic "Other" 
against which Romanticism was defined. Yet even to critics interested in problematizing 
straightforward claims about satire's decline in the early nineteenth century, the Victorian 
period (particularly its middle decades) appears to many critics to be a kind of non-
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negotiable frontier for satire. Dyer, for example, reiterates that satire necessarily petered 
out in its distinct verse and prose incarnations after the 1820s and 30s, having been 
consumed by "predominantly non-satiric genres" like the realist novel (14, 139). Echoing 
Sutherland's earlier claim, Dyer posits that after Byron's death, satire became "a 
moribund literary mode," a mode which is increasingly cast aside as an "obsolete 
remnant of crue1er ages" (127, 142). By contrast, scholars interested in the relations of 
satire to the novel, most notably Bakhtin, turn to prose-accommodating Menippean satire 
for a generic precedent - a lineage that Dryden (following Quintilian) views as being 
distinct from Roman formal verse satire in its sheer variety of subject, erudition, and 
invention (K. Combe 2). For Bakhtin, this form, along with the Socratic dialogue, 
constitutes the generic roots of the novel. In brief, Menippean satire (renamed the 
"menippea") involves discursive intellectual satire steeped in colloquy, often with 
fantastical journeys and inconsistent characters who are essentially mouthpieces for the 
competing ideologies of the day (Bakhtin, Dostoevsky 108-114). Similarly, Northrop 
Frye finds that although the novel focuses on human relationships and character, while 
Menippean satire or "Anatomy" (as he renames it) mainly dissects erudition, the two 
merged to produce hybrids (Anatomy 311-12). Yet, Dyer, among others, maintains not 
only that Menippean satire loses ground to the realistic novel in the eighteenth century, 
but that the inclusiveness of this form of satire makes its generic boundaries within the 
novel too hard to delineate (18-19). Thus, the divided, ambivalent state of prose satire 
theory and criticism, particularly with regard to claims about Menippean satire (both in 
ancient and modern texts), contributes to a widespread retreat from sustained engagement 
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with satire's intersections with the novel in general - and specifically, for the purposes of 
this dissertation, the Victorian novel. 3 
Recently, Frank Palmeri reaffirms the consensus that the Victorians were simply 
too prudish for satire. Resolutely, he claims that by 1850, satire had been eclipsed by 
other forms. Prose satire continued via the Menippean satires of Thomas Love Peacock 
and Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus (1833-4), but by the end of the 1840s satire had 
become "unavailable as a free-standing genre" (Palmeri, "Thackeray" 753). Palmeri, like 
Dyer, refuses to follow the Menippean genre into the territory of the novel; his thesis 
accords with Robert B. Martin's earlier argument that influential interpretations of wit by 
William Thackeray, George Eliot, and Thomas Carlyle, as something mean-spirited, 
produced a preference for genial, sentimental humour until the latter years of the century. 
Palmeri's conclusion concerning satire's mid-Victorian disappearance is based upon on a 
precise definition of narrative satire as a genre that critiques extreme positions and has no 
interest in the middle ground; he places satire in opposition to "accommodating" genres 
such as the comic realist novel or the historical novel, which depend on closure and do 
not emphasize satiric irony or parody (Satire, History 11-12). From the 1840s to the 
1870s, he argues, the non-satiric form dominates, and not till later in the century does 
"satire again undercu[t] respectable, middle-class pieties and middle grounds" 
("Thackeray" 772). Palmeri' s brief assessment of the relationship of Dickens's novels to 
satire, however, reveals the limits of his theory with regard to Victorian satiric practice. 
In this dissertation, I challenge his claim that, despite a return by the late 1880s, satire 
"played almost exclusively a subordinate and episodic role beginning in the 1840s" 
("Narrative Satire" 361). As well, I contest the notion that Dickens's novels of the 1850s 
and 1860s are not "primarily concerned with satiric critique of institutions or dominant 
ideologies," however "dark" in "tone" (Palmeri, "Thackeray" 772). Instead, I propose 
that Victorian novelists, often operating against their own professed views of satire, are 
as much satirists as realists. Novels by Charles Dickens, George Eliot, Charlotte Bronte, 
and others have substantial, rather than merely incidental or subordinate, satirical aims 
and elements. Disorientation resulting from satire's increasing generic turbulence as it 
interacted with the novel, combined with notions of its ostensible relegation (by 
prominent Victorian writers) to the realm of impropriety, have generated the current 
critical neglect of actual nineteenth-century satiric practices. 
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Adamancy about the social and moral function of the novel complements the goal 
(as stated in the programmatic satires) of Roman and Augustan verse satirists: to 
condemn and correct vice and folly. Satire, a genre founded upon ethics, is readily 
adaptable to Eliot's realist project (and that of many other Victorian writers): "If Art does 
not enlarge men's sympathies it does nothing morally" (letter to Charles Bray, 5 July 
1859; Letters 3: 4 75). In order to expose recurrent social, cultural, and religious 
injustices, Victorian novelists recuperated and redefined classical traditions of satire, 
including the Horatian, Juvenalian, and Menippean. 4 
The techniques and socio-political targets of authors conventionally viewed as 
satirists - Anthony Trollope, William Thackeray, and Charles Dickens - have been the 
subject of individual scholarly attention; however, such scholarship has done little to 
unsettle dominant claims about Victorian realism. In the interest of critical efforts to 
categorize the limitations of realism, satire has been sidelined. For example, notions of 
the "classic realist" text's tendency towards closure and self-consistent characterizations 
preclude its generic connections with satire. Lynn Pykett argues that the non-realistic 
dimensions (such as the fantastic and the Gothic) of canonic Victorian novels undercut 
the current critical consensus regarding the "hegemony ofrealism" (192). Pykett's 
argument is in keeping with Bakhtin's insistence that critics avoid the "philistine habit" 
(Dialogic 420) of reading texts monologically. Satire exists in a complex relationship 
with realism, and its presence in nineteenth-century literature, as Bakhtin and Frye 
suggest, is pervasive. As of yet, however, satiric modes in the Victorian novel have 
received little attention as narrative features disrupting claims about realism. In this 
study, I do not propose a comprehensive taxonomy of Victorian novelistic satire, but 
instead investigate the complex relationship of representative novels to satire. Far from 
being incidental, satire is intrinsic to the figurative and structural mechanics of many 
canonical Victorian texts. 
To balance Dyer's work on early-nineteenth-century satire, a number of literary 
studies of fin de siecle satire have emerged- especially with the resurgence of interest in 
parody.5 Surprisingly, however, more than eight decades have elapsed since Frances T. 
Russell's Satire in the Victorian Novel ( 1920) determines the "proportion" of satire in a 
"baker's dozen" of Victorian novelists. 6 Her pioneering work is an effort to balance the 
"bad reputation" of Victorians for sentimental status-quo ism. Importantly, though, she 
concedes that as realism was "having its day," it dominated the satiric aspect of the 
Victorian novel (83). Recently, Aaron Matz re-examines the relationship between late-
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Victorian realism and satire, arguing that the two modes "merged inexorably and 
indistinguishably into one another" ("Satire" 3). Matz situates George Eliot as a key 
transitional figure, through whom strands of Augustan satire connect to the grim realism 
of Gissing and Hardy. Thus, Matz's thesis maintains the Tavean trajectory that postulates 
a return to satire (harsher forms of wit) and a movement away from amiable humour in 
the final decades of the Victorian period. Despite his inclusion of Eliot's satire 
Theophrastus Such (l 879), Matz sketches a history and theory of late Victorian realism, 
therefore bypassing such writers as Dickens, Gaskell, and Bronte. As well, rather than 
engaging Horatian and Juvenalian modalities or theories ofMenippean satire and the 
novel, Matz attempts "a history ofrealism, not of satire" ("Satire" iv). There remains a 
need for a wide-ranging study that surveys the works of satiric novelists dating from the 
1830s to the 1890s in conjunction with an evaluation of the deployment of satire as an 
ascendant mode, or even a genre-constituting component, of the mid-Victorian novel. As 
well, Russell's conclusion that, as a result of the forces of democracy and science, there is 
a shift in the central targets of Victorian satire from the individual to the "collective 
shoulders of society" (315), is a tentative but resonant insight into a distinctive target of 
Victorian satires, which requires further substantiation. My goal is to demonstrate that 
Victorian satirists extended the generic possibilities of satire through an engagement with 
culturally omnipresent theories of habit - theories produced by the various discourses of 
physical and social science. These culture-suffusing discourses represent habit as being 
central to the formation and function of both the moral individual and the healthy social 
organism; as such, they become central to the period's novelistic satire. One key problem 
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that Gary Dyer encounters in categorizing the vast realm of fictional prose satire is its 
plethora of satiric targets. He discounts the possibility of locating targets multivalent 
enough to offer anything but dubious illumination (Dyer 19). In opposition to this claim, I 
argue for the constructiveness of locating and assessing a manifold thematic, such as 
habit - a revealingly pervasive and paradoxical subject of satiric inquiry - for an 
evaluation of Victorian satiric practices. Importantly, I posit that the conventional modal 
binary of Horatian and Juvenalian, and the category ofMenippean satire (a generic last 
resort for those wishing to extend satire theory to the novel), remain productive traditions 
in Victorian novelistic satire. I correlate two crucial aspects of the Victorian novel: its 
modes of satire, and its engagement with then-contemporary debates - scientific, 
philosophical, political, and economic - concerning the function of habit. Such a study, I 
hope, will not only produce a fuller understanding of the Victorian contribution to 
novelistic satire, but also illuminate the catholicity and complexity of nineteenth-century 
discourses of habit. 
My argument about the relevance of habit to satire is particularly indebted to 
Athena Vrettos's landmark essay, "Defining Habits: Dickens and the Psychology of 
Repetition," which situates Dombey and Son within the context of Victorian sociological 
and psychological debates surrounding habit and its effect on individual agency and 
society as a whole. Vrettos examines habit as a culturally entrenched, multivalent, and 
rigorously debated strain of Victorian philosophical, psychological, social, economic, 
literary, and popular discourses. Alluding to the works of G. H. Lewes, J. S. Mill, James 
Sully, William Carpenter, Henry Maudsley, Alexander Bain, William James, and many 
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others, she emphasizes that although habit was praised for its role in conserving energy 
(for learning and elevated productivity), its pathological and dehumanizing potential was 
also feared (399-400). Debates centre on the question of whether habits are indicative of 
individuality or mechanization; writers on habit question its role in individual and social 
reformation (Vrettos 401-406). Locating Dickens's position in the debate, Vrettos finds 
Dombey and Son to be a complex meditation on habit, which ultimately identifies habit 
as the "central psychological cause of the deadening of humanity in industrial culture" 
( 418). Vrettos's aim is to provide a wider historical context within which to assess 
Dickensian characterization and elucidate the links between discourses of habit and 
developments in nineteenth-century psychological realism. In addition to this important 
historicizing and generic work, I examine Victorian discourses on habit in the context of 
satire. 7 As Brian Connery and Kirk Combe assert, "satire can only gain from the 
resurgence of historicism" (11 ). 
In his recent study of the competing discourses within physiological psychology, 
Rick Ry lance notes "the generalist nature of Victorian intellectual culture" (I). 
Previously, Gillian Beer remarked that in the mid-nineteenth century, "scientists 
habitually infused their sentences with literary allusion" (Open Fields 174); additionally, 
Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth observe the "overwhelming connection 
between Victorian fictional narratives and mental science in the nineteenth century" 
(xiii). As well, influenced by Michel Foucault's view of the nineteenth century as a 
period that witnessed new paradigms of regulation and control of the individual subject, 
Shuttleworth observes Victorian ideologies of self-control as they circulate in the fiction 
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of Charlotte Bronte and George Eliot; their fiction "actively encodes," subverts, and 
contributes to "the language and preoccupations of mid-nineteenth-century social, 
psychological and economic thought" (Eliot 2). The positivist philosophy of Auguste 
Comte suggested that laws governing physiological life could govern social life; such 
organicist notions of science as a source for morality suffused the intellectual and popular 
spheres (Shuttleworth, Eliot 6). The creed of self-improvement, Walter E. Houghton 
observes, "went beyond church walls" and won over secularists (238). Inte1lectual 
radicalism, having been accused of depleting moral life with agnosticism, was especially 
invested in moral notions of self-improvement (Houghton 239). J. S. Mill, for example, in 
Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865), declares the "moral rule prescribed by the religion 
of Humanity" to be the formation of the "habit" of"positive virtue" (10: 339). Alongside 
a scientific model of self-development, economic ideologies of the free agent oflaissez-
faire capitalism spread in a growing body of literature on the value of self-control - the 
habit of which became the "sacrosanct principle of Victorian culture" (Shuttleworth, Eliot 
4-5, 23). For multiple overlapping discourses, habit is a double-edged mechanism of self-
( and social) amelioration or demise; accordingly, it is offered both as a cause of social ills 
worthy of satire or, under what Arnold would call "right reason" and regulation, it is 
offered as anodyne. 
My study of Victorian novelistic satires on habit is articulated from a theoretical 
position which draws substantially upon Bakhtin's sociological theory of the novel. For 
Bakhtin, the novel, specifically the nineteenth-century serio-comic novel, is an inherently 
parodic, multi-voiced, Menippean-inflected genre; it is invested in "laying bare any sort 
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of conventionality" (Holquist 162). Interestingly, Bakhtin's view of parodic, Menippean 
discourse is redolent of Walter Pater's view of the "genuine humourist" in his discussion 
of Charles Lamb in Appreciations ( 1889). Pater proposes that the humourist is gifted with 
a "purged sort of vision" that sees the present generation with the eyes of the future 
generation and can view the relationship of human nature to custom or "external habit" 
( 176). Both critics regard comedic genres as existing to anatomize intellectual creeds and 
social values that have become habitual. Bakhtin's notion of Menippean satire as an 
"ideational" form that poses "ultimate questions" and is highly syncretic (Dostoevsky 
115) corroborates Frye's non-sociological understanding of Menippean satire as a 
heterogeneous genre that merged with the novel but "deals less with people than it does 
mental attitudes" (Anatomy 309). For Bakhtin, laughter is a necessary ingredient in 
subversive discourses which aim to demolish the "habitual matrices" (sosedstva) of both 
literature and society (Discourse 169).8 "Negative" or Juvenalian satire, he holds, is too 
atomizing and nihilistic, unlike the comprehensive, regenerative critique of the 
camivalesque. Importantly, however, Frye's acceptance of negative satire permits a 
continuation of satire's links with Juvenalian satire, which "produc[ es] an elevated, 
tragic, confronting rather than conciliating kind of [text] .... its tones will protest decay 
rather than affirm growth - offering attack more pointed and less forgiving" (W einbrot, 
Alexander Pope xv). Satire, particularly in its vituperative Juvenalian mode, criticizes 
society's power structures; its ironies, more than eliciting laughter, function like 
"intellectual tear gas" (Frye, "Nature" 82), offering only a perverse form of catharsis. 
Drawing on the theories of Frye and Bakhtin, I shall attempt to illuminate (at least with 
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regard to Victorian novelistic satire) a central problem perplexing theorists of satire: If 
satire is inherently conservative, as some have argued, then why is it perennially subject 
to censorship by the official culture? 9 
Satire's disciplinarian function is frequently misread as being inherently 
conservative, for arguably, satire often operates as a "site of resistance to cultural and 
political hegemony" (Connery and Combe 11 ), uncovering spaces of dissension from 
dominant ideology within a given culture. Dustin Griffin repudiates the critical consensus 
that ancient and Augustan satire are "monologic" in their moral discourse, arguing that 
satire generally operates subversively as a rhetoric of inquiry, provocation, and paradox 
(37); this recalls (despite Griffin's reservations about Bakhtin's theory of "the 
menippea") Bakhtin's idea of the novel as "plasticity itself' (Dialogic 39). It is a 
taxonomicaJly elusive genre, like satire, that is ever questing, ever examining itself and 
subjecting its established forms to review" (Dialogic 39). Influenced by such insights, I 
argue that Victorian satires on habit reveal satire's pluralistic possibilities while affirming 
Frye's definition: wit or humour and a target grounded in moral criticism ("Nature" 78). 
Narratives satirizing habit, I argue, expose prevailing ethics to be little more than codified 
habit - recalling that ethics derives from the Greek word ethos, which invokes 
simultaneously "custom" or "character," as a "collection of habitual characteristics" 
(Booth, Company 8). Rather than augment cultural norms, such narratives tend to 
defamiliarize dominant ideology by revealing its reliance on the forces of habit. Habit, 
like ideology, often operates unconsciously within the individual. Satire and 
associationist theory have in common (as Rylance observes of associationism) "the 
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potential to develop a social critique of ideological conditioning" ( 61 ). The Victorian 
anatomization of habit, in many of its Horatian, Juvenalian, and Menippean incarnations, 
tends to sneak past the conservative, moralistic cant of bourgeois ideology. Conversely, 
this satire (in even its milder modes) promotes a sociological, more than essentialist, 
conception of human nature, which transcends Puritan morality - or what Matthew 
Arnold called Hebraising "stock notions and habits" (Culture 6). Instead of engaging in 
priestly moralizing, such satire takes aim at socially constructed humanity. Satire's 
license for transgression is a benefit likely gleaned from the habitual blindness of its 
subjects; as Swift explains, "Satire is a sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally 
discover everybody's face but their own" (Preface, The Battle of the Books (1697] 1). 
Chapter 1 briefly outlines satiric theory from Horace's Apology in Satire 1 to John 
Dryden's A Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of a Satire (1693)- an 
influential articulation of the differences between Horatian and J uvenalian satire. The 
eighteenth-century popularity of Horace - despite the abundance of harsh satire -
continued well into the nineteenth century. Typically, Victorian satire is neglected by 
critics who view realism as being monolithic, and who have, it seems, taken at their word 
protestations against satire by nineteenth-century writers such as Thomas Carlyle, 
Matthew Arnold, and John Ruskin. Many of the period's key novelists (including 
William Thackeray and Anthony Trollope) and leading literary critics, though attracted to 
satire's moral function, resisted what they perceived to be its inherent tendency towards 
untruthfulness, injustice, and lack of sympathy. Satire, especially Juvenalian satire, 
appeared inimical to the project of moral realism. Horatian satire, as it exhibited 
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sympathy and moderation, remained esteemed by writers who otherwise were wary of 
what they regarded as the "bitter malignity" (Sully, Laughter 381) of Juvenalian satire. 
Trollope, for example, defends his idea of the novel as a delightful sermon (with the 
support of many quotations from Horace), renouncing the indignant exaggerations of 
stronger satire. Although Victorian novelists often express a preference for kind humour 
over satire, satire is nonetheless ubiquitously enacted in the period's novelistic discourse. 
I argue that the persistence of satire in the Victorian period is best revealed through the 
lens of both Menippean traditions and the Horatian/Juvenalian dichotomy (an antimony 
that signals the degree of subversive positioning in a given text). Classical forms and 
modalities of satire remain valid models for analyzing the critical and satiric arguments 
of Victorian novels. 
As well, in Chapter 1, I summarize the large-scale generic pronouncements of the 
theorists of the 1950s and 1960s (Alvin Kernan, Edward Rosenheim, and others) and 
relate these to current discussions of satire's instability as a genre. Additionally, I trace a 
common irony in theories of the infamously protean mode or genre: critics repeatedly 
disavow intentions to suggest taxonomies for such a fluid, even pre-generic "mode," but 
proceed to make claims about the essential nature of satire. For example satire, for 
Rosenheim, "laboured unnecessarily" (306) under formal analysis; as satire is not strictly 
a "form," it can be a matter of brief moments in another "species of writing." Yet 
Rosenheim proceeds to offer a definitive feature of "satiric presence": satire "consists of 
an attack by means of a manifest fiction upon discernible historic particulars" (323). Next 
I investigate satire's relationship to the novel in general (Frye, Paulson, Bakhtin, Knight, 
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and Palmeri) and to the Victorian "classic-realist" text in particular, focusing on debates 
about the Menippean tradition and its complex relation to the novel. My insistence that 
Victorian novelistic satire is best illuminated in terms of an overarching target such as 
habit preserves a generic constant of satire: the subject of attack (a particular human trait 
or institution); it also foregrounds the fact that traditions of the realist novel are 
inextricable from those of satire. As Paulson concludes, satire survives in the novel as the 
"pointing finger that directs the reader back into the real world" (Satire 310). 
In Tristram Shandy (1759-67), Laurence Sterne studies "man" as a "creature born 
to habitudes" (354); he locates "hobbyhorsical" and habitual absurdity primarily in 
human physical nature (the animal humours), not in the social organism. Victorian satires 
continue what Paulson terms the "satiric realism" of eighteenth-century novels, adding a 
greater sociological emphasis on the phenomenon of habituation. Chapter 2 therefore 
outlines the various and often paradoxical Victorian discourses (scientific, moral, and 
economic) that inform (and were informed by) the literary understanding of habit. I focus 
on notions of habit generated by the "heterogeneous discursive framework" of emergent 
psychological theory (Ry lance 14 7). Associationist philosophies - traceable to Aristotle 
and developed by John Locke - held that the mind spontaneously links chains of thought. 
In the eighteenth century, David Hartley consolidates this notion with a biological 
argument in Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty and Expectation (1749) that 
states that the repetition of associations creates physical channels in the brain's nerves. 
Victorian physiological physiologists (such as Herbert Spencer, William B. Carpenter, 
Alexander Bain, and George Henry Lewes), following Locke and Hume, emphasize 
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associative notions of impression: the brain and nerves are inscribed by channels or 
pathways of thought made almost indelible by habit. Habit is increasingly represented in 
terms of evolutionary biology, as a product of social practices that have become 
instinctive. Charles Darwin, for example, finds support for agnosticism in his certainty 
that unnatural, "inculcated beliefs" are transmitted in an "inherited effect" 
(Autobiographies 54). I argue that William James's theories of habit, which emphasize its 
physicality and its centrality to education and to self- and social control, encapsulate 
dominant Victorian discourses of habit. Crucially, James argues, like Carpenter, Bain, 
Spencer, and Mill before him, for the potency of the human will in the formation not only 
of habits of self-control and sympathy, but also of anti-habitual habits of thought and 
action which underpin human rationality, free will, and morality; implicitly, such habits 
enable the cultural criticisms of satire. 
Habit also becomes an important site of resistance to what John Ruskin 
disparagingly calls "Economic man" - an automaton created by the soullessness of 
habitual money-getting in an emergent capitalist economy. The human propensity to form 
habits is a concept central to the social, political, and aesthetic thought of Carlyle and 
Ruskin. Furthermore, competing and intermingling economic and scientific discourses on 
habit inform the popular discourses of self- and social control epitomized by Samuel 
Smiles's bestseller Self-Help (1859). I conclude Chapter 2 with a brief assessment of 
Victorian discussions of the relationship of habit to social custom, evaluating the 
importance of a dual notion of habit to John Stuart Mill's social and political ideas, 
particularly his ethological belief that character is freely determined and that, like 
individuals, socio-political institutions need not be habit-bound. 
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Joining the various scientific, philosophical, and economic discussions of habit, 
the period's novelistic satire also investigates habit as the driving force of human 
psychology and society. With varying degrees of Horatian and Juvenalian positioning, 
many Victorian novelists aligned themselves with Thomas Carlyle in protesting the 
worship of mechanism and in the recognition that "[h ]abit is the deepest law of human 
nature. It is our supreme strength; if also, in certain circumstances, our miserablest 
weakness" (Past and Present 1843; 126) - a notion that finds full satiric expression in 
Sartor Resartus (1833-34), a Menippean anatomy of British habit. Chapter 3 investigates 
the paradoxical nature of many satires on habit and offers readings of exemplary texts 
that demonstrate a general shift in the period from Horatian (genial, non-anarchical) hope 
in amelioration to Juvenalian (pessimistic, rebellious) disillusionment. I illustrate this 
trend through a reading of Edward Bulwer-Lytton's earlier novel Pelham (1828), which 
promotes habits of sympathy, in contrast to his vitriolic satire on habit in The Coming 
Race (1871). This anti-utopian satire reflects Bulwer-Lytton's alteration in political 
thought since his radical idealism of the 1820s and 1830s. Christopher Lane convincingly 
argues that this text finds "social acrimony" to be humanity's inescapably definitive 
social state (55). Similar to Bulwer-Lytton's earlier work, however, novels by Gaskell 
and Eliot emphasize the reformative power of "good" habits and the possibility of 
individual and social regeneration through the habit of sympathy. Elizabeth Gaskell's 
Cranford (1851-53) offers an anatomy of habits of gentility that is subtly Menippean. As 
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well, the text partakes of the self-inclusive Horatian tradition, as its narrator playfully 
criticizes the collective "bad" habit of Cranford: insidiously unsympathetic obsession 
with "genteel economy" ( C 8) and comportment. Unbending, ritualistic adherence to 
rules of propriety and an overarching policy of no change is the ethos of the provincial 
town. Similarly, George Eliot's Silas Marner (1861) is a formally multifaceted 
Menippean text that is distinctly Horatian in its sympathy and optimism. To anatomize 
"our own egoism" (SM 75), the narrator/social critic surveys an insular town in which 
parochial habits create a somnambulant mental and moral atmosphere. Silas Mamer, the 
text's central figure of antisocial habit (and a study in the physiological psychology of 
non-materialistic miserliness), reforms into a "healthful state of association" ( 1802 
Preface to Lyrical Ballads 42)-the Wordworthian bedrock of social harmony. Overall, 
Cranford and Silas Marner, as exemplary Horatian and Menippean satires, remonstrate 
against morally and socially destructive habits, while promoting the role of habitual 
sympathy in social cohesion and eventual reform. 
Horatian satires expose social excess, and end with what Paulson describes as the 
conservative "solution of the golden mean, the educated man, and the happy life" 
(Fictions 58). Juvenalian satires, on the other hand, identify immovable habits of egotism 
and the blind adherence to custom as recalcitrant causes of society's moral insolvency. 
Turning to texts that are Juvenalian in their skepticism about the redemptive possibility of 
habit, I assess Samuel Butler's The Way of All Flesh (written between 1873 and 1884, 
published 1903) and George Gissing's New Grub Street (1891) as satires that outline the 
dehumanizing effect of what Butler calls the "inveteracy of habit" (Notebooks 187), 
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specifically the inveteracy of automatic assent to dominant ideology. Both texts are 
inflected with Juvenalian dissent and pessimism; thus, they emphasize the tragic effects 
of social constraint. 10 Also demonstrating that Juvenalian satire is more certain than 
Horatian satire of the moral bankruptcy of habit and custom, The Way of All Flesh 
advocates the habit of free-thinking, but is doubtful about the possibility of acquiring 
such a rarefied practice. Butler's novel demythologizes Protestant bourgeois morality, 
along with other habitual matrices of received thought, but reveals that a counter-system 
of physiological determinism, due to the indomitability of habit, offers little in the way of 
general social redemption. Similarly, New Grub Street anatomizes English society in a 
manner that is redolent of Frye's sixth level of satire, which "presents human life in terms 
of largely unrelieved bondage" (Anatomy 162). The commercialized landscape of this 
"realist" text is as despotically inescapable as any fantastic dystopia; its despairing 
protagonists engage in constant, but fruitless, Menippean colloquy- as seedy habits 
cannot be refashioned. I argue that Gissing targets habit as an amoral force killing artistic 
and moral imagination, both in literature and in life. 
Although critics are generally uncertain of Dickens's intellectual qualifications, 
resist the commingling of satire and the novel (a mixture promoted by Dickens in his 
prefaces), and continue to disavow the magnitude of his engagement with satiric 
traditions, Chapter 4 explores Dickens's "extreme habit of satire" (Chesterton, Chesterton 
on Dickens 96). Given that Dickens's satire on habit becomes increasingly Juvenalian, 
and therefore extravagant in its metaphors, I trace the cornucopia of recurring motifs 
delineating habits of perception in Hard Times (1854), Bleak House (1852-53), and Our 
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Mutual Friend ( 1864-65). Even Dickens's most overtly Menippean satire, Hard Times -
an attack on Utilitarian philosophies - operates mainly through metaphoric criticism of 
habitual routine. Coketown' s machines and Utilitarian reformers are represented as being 
equally monotonous and antithetical to humanity. Bleak House, steeped in political and 
social contemporaneity, satirizes the destructive ideologies and infrastructures which 
carve correspondingly pathological grooves in the individual mind. Despite its Horatian 
elements, the text's anatomy of habit (traceable in metaphors of illness, darkness, 
paralyzed gazes, and caged birds) reveals a "bitterly satirical truth" (BH 201) about the 
disabling tendencies of habit. In Our Mutual Friend, the inescapability of bad habit is 
represented primarily through a sequence of cannibalic Juvenalian feasts, and through 
mirror imagery that reflects the precariousness of moral transformation in a solipsistic 
materialist society. Regardless of Dickens's personal politics -Andrew Sanders defines 
his politics as "no-nonsense, middle-class, middle-brow radicalism" (Charles Dickens 
51) - his later novels evince, through their metaphorical condemnation of habit, a 
satirical irreverence for England's mechanisms of social control. 
In Chapter 5, questions of genre are related to those of gender and habit. From 
Juvenal's sixth Satire to Jonathan Swift's expressions of animosity, satire contains a long 
tradition of misogyny. There remains, however, an astounding gap in satire theory 
regarding feminist satire, and Victorian novelistic feminist satire is no exception. For 
example, the expressly satiric machinery of novels such as Shirley (1849) and 
Middlemarch (1871-72) have been only cursorily examined. Keeping in mind that 
Victorian psychologists frequently ascribed to women, more than to men, the 
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mechanizing tendencies of habit, I explore Bronte's and Eliot's criticism of how 
patriarchal ideology exposes gendered identity as being largely habit-based. Shirley -
written by Bronte in her determination to engage in social satire after the manner of 
Thackeray - explores, in frequently Menippean terms, the connections between literary, 
theological, and political habits of misogyny. Caroline Helstone's bitter social criticism 
results from the near-fatal ennui of being a vocationless middle-class woman. Through 
the liberating friendship between Caroline and her intellectual compeer, the Horatian 
Shirley Keeldar, Shirley satirizes and subverts masculinist social and literary custom. 
Middlemarch presents habitual adherence to codes of gender as a mentally and morally 
corrosive addiction, encouraged by the social medium. For Lydgate's sexism is culturally 
contracted: "he walked by hereditary habit" (M 327). The resiliently Horatian narrator, 
though self-inclusively attuned to the vanity of all human beings, in company with the 
text's internal satirists (Mary Garth and Mrs Cadwallader), is intent upon reforming 
enculturated masculine vanity. 
Throughout the Victorian period, Horatian attempts to redeem habit by harnessing 
its power for the cultivation of sympathy were countered by Juvenalian satirists who 
predominantly assailed habit for its unsettling ability to naturalize custom into instinct. 
Bulwer-Lytton's disillusioned narrator of The Coming Race is informed by a Vril-yan: 
'"We are all formed by custom - even the difference of our race from the savage is but 
the transmitted continuance of custom, which becomes, through hereditary descent, part 
and parcel of our nature"' (CR 107). Compelled ethically by this alarming but liberating 
realization, and by the "familiar fact, the power of habit" (Mill I 0: 238), Victorian 
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novelists wrote satire that was no less authentic in its deployment of satiric traditions, and 
no less exploratory, indignant, and subversive, than the celebrated satire of other periods 
in literary history. 
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Chapter 1 
The Endless Defense: A Brief History of Satire Theory from Ancient Rome 
to the Twenty-First Century 
[S]atire is problematic, open-ended, essayistic, ambiguous in its relationship to history, 
uncertain in its political effect, resistant to formal closure, more inclined to ask questions 
than to provide answers. (Dustin Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction 5) 
[T]he Victorian reader was not particularly fond of satire, but in fact he got a good deal of 
it from his novelists. (James Sutherland, English Satire 123) 
How did the critical commonplace emerge that Victoria's England was, in 
Humbert Wolfe's words, a "satiric desert" (134)? Satire's "deplorable decline" (Walker 
279) in the nineteenth century has been lamented by early twentieth-century critics such 
as Chauncey C. Loomis and James Sutherland, and by twenty-first-century critics such as 
Frank Palmeri, who maintains that "narrative satire underwent a period of eclipse by 
other forms" ("Narrative Satire" 361). 11 My first task is to trace in brief the debate-filled, 
labyrinthine history of satire, both as a genre and as a mode, from ancient Greece and 
Rome to its reputed "golden age" in Augustan England, through to its dwindling presence 
in the Romantic period. After assessing the apologetic satires of its earliest practitioners, I 
focus on two pivotal articulations of satire theory: what C. A. Van Rooy names the 
Varro-Diomedes etymological definition, and John Dryden's influential definition in "A 
Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire" ( 1692), which consolidates 
and augments both ancient notions of the didactic function of satire, and the centuries-old 
comparison between Horatian satire (genial rebuke of folly and vice) and Juvenalian 
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satire (ireful declamation against vice). Both definitions emphasize satire's moral 
prerogative. A whirlwind summary of satire's etymology and genealogy is necessary to 
situate an exploration of the Victorian redeployment of ancient satire - Horatian, 
Juvenalian, and Menippean. As Mikhail Bakhtin observes, "the historical life of classic 
works is in fact the uninterrupted process of their social and ideological re-accentuation" 
(Dialogic 420). I suggest several key reasons (other than critical habit) for an entrenched 
bias against Victorian satire - specifically, novelistic satire. First, there has been a general 
acceptance that early nineteenth-century and Victorian comic theory offers a reliable 
litmus test of the period's satiric-novelistic practice. Second, the state of satire theory is, 
in general, turbulent; as Dustin Griffin argues, the theories of the 1950s and 1960s have 
not been easily updated - especially by critics who wish to complicate or (rather 
problematically) to purge satire's association with moralism. Another factor contributing 
to the persistent neglect of Victorian novelistic satire is the dominance (until recently) of 
monologic theories of "classic realism," which occlude satirical elements from critical 
notice. As well, satire's interfusion with the equally multifarious genre of the novel is 
fraught with debates about generic and modal classifications. Discussions centre on 
Northrop Frye and Mikhail Bakhtin's universalizing claims about Menippean satire and 
the question of the applicability of their theories to such an all-engulfing genre as the 
novel. Many critics (for example, Gary Dyer) simply abandon the search for generic links 
between satire and the novel because they find it radically unclear where the demarcation 
between Menippean (or prose) satire and the novel can be made. 
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1.i Satire's Protean Reputation: Ancient, Elizabethan, and Augustan 
Conceptions and Defenses of Satire 
Repeatedly debated in studies of classical satire is the question of which author (if 
any) should be credited as the originator of satiric writing, and to what degree, or when 
(if ever), satire legitimately claims generic as opposed to modal status. It is a convention 
of critics of satire (extending to the twenty-first century) to complain of its generic 
ineffability while simultaneously endorsing a working definition of characteristic satiric 
form and content. The earliest grammarians and writers on satire debated its literary 
status, etymology, and the relative merits of its key practitioners. Kirk Freudenburg aptly 
observes that the definition of what satire is "has embarrassed professional scholars since 
antiquity"; it even befuddled the "ancient satirists themselves" (Satires of Rome 2). 
Typically, the adjectives "metamorphic" and "protean" are applied to satire (Kennedy 
299). Even Marie Claire Randolph's essay "The Structural Design of the Formal Verse 
Satire" (1942) - which argues for its rigorous bipartite structure - begins with an 
evocation of the mercurial nature of the "genus Satire": "Fluid and elusive as mercury, 
the Satiric Spirit almost refuses to be bound by any rigid tenets but easily flows into and 
fuses itself (especially in periods when it encounters episcopal and legal opposition) with 
other essentially or even temporarily congenial genres" (171). Nonetheless, Randolph and 
others continue to participate in the ancient tradition of attempting to sort out satire's 
wayward genealogy. "Puzzling and pontificating about satire" (Henderson 316) appears 
to be the perennial duty of satirists and critics alike. 
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C. A. Van Rooy's influential 1965 study of classical satire (an authority to which 
Dustin Griffin, Kirk Freudenburg, and other recent scholars constantly refer) explores the 
locus classicus for definitions of satire. Van Rooy posits that Diomedes, a fourth-century 
CE grammarian, drew on earlier sources in his Ars Grammatica for an etymological 
elucidation of satire. Diomedes's awareness of satire's reputation for multiplicity is 
partially gleaned from Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 BCE), whose De Compositione 
Saturarum is not extant (Van Rooy 1-3). Van Rooy refers to the multivalent meaning of 
satura as the "Varro-Diomedes definition," which includes (in the order stipulated in the 
Ars Grammatica) several possible meanings for satire: either the notion that satura is 
derived from satyroi or satyri because it is a poem that is as unruly as the Greek satyr 
plays 12; or that it derives from satura (the Latin feminine singular of satus, meaning full), 
which relates to the lanx satura, a platter full with a variety of fruits to be offered to the 
gods; or that satura is related to a kind of stuffing or farcimen; or finally, that it derives 
from the legal satury (one bill encompassing multiple provisions) (Van Rooy 1-17). In 
this summary of the varied meanings, satire's multiplicity is emphasized. Van Rooy 
translates Diomedes's influential definition of satire as follows: "Satura is the name of a 
verse composition amongst the Romans. At present certainly it is defamatory and 
composed to carp at human vices in the manner of the Old (Greek) Comedy: this type of 
satire was written by Lucilius, Horace, and Persius. Previously, however, saturae was the 
name of a composition in verse consisting of miscellaneous poems, such as Pacuvius and 
Ennius wrote" (xiii). The Roman poet Ennius (239-169 BCE) is credited with being the 
first to use word satura to mean literary medley; fittingly, his Saturae is a collection of 
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poems of varying forms and content (Van Rooy 19-20), which were modeled on Greek 
works (Freudenburg, "Intro" 2). Moreover, Van Rooy classifies Ennius's poems as satiric 
in the sense that they are moralizing; they mock "harmful types in society" (33). 
Authoritative notions of satire's miscellaneousness and moral ethos derive from this 
ancient definition. 
A century after Varro, Quintilian (c.35-c.96 CE), the Roman theorist of rhetoric, 
famously claims (in the tenth book of his Jnstitutio Oratoria), "satura quidem tota nostra 
est" ("satire, at least/if nothing else is tota11y ours" [qtd. in Freudenburg, "Intro" 2]. His 
proclamation dismisses Ennius and ignores the influence of old Greek comedy (Muecke 
33). 13 As G. L. Hendrickson notes, Quintilian patriotically endorses a definition of satire 
as a special type of Roman literature created by Lucilius and fixed by a series of 
canonical writers ( 48). Hendrickson posits that Quintilian does not deny satire its status 
as a word denoting moral criticism (after the manner of Aristophanes), but wishes to 
assert that the Greeks did not create a fixed form for satiric expression. Indeed, satire as a 
mode is found in an assortment of Greek literary genres from iambic poetry to Cynic 
diatribe (Muecke 34). 14 Quintilian not only downplays the influence of old Comedy to 
assert Roman satiric singularity, but, Griffin adds, he sidelines another Greek satiric 
form, Menippean satire (9). Although the Greek cynic Menippus' s satire (characterized 
by its mixture of prose and verse) has vanished, its generic possibilities were carried 
forward by his Roman imitator, Varro, who wrote one hundred and fifty books of Saturae 
Menippeae (Van Rooy 55-6). Hendrickson, with Van Rooy, regards satire in all its Greek 
and Roman versions "as an instrument of reform in the battle against human vice and sin" 
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(Hendrickson 40)-akin to moral philosophy. Griffin posits that Diomedes's definition of 
satire led to an emphasis on satire's moral function that "dominates satiric theory from 
the Renaissance into the mid-twentieth century" ( 10). In essentially all of its 
etymological, generic, and modal incarnations, therefore, satire is associated with 
miscellany and moral criticism. 
In Quintilian's view, Gaius Lucilius (168-102 BCE) is satire's true primogenitor. 
Approvingly, Kirk Freudenburg assesses the Lucilian legacy: 
No two satirists produce the same list of models. In fact the only constant 
explicitly named on all the lists produced by Horace, Persius, and Juvenal 
is Lucilius. Naming him is thus not simply a cataloguing cue, it is a genre-
constituting act. For in a genre so loose in its habits, ... we know that we 
have 'it' only when the satirist says ... 'I'm writing satire now. You know, 
the kind of thing that Lucilius wrote.' ("Intro" 14) 
Although Lucilius did not select dactylic hexameter as his primary meter until his 
thirtieth satire, 15 it thereafter became the definitive meter for all verse satire by virtue of 
its ability to accommodate epic parody (Muecke 39-41 ). Lucilius's satire contains 
autobiography, literary polemic, philosophical erudition, and speculation (Muecke 39); its 
"essential function" is moral censure (Van Rooy 51 ). 16 Van Rooy finds the "Lucilian 
medley" to be aggressively political and topical in its parody of religious and 
philosophical debates (52-3). Freudenburg concurs that Lucilius's aggressive free speech 
(libertas) became the hallmark of the genre; he adds that it was also "a key defining 
feature of an elite, male self' (Satires of Rome 3). Importantly, Frances Muecke notes 
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that Roman satire, given its lower literary status and reputation for offensiveness, was 
always a self-conscious and "inherently controversial genre" (34 ). In Book 26 of 
Lucilius's first work of satire, the fictionalized poet defends (to a friend) his right to 
criticize Roman society (Van Rooy 14 7); this dramatic defense becomes a trope of future 
satires and the "the peg for generic self-definition" (Muecke 42). 
Yet, just when there appears to be a secure form (dactylic hexameter) to embody 
the satiric tradition from Lucilius onwards, satiric writers complicate matters. Quintus 
Horatius Flaccus (65-8 BCE), for example, spread his satire over multiple forms (formal 
verse satire, epistles, and epodes) and thus "made the job of generic classification and 
definition more difficult" (Griffin 9). Satire's narrative in antiquity could be summarized 
as follows: it functioned as a mode in Greek literature, became a Roman genre, and, 
never having lost its modal flexibility, sporadically changed back to a mode again. 
Horace refashions Lucilius's satire by outlining how his own style differs from 
that of the famous poet. Horace's persona is that of a humble poet and civil servant in the 
house of Maecenas, who, unlike the aristocratic Lucilius, is not impervious to retaliation 
(Gowers 48-49). To give a "reconfigurative shake" to the genre (Freudenburg, Satires of 
Rome 39), Horace wrote three programmatic satires: Satires 4 and 10 of Book I, and 
Satire 1 of Book II. Satire 4 is a dramatic dialogue (between the poet and his friend) 
explaining why he is compelled to write satire - a kind of poetry that many find ill-
natured. Luci Ii us, the speaker observes, derives his noble goal of moral censorship from 
Old Attic Comedy, but unfortunately, his poetry is formally and thematically excessive. 
His poems are "muddy" and "overstuffed"; basically, Horace charges Lucilius with 
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sloppiness and bad editing (1.4.11 ). He proposes that his own style is less grand, "a style 
rather close to prose" (1.4.42) - he is not even sure if it is genuine poetry. 17 To mark his 
opposition to Luc iii us further, Horace vows to avoid nasty, personal invective (1.4.101-2). 
Instead, his gentler method will emulate parental wisdom: "My good father gave me the 
habit; to warn me off/he used to point out various vices by citing examples" (1.4.106-7). 
Horace then vows to continue his "habit" of writing satire (1.4.140). In Satire 10, Horace 
implores his audience to agree that Lucilius lacks poetic excellence and is too harsh in his 
censure. Contrastingly, Horace promotes himself as an advocate of restraint and reserve 
both in writing and in moralizing anger; he insists that humour "is often stronger/ and 
more effective than sharpness in cutting knotty issues" (I. l 0.14-15). 
Satire I of Book II contains yet another justification for why Horace continues to 
write satire - this time in the form of a conversation with the celebrated lawyer Trebatius 
Testa. Horace, the speaker, claims to be a follower of Lucilius (1.3.34), one who wielded 
his pen as sword and "indicted the foremost citizens and the whole populace" (1.2.68-9), 
but Horace promises to use his pen in self-defense alone; in this way he hopes to avoid 
the ills of personal abuse. Van Rooy affirms that Horace (fairly true to his word) satirized 
only unimportant people by name, dwelling instead on discussions of human nature (Van 
Rooy 62, Gowers 51 ). The Horatian persona of a self-parodying "imperfect moralist" is a 
"composite of comic types - the cowed son, the parasite, [and] the slipshod, bumbling 
Cynic philosopher" (Gowers 55). Generally, Horace's his favorite satiric theme is selfish 
and sensual ambition: "there are certain people, you see, who detest this kind of writing,/ 
for most men deserve a scolding. Pick anyone you like/ from a crowd: he's plagued with 
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avarice or else the disease of ambition" (1.4.23-26). Emily Gowers nominates Horace's 
signature phrase (denoting his satiric ethic of moderation) as being, "That's enough now" 
(57). She stresses the delicacy of Horace's position as a self-made man in a moderate 
political atmosphere trying to write satire; effectively, his programmatic satires position 
him prudently as a genial satirist who redresses Lucilius's stylistic and moralistic 
harshness. 
The next widely-recognized satirist after Horace is Au1us Persius F1accus (34-62 
BCE). Persius professes to fo11ow the Lucilian idea] of derisive satire, but his poems are 
more like Stoic sermons (Van Rooy 73-74). Freudenburg and other classicists speculate 
that it was too dangerous to write overt satire under Nero, thus Persius's satires do not 
contain overt allusion to contemporary politics, focusing instead on generalities about 
human nature (Satires of Rome 125, Cucchiareli 76). 18 Possibly as a result of John 
Dryden's condemnation of Persius as unworthy of comparison to Horace or Juvenal - his 
satire is dismissed as being too obscure (out of fear of Nero) and un-poetic (Dialogue 
118-119) - Persius's satiric legacy has had relatively less impact on the evolution of 
satire than that of Horace or Juvenal. 
Decimus Iunius Juvenalis (c.55-c.135 CE) defines "the primary impulses of 
Horatian satire by ruthlessly departing from them" (Burrow 245). Praising Lucilius's high 
style and combative ethos, Juvenal enthusiastically figures the older poet as the hero of 
satire, wielding his pen like a powerful sword: "when fiery Lucilius rages with satire's 
naked sword I His hearers go red; their conscience is cold with crime" (1.166). Juvenal 
regards satire as a high form (like rhetorical declamation) and not as Horace positioned it 
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- as a prosaic, self-parodying form. Invested in an impersonal, objective voice like that of 
the epic, Juvenal's satire takes the form of an '"epic' rant" (Barchiesi and Cucchiarelli 
220). Ronald Paulson finds that compared with Horace's "admonitory and subjective" 
mode, Juvenal's satire is "presentational and objective" (Fictions 29). Horace addresses 
fellow fools, whereas Juvenal implicitly addresses the virtuous (Paulson, Fictions 29). Of 
his satires - unlike Horace, Juvenal did not write odes or epistles - Satire I contains his 
most polemical justification for the necessity of writing satire. Further differentiating 
himself from Horace, he does not thematize and defend his style of satire. He is so 
outraged about Rome's epidemic of vice that he appears unconcerned about writing 
literary exhortations on satiric methodologies. After complaining of the inanity of epics 
in a world empty of heroes, he claims that satire is the only mode of culturally viable 
truth-telling. Thus, Juvenal commands rather than defends the writing of satire: 
Who can sleep easy today? If your greedy daughter-in-law 
Is not being seduced for cash, it'll be your bride: mere schoolboys 
Are adulterers now. Though talent be wanting, yet 
Indignation will drive me to verse, such as I - or any scribbler -
May still command. All human endeavours, men's prayers, 
Fears, angers, pleasures, joys and pursuits, these make 
The mixed mash of my verse. 
When has the purse 
Of greed yawned wider? When was gambling more frantic 
Than it is today? (1.77-90) 
As this passage demonstrates with its surfeit of rhetorical questions and catalogue of 
rampant vice, Juvenal opposes his satire implicitly with the reticent ')ust enough" of 
Horace (both in form and content). Angry hyperbole aligns Juvenal's satire with that of 
Lucilius. Broadly speaking, Juvenal's "farrago" or "mixed mash" serves the passionate 
ethical function of assailing vice - particularly, the hypocrisy and material and sensual 
excesses of Rome's elite citizenry. Moral outrage without restraint is Juvenal's satiric 
modus operandi. 19 
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Van Rooy argues that in the third century, verse satire is no longer a living genre 
(168). After Juvenal, satire follows a confusing path of occasional rebirth, or as Bakhtin 
would say, reaccentuation. The first use of the word satyricus to denote a satirist is found 
in the work of scholar Pomponius Porphyrion (third century CE). Increasingly, as 
Christian apologists (such as St. Jerome) write satirical prose, from the fourth century to 
the seventh, there is a tendency to derive satura from satyroi (Van Rooy 171 ). This 
tendency culminates in the assumption by Elizabethan and Renaissance scholars and 
satirists alike that satire was derived from satyr and thus was a necessarily obscene genre, 
much like the mythological beast in Greek satyr-plays. Critics of medieval theories of 
satire have argued that satire in the Middle Ages - particularly in the writings of Geoffrey 
Chaucer and Piers Plowman - was singularly unshaped by classical traditions; works 
criticizing vice could be described only informally as "satiric." Following John Peter's 
1956 study, the argument that satire truly emerged only in the sixteenth century, after the 
rediscovery of Latin precedents, has been contested by critics such as Ben Parsons, who 
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acknowledges that "the ancient satirists were widely studied in the grammar schools and 
universities" of the period (Parsons 105-6).20 Interestingly, though, if Latin medieval 
satires acknowledge classical models, they tend to disavow the indignant anger associated 
with Juvenalian texts (Kendrick 52). Both Thomas Lodge's Defence of Poetry (1579) and 
George Puttenham's Arte of English Poesie (1589) link satire to satyrs and urge 
practitioners to do the same (Griffin I 0). Alvin Kernan, in his study of Renaissance satire 
from 1590 to 1620, asserts that bitterness and invective were thought to characterize both 
satyrs and satire, and thus Juvenal, not Horace, was favoured for imitation (64-65). The 
rhetorical tradition of positioning Horace and Juvenal as competing antimonies is 
inaugurated in this period. 21 
Counterbalancing the fact that satire was an ill-defined term, Horace and Juvenal 
became a "centre of reference" (Elkin 34) for critics of the genre. John Marston (1575-
1656), Joseph Hall (1574-1656), and Thomas Middleton (1580-1627) associated 
themselves more with Juvenal than Horace (Burrow 248). Yet as Howard Weinbrot 
argues, even Horace's satire was styled as Juvenalian; for example, Thomas Drant's 1566 
translation of Horace's satires represents him as a biting satirist (Alexander Pope 5-6). 
Late Elizabethan satirists were anxious about satire's status as literature; their satire was 
aggressively topical in its subject matter (Burrow 249-50). Hall's forceful satires on 
contemporary abuses led to the genre being banned in June 1599 by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the Bishop of London, who ordered that no satires (or epigrams) be 
printed (Burrow 253). The preference for Juvenalian aggression and moral outrage did 
not diminish after 1660, for John Oldman and Robert Gould continued the traditions of 
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Marston and Hall (Weinbrot, Pope 9-10).22 It is a testimony to the capaciousness of 
satura/satire that from the early sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, satire 
accommodated a misguided etymology (from satyr) and was modeled almost exclusively 
on the Juvenalian ethos of ferocious disdain. It is clear that alongside the farraginous 
quality of satire, moral indignation was construed as a generic constant. 
A central text in Renaissance theory of satire is Isaac Casaubon' s De Satyrica 
Graecorum poesi & Romanorum satira (1605). Casaubon is credited with disentangling 
the etymological error of attributing satire to the Greek satyr instead of the Latin satura 
(Weinbrot, Pope 13). Casaubon found Juvenal and Horace to be equal in quality, but their 
achievement was disputed by two camps: Nicolas Rigault (rejecting Horace in preference 
for Juvenal), and Julius C. Scaliger, Andre Dacier, and Daniel Heinsius (rejecting Juvenal 
in preference for Horace) (Griffin 13-14). John Henderson effectively contextualizes this 
dispute: "the genre of satire breeds bouts of dialectical positioning in terms of polarity 
between Horace and Juvenal" (310). As well, Charles Martindale notes that from the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth century, when "Roman verse satire was regularly translated 
and imitated" and propagated throughout Europe, Horace and Juvenal constituted a 
"mutually defining pair" (287).23 Howard Weinbrot concurs that comparisons between 
Horace and Juvenal were a convention of the Renaissance and later seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century theories of classical satire (Pope 129); the result was a definitive 
polarity between the "drolling" and "hectoring" modes (Pope 130). Continuing this 
fixation on a Horatian/ Juvenalian binary, John Dryden's "A Discourse Concerning the 
Original and Progress of Satire" (1692) ambitiously attempts the impossible: to "give the 
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definition and character of true satires" - an aim that is cautiously reduced to an attempt 
to "describe if not define the nature of that poem" (Dryden 78, 95). Cannily, Dryden 
begins his defense of satire by arguing (against Aristotle's notion of the generic 
preeminence of tragedy) for the epic's superiority to tragedy; next, he honorifically 
designates satire as a "species" of poetry related to epic (82). 
Significantly, before launching his disquisition on Horace and Juvenal, Dryden 
defines "another kind" of satire descended from the ancients: "'Tis that which we call the 
Varronian Satire, but which Varro himself calls the Menippean, because 
Varro .. .imitated, in his works, the manners ofMenippus the Gadarenian" (113). The 
latter, he explains, mixes prose and verse, and Latin with Greek, and various philosophies 
(114). Dryden identifies the distinctive quality of Varronian/Menippean satire as its 
variousness of subject, and outlines a tradition for prose satire that includes Lucian's 
dialogues and the works of Apuleius, Seneca, and Erasmus. Dustin Griffin finds that 
Dryden diminishes Menippean satire as being less important than the formal satire (which 
is his main theme), yet Dryden places his own "Absalom and Achitophel" (1681) and 
"Mac Flecknoe" in this tradition (115).24 
Dryden reinforces Casaubon's notion that two elements constitute Roman satire: 
"moral doctrine" and "well-mannered wit" (122). The essential function of satire is "the 
scourging of vice and the exhortation to virtue," for "Satire is of the nature of moral 
philosophy, as being instructive" (122). To reinforce this claim, Dryden quotes from his 
preface to "Absalom and Achitophel": "The true end of satire is the amendment of vices 
by correction. And he who writes honestly is no more an enemy to an offender than the 
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physician to the patient when he prescribes harsh remedies to an inveterate disease" 
(114). Dryden admits that although Horace is "perpetually moral" (128), Juvenal pursues 
a more noble aim: the lashing of vice (129). Juvenal is also a more "delightful" author to 
read (127): "his expressions are sonorous and more noble" and sublime. Horace's "low 
style," by contrast, is often "groveling" and lacking in manly vigour (130-131 ). 
Importantly, Dryden deems Juvenal's satire to be admirably masculine because it is 
strongly political: Juvenal "has more of the commonwealth genius" which fights against 
tyranny, whereas Horace is "a temporizing poet, a well-mannered Court slave" (132). 
Dryden does concede that Horace's era (under Augustus Caesar) was not characterized 
by the "enormous vices" which demand a satirist to be as virile and vengeful as Juvenal. 
In his aesthetic discussion of ideal satiric form, Dryden offers a recipe for "true," "manly 
satire" (14 7). Paradoxically, satire's etymological connotations of variety are preserved in 
Dryden's definition, despite his ideal structural prescription for formal verse satire: "unity 
of theme, or subject" (146). The satirist ought to caution against one vice/folly and 
explicate on precept of moral virtue (146).25 Ultimately, Dryden's polemical project is 
nothing less than to win for satire its true status as high art - as moral art.26 
Dryden's "Discourse" influenced critics and practitioners alike and became the 
most important English discussion of formal verse satire (Weinbrot, Formal 59-60, 65). 
Thomas Warton's The History of English Poetry (1774-81) finds in Elizabethan satire the 
same pattern of attacking a central vice and praising of its opposite (Weinbrot, Formal 
74); there are allusions to the "Discourse" by Richard Addison, Sir Richard Blackmore, 
John Dennis, and Samuel Johnson (Weinbrot, Formal 68-9).27 For eighteenth-century 
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writers, the "Discourse" consolidated the didactic, aesthetic, and moral function of satire. 
Furthermore, Dryden's insistence that Horace excelled in comic satire and Juvenal in 
tragic was widely accepted (W einbrot, Eighteenth Century 7). Hearkening back to the 
Varro-Diomedes definition, Dryden preserves notions of satire's variegated nature 
(accepting both its prose and verse incarnations), while simultaneously promoting it as an 
artistically unified genre that is morally motivated. Significantly, Dryden politicizes the 
Horatian/Juvenalian dichotomy, aligning Juvenal with bold subversion and Horace with 
sycophancy. Dryden's view of Juvenal as the more bravely political of the two has been 
recently undermined by Kirk Freudenburg, who argues that Juvenal's satire was 
unabashedly located in the recent and remote past (it was not written under Domitian) 
and is therefore not defiantly political and Lucilian (Satires of Rome 212-213).28 Yet, 
regardless of whether or not Dryden's assessment of Juvenal and Horace is accurate, his 
judgment of each satirist held literary authority. Similarly, although Griffin criticizes 
Dryden's theory as being "distinctly partial and polemical," for having limited 
application to the practicing satirists of his day, and for being weighted against prose 
satire, he agrees that it exerted an "extraordinary influence on subsequent theoretical 
thinking about satire, both in the age immediately following Dryden and in the mid-
twentieth century as well" (14-15). 
Similar to Dryden's "Discourse," much satiric theory in the eighteenth century 
was a defensive reaction to attacks made on the genre's morals, motives, and literary 
status (Griffin 24). P. K. Elkin posits that as a result, the milder satire of Horace was 
celebrated over that of Juvenal in the Augustan period (16, 146). Alexander Pope's 
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poems, for example, were considered an imitatio Horatii (Elkin 3). Howard Weinbrot, 
however, finds this position too simplistic, arguing that Pope is a "synthesizing satirist" 
(Pope 4) who looked to Lucilius, Horace, Juvenal, and Persius as models - after the 
manner of Nicholas Boileau,29 who combined notions of each of the classical satirists 
(Pope 5). Furthermore, Pope's contemporaries often perceived his satires to be 
Juvenalian (Weinbrot, Pope xv). According to Weinbrot, Pope adapted Horatian devices 
(but not necessarily values) because they were well-suited to his political aim of 
criticizing the Whig ministry in the 1730s (Pope 43). Yet, Weinbrot categorizes "An 
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot" as being Juvenalian, for it "lacks the community of values 
between satirist and monarch essential for the solid base of the Horatian epistle and 
satire" (Pope 240).30 Vincent Carretta explains Pope's strategic assumption of a Horatian 
persona in his translation of Horace's first satire (of the second book), published in 1733 
at Henry Bolingbroke's suggestion (93). Horace's opposition of court and country values 
offers an ideal analogy for Tory satirists. After the manner of Horace, Pope's poetic 
persona defends his satiric practice to his lawyer and declares that his poems will focus 
on actions, not men (95). Yet despite his Horatian pledge to avoid personal abuse, Pope, 
as Carretta points out, proceeds to name names (such as Sir Robert for Walpole) (102). 
As well, the poem ends bereft of Horatian gaiety (Carretta I 03). 31 
Pope's 1735 "Advertisement" for his Satires and Epistles of Horace Imitated 
(1733) appeals to the authority of both Horace and John Donne, who were accepted by 
the "Princes and Ministers under whom they lived," and warns against the foolishness of 
"mistaking a Satyrist for a Libeller; whereas to a true Satyrist nothing is so odious as a 
Libeller" (212). In the imitation of the first satire of Horace's second book, Pope's 
fictionalized lawyer warns that the poet's life will be shortened by his desire to write 
satire; Pope replies with what amounts to a promise to engage in personal satire: 
What? arm'd for Virtue when I point the Pen, 
Brand the bold Front of shameless, guilty Men, 
Hear this, and tremble! you, who 'scape the Laws. 
Yes, while I live, no rich or noble knave 
Shall walk the World, in credit, to his grave. (105-6, 118-20) 
Pope too evinces a Juvenalian interest in naming names. In the Epilogue to the Satires 
(l 738), "Dialogue II," he zealously defends the noble necessity of specific as well as 
general satire: 
Yes, I am proud; I must be proud to see 
Men not afraid of God, afraid of me: 
Safe from the Bar, the Pulpit, and the Throne, 
Yet touch' d and sham' d by Ridicule alone. 
0 sacred Weapon! left for Truth's defence, 
Sole Dread of Folly, Vice, and Insolence! 
To all but Heav'n-directed hands deny'd, 
The Muse may give thee, but the Gods must guide. 
Rev'rent I touch thee! but with honest zeal; 
To rowze the Watchmen of the Publick Weal[.] (208-217) 
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Like Juvenal before him, Pope declares more than he defends satire as his god-given 
right. Thomas Lockwood finds that the tradition of satiric apologia - the negotiation with 
satire's critics that Lucilius inaugurated - is exemplified, not only in Pope's "Arbuthnot," 
but also in Jonathan Swift's "Verses on the Death of Dr Swift" (1731) (21). Both 
"apologetic set pieces" reveal culturally current anxieties about the ability of satire to 
serve the public interest (Lockwood 34), and both stage a moral defense of the genre. 
Swift's cynical and self-elegiac poem offers the various subjective viewpoints of his 
friends whom he imagines meditating on his career - after his death. In their mixed 
reactions to his works, there is the occasional defense of his satiric ethos. One friend 
writes: 
As for his Works in Verse or Prose, 
I own myself no judge of those: 
Nor can I tell what critics thought 'em; 
But this I know, all people bought 'em, 
As with a moral view design' d 
To cure the vices of mankind. (Swift 308-313) 
The absence of the satirist persona from the poem places Swift's claim that he is a satirist 
and not a libeler in the legitimizing voice of a critic: 
Perhaps I may allow, the Dean 
Had too much satire in his vein, 
And seemed determin 'd not to starve it, 
Because no age could more deserve it. 
But malice never was his aim; 
He lash' d the vice, but spared the name. 
No individual could resent 
Where thousands equally were meant. ( 455-62) 
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Ironically, in the same poem Sir Robert Walpole and Colly Cibber are implicated by 
name - a Juvenalian tactic. Paulson speculates that Swift's persona became less and less 
Horatian and shifted to the Juvenalian one of "ethical hero" (Fictions 207). The 
contradictions within Swift's poem reveal a critically current tension between the practice 
of satiric propriety (regarding personal abuse) and the more general moral duty of satire 
"to cure the vices of mankind." This poem certainly contributes to what Elkin observes as 
the "considerable body of theoretical opinion on the nature and function of satire" (1-2) 
amassed in the eighteenth century; the theories were not monologic, but "haphazard," and 
engaged with the ethical concerns of particular and personal satire, as opposed to safer, 
generalizing satire (Elkin 3). 
Although the need for rhetorically savvy apologies remained, satire was a 
dominant literary art in the eighteenth century. "By the middle of the eighteenth century," 
James Sutherland observes, "satire had become a literary habit" (68); it became the 
Augustans' "paramount mode of expression" (Elkin 6). David Nokes also purports that 
"the literature of the early eighteenth century, indeed the literature of the entire century 
from the Restoration of Charles II to the ascension of George III, is dominated by satire" 
(1). By the end of the eighteenth century, there is a marked shift towards a preference for 
the gentler manner of Horace (Martindale 286). This heightened valuation of Horace is 
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exemplified by James Beattie's statement in "On Laughter and Ludicrous Composition" 
(1776): "'I find that the generality of critics are all for the moderation and smiling graces 
of the courtly Horace, and exclaim against the vehemence and vindictive zeal of the 
unmannerly Juvenal"' ( qtd in W einbrot, Pope 22). As Stuart Tave influentially notes in 
The Amiable Humorist: A Study of the Comic Theory and Criticism of the Eighteenth and 
Early Nineteenth Centuries (1960), the counter-current favouring the milder Horatian 
mode began early in the eighteenth century and was linked, at one level, to theories 
opposing humour (deemed natural, sympathetic, and good-natured) with wit (which is 
demoted artificial and unkind). Wit was associated with satiric humour, and thus the 
notion of the "viciousness of satire was as much a commonplace of the eighteenth 
century as its virtues" (Tave 23). Sir Richard Blackmore's "Essay upon Wit" (1716) 
defines wit as being malignant (Tave 11); Corbyn Morris's "An Essay Towards Fixing 
the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Raillery, Satire, and Ridicule" (1774) finds humour 
to be closer to nature and the feelings of the heart than satiric wit is (Tave 117). William 
Hazlitt's "On Wit and Humour" (1818) admires humour as natural and wit as the 
"product of art" ( 425);32 Jean Paul Richter, in Vorschule de Aesthetik (1804), refutes 
Hobbes's theory of laughter as being scornfully superior and develops instead a theory of 
good-natured humour- which influenced Coleridge's, and later Carlyle's, views on the 
subject. Literary historians agree that Richard Steele and Joseph Addison's model of 
gentlemanly rhetoric became ascendant (Martindale 286). Steele's argument in Tat/er No. 
242 (1710) was "a standard eighteenth-century account of the art of satire" (Tave 24). 
"[G]ood nature [is] an essential quality in a Satyrist" (Tat/er 182), Steele declares, and 
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advocates "Delicacy of Scorn, without any Mixture of Anger" (Tat/er 183). Horace and 
surprisingly Juvenal are offered as exemplary satirists in opposition to the current 
"Coxcombs" whose satire is petty and personal (Tat/er 183-185). Paulson notes the 
Horatian and barely satiric nature of the Whig Spectator, which positioned itself against 
the excoriating practice of Tory satire (Fictions 216). 
Critics interested in post-Augustan satire and the decline of verse satire after 
Pope, such as Thomas Lockwood, argue that satire became more concerned with the 
subjectivity of the satirist (8-11 ). Paulson speculates that this shift is linked to the 
privileging, in Lockean epistemology, of the mind of the individual over and above 
external truths - a belief that was "dangerous to satire" (Satire 4-5).33 Yet, despite the 
frequent diminishment of satire's credibility in the early nineteenth century, critics have 
recently contested the notion that the Romantic period was devoid of satire. Gary Dyer's 
pioneering acknowledgement of the hundreds of verse and prose satires published 
between 1789 and 1832 redresses calcified notions of satire's dilution and disappearance 
in this period. Aside from Marcus Wood's Radical Satire and Print Culture 1790-1822, 
which acknowledges populist radical writers such as William Hone, there are only 
piecemeal evaluations of satiric works by major authors (such as Wordsworth's 
unfinished imitation of Juvenal's eighth satire; Shelley's fragment against satire; and 
Byron's English Bards and Scotch Reviewers [1809]), while hundreds of satirical works 
in poetry and prose by less canonical writers remain unnoticed (Dyer 8-9). Dyer dates 
satire's decline not at Charles Churchill's death in 1764, but closer to Byron's in 1824 
(11); he attributes satire's diminished popularity, in part, to the financial crisis of 1826, 
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which caused booksellers to avoid both satire and poetry (14).34 Furthermore, the Puritan 
demotion of comedy (and by implication, satire), is attributed by Robert Martin to the 
middle-class "hatred of laughter" (5). For example, The Bridgewater Treatise of 1862 
advises that the "habit" of comical perception is unmanly, unhealthy, and un-Christian 
(Martin 7). Exploring the work of three verse satirists - William Gifford, Thomas James 
Mathias, and John Wolcott ("Peter Pindar") - Dyer concludes that the 
Horatian/Juvenalian antimony gains "specific political resonances" (3) in this period.35 
Steven E. Jones's Satire and Romanticism, 1760-1832 unearths the canon-forming 
relationship between satiric and Romantic modes, which he argues were mutually 
defining; satiric forms played an overlooked role in the dialectical constitution of the 
concepts of Romanticism (Jones 1-5). Many Romantic works (such as those of 
Wordsworth) are fashioned in a sentimental, counter-satiric mode (set against the satiric 
discourse of authors such as Thomas Crabbe) (Jones 16-17). Furthermore, the notion that 
Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, and Keats displaced Augustan rationality with sentiment, 
imagination, sincerity, and natural feeling eschews a large number of romantic parodies 
(Jones 5-6).36 
Although critics such as Dyer and Jones contest straightforward narratives of the 
disappearance of satire after Charles Churchill, they generally accept that satire as a genre 
(or at least as a dominant feature of a work) did not persist much beyond the 1830s. Dyer 
is convinced: "unquestionably, satire had almost ceased to exist as a distinct genre by the 
1830s" (13): 
To some extent the satiric was absorbed into predominantly non-
satiric genres like the novel: instead of Moore or Henry Luttrell, 
the Victorians had Thackeray; instead of Peacock, the mature 
Disraeli. Though I run the risk of appearing to endorse a 
hydraulic or a "zero-sum" model of genre history, I am claiming 
that writers increasingly were forced by market considerations 
and other cultural factors to channel their satirical impulses into 
forms where satire merely exists alongside other strands, to 
which it usually is subordinate. The disappearance of satiric 
forms did not signal the extinction of the satiric spirit; in fact, it 
arguably cleared space for its survival, particularly in the novel, 
although there satire often stands in an uneasy alliance with 
comedy, and usually lacks the topoi conventional in the verse 
satire or the Menippean satire. (14; my italics) 
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Despite his acknowledgement of prose satire, Dyer concludes that "satire in the strong 
sense began to fade" (144) in the nineteenth century as it was absorbed into and 
dominated by the novel, only to be linked with the gentler, less offensive, comic tradition 
extending from Cervantes to Fielding, Sterne, and Dickens (144). Thus Dyer appears to 
accept Stuart Tave's central thesis that satire was supplanted by sentimental humour in 
the novel. If satire exists in this form, it is found in a benign Horatian mode - a mode 
which, being both prosaic and "lenient," is easily adapted, unlike the Juvenalian, to the 
English comic tradition (Dyer 96). The "Juvenalian spirit," being suited to oratory and 
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formal verse, "translated into prose poorly" (Dyer 97). Although Paulson, Dyer, Griffin, 
and Palmeri agree that the novel is a prose form that demonstrates singular suitability to 
satire, they accept Tave's thesis of the general dominance of sentiment over satire in the 
novel. After 1830, satire receives from many critics a near-death sentence - only to find 
resuscitation late in the century. Yet, just as the critical preference for Horatian satire 
(beginning in the eighteenth century) did not result in the extinction of Juvenalian satire 
(which was practiced by leading satirists such as Pope and Swift), so the preference for 
gentle humour in the nineteenth century did not destroy the harsher, satiric sensibility 
which, I argue, did thrive in the Victorian novel. Furthermore, this strongly satiric 
sensibility was not universally subordinated to the "sentimental" aspects of the novel. 
Satire, in the more purely satiric, Juvenalian mode, persists in the Victorian novel, but 
requires the age-old hallmark of satire, a defense. 
1.ii Satire "may be very well in its place": Victorian Comico-satiric 
Theory and its Uncertain Practice 
Tave's conclusion that sentimental forms such as the novel engulfed satire has 
been applied influentially to Victorian comic theory by Robert B. Martin. Martin 
complicates Tave' s proposition by suggesting a shift later in the nineteenth century away 
from amiable sentimental humour (promoted by Carlyle and ostensibly practiced by 
Dickens, Trollope and others) to the comedy of wit and paradox. Wit's negative 
reputation - for being coldly intellectual compared with the empathetic geniality of 
humour - began to abate around the 1870s, Martin argues, influenced by such works in 
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comic theory as Leigh Hunt's Wit and Humour (1846), which defends the pleasures of 
(kindly intended) witty comedy (Martin 70). For example Hunt praises Swift as the 
"grand master of wit and humour" (Wit 287). As well, Leslie Stephen, in "Humour" 
(Cornhill 1876), prefers the intellectual wit and "virile" comedy of the eighteenth century 
to the sentimental humour currently popular (Martin 80). Martin interprets George 
Meredith's "Essay on Comedy" (1877) as a culmination of this increasing regard for the 
value of wit in late Victorian literary culture. For Martin, the essay is an attack on 
sentimental humour (92), but it is, perhaps more importantly, an attack on satire; for 
example, Meredith's ambivalence towards satire animates his comic theory. Apparently, 
Meredith promotes the civilizing comedic spirit at the expense of the barbaric aggression 
of satire. Although Martin's thesis implies increasing Victorian approval of satire in the 
later part of the century (when associated with wit), it neglects to address the debates 
about satire which are encoded in Victorian comic theory. Following Martin, Jennifer 
Wagner-Lawyer unhelpfully conflates the terms satire, humour, and comedy; in this way, 
she also ignores the influential conflict surrounding satire.37 Victorian comic theory, 
however, is inflected with century-long debates of the satiric tradition. 
Charles Martindale finds verse satire to be in desperate straits in the nineteenth 
century, for it is omitted from Palgrave's Golden Treasury (1861) (295). Certainly, 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century ideas of wit and satire as inferior to humour and 
sentiment held sway well into the Victorian period. Early nineteenth-century anxiety 
about the morality of wit and satire is expressed by William Wordsworth, who, as 
Sutherland points out, aimed to awaken people from the moral apathy of custom, but 
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ironically disliked satire (12). With the exception of the "philosophical" satires of Horace 
and Juvenal, most satire, according to Wordsworth, is occasional and personal, "rarely 
comprehending sufficient of the general in the individual to be dignified with the name of 
Poetry" ("Preface to Poems of 1815" 142). Victorian writers who were influenced by 
Wordsworth's poetic theory, such as George Eliot, Matthew Arnold, and Thomas 
Carlyle, were likely aware of Wordsworth's resistance to the "Artificial School" of 
poetry that made Pope's epigraphs the epitome of immoral literary discourse. Leigh 
Hunt's words reveal that even advocates of satire tended to qualify their praise: "Wits and 
satirists may write in verse in order to concentrate their powers and sharpen their effect; 
but it will never be of any high or inspired order ("On Wit" v). As well, Thomas 
Babington Macaulay's view of the prurient nature of Juvenal's satire is evidence of 
satire's tarnished reputation in the Victorian period. Although he did not wish to see the 
work of Juvenal banned, Macaulay felt, with Samuel Johnson, that many of the Roman's 
satires were "too gross for imitation" (Essays and Lays 164).38 Juvenal and Lucien, like 
all "teachers of virtue had all the vices of their neighbours, with the additional vice of 
hypocrisy" (Macaulay, Essays and Lays 403).39 Furthermore, Macaulay found Leigh 
Hunt's praise for Restoration comedic wit to be morally inexcusable. Rather than arguing 
for a wholesale rejection of satire, however, Macaulay, in "The Life and Writings of 
Addison" (Edinburgh Review, July 1843), praises the moral genius of Addison's style of 
ridicule (the "grace, the nobleness, the moral purity, which we find even in his 
merriment") in contrast to the temperamental Tory satirists, such as Swift, who abused 
the power of ridicule by creating misanthropic works (Essays and Lays 725). Thus, 
writers such as Macaulay, who were not invested in a wholesale rejection of satire as a 
genre, specifically rejected unsympathetic, Juvenalian satire. As Chauncey C. Loomis 
asserts, Juvenal "was almost universally condemned" (5).40 It appears that the age-old 
juxtaposition between Horace and Juvenal still held Victorian critical purchase. 
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After the eighteenth century, the direct influence of Roman verse satire abated 
(297). Whereas the Augustans "look[ ed] wholly to the ancients, and to Rome rather than 
Greece" (Elkin 42), the Victorians looked to ancient Greece for cultural and literary 
ideals. George Henry Lewes, for example, in his biographical history of philosophy, 
declares: "We omit Rome; the Romans, confessedly, had no philosophy of their own; and 
did but feebly imitate that of the Greeks" (xvi). As Frank M. Turner notes, many 
Victorian writers considered the ancient Greeks to be kindred spirits: this was a 
"fundamental opinion of Victorian intellectual life" ( 11 ). Enamoured of Greek ideals of 
heroism and art, they were also enthusiastic about parallels between Athenian democracy 
and modem democracy ( 11 ). Ancient Rome, by comparison, was considered to be more 
thoroughly pagan and politically corrupt. Thomas Carlyle, for example, showers scorn on 
the Roman period in On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (1841) when 
he compares the detestable "scepticism, simulacra and universal decadence" (175) of the 
eighteenth century with that of ancient Rome. 
Despite the general Victorian neglect of ancient Rome, the Roman poet Horace 
"was the best-remembered classical author in nineteenth century England" (Vance 199). 
Norman Vance posits that Horace became a kind of"honorary Victorian" (216) partly 
because he translated Greek poetry into Latin and thus exemplified the Roman 
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enchantment with Greece (199). Sir Theodore Martin's series, Ancient Classics for 
English Readers (1870), among others, popularized Horace's works for easy assimilation 
by the "well-educated, sociable nineteenth-century man-about-town which middle-class 
readers without much Latin wished to be" (Vance 206) . .4 1 In "Horace's Art of Conduct" 
in The Cornhill Magazine (1876), the author argues that in contrast to Horace, Juvenal 
"grows monotonous" ( 40), for "Horace is the most quotable of ancient authors" ( 44 ): 
"There are Byronians, Shelleyans, Wordsworthians; everybody is a Horaceite" (44). 
Bulwer-Lytton's essay "Charles Lamb and Some of his Companions" (Quarterly Review, 
January 1867) compliments the essays of Elia by proclaiming them to be reminiscent of 
the verse of Horace, with Lamb resembling Horace in economy of style and the "intense 
sympathy" that he has with the world (106-7). This essay reveals Bulwer-Lytton's early 
preference for Horatian/sympathetic humour: "Humour in itself is among the most 
popular gifts of genius; amiable humour among the most lovable. The humour of Charles 
Lamb is at once pure and genial; it has no malice in its smile" (Bulwer-Lytton 107).42 
Despite a preference for benign humour over wit and satire, and a turning to Greece and 
not Rome for literary models, Horatian satire was categorized with genial humour, and 
revered by many. James Sully's discussions of satire in his An Essay on Laughter (1902) 
seem at once a culmination and a summary of Victorian esteem for "tolerant" "good-
natured" humour and corresponding resistance to the virulence of "the satire of antiquity" 
(Laughter 385, 382). Sully observes that the "mirthful spirit," when utilized for 
"demeaning attack" or "serious exposure," is transformed: "To laugh with Juvenal or 
with Swift is to feel more of a bitter malignity than of gaiety. We may say that satire 
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takes us back to the brutal laugh of the savage standing jubilant over his prostrate foe" 
(Laughter 381). George Eliot, for one, though wary of Juvenalian forms of satire, as well 
as disapproving of personal satire (that "bastard kind of satire"), embraced genial 
Horatian satire.43 Importantly, Loomis identifies James Hannay's Satire and Satirists 
(1854) as the "only extensive defense of satire in the mid-Victorian period" ( 4 ). Hannay 
attempts to re-fashion satire so as to make it more palatable to Victorian readers. 
Defending the "humanity" of satire, the treatise demonstrates that "the great Satirists 
have been good and lovable men," and that satire is an artistic and moral art (Hannay 4). 
Satire, Hannay claims, is the one art in which the Romans were not mere imitators of the 
Greeks: "We derive our satirical forms from Horace and Juvenal" (8). Thus he concludes 
that "you can classify all the great satirical writers with one or the other" (23). Yet, 
despite the general acceptance of Horace as a genial satirist, satire remained in a 
suspended state of grace - distrusted and regarded with ambivalence by Victorian writers, 
critics, and readers. Not surprisingly, as Loomis notes, Hannay's tract was "received 
coolly by the critics who clearly thought that the defense of satire was not a noble cause" 
(5). 
Although Thomas Carlyle is dismissive of eighteenth-century writers (including 
the satirists), he speaks more favourably of the humourist. In the eighteenth century, the 
"Man of Letters" was "half-paralyzed" by the skepticism of his age: "Scepticism means 
not intellectual Doubt alone, but moral Doubt; all sorts of infidelity, insincerity, spiritual 
paralysis" (Carlyle, Heroes 170). In an age dominated by "Mechanical life," heroism was 
absent (170-171). In Carlyle's review of Heinrich Doring's Life of Richter (Edinburgh 
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Review [1827]), Sterne and Cervantes are praised as true humourists, but the humour of 
Swift, Ben Jonson, and Voltaire is dismissed for being "encased" in a "most bitter and 
caustic rind" (Carlyle, "Richter" 16). Carlyle regards Jean Paul Richter as a "Philosopher 
and Moral Poet" (10) whose "ruling quality" is humour: "the essence of humour is 
sensibility; warm, tender fellow-feeling with all forms of existence" (15). Richter's 
paternal "soul rushes forth in sympathy with gladness and sorrow, with goodness and 
grandeur over all Creation" (Carlyle, "Richter" 14 ). Irony and caricature, Carlyle argues, 
offer only "superficial distortion" ("Richter" 15) of their subject and are a soulless 
"habit." "True humour springs not more from the head than from the heart; it is not 
contempt; its essence is love" (Carlyle, "Richter" 15-16). By inverting the sublime, 
humour "exalt[ s] into our affection what is below us" (Carlyle, "Richter" 16). The only 
style of satire that elicits the affection (of which Carlyle approves) as well as anger, is 
Horatian. Yet, just as the Whig writers (such as Addison and Steele) who defined their 
work in opposition to satire nonetheless wrote satire (Paulson, Satire, 60), Carlyle's 
comic-satiric doctrine and practice do not necessarily accord. Emphatically, he 
disapproved of Juvenalian satire; hence, his famous injunction: "Close thy Byron; open 
thy Goethe" (SR 145). But his caustic rants against the "gross, steamengine 
Utilitarianism" (Heroes 172) are not exactly consistent with his paternal model of the 
humourist. Sartor Resartus (1833-34), which he declared to be a "Satirical Extravaganza 
on Things in General" (xiii), denounces the somnambulism of the unenlightened life and 
the soul-deadening effects of Utilitarianism. Professor Teufelsdrock's philosophy of 
clothes (an allusion to Swift's Tale of a Tub) reduces human beings (in a society founded 
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on cloth) to various suits of clothes (the mental habits of materialism) which "tailorize 
and demoralize us" (SR 38). H. A. Taine, complaining of Carlyle's "gloomy cast" and 
indignant anger, declares: "[Carlyle] despises his epoch" (574 ). Anthony Trollope also 
finds fault with the pessimism and satiric excesses of Carlyle (and Ruskin): "The 
loudness and extravagance of their Lamentations, the wailing and gnashing of teeth 
which comes from them over a world which is supposed to have gone altogether shoddy" 
(Autobiography 224). Ironically, Juvenal's non-affectionate, doom-and-gloom mode of 
satire is decidedly present in the writings of Carlyle - the self-styled advocate of Horatian 
benignity.44 
Currently, many critics assume "[i]t is easy to account for satire's rejection by the 
Victorians simply on the basis of its tastelessness" (Connery and Combe 4 ). Yet Matthew 
Arnold is perhaps the single Victorian sage who unequivocally disliked satire. He even 
found Horace to be over-rated and not serious enough (Vance 200). Certainly, in his 
Preface to the first edition of Poems (1853), Arnold asserts that poetical art in its highest 
form (which is both "serious" and "grand") ought to portray a noble and significant 
action (after the manner of the ancient Greek poets, who followed Aristotle). The Greeks 
wisely apprehended that "an action of present times was too near them" to be a grand 
enough subject "for a tragic poem" (Arnold, Works 1: 6). Contemporary matters belong 
instead to "the domain of the comic poet, and of the lighter kinds of poetry" (Arnold, 
Works 1: 6). His view that the "spiritual discomfort" (Arnold, Works 1: 14) and general 
cultural turmoil of his age produces no great subjects for the poet implicitly denounces 
satire - a vigorously topical genre. In Arnold's poetic hierarchy, reminiscent of 
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Wordsworth's, satire, insofar as it is a comic genre, lacks the "moral grandeur" of higher 
forms.45 Additionally, Arnold's promotion of Goethe's view of the ideal modern poet 
implies a rejection of the anger of satire, particularly of the Juvenalian mode. The true 
poet 
will not, however, maintain a hostile attitude towards the false pretensions 
of his age: he will content himself with not being overwhelmed by them. 
He will esteem himself fortunate if he can succeed in banishing from his 
mind all feelings of contradiction, and irritation, and impatience; in order 
to delight himself with the contemplation of some noble action of a heroic 
time[.] (Arnold, 1853 "Preface," Works 1: 14) 
Arnold discredits the distemper of satire in the interest of his poetic project to banish 
"morbid" poetry (even his own "Empedocles on Etna") in order to ensure that art creates 
joy, not vexation (1853 "Preface," Works 1: 3). In accordance with this view (and also his 
complaint that "modern" poets are more concerned with expression than subject matter), 
Arnold dismisses the poetry of Pope and Dryden as being incapable of possessing "truth" 
and "seriousness" (Arnold, "The Study of Poetry" (1880); Works 9: 176). He complains 
that although "our whole eighteenth century" flattered itself that it produced classics, its 
poets did not reach a standard of critical high seriousness: "Dryden and Pope are not 
classics of our poetry, they are classics of our prose" (Arnold, "Study," Works 9: 178, 
181).46 Arnold even dismantles Addison's reputation as a great moralist by pronouncing 
his ideas "provincial" (despite his classic style) ("The Literary Influence of Academies" 
[ 1864]; Works 3: 248). In Culture and Anarchy ( 1869), Arnold employs Swift's idea 
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(from the Battle of the Books) that "sweetness and light" are the most noble qualities with 
which to articulate an ideal of culture; ungenerously, however, he chastizes Swift for 
having "too little" of these qualities himself (54). Additionally exposing his dislike of 
satire, Arnold finds that Byron's poetry has "little endurance in it," being "empty of 
matter" (Works 3: 262). In Arnold's scathing assessment, comedy and satire will never 
qualify as true poetry. 
In "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" (1864), Arnold rigorously 
separates the realms of creative art and criticism.47 Such a view necessarily excludes 
satire from the domain of high art, as its critical function is primary. Arnold's decree that 
the "world of ideas" and the "world of practice" remain separate ("Function," Works 3: 
265) renders him an enemy to satire. In the "burning matters" of "politics and religion," 
Arnold warns, literature "is most likely to go astray" ("Function," Works 3: 282); 
therefore "direct political action is not the true function of literature" ("Heinrich Heine," 
Works 3: 118). Satiric genres, for Arnold, are Philistine in that they work against the 
highest cultural goal: the promotion of the "free disinterested treatment of things" 
("Function," Works 3: 275). 
Francis O'Gorman and Katherine Turner resist the commonly accepted notion 
that the Carly lean/ Arnoldian rejection of Augustan literature straightforwardly 
summarizes the Victorian relationship to eighteenth century literature; they suggest a 
more complex relationship. Yet, similar to Martin, they stress the increasing acceptance 
of eighteenth-century wit towards the end of the century.48 For example, in the "climate 
of interest in the functional value of literature," Johnson's Rasselas gained in popularity 
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and appeared in editions designed for schools and colleges (K. Turner, "Samuel Johnson" 
130). As well, according to Macaulay's 1856 entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Samuel Johnson's the "Vanity of Human Wishes" remained in strong circulation (K. 
Turner, "Samuel Johnson" 120). Contradicting the seemingly universal Victorian distaste 
for Juvenalian satire, Johnson's imitation of Juvenal's tenth satire still found popularity 
with a nineteenth-century audience. Dismissing "the habitual model of the relationship 
between the Victorians and Alexander Pope as one of disapproval" ("High Priest" 76), 
Francis O'Gorman argues that despite Pope's exclusion from Palgrave's Golden Treasury 
(1861 ), he was admired and read in the Victorian period (by the Brownings, Tennyson, 
Ruskin, and others) ("High Priest" 77-78). Significantly, his stylistics became a model for 
composition, and educational editions of his work grew in number after 1870. Readers 
were, however, urged to ignore his morals, wit, and religious notions (O'Gorman, "High 
Priest" 87).49 
John Ruskin is the Victorian sage whose attitude to eighteenth-century writers 
epitomizes this ambivalent admiration. Dinah Birch has specialized in decoding Ruskin's 
conflicted assessments. Ruskin's initial conclusion about the Augustan period was that it 
Jacked a sense of the sublimity and moral force of nature. Later, however, he commended 
novelists such as Henry Fielding for their moral work (Birch 163-64). Pope's poetry is 
initially rejected in "Of the Pathetic Fallacy" (1856) as being utterly bereft of imaginative 
power, and is offered as an example of the very worst kind of affected poetry, which "has 
set [his] teeth on edge" (Ruskin, MP 5: 207-8). Yet in "Lectures on Art" ( 1870), Ruskin 
presents Pope as a kind of heroic moral poet and master of English literature (Birch 167); 
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according to Birch, this more flattering assessment reflects Ruskin's increasing interest in 
the "moral and political ethics of writing" (168). Yet a persistent ambivalence towards 
satiric forms seems to characterize Ruskin's thought overall. He perceives the ideal of 
moral "truth to nature" in art to be handicapped in his century both by capitalistic 
corruption and by the inherent limitation of English character, which easily finds "delight 
in forms of the burlesque" (Ruskin, Lectures on Art 20: 29). The English love of Chaucer, 
Ruskin observes, betrays the inveterate desire of the English imagination to "stoop to 
play with evil" (Lectures on Art 20: 30). An immature "earthly instinct" (Lectures on Art 
20: 30) infects even the most moral English writers and prevents them from achieving the 
sublime in art. Regrettably, an evaluation of Ruskin as a satirist himself exceeds the 
scope of this study, but Ina Rae Hark has evaluated Unto this Last (1862) as a satiric 
work. She aligns Ruskin's role as a Victorian sage who rages against laissez-faire 
capitalism and the dunces who promote it with that of the indignant satirist-prophet (Rae 
Hark 22-23). Ruskin's recurrent portrait of "Economic Man" as a dead man employs, as 
do many of his hyperbolic analogies, the satirical device of reductio ad absurdum (Birch 
24). Ruskin, it seems (like Carlyle), was both attracted to and repulsed by the satiric 
bathos of the eighteenth century. 
Another literary figure whose writing reflects the contradictory relationship 
between Victorian satire theory and its practice is William Makepeace Thackeray. In his 
lectures on "The English Humourists of the Eighteenth Century" (delivered in 1851, 
published 1853), Thackeray renounces his association with harsh satire, and declares 
instead a preference for culturally viable Horatian humour.50 A humourist, as defined by 
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Thackeray, scorns hypocrisy and untruth, while also awakening the reader's pity and love 
for humanity. Fulfilling these precepts, Matthew Prior's poetry is praised for its "happy 
easy turns" and charming humour, which resemble Horace, the "most delightful and 
accomplished master" (221 ). Juvenal he regards as a "truculent brute."51 Thackeray's 
object in "The English Humourists" is "rather to describe the men than their works; or to 
deal with the latter only in as far as they seem to illustrate the character of their writers" 
(228). Yet this declaration betrays the necessary link (in Thackeray's mind) between the 
moral character of a satirist and the moral quality of his satire. Though he deems 
Jonathan Swift "our great satirist," Swift's character is assessed as being dangerously 
skeptical: his lived his life "tearing, like a man possessed with a devil" ("English 
Humourists" 137, 135). Thackeray selects Gulliver's Travels, with its "unmanly 
blasphemous moral" ("English Humourists" 140), as the work which most reflects 
Swift's personal character. Swift is portrayed more as a madman who had a genius for 
"roasting a subject with a vengeance" ("English Humourists" 137) than as a true writer or 
moralist. Another eighteenth-century wit, William Congreve, is dismissed as a man of 
fashion who was inspired by a morally ungrounded comic muse. But Joseph Addison's 
happy moral satire is praised, in sharp contrast to Swift's melancholy wit or Congreve's 
shallow comedy. Addison is revered by Thackeray as the "Great moralist of the last age" 
("English Humourists"l 68). Not surprisingly, Alexander Pope elicits the most 
ambivalence. Although Thackeray deems Pope's works to be "the best satire that ever has 
been penned," he is resentful on behalf of all authors whom Pope libeled as "Grub Street" 
hacks, thus "depreciat[ing]" the "literary calling" ("English Humourists" 243, 253). Yet 
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surprisingly, Thackeray's sketch of Pope concludes with an analogy between Pope and 
Bonaparte; their vices were of the meanest kind, but they nonetheless had "great soul[s]"; 
reluctantly, Thackeray "do[ es] homage to the pen of a hero" ("English Humourists" 255). 
The aggressive satire and personalities of Swift and Pope unsettle Thackeray's 
comic/satiric ethic, while the milder satire and manner of Addison (as well as Hogarth 
and Smollett, whose satire is "manly, kindly, honest, and irascible" ["English 
Humourists" 273]), effectively conjoin satire, manliness, and morality. 
Thackeray's ambivalence in "The English Humourists" towards satire culminates 
in his assessment of Henry Fielding, whom he cannot "hope to make a hero of' (279). 
Distaste for Tom Jones, who is "not half punished enough before the great prize of 
fortune and love falls to his share" ("English Humourists" 284 ), is ironic for the author of 
Vanity Fair (184 7-8) and Pendennis (1848-50), given that both are novels without heroes. 
Pendennis (after the manner of Tom Jones) wins Laura Bell's devotion without having 
proven himself to be anything but a libertine. As well, in the preface to Pendennis, 
Thackeray praises Fielding's unconventionality: "Since the author of Tom Jones was 
buried, no writer of fiction among us has been permitted to depict to his utmost power a 
MAN. We must drape him, and give him a certain conventional simper. Society will not 
tolerate the Natural in our Art" (lvi). For this reason, "A little more frankness than is 
customary has been attempted in this story" (lvii). Despite links between Thackeray's 
satire and that of Horace - Sir Theodore Martin positioned Thackeray as the modem 
Horace (Vance 207) and David Masson praised the "Horatian strictness" of his prose 
(British Novelists 246) - critics of his novels found them replete with Juvenalian 
pessimism and castigation.52 
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Frank Palmeri' s initial observation that Thackeray's increasing adherence to a 
Victorian doctrine of decency weakened his satire, and Dyer's view that he is the 
representative Victorian writer under whom satire "grew up and acceded to the values of 
domesticity" (167), do not accord with contemporary criticism of Thackeray's unsettling 
satiric method, particularly in Vanity Fair. Recently, in 2007, Palmeri revises his opinion 
to claim that Vanity Fair is "the last instance" of "narrative satire in early Victorian 
Britain" ("Narrative Satire" 367).53 Although John Forester (in the Examiner, 22 July 
1848) approved of the novel's satire, he wished that such "stifling ingredients" as 
unremitting satire could have been relieved by lighter moments (57). Similarly, Robert 
Bell (in Fraser's Magazine, September 1848) found that although the moral of the novel 
is admirable, "More light and air would have rendered it more agreeable and more 
healthy" (Tillotson and Hawes 65). Revealingly, undercutting both Palmeri and Dyer's 
view of Thackeray as a sentimentalist, Thackeray himself also remarks: "Pathos I hold 
should be very occasional indeed in humorous works" (Tillotson and Hawes 69). George 
Henry Lewes, in the Leader (21 December 1850), regrets what can only be called the 
Juvenalian tone of Vanity Fair: "we felt the scoundrelism and pretence oppressive" 
(Tillotson and Hawes 109).54 It is certainly true that Thackeray's Vanity Fair/London is 
as inveterately corrupt and money-grubbing as Juvenal's Rome. The implied reader of 
Vanity Fair is accused of avariciously desiring the death of rich aunts, excessive amounts 
of roast beef, and even Amelia Sedley. From the aristocratic Crawleys to the middle-class 
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stock-broker Mr Sedley, scoundrels - of whom Becky Sharp is the arch-example-
preside in every class. No character is offered as a model of heroic virtue. The two least 
offensive characters in the novel are Amelia Sedley and George Dobbin, but Amelia is an 
insipid, strangling vine and George is her sycophant; even the narrator is merciless and 
equivocal. The closing words of the novel underline the dystopic inescapability of Vanity 
Fair: "Ah! Vanitas, Vanitatum! Which of us is happy in this world? Which of us has his 
desire? or, having it, is satisfied?" (Vanity Fair 878). This expression of resignation to a 
condition of general corruption seems an echo of Juvenal's cynical warning: "Today 
every vice I Has reached its ruinous zenith" (1.147-8). Thackeray's illustration of the 
novelist himself (appearing after the narrator's assertion that all members of the British 
middle-class - including himself - are corrupted by materialistic desires) with the 
smiling, Horatian jester's mask discarded on the ground and a frown on his face is a 
dramatic assertion of Juvenalian pessimism. Yet, it was to Thackeray's great indignation 
that he be viewed as a "dreary misanthrope" ("Charity" 282). 
Anthony Trollope's opinion of Vanity Fair, in his 1879 biography of Thackeray, 
also reveals culturally current anxieties about the morality of satire. He defends the novel 
as one which proved an exception to the rule of anti-satire critics and general readers, 
about whom he observes: "There was no doubt a feeling ... that though satire may be 
very well in its place, it should not be made the backbone of a work so long and so 
important as this" (Thackeray 93). In view of this injunction, Trollope marvels that 
Thackeray, in his first serious attempt at a novel, "dared to subject himself and Sir Pitt 
Crawley to the critics of the time" (Thackeray 96). For Trollope, the novel announces 
65 
Thackeray's investment in "the business of castigating the vices of the world" (Thackeray 
90). Fundamentally, he admires Thackeray's effort to convey a key truth about the human 
condition: what he later terms the "absence of the heroic" (Thackeray I 08). Amelia 
Sedley and George Dobbin are commended for being absolutely true to nature in their 
faulty but well-meaning impulses. Yet, although Trollope proclaims Vanity Fair's moral 
teachings to be unimpeachable, there is more than a hint of censure in his suspicion that 
Thackeray's concentration on vice for the purposes of moral instruction (over and above 
the revelation of virtue) capitalizes, somewhat improperly, on the fact that "goodness and 
eulogy are less exciting than wickedness and censure" (Thackeray 104). Similarly, The 
Newcomes (1855), Trollope complains, is over-brimming with declarations of "how vile 
and poor a place this world is" (Thackeray 115). Yet despite his criticism of Thackeray, 
and despite concluding his own Barchester Towers (1857) with the message that good 
always wins over evil - Mr Slope is evicted and Mr and Mrs Proudie return to London, 
the proper locus of sin - Trollope is the novelist whose explicitly contradictory opinions 
and practice of satire epitomize (even more than Thackeray's) a position of extreme 
ambivalence about the genre. 
Moreover, Trollope's defense of satire's place in the novel as a method of anti-
heroic representation and a source of the "physic" of moral teaching is undercut by his 
exploration of the dangers of satire in An Autobiography (1883). In this work, Trollope 
self-consciously struggles to reconcile his view of satire with his novelistic practice; he 
reveals both his high regard for and his anxiety concerning satire. Trollope's 
preoccupation with the etiquette of satire is reflected particularly in his troubled view of 
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his own novel The Way We Live Now (1874-5). The latter, in which he had "ventured to 
take the whip of the satirist into [his] hand" (Autobiography 225), scourges the 
commercial practices of his day through the story of the crass Mr Melmote, the gambling 
spendthrift Sir Felix, and the literary charlatan Lady Carbury. Roger Carbury, the novel's 
only virtuous character, is unable to redeem (even in a small way) his hopelessly 
debauched social environment. Not surprisingly, the novel was roundly criticized for its 
satiric harshness. 55 In line with his critics, Trollope himself charges the novel with the 
fault he considers endemic to satire: exaggeration. Alluding to his own guilty hyperbole, 
he concludes: "Who when the lash of objurgation is in his hand, can so moderate his arm 
as never to strike harder than justice would require?" (Autobiography 225). Subverting 
his self-criticism, he maintains that in many ways his novel was a "powerful and good" 
satire [Autobiography 225]. In this grudging admission of a crime against truthful 
characterization, Trollope advocates what David Skilton identifies as the mid-Victorian 
demand for moral balance in characterization (xi).56 Referring to The Warden (1855) he 
advocates temperate satire, which complements realism, as the elusive ideal: "Satire 
though it may exaggerate the vice it lashes, is not justified in creating it in order that it 
may be lashed. Caricature may too easily become slander and satire a libel. I believed in 
the existence neither of the red nosed clerical cormorant, nor in that of the venomous 
assassin of the journals" (Autobiography 65). Trollope had came to be regarded as a 
novelist who specialized in balanced representations of ordinary men, and he did not 
want satiric distortions to destroy his reputation for "true to life" portraiture. Concerns 
regarding caricature are at the root of Trollope's (and his contemporaries') discomfort 
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with satire. Trollope's objections to Dickens's novels also stem from his ambivalence 
about the truth claims of satire; Dickens's worst infraction regarding the proper humour 
and pathos of the novel is his exaggerated and inhuman characters or "puppets" 
(Autobiography 159). For Trollope, ungenerous caricature betrays a jaded view of society 
at large.57 In a May 2 1870 letter to Alfred Austin, Trollope scathingly demolishes 
Austin's The Season: A Satire (1869) (an attack on the London marriage market) and 
proposes a theory of satire. He charges Austin with writing "general" and "unmixed 
satyre" that is wholly censorious of a world "presumed by the satyrist to be so grievous as 
to oppress the virtues, - I doubt the use, and generally doubt the truth" (Letters 515). 
(Trollope finds the attack too general in its omission of virtuous female exceptions.) He 
admits this is a judgment upon all such wholesale satire: "And satyre runs ever into 
exaggeration, leaving the conviction that not justice but revenge, is desired" (Letters 
515). Such exceedingly "strong" "modes of expression" obliterate truth for the reader, "as 
the eater loses the flavour of his meat through the multiplied uses of sautes and pepper" 
(Letters 516). Similarly, in "On English Prose Fiction as a Rational Amusement" (1870), 
Trollope justifies his condemnation of Gulliver's Travels: "Satire may be virtuous, - may 
also be useful. To be the first it should spring from a hatred of vice, and not from 
disappointed hopes. To be the latter it should at least be true" ("English Prose Fiction" 
106). Trollope's concerns about untruth and injustice in satiric works of fiction stem from 
a contradictory tension between satire and realism inherent in his theory of the novel. 
Although Trollope commits to the Carly lean idea of the novelist as a producer of 
"sermons" to warn of evil conduct and promote a "system of Ethics" that makes "virtue 
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alluring and vice ugly" (Autobiography 143), a novel should also "give a picture of 
common life enlivened by humour, and sweetened by pathos" (Autobiography 84). The 
novel should be both "moral and amusing" (Thackeray 184). As guide and tutor, the 
"novelist creeps in closer than the schoolmaster, closer than the father, closer almost than 
the mother" (Thackeray 203). Given that satire's aim is moral correction, which Trollope 
also views as the aim of the novel, then why is he so resistant to satire? Trollope's 
Ruskin- and Eliot-approved moral realism requires truth to nature; therefore, novelists 
should steer a "middle course" between "romance" and "burlesque" (Thackeray 186-87). 
In other words, satire, with its immoderate, pessimistic, and caricatural tendencies, 
counters its own moral objectives, jeopardizing the high art of moral realism. For 
example, according to Trollope, Thackeray's chief fault was that (at the expense of truth) 
he could never "abstain from that dash of satire" (Autobiography 121 ). According to this 
formulation, satire is a guilty pleasure that contaminates the noble truths of realism. 
Further complicating Trollope's view of the problem of satiric restraint is his inability 
(like Thackeray before him) to separate authors from their satire. 
Trollope agrees with Thackeray that Gulliver's Travels is "the most cynical, the 
most absolutely illnatured, and therefore the falsest" satire "in our language" (Thackeray 
161); the ill-natured cynicism he speaks of is Swift's. Trollope's equivocal assessment of 
Thackeray's own cynicism further reveals a discomfort with satire as a form of writing 
which betrays, and possibly augments, a personal habit of cynicism - a habit that is 
ungenerous and unhealthy. 58 Trollope struggles with the fact that cynicism and the cynic 
have always had the negative connotation of reflecting an unkind disposition.59 Yet 
Trollope is puzzled that Thackeray, with his kindly disposition, actually wrote satire (a 
fundamentally cynical form): 
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Any satirist might in the same way be called a cynic in so far as his satire 
goes. Swift was a cynic certainly. Pope was cynical when he was a satirist. 
Juvenal was all cynical, because he was all satirist. If that be what is 
meant, Thackeray was certainly a cynic. But that is not all that the word 
implies. It intends to go back beyond the work of the man, and to describe 
his heart. It says of any satirist so described that he has given himself up to 
satire, not because things have been evil, but because he himself has been 
evil. ... If Thackeray be judged after this fashion, the word is as 
inappropriate to the writer as to the man. (Thackeray 207) 
Trollope feared "giving himself up to satire" because of its implications for his personal 
character: "The satirist who writes nothing but satire should write but little, - or it will 
seem that his satire springs rather from his own caustic nature than from the sins of the 
world in which he lives" (Trollope, Autobiography 121).60 Preoccupation with the moral 
integrity of the novel as a genre, his sense of the ethically close relation between author 
and text, and the problematic quality of cynicism, tainted - even confused - Trollope's 
view of satire as a moral genre. His suspicion of satire (like Thackeray's) was a dominant 
critical trend. For example, in Partial Portraits (1888), Henry James offers mixed praise 
for Trollope's plodding realism, but commends his "wholesome mistrust of morbid 
analysis" ("Anthony Trollope" 528). As Stuart Justman argues, Trollope, "a sometimes 
satirist" (84 ), belongs more to the line of Addisonian moderation (i.e. Horatian satire), for 
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continually he qualifies his satiric criticism with an "endorsement of things as they are" 
(90). Trollope's investment in the truth-based integrity of the novel as a moral genre and 
his sense of the ethical kinship between author and text chastened his attraction to satire -
especially the guilty pleasure of Juvenalian satire, which tempts the writer toward the 
evils of unamiablity and a view of the world as "going straight away to darkness and the 
dogs" (Autobiography 224 ). Like many of his contemporaries, Trollope was a most 
reluctant satirist. 
Another novelist aspiring to keep satire in its place was George Meredith; unlike 
Trollope however, Meredith seems less conscious of the frequent contradictions between 
his published views of satire and his unwitting satiric practice. In "An Essay on Comedy 
and the Uses of the Comic Spirit" (1877), he extols what he names the "Comic Spirit" as 
a form of ''clear Hellenic perception of facts" of the "actual world" ( 443, 433). As "a 
fountain of sound sense," it is an anodyne to the modem social ills of egoism and ennui. 
Meredith rejects Puritan notions of comedy as a 'jade" or "vile mask" ("Essay on 
Comedy" 433, 434 ); these descriptions more accurately characterize satire, which, by 
contrast, is too harsh and misanthropic for salutary effects. In place of the priestly "pain 
of satirical heat, and the bitter craving to strike heavy blows," Meredith advocates a 
genial moralism, which he personifies as a mischievous sprite who chases folly not with 
angry contempt but with calmly intellectual "sunny malice" ("Essay on Comedy" 447, 
446). Arguably, Meredith's comic spirit is the ideal Horatian satirist who is temperate 
and laughing. The vengeful, unamused Juvenalian satirist, by contrast, is too bitter about 
inexorable corruption to be morally effective. True "comic intelligence" is above the 
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angry contempt of satire; unfortunately, according to Meredith, the English excel at 
satiric forms because of a "national disposition for hard-hitting, with a moral purpose to 
sanction it" ("Essay on Comedy" 443). The degrading metaphor throughout the essay for 
satire is that of a vulture, a "social scavenger" whose beak "smells like carrion" and is 
full of destructive bile and the base desire to scourge ("Essay on Comedy" 445); 
contrastingly, the heavenly "Comic Spirit" is restrained and "humanely malign" - the 
embodiment of reason ("Essay on Comedy" 446). Robert Martin argues simply that 
Meredith promotes intellectual wit over sentimental humour, but, importantly, Meredith 
rejects the cold and narrowly self-righteous cruelty of satire. Meredith's comic theory is 
infused with the centuries of debate (detailed in this chapter) about the moral and artistic 
integrity of satire; his essay evokes the "comic spirits" of Aristophanes, Rabelais, 
Voltaire, Cervantes, and Fielding ("Essay on Comedy" 442)- interestingly, a mixture of 
Horatian and Juvenalian satirists. Furthermore, Meredith's The Egoist: A Comedy in 
Narrative (1879), which begins with an evocation of the "Comic Spirit," is far more 
satiric (even Juvenalian) in its mode of anatomizing egoism than is permitted by 
Meredith's own theory of comedy. "The Book of Egotism" appears throughout the 
narrative (blasphemously evoking the patrilineal customs of the Bible) to satirize the 
incurable egoism that reduces "the English Gentleman" to a destructive artifice. The 
astoundingly successful influence of "The Book of Egoism" - as "few people are in the 
habit of thinking for themselves" ("Essay on Comedy" 434) - is a Juvenalian criticism of 
the ineffectiveness of the forces of pure intellect. 
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Just as there were strong counter-currents of anti-satiric theory in the eighteenth-
century alongside the abundant production of strong satire, the Victorian theoretical 
distaste for satire did not annul its literary practice. Thus, although theorists of Victorian 
political, social, and literary culture such Arnold, Carlyle and Ruskin, and more 
importantly for this study, Victorian novelists, often express a preference for kind 
humour over cruel wit, the Juvenalian mode (which is more securely satiric rather than 
comic) is ubiquitously enacted in the period's novelistic discourse. 
1.iii Theoretical Disorientation: Twentieth-Century Satire Theory 
Victorian satire requires a defense, not only because it has been condemned in the 
comico-satiric theory of many of the period's influential writers, but because it has been 
overlooked in the crossfire of contemporary generic debates about satire, both in general, 
and particularly in the novel. Dustin Griffin contends that after the "hostility of Victorian 
criticism" (29), theorists and critics of satire in the twentieth century found it necessary to 
resuscitate and defend satire as a literary art. As previously discussed, satire's fluctuating 
status (in literary circles) as a mode and/or genre, and the nature of its distinguishing 
characteristics, has been the subject of incessant debate from the ancient period to the 
present. The confusing narrative of satire's evolution is as follows: it is an ancient mode 
that became a Roman genre and then, as some believe, reverted to its modal status, while 
others (such as Leon Guilhamet) maintain that it has always been a genre - admittedly, a 
protean genre of mixed forms. Against Guilhamet, P. K. Elkin argues that satire is not a 
form as much as an "informing spirit" (11 ). For example, in the Augustan era, anything 
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that "smacked of censure and was delivered in a mocking, ironical, derisive, censorious, 
abusive, or a jesting manner," was construed as satire (Elkin 11 ). Similarly, Northrop 
Frye observes that satire "hardly exists now" as a form, but instead thrives mainly as a 
"tone" or "attitude" ("Nature" 75).61 Yet, despite the modal focus of many critics of 
satire, there is a widespread tendency to revert to generic conclusions. Fredrick Bogel 
refers to this critical trend in satire studies as "fence sitting" (5) between genre and mode. 
Like many critics of satire, Edward and Lillian Bloom, while determined to 
embrace satire's complexity as a mode, still promote quasi-essentialist claims about its 
nature. Although the Blooms acknowledge that satire is "like the god Mercury ... wearing 
many guises" (5), they determine that it is fundamentally a "persuasive art" (20-21) 
"prompted by the realistic and topical" (23). George Test's Satire: Spirit and Art (1991) 
also exemplifies the contradictions and confusions characteristic of satire theory. His goal 
is to examine satire as "merely the aesthetic manifestation of a universal urge too varied 
as to elude definition" (ix). Defining satire as a "bent," he nonetheless offers four 
elements that are "basic to satire": attack, laughter, play, and judgment (Test 12, x). In a 
similar vein, John Snyder argues confusingly that satire, the "most shape-shifting of all 
genres," is a "semi-genre" - or rather an "unstable genre" (11, 15) without an essence. In 
fact, he asserts it is a method more than a genre, which has "its own characteristic 
deployment of power" (Snyder 15) - namely rational superiority. Snyder then proceeds to 
define satire as the "genre most resorted to for political critique" (132; italics mine). 
Charles A. Knight also tries to avoid labeling satire as either a mode or a genre, 
concluding that it transcends both in its status as an attacking "frame of mind" or to 
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become "pre-generic": "a mental position that needs to adopt a genre" (1-5). Arguably, 
this definition necessarily positions satire as a mode. All of these critical positions 
demonstrate that thematic and tonal (or modal) analyses of satire tend ultimately toward 
formal assessments. 
Edward W. Rosenheim assesses satire as both a mode and a genre, but places his 
emphasis on the satiric target: "All satire is not only an attack; it is an attack upon 
discernible, historically authentic particulars" (317-18). Knight adds literary subjects to 
the satiric target or "referent": "satire straddles the historical world of experience and the 
imaginative world of Ideas and insists on the presence of both" ( 45). Many critics concur 
that topical referentiality and factuality are central to satire (Bogel 9, E. Bloom and L. 
Bloom 34, Test 29, Snyder 97, and Hooley, Roman Satire 169). The relatively greater 
importance of the historical-referential world outside the text further distinguishes satire 
from comedy. Elkin finds that satire elicits "responsible laughter," not the "liberating" 
laughter of comedy (13). As well, David Worchester distinguishes between comedy and 
satire by the specificity and "intensity of condemnation" (37). Comedy's laughter is 
comparatively purposeless (Worchester 38). Rosenheim's conviction that "the essence of 
the satiric procedure is attack" (321) appears to hold sway. Dyer, for example, updates 
this view in his definition of satire as "sophisticated discursive assault" (10). In various 
critical accounts of satire, past and recent, the object of attack remains definitive, or even 
as Bogel calls it, a "generic imperative" (9). Whether the attack is ascribed as being 
moral or not is another issue that perplexes critics of satire. 
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Dustin Griffin regrets that twentieth-century theory has not substantially revised 
Augustan or even ancient notions of satire (28). Drawing attention to the partisan nature 
of all critical commentary, he condemns the efforts of scholars of the 1950s and 1960s for 
being too attached to hopelessly outmoded assessments of satire as a narrowly moral and 
didactic art. Mary Claire Randolph's landmark 1942 essay on verse satire, for example, 
reasserts Casaubon and Dryden's views (Griffin 28). Certainly Northrop Frye, "the most 
influential modem theorist" of satire (Spacks 361), does maintain Dryden's essential 
definition of satire as wit or humour combined with an object of attack; as well, he 
reiterates the notion of a Horatian and Juvenalian polarity, but reconfigures this as a 
continuum whose boundaries are comedy (humour without attack) and tragedy (attack 
without humour) ("Nature" 75). Fundamentally, however, Frye differs from Dryden by 
associating satire overall with tragedy and not epic ("Nature" 86-87). Contrary to Patricia 
Meyer Spacks, Frye refuses to "dismiss moral purpose as a necessary component of 
satire" (Spacks 362); instead, along with Dryden, he suggests that satire contains "an 
assertion and defense of a moral principle" ("Nature" 78). Frye argues that satire's 
"moral norms are relatively clear, and it assumes standards against which the grotesque 
and absurd are measured" (Anatomy 223). Selection of a satirical target is a "moral act" 
(Anatomy 224 ). The overall critical consensus of the 1950s and 1960s, according to 
Griffin, is that satire is monolithic and clear-cut in its aims and moral standards (35).Yale 
satire scholars, for example, including Maynard Mack, Alvin Kernan, Robert C. Elliott, 
and Ronald Paulson, produced a rhetorical theory of satire - related to the then-ascendant 
New Criticism - invested, as Dryden was, in defending satire as an art (Griffin 28-29), 
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specifically a moral art. (That satire still needed defending is evidenced by the opening 
sentence of Gilbert Highet's Anatomy of Satire (1962): "Satire is not the greatest type of 
literature" [3].) In the 1960s, University of Chicago satire theorists, such as Sheldon 
Sacks, and Edward Rosenheim challenged the purely rhetorical focus of the Yale school 
and emphasized historical context, but still the moral imperative of satire remained the 
dominant generic signifier (Griffin 31 ). 
Griffin would undoubtedly reject pronouncements such as Maynard Mack's in 
"The Muse of Satire" (l 951 ): satire "asserts the validity and necessity of norms, 
systematic values, and meanings that are contained by recognizable codes" (as opposed 
to tragedy, which tends to show the limits of ethical codes) (194). Similarly, Kernan 
posits that the satirist "sees the world as a battlefield between a definite clearly 
understood good, which he represents, and an equally clear-cut evil" (21-22). P. K. Elkin 
observes that satire increases the reader's awareness of "norms, conventions, traditions, 
and established standards" (7). Griffin avidly rejects what he interprets as being biased 
views of the satirist having moral tunnel vision; satiric rhetoric, he insists, need not be 
categorized as "simply ... the communication of previously codified moral knowledge," 
but can be identified instead as "a rhetoric of inquiry and provocation" that creates a 
more complex relation to satiric targets than simple rejection (39, 64). The satirist, he 
argues, is rarely in full control of the satiric work- even its moral message. Interestingly, 
however, Griffin is unable to dispense fu]]y with moral positioning in satiric rhetoric. He 
concedes that the moral element is present as "one strand" in satire; most of satire's 
moral ideas "are often so elementary ... as to be a kind of irreducible moral minimum for 
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sentient beings" (37). Griffin's basic point, however, is that satire is a genre which tends 
to challenge the orthodoxies of received opinion, and thus is not necessarily a politically 
conservative genre entrenched in the status quo ( 60). Fredrick Bogel also calls for a 
"more adequate theory" with which to assess the "complexities of the satiric mode" (vii-
viii). In his post-structuralist approach, he wishes to dispense with the "secure" binary 
(based on authorial intention) between satirist and satiric object; he troubles this dualism 
by arguing that the satirist exists in an angst-ridden relationship with the satiric target. 
His goal is to subvert the "alleged clarity of satire's norms of judgment" that have given 
satire "generic stability" (Bogel 3). Bogel, however, like Griffin, disregards the moral 
complexity ascribed to satire by earlier critics. Both critics, in their efforts to challenge 
satire's status as a moral art, over-simplify the conclusions of the theorists of the 1950s 
and 1960s, who grappled with satire's variegated moral ethos in their efforts to explore 
its contradictory nature (for example, its simultaneous tendencies towards both the 
conservative and rebellious). 
Griffin and Bogel believe that to conceive of satire as being narrowly moral or 
ethical necessarily reduces it to a monologic, conservative genre. Linda Hutcheon makes 
a similar critical conflation in her theory of parody.62 It is important to note, however, 
that many theorists do not agree that the Varro-Diomedes-Dryden notion of satire as a 
moral art is necessarily yoked to a conservative investment in the status quo. In my view, 
much of the critical confusion in current satire theory results from varying interpretations 
of the concept of moral/ethical positioning in satiric texts. For example, Robert C. Elliott 
acknowledges the ostensible conservatism of the Tory satirists (who, ironically, saw 
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themselves as the "true" Whigs [Carretta 35]), but also notes the revolutionary potential 
of satire. Swift, he argues, as a Tory could not have wished to dismantle the political and 
social structures in place, but his art "[i]nstead of shoring up foundations, it tears them 
down. It is revolutionary" (275).63 As well, for Frye, the moral quality of satire does not 
preclude its revolutionary potential, due to the pragmatic nature of many of its "moral 
sentiments" ("Nature" 78) (for example, its position against greed and hypocrisy). 
Furthermore, the "innate nihilism of satire can be put to revolutionary use" (Frye, 
"Nature" 88).64 Charles Knight argues that satire, concerned primarily with the well-
being of a community, is inherently neither conservative nor liberal (226). Yet, Knight, 
like Griffin, Bogel and others, is equivocal about the moral aspect of satire. Ideally, he 
suggests, satire is independent of moral purpose but "insofar as satire is moral at all, it 
tends to create its own values" based on an ironic perspective towards the "historical 
subject" (Knight 5, 6-8). According to this approach, satire often implicitly involves 
moral resistance to moral norms. Similarly, the Blooms note that "every satire is built on 
some form of reproach" (120), even if it is reproach of current moral norms. It appears 
that George Levine's description of the term realism as being "dangerously multivalent" 
and provoking "sticky self-contradictions" (Realistic I 02-3), applies equally to the word 
moral.65 
Griffin calls for a "new theoretical consensus" (2) in satire theory, but admits that 
this is far from being achieved. Satire theory remains in a disjointed state, it seems, due to 
its incompatibility with post-structuralist rejections of intentionality, and what Wayne 
Booth refers to as a ubiquitous ban on moral criticism based on the "conflation" of 
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narrow "moral codes" with "total ethical effect" (242). Satire studies, as Kirk Combe 
predicts, benefit from trends in new historicism - the identification of Rosenheim' s 
"historically authentic particulars" - yet satire theory seems beleaguered as much as ever 
by terminological confusion related to morality and ethics. Reduced to its perennial 
elements in terms of centuries of haphazard consensus, satire is a mode and/or genre; it is 
parodic and variegated in its form and subjects; involves a critical attitude, or attack that 
is moral (in the various senses of that troublemaking word); and is often politically 
oriented (towards either the preservation or, quite often, the destruction of dominant 
ideology) - utilizing for its critique ironic elements of wit or humour. Yet, the 
genealogical chaos surrounding satire in general is only unleashed in full force when 
satire's relationship to the novel is confronted, "[a]nd Universal Darkness buries All" 
(Pope, Dunciad IV 656). 
1.iv The Menippean Abyss: Satire and the Novel 
A central site of satire's theoretical and practical dislocation continues to be the 
novel. Although rigorous divisions between prose and verse satire have been condemned 
as "superficial" (Guilhamet ix), prose fiction in the form of the novel has been perceived 
to be scattering the remains of satire as a genre (and even as a mode) beyond theoretical 
recuperation. Many critics would like to see a revised theory of satire as it functions in 
prose fiction. Despite this hope, there is a surprisingly widespread tendency among critics 
of satire to avoid the novel altogether. Gary Dyer, for example, omits the novel from his 
assessment of satires written between 1789-1832, arguing that satire's borders with the 
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novel are generally too vague. Griffin's remarkable statement also exposes this trend: "In 
the last two hundred years satire in the W estem tradition is most commonly found not as 
an independent form or parody; it is found in the novel. But what happens when satire 
invades the novel is a subject so vast and unwieldy that I do not attempt to treat it here" 
(3). In 2005, Duncan Kennedy quotes this declaration and adds in wistful overstatement, 
"sadly no one else does either" (308). 
For Guilhamet, satire as a genre has a definitive structural attribute: the tendency 
to mix, absorb, appropriate, and blend other genres, to "deform" and transform them into 
satire (11-16). In similar terms, Terry Eagleton's panoramic study, The English Novel: an 
Introduction (2005), assesses the generic elusiveness of the novel, asserting that it "is the 
most hybrid of literary forms" - it is a "maverick form" (English 6). The novel has clear 
roots in romance (including texts of ancient Mediterranean cultures): "Novels are 
romances - but romances which have to negotiate the prosaic world" (Eagleton, English 
2). Yet, the novel's ties with romance are contradictory, for, according to Eagleton, 
novels are "wedded to the common life" and must reject "rhetoric and fantasy" (English 
5, 4). Novels, in fact, are "a satire on romance, and thus a kind of anti-literature" 
(Eagleton, English 3). Paulson would agree: "Satire's realism, violent exaggeration, [and] 
discursive expository," he suggests, are rooted in anti-romance (Satire 23). Specifically, 
George Levine concurs that "nineteenth-century realism defined itself against romance 
because that form implied wish fulfillment rather than reality" (Realistic 9). Eagleton, 
however, focuses on the novel's ambivalent relationship with romance and does not 
explore the generic cross-fertilization of the novel and satire.66 Both the realist novel and 
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satire, it seems, are held to be literature's most generically hybridic forms, and both 
(critics claim) have a similar relationship to reality. What Levine states as the crux of 
realism applies to both: the "self-conscious effort, usually in the name of some kind of 
moral enterprise of truth telling" (Realistic 8).67 Juvenal, for example, insisting upon the 
veracity of the sexual immorality that he exposes in Satire VI, protests that he is not 
"making the whole thing up": "How I wish that it was all nonsense!" (6.635, 638). Satire 
and the novel, particularly the "realist" novel, exist in confusingly close correlation.68 
One critic who has braved the disorienting generic overlap between satire and the 
novel is Paulson, whose Fictions of Satire (1967) and Satire and the Novel (1967) 
consider the ways in which satire was transformed and absorbed by novelists in the mid-
eighteenth century. For Paulson both the novel and satire find common ground in realism 
(Satire 11 ). The similarity of novelistic representational realism and satire is revealed, for 
Paulson, by the fact that just as realism is a practice which aims at "truth to life"69 the 
premise of satire is that it is not fiction (Satire 20-23). Both forms rely on dramatic and 
mimetic structures and conventions. Essentially, for Paulson, satire involves "fictions" 
which engage in the "mimesis, exploration and analysis" of evil - usually in the form of 
excessive order or chaos (Fictions 78, 20). Both the novel and satire are topical genres, 
despite the novel's aim of truth to actual experience and satire's ideal of ironic 
detachment (Satire 7). Paulson observes, however, a drift in the eighteenth century away 
from discursively formal satire to satire that foregrounds its fictionality while maintaining 
the conventions of verisimilitude (Fictions 76). Augustan satire, according to Paulson, 
evolves by focusing less on the satirist as a detached "normative satiric commentator" 
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(Fictions 143) (as in Swift's Tale of a Tub). This creates an interesting paradox: "as satire 
increases in rhetorical effectiveness it draws less and less attention to itself as satire; 
ultimately the most effective satire (given its satiric aims) would be the one that passed as 
something else" (Paulson, Fictions 152). Paulson's evocative suggestion that satire may 
often simply be passing as novelistic realism reinforces the perplexing generic contiguity 
of the forms. 
Paulson asserts that the satirist "customarily regards reality as something that the 
ordinary person can see only ifhe takes off the glasses of convention" (Satire 18). In tacit 
agreement, Elkin observes that satiric writers from Dryden to Goldsmith, wishing both to 
delight and instruct, believed that in order to educate successfully, satire must be realistic: 
"the goal of the satirist was to show people as they were and the age what it was like" 
(81 ). In fact, it cast itself as "superior realism" (Elkin 82). In the preface to Joseph 
Andrews (1742), for example, Fielding insists that, in opposition to the distortions of 
romance, everything in his novel/"comic Epic-Poem in Prose" "is copied from the book 
of Nature" ("Preface" 8). Regretfully, Paulson concludes that satire in the novels of 
Fielding and Smollett is, for the most part, "domesticated" (Fictions 222) or "sublimated" 
(Satire 291 ); it is reduced to one element of a larger whole (Fictions 222). Key 
differences between the novel and satire are summarized as follows: the novel typically 
promotes new values, whereas satire is usually conservative; the novel is more concerned 
with character, satire with action; novelists search for "ultimate truths," while satirists 
"see[k] at best a provisional truth" (Fictions 230). Furthermore, Paulson discerns a 
structural tension between the sentimental and satiric content of novels. There is a 
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continual alternation between the angry demolition of the satiric object and the 
sentimental evocation of pathos (Fictions 237-239). This novelistic structure extends 
"deep into the nineteenth century" - and is best exemplified by the "satiric logic" of 
Dickens's novels (Satire 236). Paulson concludes that satire's extinction as a major genre 
is related to its envelopment by the sentimental novel; both claim to be morally 
improving, and both employ melodramatic scenes of strong feeling (Satire 239). The 
crucial difference is that satire emphasizes the agency of evil, while sentimental novels 
emphasize that of good (Satire 237). Paulson concludes that English authors from 
Fielding onwards increasingly exhibit a sentimental focus on good (Satire 245-6); 
whereas, satire, in Guilhamet' s words, "sets its gaze squarely on the worst of what is 
real" (16). 
Paulson's thesis concerning the similarities yet ultimate divergence of the forms, 
influenced by Stuart Tave's earlier conclusions about the ascendancy of humour over wit, 
has been widely accepted. For example, Charles Knight agrees that relations between the 
novel and satire are difficult to assess due to the "generic closeness of the forms" (203). 
Both forms exhibit abundant similarities; for example, formal self-consciousness, parodic 
intertextuality, assertions of originality, and a concern for the relationship between the 
individual and society (Knight 203, 206). The key difference between them, however, is 
the complexity of characters and the degree of readerly sympathy generated for them in 
the narrative (Knight 232). When criticism of society is secondary to the depiction of 
psychology, he insists, satires become novels (and vice versa) (Knight 204-5). Frank 
Palmeri, in Satire, History, Novel: Narrative Forms (2003), holds a similar view. Satire 
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was a strong element in comic-realistic narrative in Britain until the 1780s; after this date, 
satire gradually "assumed a subordinate and local role in the narrative as a whole" (32). 
More sentimentality in the novel resulted in the increasing accommodation of distinctly 
un-satiric middle grounds. 70 Smollett, for example, sacrificed satire for a realistic, 
domestic focus on his characters (Palmeri, Satire, History 41, 185, 293).71 
It is important to note that critical efforts to identify the ideological limitations of 
representational realism have necessarily sidelined satire. Satire complicates the notion 
that realism is a "predominantly conservative form" (Belsey 51 ). Generally, satire is an 
unsettling mode/genre whereas, as Catherine Belsey argues, "[t]he experience of reading 
a realist text is ultimately reassuring" and reflective of the "world we seem to know" 
(51 ). Francis O'Gorman notes that theories of realism prevalent in late 1970s and 1980s 
which engaged in post-structuralist arguments (influenced by Barthes' theories of 
language and Athusserian notions of ideology) interpreted Victorian realists as "naive 
and dangerously conservative" (Victorian Novel 94). O'Gorman considers Betsey's 
assessment of "classic realism" to be typical of the trend in the 1980s towards politicized 
readings of realism (Victorian Novel 94-95). According to Belsey, the "empiricist-
idealist" position encoded in realist texts is founded on a conception human nature as 
unchanging, "transcendent" (7), and not socially constituted. A "classic realist" text is 
ideologically incapable of accepting contradiction. Thus, its characters are self-consistent 
and their natures reflect a "system of character-differences existing in the world" (Belsey 
74). Maggie and Tom Tulliver in Eliot's Mill on the Floss (1860), Belsey argues, are 
depicted as having "essential differences" (74). Yet, this conclusion necessarily ignores 
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the novel's overt critique of the gendered social influences forming character. "Classic 
realism" also preserves its lack of contradiction through a narrative in which disorder is 
ultimately replaced by order (Belsey 91 ). The latter is necessary to lull (or "interpellate") 
the reader into a non-contradictory subject position (usually of that the omniscient 
narrator) (Belsey 91 ). This subject position is a construction that confirms a middle class 
vision of social reality. Insistence upon the "classic realist" text's requirements of self-
consistent characterizations and enactment of closure - a position articulated not only by 
Belsey, but also by Terry Eagleton, Toril Moi, Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, and others -
preclude its generic connection with satire.72 
According to Brian Connery and Kirk Combe, one aspect of satire that 
consistently confuses critics is its frequent lack of satisfying closure: its "open-endedness, 
irresolution, and thus chaos" (5). This quality of satire squarely opposes a key tenet of 
"classic realism" yet pervades the realist novel. Arguing against the assumption that 
Victorian novelists were na"ive about the constraints of realism, Levine asserts that they 
"were already self-conscious about the nature of their medium" (Realistic 100). "With 
remarkable frequency," he argues, "they are alert to the arbitrariness of the reconstructed 
order toward which they point" (Levine, Realistic 101). Novelists reveal this awareness 
"through self-reference and parody" (Levine, Realistic 101 ). The notion that Victorian 
realist texts are inherently opposed to indeterminacy discounts the prevalence of self-
reflexive narrative techniques which ironize realism and satirize its narrative conventions. 
In works by Trollope, Thackeray, and Bronte, satiric narrators frequently comment upon 
the artificial constraints of the three-volume novel and critique the limitations of their 
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middle-class audience. Henry James, for one, resented this habitual destruction of the 
realist illusion, particularly in Trollope's novels. In Barchester Towers (1857), closure is 
orchestrated with jocular irony: "These le'ave takings in novels are as disagreeable as they 
are in real life; not so sad, perplexing, and generally less satisfactory. What novelist, what 
Fielding, what Scott, ... can impart interest in the last chapter of his fictitious history. 
Promises of two children and superhuman happiness are of no avail" (Barchester Towers 
251). As well, Thackeray's narrator in Vanity Fair (1847-48) describes the various genres 
in which he could have portrayed the subject of his Vauxhall chapter and then settles 
parodically upon realism: "Let us then step in the coach" (despite the fact that there is 
"barely room") (Vanity Fair 61). In Chapter 5, I discuss Bronte's satiric reduction of 
Shirley's ending to a business transaction. Theories ofrealism' s reliance on 
uncomplicated closure repeatedly disregard the Victorian satire on narrative conventions 
of realism. 
"Classic realist" novels frequently employ allegorical or picaresque modes to 
devastate habits both of literary realism and the world it claims to represent. Such 
narrative modes are characteristic of Menippean satire (a definition of which is 
forthcoming). The picaro/satirist is a changeable figure whose plasticity extends the 
critique of human society as far as narratively possible. Inconsistent characters are 
effective vehicles of satire, and, ironically, are quite populous in "classic realist" texts. 
Furthermore, Sally Shuttleworth points out that theories insisting upon a unified 
psychological subject as being critical to the form of the realist novel "fail to take into 
account the complexity of nineteenth-century social and scientific thought"; the 
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individual subject was not represented in these discourses as necessarily coherent or self-
directing (Eliot 12-13). Shuttleworth' s statement calls to mind many central characters of 
Victorian novels. In Great Expectations, Pip's hazy awareness of his masochistic habit of 
self-suppression results in numerous proclamations of a divided self ("restlessly aspiring 
discontented me" [135]). Hardy's Jude Fawley is a self-proclaimed "chaos of principles 
groping in the dark" (Jude 399). Even Arthur Donnithorne of Adam Bede, George Eliot's 
prototypical realist text, wavers between the deeds that will determine his character due 
to that psychological source of inconsistency, the "backstairs influence" or "small 
unnoticeable wheel" (173) of the unconscious. In fact, Victorian "classic realist" texts are 
preoccupied with divided, inconsistent characters who are directed by motives and habits 
of mind of which they are not fully aware. Far from opposing satire in the novel (as 
Paulson claims), psychological realism creates inconsistent characters who are apt 
vehicles of satire. 
Despite Paulson's articulation of fundamental differences between novelistic 
realism and satire, he acknowledges the continuance of what he terms "Lucianic satire." 
The latter, evident in the novels of Cervantes and Fielding, involves a (corruptible) 
picaro character (often of low birth) who journeys through a world of robbers and 
charlatans (or even journeys to another world entirely) to show the "multifarious 
complexity of experience" and to "ridicule the over-formalized" (Satire 24-25). Paulson's 
acceptance of Lucianic/Menippean satire as "one branch of satire more or less parallel to 
the aim of the novel" (Satire 157) seems at odds both with his view of the novel and 
satire as two discontinuous traditions (Satire 10), and with his previous definition of the 
novel as sentimental and character-based. Yet it accords with Mikhail Bakhtin and 
Northrop Frye's generic conclusions about Menippean satire. 
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Duncan Kennedy asks if Greek and Roman satiric traditions are truly "dead in the 
water" (299), or if the prevalence of referring to satire as a mode has simply clouded 
genealogical connections between ancient and modern forms of satire. Kennedy 
commends Bakhtin and Frye for their assessment of the formal features of prose fiction 
and for their "construct[ion of] genealogies that extend back to the Roman satirical 
tradition" (301 ). I contend that Bakhtin and Frye's theories, if combined, reveal satire to 
be far more than an incidental mode in the novel; specifically, Horatian, Juvenalian and 
Menippean satire are modal and generic properties of the Victorian novel. 
1.v Dialogic Genres: The Novel and Satire 
Together with Paul Medveldev in The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship 
(1929), Mikhail Bakhtin criticized Russian Formalist's neglect of the ideological aspects 
of language and literature (Striedter 3). Victor Shklovsky, for example, in his landmark 
essay "Art as Device" (1916), focuses on the purely formal or aesthetic function (at the 
expense of the ideological) of what he determines to be the key device of all literary art: 
priem ostroneniya, the device of defamiliarization (Striedter 23). Defamiliarization, for 
Shklovsky, "impedes the kind of perception automatized by social convention" (Striedter 
23-24), and thus renders the familiar unfamiliar. Furthermore, defamiliarization draws 
attention to the literariness of literary art by disrupting the reader's habitual perception of 
reality. This technique exposes perceptual illusions (created by habit/convention) and 
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promotes the "deautomatization" of the reader (Striedter 25). Shklovsky and other 
Formalists increasingly applied such poetic theories to prose, specifically the novel. In 
"Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin argues for the unification of formalism and ideological 
criticism (Dialogic 259). He promotes Shklovsky' s notion of literary art as estranging 
and therefore destructive of convention, but adds, through his concept of dialogization, a 
diachronic approach which considers socio-cultural ideology and thus politicizes this 
formal property - particularly of the novel. 
For Bakhtin, novels magnify and expose the cultural system from which they 
emerge by artistically exploring "the internal dialogism of discourse" (Dialogic 285). 
Given that language is "ideologically saturated" (Dialogic 271) with a world view, the 
existence of many languages (heteroglossia) in a text implies "the co-existence of socio-
ideological contradictions" (Dialogic 300). The "novelistic word ... registers with 
extreme subtlety the tiniest shifts and oscillations of the social atmosphere" (Dialogic 
300). By contrast, closed forms (such as epic poetry) adhere to unitary or monologic 
language, and therefore "serve to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world" 
(Dialogic 270).73 Heteroglossia is absent from all literary forms invested in the 
centripetal forces "of sociopolitical cultural centralization" (Dialogic 271 ). The novel, by 
virtue of its heteroglossic language, is connected to the contradictory flux of authentic 
social variety and therefore promotes decentralizing, centrifugal forces which counter 
dominant ideologies (Dialogic 271). Bakhtin argues that the novel subverts the "habitual 
matrices" (sosedstva) or conventions of both society and literature (Dialogic 169). 
"Dialogization" - a "diversity of social speech types (sometimes even diversity of 
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languages) and diversity of individual voices, artistically organized" (Dialogic 262) - is 
the distinctive feature of the novel. Bakhtin clarifies that novelistic language is stratified, 
for it includes genres both literary (short stories, poems) (Dialogic 264, 323) and extra-
literary (letters, diaries, confessions, forms of rhetoric, political manifestos) (Rabelais 
33); it also includes language reflecting social stratification (such as professional jargon 
and age-specific language). Most importantly, the novel is infused with the discourse of 
characters, whose speech is always an "ideologue" that blends the speech of both other 
characters and the narrator (Dialogic 333, 319). Yet another language that is refracted in 
the novel is that of the author. In short, the novel offers generic and social diversity 
through heteroglossia (Dialogic 368). Famously, Bakhtin also asserts that the novel "gets 
on poorly with other genres" (Dialogic 5). Unlike "straightforward genres," the novel "is 
always criticizing itself' and is parodic and "double-voiced" (Dialogic 49, 273). Parody 
requires the "stratification of literary language into generic languages" (Dialogic 76). 
Being the antithesis of hegemonic discourse, the novel undermines the authority of not 
only social but literary custom. 
Bakhtin theorizes that the serio-comic, heteroglossic novel developed out of the 
"Second Line" of the European novel (in contrast to the "First Line" or Sophistic novel, 
which is not heteroglossic but "purely monologic" [Dialogic 372]). Serio-comic authors 
such as Cervantes and Rabelais excelled in juxtaposing everyday language with 
rhetorically ornate romantic. discourses (Dialogic 383). Parodically stylized, the comic 
novel became an "encyclopedia of all strata and forms of literary language" (Dialogic 
301 ). A distinctive aspect of the serio-comic novel, Bakhtin proposes, is the presence of 
the "direct authorial word" (sentiment or a moral, didactic discourse) which "directly 
embodies (without any refracting) semantic and axiological intentions of the author" 
(Dialogic 301 ). Yet the main language infusing the comic novel (through which the 
author's voice is refracted) is that of the "common language" or the "going point of 
view" (Dialogic 30 I) - the general, habitually held opinion of the body politic. 
Furthermore, the novels of Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne parody multiple discourses -
scholarly, moral, rhetorical, professional, and poetic. Perhaps most importantly, they 
parody novelistic discourse itself - a "means for refracting new authorial intentions" 
(Dialogic 309). In this way, the novel preserves its open-endedness and plasticity: "the 
generic skeleton of the novel is still far from having hardened" (Dialogic 3). Although 
the novel develops in the Hellenic period, late Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, 
Bakhtin holds (along with Ian Watt) that it does so "with special force and clarity at the 
beginning of the second half of the eighteenth century" (Dialogic 5). Due to its serio-
comic heritage, the novel is "flexible, dialogized, permeated with laughter, irony, 
humour, elements of self-parody" (Dialogic 330); it is actively affixed to the historical 
reality in which it is evolving. In the novel, the official languages of the status quo are 
"unmasked" as being insufficient to express the plasticity of contemporary reality 
(Dialogic 26-27). Unquestionably, Bakhtin's recognition of the ideological basis of the 
novel as a dialogic, parodic and thus critical form, affirms its generic links with satire. 
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Throughout his writings, Bakhtin evinces a special interest in the genealogy of the 
novel and its relations to inherently dialogic genres such as satire. He asserts that "the 
germs of novelistic discourse" (Dialogic 3 71) are found in satires, autobiographical 
forms, some purely rhetorical forms (like the diatribe), and historical and epistolary 
genres (Dialogic 371). Ancient serio-comical literature (referred to by the Greeks as 
spoudogeloion) included mimes, fables, memoirs, Socratic dialogues, Roman satire 
(Bakhtin refers to Lucilius, Persius, and Juvenal), and Menippean satire: "All these 
genres, permeated with the 'serio-comical,' are authentic predecessors of the novel" 
(Dialogic 21, 22). 
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Bakhtin draws a parallel between the festivals of the Roman Satumalias and 
mediaeval carnivals in which the traditional hierarchal relationships were temporarily 
reversed (Rabelais 10). Menippean satire, in particular, was associated with the "freedom 
of Saturnalian laughter" (Dialogic 26). As well, Roman literature was inherently dialogic, 
for it contained an awareness of Greek language and forms; the words of Latin literature 
were always words "with a sideways glance" (Dialogic 61 ). Importantly - and likely due 
to his rejection of what he calls "negative satire" - Horace, and not Juvenal, is singled out 
by Bakhtin as an exemplary dialogic satirist who parodically stylized his own voice as 
well as the voice of general opinion (Dialogic 371 n. 38).74 Most relevant to the history of 
the novel is the fact that its "double-voiced" elements "coalesced in the ancient period" in 
the Menippean genre, which influenced novel types from the Middle Ages to the 
twentieth century (Dialogic 3 72). 75 Bakhtin finds elements of Menippean satire in the 
works of Lucilius and Horace, but does not mention Juvenal. Arguably this is another 
significant omission of Juvenal which perhaps hinges on Bakhtin's general rejection of 
uncongenial, un-laughing, or "purely negative satire" (Rabelais 120). Laughter is central 
to Bakhtin's definition of Menippean and novelistic dialogization. 
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Menippean satire is "genetically related" to the Socratic dialogue - a genre 
invested in the dialogical pursuit of the truth (Dialogic 26, Dostoevsky I 09). Socratic 
dialogues provided a prose model for the novel based on the concept of the hero turned 
jester, whose paradoxical motto is, "'I am wiser than everyone because I know that I 
know nothing'" (Dostoevsky 25). Menippean satire maintains the "intense spirit of 
inquiry" and utopian speculation of the Socratic dialogue, but interrogates truth with a 
greater quantity of laughter and crudity (Dostoevsky 26). Evincing a "joyful relativity," 
the genre remains one of the key "channels for the carnival sense of the world in 
literature" (Dostoevsky I 07, 113). Menippean satire, like all serio-comic genres, has 
contemporary reality as its focus; as a result, its subject matter is rendered not with "epic 
distance" but with familiarizing laughter (Dostoevsky 22, 23). The subjects in Menippean 
satire are "stripped" of '"empty' clothing" (or habit) and made ridiculous (Dostoevsky 
24). Appropriately, Bakhtin (similar to Carlyle) chooses the metaphor of clothing for 
socio-ideological habits of mind; "all existing clothes are always too tight" (Dialogic 37) 
for the heroes of serio-comic genres. In dialogic genres, the hero is an ingenu[ e] who is 
alienated from a society's "authoritative discourse" and who thus fails to understand the 
"habitual way of conceiving the world" (Dialogic 402). The "uncomprehending fool" is a 
parodic/satiric tool to "make strange" the world of social conventionality (Dialogic 404). 
The fool/ingenue functions to "destro[y] every nook and cranny of the habitual picture of 
the world" (Dialogic 177). Laughter destroys hierarchical habits of seeing the world. 
Bakhtin identifies fourteen features of Menippean satire - renamed "the 
Menippea": a comic element; extreme freedom of plot; the testing of a received truth 
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through the "bold use of the fantastic" (more than the adventure of any one character it is 
"the adventure of an idea or truth in the world" [Dostoevsky 115]); an organic 
combination of the fantastic and lofty with settings of "slum naturalism" (brothels, 
prisons, marketplaces); wrestling with ultimate philosophical questions; often a journey 
to a different plane of existence (frequently the nether world); frequently the exploration 
of abnormal (fragmented) moral and psychic states; the use of "scandal scenes" to 
dramatize departures from social norms; the celebration of oxymoronic "mesalliances of 
all sorts" (Dostoevsky 118); elements of social utopias with voyages to unknown lands; 
and the parodying of inserted genres, dialogization, and critical engagements with the 
ideological currents of the day (Dostoevsky 114-118). Relihan notes that Bakhtin's 
gesture of renaming the genre "menippea" acknowledges that Menippean satire proper is 
a much narrower genre (8). Certainly, Bakhtin conceives of the "menippea" as a plastic 
category which preserves traits of the ancient. A genre's "archaic elements," according to 
Bakhtin, are renewable: "Genre is reborn and renewed at every new stage in the 
development of literature and in every individual work of a given genre" (Dostoevsky 
108). Bakhtin does not propose that Dostoevsky consciously reworked the ancient genre 
of Menippean satire, but that its characteristics were "renewed'' in his work (Dostoevsky 
121 ). More generally, the novel itself preserves certain features of the ancient genre 
(Dostoevsky 121 ). 
Northrop Frye also renames Menippean satire - Frye's preferred term is 
"anatomy" - in recognition of his choice to recast the ancient genre as a kind of 
"supergenre" (Relihan 8). Frye's overarching view of satire, as literature that falls 
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generally under the narrative category (prior to genre) of irony (satire is "militant irony" 
[Anatomy 223], contains six "phases." The latter are redolent of categories ofHoratian, 
Juvenalian, and Menippean satire. The first phase, satire of the "low norm," accepts that 
human beings are flawed, but does not challenge "accepted codes of behavior" (Anatomy 
227); in fact, the reader is advised to uphold social conventions. In this phase "gaiety 
predominates" (Frye, Anatomy 227). This category of satire (which offers "conventional 
satire on the unconventional" [Anatomy 227]) contains the hallmarks of Horatian satire -
although Frye does not refer to it as such. The second phase or "quixotic satire" targets 
social convention and "fossilized dogma" often in the form of a picaresque narrative in 
which the rogue/hero levels systems of philosophy and exposes the romantic folly of 
"imposing" "oversimplified ideals on experience" (Anatomy 230-231 ); advocating 
detachment, "quixotic satire" analyzes and "breaks up the lumber of stereotypes, 
fossilized beings, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive 
fashions, and all other things that impede the free movement. .. of society" (Anatomy 
233). The third phase is similar to the second, but is more skeptical of common sense as 
an alternative to dogmatism. Frye's phases two and three satire correspond to his 
definition of Menippean satire or what he later terms "anatomy." 
In his assessment of Swift's Gulliver's Travels, Voltaire's Candide, Butler's The 
Way of All Flesh, and Huxley's Brave New World, Frye defines Menippean satire (which 
he renames "anatomy") as a genre concerned less with character than with mental 
attitudes and intellectual ideas (it brims with pedants, cranks, and philosophi gloriosi) 
(Anatomy 309). Unlike the novel, the "chief interest" of which he claims is "human 
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character as it manifests itself in society' (Anatomy 308), Menippean satire's characters 
are "stylized" mouthpieces for current intellectual trends (Anatomy 309). Importantly, he 
stresses that "no sharp boundary lines can or should be drawn" between Menippean satire 
and the novel, but, generally speaking, anatomy (dissection or analysis) is the organizing 
principle of Menippean satire, whereas "naturalistic," less "occupational" rendering of 
human beings is integral to the novel (Anatomy 309). This satire, like Bakhtin's 
"menippea," is loose-jointed in its narrative form, involves marvelous journeys, and is a 
highly "intellectualized" form which unsettles systems of knowledge (Anatomy 311 ). 
Reminiscent of Bakhtin's link with the Socratic dialogue, Frye finds the shortest form of 
Menippean satire to be the colloquy. Juxtaposing Menippean satire/anatomy with the 
novel opposes Bakhtin' s emphasis on their generic continuity; yet such distinctions 
between the forms are overturned by Frye's later assertion that anatomy is one of the four 
chief "strands" in the novel (confession, anatomy, romance, novel). Many characters in 
novels, he acknowledges, have "Menippean blood in them" (Anatomy 309). Frye's 
further qualification of his previous distinction between Menippean satire and the novel 
exposes the insufficiency of attempts to segregate the genres, especially using character 
as a primary basis of distinction (as Paulson, Knight, and others have attempted). What 
prevents, for example, a character such as Thomas Hardy's Jude Fawley from being 
simultaneously a psychologically complex portrait of a failed idealist and an anatomy of 
"the grind of stem reality" (Jude the Obscure 473)? George Eliot's Edward Casaubon is 
simultaneously a man whose inward trouble "claims some of our pity" (M 78) and a 
vehicle for satire on misogynist egoism and erudition. The "Menippean blood" of many 
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characters disrupts monologic notions of the novel's boundaries with satire - as Frye 
himself acknowledges. Interestingly, in keeping with Bakhtin' s notion of the 
deheroization of the individual as central to novelistic discourse (Rabelais 35), Frye 
observes that one of the central themes of satire is the disappearance of the heroic 
(Anatomy 228). For Bakhtin, in dialogic genres such as satire and the novel, 
deheroization is humanization though laughter; for Frye, however, this phenomenon 
complements his notion of satire's links with tragedy: satire "at its most concentrated ... 
is tragedy robbed of all its dignity and nobility" ("Nat~re" 86-87). 
Frye's fourth to sixth phases of satire represent less a strict division of levels than 
a continuum of depleting meliorism in terms of social and psychological reasons for 
human tragedy. Phase four satire involves the pessimism of tragic realism (as in the 
novels of Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad), in which the "fall of the tragic hero" is 
explained by "social and psychological" cause; it is a phase characterized by "explicit 
realism" (Anatomy 236, 237). In this phase (as in phase five, which is "fatalistic" and 
"resigned" to tragedy) idealists are still revered, but by phase six, no redeeming human 
trait is represented, and human life is depicted "in terms of largely unrelieved bondage" 
(Anatomy 237, 238). Crazed and miserable desdichado characters in scenes of madhouses 
and prisons dominate texts of this kind, and religion is parodied fiercely; but most 
importantly, "laughter has evaporated" (Anatomy 238). Frye's fourth to sixth phases of 
satire acknowledge the un-laughing word banned by Bakhtin. Frye's porous categories 
implicitly acknowledge the Juvenalian mode of satire (even in its most extreme form) as 
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a legitimate "phase," mode or category of satire in the novel; by contrast, Bakhtin rejects 
tragic, Juvenalian negativity. 
Bakhtin differentiates between the laughing "grotesque realism" (Rabelais 8) 
epitomized by the Rabelaisian carnival scene, with its focus on change and renewal, and 
what he calls "the purely formalist parody of modern times which has a solely negative 
character and is deprived of regenerating ambivalence" (Rabelais 21 ). "Grotesque 
realism" continues to exist in the Renaissance (in the work of Cervantes, for example) but 
the three centuries that follow are only "strewn with" its fragments (Rabelais 24).76 Like 
Carlyle, Bakhtin denounces the skepticism of the eighteenth century along with satirists 
such Voltaire, and Swift, who merely formalized grotesque images and created laughter 
that was didactic in its skepticism and "bare mockery" (Rabelais 3 7, 119). Laughter lost 
its rejuvenating potential and was utilized instead for the narrow, individualistic purposes 
of"dogmatic negation" unrelated to the culture.at large (Rabelais 101). "Bare negation is 
alien to folk culture," Bakhtin maintains, and laughter is inherently anti-dogmatic and 
anti-authoritarian (Rabelais 11, 95). In Bakhtin's view, negative or un-laughing satire 
focuses on a single target and anatomizes this singular subject, but does not engage in 
carnivalesque negation of an entire order of life (Rabelais 306-307). To repudiate a whole 
worldview through laughter implies apocalyptic renewal, and for Bakhtin, negative satire 
is too piecemeal to be truly revolutionary. 
Although the dialogic features of the novel were developed significantly in the 
eighteenth century, Bakhtin claims: "It could be said that in the nineteenth century the 
distinctive features of the Second Line [of the European, serio-comic novel] become the 
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basic constitutive features for the novelistic genre as a whole" (Dialogic 414). In keeping 
with his selection ofFyodor Dostoevsky's works for his extensive study of the dialogic 
novel, Bakhtin designates the nineteenth century as the age in which the novel reached an 
evolutionary apex. The Dickensian text, for example, is "washed by heteroglot waves 
from all sides" (Dialogic 307). Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne are cited along with 
Cervantes and Rabelais as Dickens's "predecessors" (Dialogic 308). Bakhtin highlights 
Dickens's mastery of "parodic stylization" of the voice of general opinion (Dialogic 303) 
(particularly in Little Dorrit, in the exemplary speech of Mr Merdle). Interestingly, 
Bakhtin argues that the Victorians only produced "negative rhetorical satire" (Rabelais 
45) in the second half of the nineteenth century. Renaissance grotesque imagery, which 
utilizes regenerative laughter, influenced Balzac, Hugo, and Dickens (Rabelais 52), but 
later in the nineteenth century the novel, in Bakhtinian terms, is de-novelized; it engages 
in negative satire, the "laughter that does not laugh" (Rabelais 45). Bakhtin's theory of 
the regenerative, ambivalent laughter of grotesque realism that opposes negative satire 
appears, in some aspects, to be an articulation of the traditional Horatian/Juvenalian 
binary. 
Bakhtin, with his acceptance and promotion ofHoratian and Menippean satire as 
dialogic genres related to the novel, and Frye, with his view ofHoratian, Menippean, and 
Juvenalian satire, reveal that the age-old preference for either the Horatian or Juvenalian 
satiric mode, based on arguments which nominate one over the other as the most 
effective artistically and even socio-politically, continues implicitly in the theories of the 
two most influential twentieth-century theorists of satire. As the following chapters 
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demonstrate, the argument that Victorian novelistic satire is linked to ancient satire (of all 
varieties) can be augmented by the work of both critics. Fundamentally, both theorists 
interpret satiric genres as being crucial for an assessment of social and literary habits and 
conventions. For Bakhtin and Frye, genre is essentially habit, and Menippean satire and 
the novel stand in a special relationship to habit. Frye evocatively names his Anatomy of 
Criticism after the genre that he defines as being especially free of social habits of mind, 
in an effort to highlight his critical project: to place literary criticism in a realm of 
intellectual freedom from "current social values" (Anatomy 348). His ideal, like Matthew 
Arnold's, is that criticism should escape being a slave to "compulsions of habit, 
indoctrination and prejudice" (Anatomy 348). Frye's goal of a non-partisan criticism -
which like the Menippean genre itself, "relies on the free play of intellectual fancy" 
(Anatomy 310) - is unattainable to Bakhtin, who, more radically, elevates the novel as the 
only genre that is inherently anti-canonical, self-critical, and therefore Menippean. Yet, 
the negative or anti-Rabelaisian mode of novelistic satire (what appears in Bakhtinian 
terms to be the Juvenalian mode) is unproductive in its assault on habit. Unlike the 
Rabelaisian forms of the novel, which parallel the Horatian satiric tradition, Juvenalian or 
pessimistic forms destroy potential anarchy by generating fear: "All that is ordinary, 
commonplace suddenly becomes meaningless, dubious and hostile .... Something 
frightening is revealed in that which was habitual and secure" (Rabelais 39). 
Contrastingly, for Frye, Horatian satire (seemingly phases one three) does not generate 
enough denunciation of the habits of mind which "impede the free movement...of 
society" (Anatomy 233). 
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As the next chapter will demonstrate, concepts of habit, which pervade multiple 
Victorian discourses (scientific, moral and economic), provide a satirical target 
multivalent and paradoxical enough to accommodate Horatian, Juvenalian, and 
Menippean methods of satire in Victorian novels. An ethical preoccupation with the 
possibilities and problems of habit predisposes Victorian novelists to satire, a mode or 
genre of literature that was - from Horace's playful criticism of people's "seeds of 
wickedness," planted "by nature or by some bad habit" (1.3.35-36), to Juvenal's enraged 
exposure of "[u]pper-class Roman habits" (2.170)- founded on the anatomy of 
individual and social habit. 
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Chapter 2 
Habit in Victorian Physiological Psychology and Related Moral, 
Educational and Social Discourses 
As years advance, example and imitation become custom, and gradually consolidate into 
habit, which is of so much potency that, almost before we know it, we have in a measure 
yielded up to it our personal freedom. (Samuel Smiles, Character 65) 
The study of psychology in the nineteenth century is in essence a study of habit. (Philip 
Fisher, "The Failure of Habit" 5) 
2.i A Victorian Subject for Satire 
As I have argued in Chapter 1, Victorian satiric practices in the novel have been 
de-emphasized and misrepresented as a result of a critical consensus that the Victorians, 
preferring sentimental realism to satire, discarded this unruly genre (especially its 
wrathful Juvenalian mode) as a crude pastime of unempathetic eighteenth-century writers 
such as Pope and Swift. Thus the narrator's statement in Thackeray's Vanity Fair, "Satire 
and Sentiment can walk arm-in-arm together" (200), has largely been ignored. Studies of 
satire in the Victorian novel tend to be restricted to piecemeal analyses of substantially 
satiric novels such as Martin Chuzzlewit or The Way of All Flesh. Palmeri's view that 
satire is a form of writing that disappears "underground or into eclipse" ("Thackeray" 
770) in the mid-Victorian period is representative. Importantly, Frances T. Russell's 
Satire in the Victorian Novel assesses the "Victorian contribution" to satire in a sweeping 
103 
manner. 77 Her study of Victorian satire's "distinctive features" explores the work of a 
"baker's dozen" of key figures: Thomas Peacock, Bulwer-Lytton, Benjamin Disraeli, 
Elizabeth Gaskell, William Thackeray, Charles Dickens, Charles Reade, Anthony 
Trollope, Charlotte Bronte, Charles Kingsley, George Eliot, George Meredith, and 
Samuel Butler ( 45-46). Her broadly-stated goal is to "discover the proportion and nature 
of the satiric element in Victorian fiction" (45). Works such as Vanity Fair are "satire 
soaked" (88), but in most Victorian novels, she argues, satire is present in diverse ways. 
Russell identifies the global object of satire as deception in its many forms. 78 Yet, most 
evocatively in her concluding chapter, Russell identifies a distinctive Victorian 
contribution to satire: namely, that satire's target shifts from effects to causes, and the 
argument that economic and social factors share the blame for human folly (297): "In 
proportion however, as the individual is spared, the burden of responsibility is shifted to 
the collective shoulders of the society he has bound himself to" (315). Forces of science 
and democracy influence this adjustment in satire's moralism (Russell 294). The 
"democratization of objects" in satire increases its criticism (which, Russell finds, is 
rarely Juvenalian) of institutions, including "Society, Church, School, and State" (315, 
294). Russell's identification of a sociological emphasis in Victorian satiric practices is a 
profound and resonant insight into a new focus for the period's satire. The belief that 
human character is substantially a social creation - a revolutionary concept, according to 
G. H. Lewes - becomes a Victorian preoccupation. Lewes's observation is exemplary: 
"To understand the Human Mind we must study it under its normal conditions, and these 
are social conditions" (P LMJ 128). 
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In this chapter, I endeavour to further Russell's argument concerning a Victorian 
satiric focus on society as the cause of moral ills by including habit as a dominant, 
encyclopedic subject of novelistic satire. Satiric assessment by target alone, as Gary Dyer 
points out, is often reductive in the extreme, but Victorian conceptions of habit are 
singularly all-embracing, multivalent, and paradoxical. Furthermore, multiple discursive 
fields were invested in habit as the driving force of human character. From physiology to 
psychology, established and then-emerging scientific discourses isolated habit as the key 
to the functioning of all organisms. In social, moral, and economic discourses (of self-
help and sympathy), habit was discovered to be the mechanism of progress not only of 
the individual but also of the state, as Samuel Smiles asserts: "National progress is the 
sum of individual industry, energy, and uprightness, as national decay is of individual 
idleness, selfishness, and vice" (Self-Help 18). Crucial, however, to the complexity and 
omnipresence of satiric investigations of habit in the period's fiction is the paradoxical 
nature of habit as it was variously theorized. Writers on habit fluctuate between 
Juvenalian cynicism and Horatian optimism. Across various Victorian disciplines, habit 
is identified as being simultaneously a grim, deterministic agent transforming humans 
into machines, and also a redemptive locus of ethical and intellectual possibility through 
"the habit of willing," self-discipline, reflexive sympathy, and the habit of free thought. 
Additionally, theories of habit form the basis not only of conservative middle-class 
values of incremental social change, but also of more radical concepts involving non-
customary thought and sweeping change. 
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As I stated at the outset, my focus on habit is indebted to Athena Vrettos's 
pioneering essay "Defining Habits: Dickens and the Psychology of Repetition," in which 
she explores Dombey and Son within the context of widespread sociological and 
psychological debates concerning the "function and implications of habitual behavior" 
(399). 79 Discussions of habit in magazine articles, religious tracts, psychological treatises, 
literature of self-help and character formation, and biographies of the period, as Vrettos 
observes, offer habit as a "guiding psychological mechanism of social structure" (399). 
Writers on habit, she notes, either maintain or question the reformative power of this 
force, which shapes and propels human character; debates centre on the question of 
whether habits are indicative of individually empowering forces or debilitating, 
anatomizing mechanization. Importantly, Vrettos outlines a double discourse concerning 
habit: one that is simultaneously hopeful of its potential for good (i.e. its usefulness in 
learning, and general productivity) but concerned about pathological potential. Notions of 
habit derive from associationist philosophers John Locke, David Hume, and David 
Hartley, and are specifically advanced in the nineteenth century in the works of G. H. 
Lewes, J. S. Mill, James Sully, G. F. Stout, William Carpenter, Henry Maudsley, 
Alexander Bain, and William James (Vrettos 399). Maxims concerning habit's powers 
for good or for ill, she observes, saturate the period's advice literature; Vrettos highlights 
Sarah Stickney Eilis's The Women of England (1838) and Samuel Smiles's Self-Help 
(1859) as exemplars of this popular discourse. Framed by such cultural discussions, 
Dombey and Son, Vrettos argues, displays the (culturally current) tension between habit 
as the simultaneous basis for individuality (in the form of eccentric routines or 
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behaviours) or as the basis of mechanicality, conformity, and "deadening routine" -
particularly in industrial culture (417). Vrettos not only contextualizes Dickensian 
characterization, but also, through her evocative commentary on culture-suffusing 
notions of habit, she initiates an investigation of an overarching preoccupation in 
Victorian culture. I will expand upon Vrettos's important assessment of the period's 
multivalent and embedded discourses of habit within novelistic prose (her focus is 
psychological realism) by adding the modal or generic consideration of satire. In this 
chapter, I analyze further the cultural significance of habit in the Victorian period, paying 
particular attention to scientific discourses explicating its mechanics (discourses which 
increasingly validate psychology as a science of human character). Ultimately, my 
interest is in the coalescence of moralized discourses of habit and the novelistic satire of 
the period. 
In Chapter 3, I will examine in detail the confluence of satire and habit through 
close readings of an array of canonical Victorian novels; presently, however, I would like 
to offer a suggestive example of the overlap between Victorian satiric concerns and 
dualistic thought on habit (as a virtue or a vice). The anonymous essay "Horace's Art of 
Conduct" ( 187 6) concludes that conduct is the central theme of the exemplary ancient 
satirist's work, specifically that which results from the habits tyrannizing men - habits 
which reduce men to "narrow consistency" (25). The writer contemporizes Horace's ideal 
of the "golden mean" as being akin to the "habit of self-management" ("Horace's Art" 
37, 28). Horace's ideal habit, interpreted as the conscious control of all experience 
("habitually seeking a permanency of self-consciousness" ["Horace's Art" 29]), accords 
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with the habit of consciously controlling one's will, a habit promoted by novelists and 
Victorian physiological psychologists alike. Habituality is a cause either of failure or, 
when harnessed by the powers of the will, salutary change. Similarly, Victorian 
discourses relentlessly present habit as a double-edged mechanism of personal and social 
management; it is either a force of progress, or one of stagnation - a force of dignified 
control or debauched chaos. 
In this chapter, I do not claim to comment comprehensively on the manifold 
discourses of habit in Victorian culture, however much such an expansive project would 
be a fruitful contribution to Victorian studies. Instead, I present an overview of the 
pervasive conceptions of habit that saturate Victorian scientific, educational, moral, and 
economic discourses (often at fundamental levels). My focus is on physiological 
psychology, which claimed to authenticate older theories of associationism that identify 
habit as a pivotal mechanism controlling thought. Theories of habit are a vital component 
of Victorian thought in both its orthodox and heterodox manifestations. The word habit, 
as it pertains to theories of human character and social function, acquires explicatory 
authority in so many nineteenth-century fictional and non-fictional works that studying 
its function as a flexible and "many-sided" (to use an Arnoldian descriptor) subject of 
Victorian satire requires an accordingly wide-ranging survey of its importance. 
2.ii The Law of Habit, from Moral Philosophy to Mental Science 
As defined in the OED, the English word habit is derived from the Latin habitus, 
the stem of which is habere: originally to have, hold, to be constituted, or to be. The word 
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developed a dual application either to external qualities (the manner in which one 
displays physical appearance, bodily constitution, or way of dressing80), or to internal, 
ontological qualities (a person's mental and moral constitution, character, disposition, or 
customary way of acting). The development of the word from associations with "to hold" 
to suggestions of acquired tendencies was completed in ancient Latin. In English, the 
most common usage noted by the OED is to denote the frequent repetition of an act until 
it is nearly involuntary. In biology, the word applies to the instinctive practices of 
animals; in psychology, it denotes an automatic action acquired by learning/repetition. 
Necessarily, the word habit as it describes the human constitution, either innate or 
acquired, is tied to theories of human nature, and thus moral philosophy. Writers on habit 
tend to quote William Paley's 1875 axiom: "man is a bundle of habits" ( 48). William B. 
Carpenter, for example, justifies his interest in habit with an assertion that man's 
"tendency to Habitual action is so universally recognized" that we are said to "be a 
bundle of habits" (350). William James declares, in the opening sentence of his famous 
chapter on habit in The Principles of Psychology (1890; originally an essay in Popular 
Science Monthly, 1887), "When we look at living creatures from an outward point of 
view, one of the first things that strike us is that they are bundles of habits" (Principles 
109).81 Habit is critical, perhaps even foundational, to theories of human character 
formation. Because of its acquired aspect, it is also of central concern to theories of 
human social and ethical practice. 
Aristotle's moral theory, particularly as it is expounded in Nicomachean Ethics 
(350 BCE), informs centuries of thought on habit. In this treatise, which offers practical 
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advice on how to become a good man though virtuous action (Malikail 3), Aristotle 
emphasizes the importance of hexis (translated into Latin as habitus, which is generally 
termed habit), a characteristic, a trained ability, a second nature or "firmly fixed 
possession of the mind" (Ostwald 308).82 For Aristotle, hexis is the sum of a man's 
knowledge and his moral character (Malikail 5-6). Natural or inherent character is altered 
by the habits we form in our youth; therefore habit, according to Aristotle, determines 
one's hexis, which is more resistant to change than a mere disposition; it "is a compound 
product of nature, habit (repeated practice) and reason" (Malikail 13, 9). Aristotle 
emphasizes the role of education in cultivating moral virtue "just as land must be 
cultivated before it is able to foster the seed" (Ethics 296). Moral goodness is the result of 
habit, for virtue consists in habitual good actions (Ethics 143); yet it is also possible to be 
"depraved by habit" (Ethics 256). Aristotle's theories of habit contain the fundamental 
paradox of future habit theory: habit is automatic and unconscious, but voluntariness is a 
prerequisite for human moral action. According to Aristotle's moral philosophy, we are 
partly responsible, through our choice of habit/automatic action, for our character. In 
Victorian discourses of habit, filaments of the Aristotelian conception are pervasive, 
particularly in their focus on the importance of self-determined habituation to moral 
virtue expressed through action, and on the recalcitrance of habitual dispositions.83 A 
neo-Aristotelian emphasis on the all-determining, character-constructing powers of habit 
gains further authority in the nineteenth century once a biological basis for habit is 
confirmed. 
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In the late seventeenth century, John Locke (1632-1704), expanding upon 
Aristotle's notions of thought by habitual association,84 held that the mind spontaneously 
links chains of thought. Locke speculated that habit is not restricted to the determination 
of moral character, but influences both the content of the intellect and the reasoning 
process. Further, Locke warned that doctrines are "fastened by degrees" and "riveted" in 
the mind "by long Custom and Education beyond all possibility of being pull'd out 
again" (712). Even more insidious to notions of human beings as self-directing creatures, 
"Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come, at last, to produce actions in us, 
which often escape our observation" (Locke 14 7). In Locke's association theory, 
"Chance or Custom" produce a "Connection of Ideas" which have no "Correspondence 
or Connection with one another" (395) except by chance association. The latter affects 
cognitive faculties and the will: 
Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of 
Determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to 
be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a-going 
continue on in the same steps they have been used to, which by often 
treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes easy 
and as it were Natural. (Locke 396) 
Thus, Locke articulates a psycho-physical way of conceiving habit. 85 (Laurence Sterne's 
narrator in the Menippean satire Tristram Shandy parodies Locke's physical metaphors 
for habit with a bawdy description of the "hobby-horsical" (55) humours which disrupt 
rationality and tether a man to his passionate habits.86) 
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Habit, for Locke, is an unseen dictator of perception. 87 In "Of the Association of 
Ideas," Locke links madness to the general idea of prejudice and customary associations. 
The fact that perception is insidiously distorted and determined by habit is disconcerting, 
because it is the faculty of perception which "puts the distinction betwixt the animal 
Kingdom, and the inferior parts of Nature" that operate through "bare mechanism" 
(Locke 14 7). Not only did Locke lay the groundwork for future assessments of mental 
association, but he also set in motion subversive strains of habit theory that emphasize 
habit's role as a naturalizer of the artificial constructions of society;88 he grappled with 
the determinist fear that habit-based thought reduces human beings to the "bare 
mechanism" of other animals. 
David Hume (1711-1776) is another English empiricist who advances a 
philosophy of habit. John Biro argues that despite Hume's skepticism about positive 
knowledge, he outlined a new science of human nature in his A Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739-40) (Biro 33). Belief, for Hume, is the product of our non-rational faculty -
variously labeled as imagination, instinct, habit, or custom (Biro 39). As well, reason has 
roots (like madness and prejudice) in custom and habit; it forms our notions of causality, 
for without "sensible violence" (Hume 175) we cannot view any other relation of cause 
and effect than that which is habitually associated. Probabilistic reasoning, according to 
Hume, has roots in custom and association (Wright 121).89 In the wake of Locke and 
Hume, habit is no longer, in Aristotelian terms, limited to the formation of moral habits; 
it is equally a foundation of reason; it becomes a force influencing (even determining) 
morality and rationality. 
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With David Hartley (1705-1757), associationist notions of habit are further 
anchored in scientific evidence. Hartley consolidates notions of the biology of association 
in his neurophysiological theory put forth in Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty 
and Expectation (1749). 90 The repetition of associations, he insists, excites "the 
propagation of vibrations along the course of the nerves and brain" (Hartley 15). In 
Hartley's "doctrine of vibrations," impressions, with enough repetition, change the 
"natural vibrations" of a part of the brain; thus, both reason and affection are "the mere 
Result of Association" (60, 61, 90). Importantly, Hartley equates the "power of habit" 
with association (60); his research reinforces theories that habit is destructive to the 
complexity of human being for it operates in the "medullary Substance of the Brain and 
Nerves" (6) with a kind of indomitable physical necessity. 
As if to announce the successful advance of association theory to the Victorian 
era, Herbert Spencer states his absolute compliance with the "Law of Association" (his 
succinct definition of the phrase highlights its basis in habit): 
All theories and all methods of education take it for granted - are alike 
based on the belief that the more frequently states of consciousness are 
made to follow one another in a certain order, the stronger becomes their 
tendency to suggest one another in that order. The sayings - 'Practice 
makes perfect,' and 'Habit is second nature,' remind us how long-
established and universal is the conviction that such a law exists. (PP 1: 
421)91 
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Associationist theories of habit, increasingly biologized - as Hartlean physicalism was 
furthered by Alexander Bain, who "incorporated associationism within a 
neurophysiological framework" (Daston 197) - advanced well into the nineteenth century 
as philosophical theories of mind evolved into the field of mental science, psychology. 
The word "psychology," coined in the mid-seventeenth century by William 
Harvey, was immeasurably fertile with variable connotations (Rylance 13-14). In the 
British Cyclopaedia (1788), "psychology" was defined as the "science of the soul," but 
by the mid-nineteenth century, the meaning had shifted from "soul" to "mind" (Smith 
24 ). 92 In the 1830s and 1840s, there was a clear, Cartesian distinction between the reflex 
functioning ascribed to the spinal cord and brain stem, and the cerebral hemispheres 
associated with complex consciousness (Danziger 124 ). In the mid-Victorian period, Kurt 
Danziger argues, there is a new interest in medical psychology, an interest linked to 
developments in knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system, and to 
the fact that, by the 1840s, the psycho-social effects of industrial capitalism (such as mass 
alcoholism) were obtrusive (121). In the 1850s, there was a substantial increase in the 
number of medical psychology textbooks; between the mid- l 850s and the 1870s, a 
physiological approach to psychology was increasingly stressed (Smith 81 ).93 Bain, 
Darwin, Spencer, Maudsley, Carpenter, and Lewes were among those who turned to 
biology and not metaphysics for a new science of physiological psychology, which 
flourished from 1850 to the 1880s (Ryan, "Material Mind" 22). For Lewes, psychology 
without biology is like astronomy without mathematics; he declares "an almost universal 
agreement" that physiology must be attended to in matters of the mind (PLMJ 117). 
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Spencer classifies psychology as a "sub-science" of biology, "the science of physical 
life" (PP 1: 390); James Sully asserts, in The Human Mind: A Text-Book of Psychology 
(1891 ), that psychology is now a positive science "fully separated from philosophy" (3). 
To demonstrate the "generalist nature" of Victorian intellectual culture, Rick 
Rylance emphasizes the contribution of diverse forms of writing (specialist psychological 
tracts, political polemics, essays, periodical reviews, novels, and poems) to the 
"unfolding public network of debate over psychological problems" (3).94 Psychology was 
an "open discourse" (Rylance 7) "filled with dispute"; yet for Rylance, "habit" is merely 
one of the myriad terms that populate the debate. Arguably, however, habit underpins an 
interdisciplinary anxiety about the ultimate loss of free will that scientific inquiry into the 
mechanisms of the mind might prove. 
Theories of habit are inextricable from perennial debates between traditions of 
thought that can be broadly categorized as spiritualist or materialist. Customarily, 
spiritualists or idealists emphasize free will, volition, consciousness, and an idea of innate 
(a priori) qualities (of soul or mind); materialists promote utilitarian, empiricist (a 
posteriori) associationist ideas, including a belief that the mind is constituted 
substantially by experience (Rylance 40-42, Smith 85-87). The idealist "Common sense 
school" (developed from Thomas Reid's An Inquiry into the Human Mind [1764]) 
maintained the Cartesian separation of mind and body and rejected associationist theory 
as leading to materialism and skepticism (Rylance 44).95 An esteemed editor of Reid, 
William Hamilton, developed a transcendental conception of consciousness in opposition 
to physical theories of mind that he considered to be immoral (Ry lance 45).96 In response, 
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G. H. Lewes and J. S. Mill label thinkers such as Reid and Hamilton as belonging to the 
"a priori school" (Ry lance 46) of unscientific, metaphysical psychology. Mill praises 
instead the "mental habits" of thinkers who, having banished metaphysical thinking, are 
no longer in the habit of referring to the inherent nature and essence of phenomena (ACP 
10: 271, 273). Mill's two-volume A System of Logic (1843) aims to extricate moral 
science from a theory of innate ideas (7: 9). He defends physiological psychology, and 
champions Alexander Bain for merging associationism with new knowledge of the 
nervous system (Smith 88-89). Mill also credits Bain for the "physiologizing of classical 
associationist mental philosophy" (Danziger 123-4 ). Yet biologized notions of habit 
continued to give (ironic) fuel to the so-called materialist school by inadvertently aligning 
human beings with soulless machines. 97 
Danziger identifies Thomas Laycock and William Carpenter as exemplars of 
opposing positions within the materialist/spiritualist debates. Their work, he argues 
(which other psychologists tend to repeat), crystallizes debates concerning the psycho-
physical relationship in terms of concepts of reflex action ( 124). In 1845, Laycock 
(Professor of Medicine, University of Edinburgh) wrote "Reflex Functions of the Brain," 
the flagship work that "initiated the whole psycho-physiological trend" (Danziger 122). 
In his later work, Mind and Brain (1860), Laycock applies to the human mind a purely 
physical idea of reflex action and demotes consciousness and will to mere properties of 
the nervous system (Danziger 126-127, 133).98 Rejecting the "Materialist hypothesis," 
William B. Carpenter (Professor of Physiology, the Royal Institution) maintains a 
dichotomy between purely automatic, reflex function and voluntary action (Danziger 
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128); to explicate his ideas, he invents a new set of automatic cerebral activities called 
"Ideomotor actions," which are controlled by voluntary attention (Danziger 121, 129, 
131).99 Acknowledging both animal automatism and human agency, Carpenter's 
followers, including Lewes, Mill, and William James, reject both a priori essentialism 
and the extreme Laycockian notion of the human mind as an assemblage of base habit -
animal instincts and machine-like reflexes. 
Scientific concepts of habit as a physiologically inevitable phenomenon are 
further augmented by evolutionary discourses. Long-standing, complex debates surround 
and sometimes confound the differences and similarities between Lamarckism and 
Darwinism - a discussion of which exceeds my purpose in this chapter. I wish only to 
observe Darwin's influence on the biologization of habit, while acknowledging that it 
was Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1784-1829) who identifies habit as the mechanism of 
evolution. In 1809, Lamarck noted that the "changing environment and changing needs of 
the organism, fosters alterations of habit, which slowly involve changes to bodily 
structures which are then inherited" (Zoological Philosophy 45). Yet, as Robert J. 
Richards points out, a theory of inherited habit is also postulated by Darwin in On the 
Origin of Species (1859) (143). Darwin's mechanism of evolution is not habit per se, but 
natural selection; his hypothesis, despite well-documented resistance, superseded that of 
Lamarck. Natural selection - the random preservation of favourable adaptations through 
"infinitesimally small modifications" (Darwin, Origin 115) - either maintains or 
dismantles the habits of an organism; instincts and habits (like structures) increase or 
decrease with habitual use or disuse. 100 Habits which are due to innate tendency (that is, 
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inherited by natural selection) are called instincts and are the habit of generations. 
Instincts can be lost under domestication; occasionally, habits are made permanent by 
natural selection (Origin 236-243). Yet, the "effects of habit are of quite subordinate 
importance to the effects of the natural selection of what may be called accidental 
variations of instincts" (due to "unknown causes") (Origin 236). Darwin insists that in the 
"Great Battle of Life" all organisms are to some degree plastic - susceptible to change in 
structure or habit (Origin 127, 140). Unlike Lamarck's focus on the volitional behaviour 
of individuals, however, Darwin focuses on the random force of natural selection as it 
operates in the evolution of communities. Nonetheless, regardless of such distinctions, 
habit remains instrumental to Darwin's theory of evolution. 
Samuel Butler observes in his aptly titled Luck, or Cunning? ( 1886) that Darwin's 
natural selection, when applied to human evolution, insultingly diminishes human 
consciousness and volition. Preferring Lamarck's teleology, Butler finds that Darwin 
"denied design" (Luck 17). 101 Darwin was routinely accused of demoting the human mind 
as drastically as he diminished the human body - perhaps best epitomized by his dramatic 
analogy between the hand of a man and the wing of a bat (Origin 415). Thus, when 
William James speaks of the "darwinizing" (Principles 143) of the human mind, this is 
shorthand for what he views as Darwin's reduction of the role of human will in evolution. 
Ironically, Darwin himself resisted associationist psychology's emphasis on nurture over 
nature, regretting Mill's (and Bain's) rejection of innate qualities (Descent n. 121). In 
contrast, he considers social morality to be innate in lower animals and therefore innate in 
men (Origin 119). Yet natural selection, with or without Darwin's consent, proved a 
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"death blow" to teleological arguments and a great support to mechanistic determinism 
(Danziger 134). Evolutionary biology, as theorized by Darwin, Spencer, and Lewes, 
further consolidates habit as a subject of scientific scrutiny for psychology. 
For Lewes, evolutionary biology provides a ground for reconciliation between the 
warring empiricist and transcendental schools. Lewes, like Darwin, recuperates a notion 
of innateness through a biological doctrine of the inheritance of acquired modified 
structures and instinct. He rejects the traditional meaning of innate ideas as being 
"untenable": "There are no innate ideas, no innate truths, no thoughts having a 
metaempirical source, - simply innate tendencies, congenital aptitudes, which cause us to 
respond in certain ways to certain stimuli" (P LMJ 152). Furthermore, according to 
Lewes, the "daily facts of Habit" demonstrate how "tendencies become organized" and 
actions that were once laborious become easy and "inevitable" (PLMJ 210). Once a habit 
has been organized, it can be transmitted to descendents; for Lewes, this "process 
underlies all development" (PLMJ 211). In brief, "voluntary actions become involuntary, 
the involuntary become automatic, the intelligent become habitual, and the habitual 
become instinctive" (Lewes, PLMJ 211); 102 Most pointedly, "the sensitive subject is no 
tabula rasa; it is not a blank sheet of paper, but a palimpsest" (P LMJ 149): "There is thus 
what may be called an a priori condition in all Sensation, and in all Ideation. But this is 
historical, not transcendental" (P LMJ 149-50). 
The centrality of notions of habit to the perennially raging spiritualist/materialist 
dispute is confirmed in the late nineteenth century by William James. The associationist 
idea (which he equates with materialism) is, James argues, just as problematic as the 
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spiritualist. The human intellect cannot be reduced to crude mechanical constituents; he 
illustrates this (as is his rhetorical habit) with a literary example: "Romeo wants Juliet as 
the filings want the magnet" (Principles 20), but Romeo, unlike the filings, can find 
many different ways around an obstacle: the "pursuance of future ends and the choice of 
means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in 
a phenomenon" (James, Principles 20). Habit is integral to this process, for actions 
"prompted by conscious intelligence may grow so automatic by dint of habit as to be 
apparently unconsciously performed. Standing, walking, buttoning and unbuttoning, 
piano-playing, talking, even saying one's prayers, may be done when the mind is 
absorbed in other things" (James, Principles 19). James posits, as does Lewes before him, 
that "such machine-like yet purposive acts" should be included in the science of 
psychology, as all "nervous centres" function to produce "intelligent action": "They feel, 
prefer one thing to another, and have 'ends"' (Principles 19, 85); they evolve from 
ancestor to descendent either downward towards "unhesitating automatism" or "upwards 
into larger intellectuality" (Principles 85-86). James concurs with Lewes that instinct is 
habituated, fixed intelligence. By the logic of such circuitous arguments, human choice is 
not eradicated from behaviour. In the tradition of Victorian mental physiology, and 
eighteenth-century association philosophy, James places the problem of determination 
and freedom on the physiological fact of habit. He maintains that the "aptitude of the 
brain for acquiring habits" is the most important aspect of brain physiology for 
psychological theory (Principles I 08). For James, as for most Victorian mental 
physiologists, habit is a psycho-physical law that retains at least some element of choice. 
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James' s chapter on habit in The Principles of Psychology (1890) carries forward 
the ideas of many earlier nineteenth-century psychologists on habit, its very real 
physiological implications, and its impact on human thought and volition. I would argue 
that his famous chapter exemplifies the Bakhtinian notion of dialogic prose by re-
accentuating the habit theory of William Carpenter, Alexander Bain, Mill, and others 
through direct incorporation of their texts and terminology. In fact, significant portions of 
the essay are actually quotations from Carpenter's Principles of Mental Physiology 
(1874). James's synthetic discussion, which provides a kind of summa of Victorian 
thought on habit, can be divided into three general phases: firstly, he asserts the physical 
fact of habit (utilizing associationist philosophy's tropes of paths, tracks, and channels); 
secondly, the paradoxical possibilities of habit, involving either the stultification or 
enactment of human will, are emphasized, along with habit's centrality to education; 
finally, his discussion ironically addresses the relation of habit to social custom -
highlighting its ultimate role as a force of conservatism. 
One vital component of the Victorian tradition of mental physiology, which James 
reinforces, is the physical basis of habit. The "philosophy of habit," as he calls it, is "at 
bottom a physical principle": "The phenomena of habit in living beings are due to the 
plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are composed'' (Principles 110). 
Habit is thus a biological fact of all organisms. 103 The brain contains "currents" which 
either "deepen old paths or to make new ones" (Principles 112): "the entire nervous 
system is nothing but a system of paths" (Principles 113). Habits take root in the brain 
because paths, once frequently traversed, are more easily travelled in future and "do not 
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easily disappear" (Principles 112). Even complex habits are "discharges in the nerve-
centres" (Principles 112). Notably, despite his resistance to associationism, James 
imports a traditional associationist lexicon of habit - paths, currents, channels, tracks, and 
routes - to denote habit's physicality, its linearity, and its inherent motility and 
momentum. 
James's declaration of the biological reality of habit serves to reinstate 
Carpenter's earlier assessment of the "Physiology of Habit": we are "automatically 
prompted to think,feel, or do what we have been before accustomed to" (Carpenter 344), 
because "every state of ideational consciousness which is either very strong or is 
habitually repeated, leaves an organic impression on the Cerebrum" (Carpenter 344). 
Similarly, Alexander Bain accepts a biologized version of the "Laws of Association." He 
defines "nerve force" (S&I 57) as a current generated, conveyed, and discharged in the 
nervous system like electricity through the telegraph wire. Any movement "struck out by 
central energy leaves as it were a track behind, and a less amount of nervous impulse will 
be required to set it on a second time"; these tracks are "cultivated and confirmed by 
repetition" (S&I 320-1 ). Bain compares the nervous system to an "organ with bellows 
constantly charged, and ready to be let off in any direction, according to the particular 
keys that are touched" (S&I 291 ). Despite these noteworthy metaphors of technology and 
music, Bain' s language of habit is steeped, like Carpenter's and later James' s, in images 
of tracks or tracts, currents, and streams. 
Lewes was "an influential disseminator of physiological knowledge" (Reed 11) 
and mental physiologist in his own right, and his ideas are implicitly invoked in James's 
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habit chapter. Lewes's conception of habit reflects his theory of organicism: no thing can 
excite one part without indirectly catalyzing the whole (PLMJ 131 ). The law of 
irradiation requires that "every excitation must be propagated" (P LMJ 131 ); each 
excitation is diffused throughout nervous tissue following "the lines of least resistance" 
(PLMJ 132). In this way, a "neural tract" or "pathway of discharge becomes more or less 
defined" (P LMJ 136, 132). These paths restrict irradiation, "which would otherwise be 
indefinite" (P LMJ 132); they "prevent new acquisitions, and resist new combinations" 
(PLMJ 133). Similarly, notions of habit as primarily a process of restriction are promoted 
by later in the century by James Sully, who notes that habit often opposes the new actions 
required by environment (Human Mind 232). Ironically itself a product of development, 
habit tends to opposes growth by "diminish[ing] the plasticity of the neuro-muscular 
apparatus" - the "characteristic note of habit is mechanicality" (Human Mind 231, 
225). 104 Habit, defined in neuroscience as a potentially constricting, rigidifying law of 
mental existence, had, as James, Carpenter, Bain, Lewes, Sully, and others discern, 
profound ethical implications. 
Verification of the physical reality of habit transformed an ancient philosophical 
concept of human nature into a newly significant mechanism shaping human character. 
New knowledge of the reflex functioning of the nervous system, along with evolutionary 
biology, further legitimized the scientific basis of habit. In addition, influenced by the 
discovery of the laws of thermodynamics, theorists of habit after the 1840s relied 
increasingly on the necessity of conserving energy. The mind was conceptualized "as a 
closed system, driven to repetitive, automatic behaviors in order to conserve energy for 
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more difficult or novel tasks" (Vrettos 400). 105 In the Victorian period, science surpassed 
philosophy as the principle discourse authenticating habit as an inescapable "law" of 
human thought. The next difficulty, for materialist and spiritualist psychologists alike, 
was reconciling the linear, restrictive, and mechanical nature of habit with the complexity 
of human consciousness. 
2.iii "Walking bundles of habits" or Creatures of Volition?: Self-discipline 
and Sympathy in Victorian Theories of Character Formation 
According to Renee Tursi, William James instigates a "uniquely American" 
engagement with habit, which is "refreshingly paradoxical" and not yoked to the "simple 
Victorian reliance upon habit to assuage the risks of an unsafe world" (19). Tursi wants to 
establish habit as a "philosophical and rhetorical force of American early modernism" 
(2). 106 Following Philip Fisher, she assents to a mono logic notion of the Victorian faith in 
self-control and habits of earnest industriousness; her statement avoids the complicating 
fact that Victorian discourses on habit were no less paradoxical. In fact, doctrines 
promoting salutary habits of self-help and sympathy, and even the role of habit in higher 
orders of thought, were driven by fear of dehumanizing habits. Competing positive 
discourses surrounding habit emerged to oppose the moral and intellectual decay that 
habit facilitates. The counterforces that aimed to defeat habit by habit itself prescribed the 
moral habits of the ascendant will and self-discipline, sympathy, and excursive, original 
thought. Furthermore, habit was enlisted simultaneously to promote a conservative 
Victorian ethic of controlled change, and to reinforce more radical values of free thought 
and non-customary truth. Habit, in Bakhtinian terms, contains both monologic and 
dialogic potential. 
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William James, along with many of his nineteenth-century predecessors, asserts 
an Aristotelian emphasis on the importance of education in habit formation. In wild 
animals, he notes, habits are innate, but in humans, habits "see[ m ], to a great extent, to be 
the result of education" (Principles I 09). For this truism, James cites William Carpenter's 
proposition that the "ganglionic substance" of the brain, in its plasticity, was readily 
developed by education (James, Principles 114-15). Adults possess habits that were 
acquired in their youth, for what is learned early is "branded" upon the brain (James, 
Principles 117). A central maxim of habit theory (that James accepts) from Aristotle 
onwards is that for mature people, acquiring habits and discontinuing old ones is a 
struggle, for "[b ]oth the Intellectual and the Moral character have become in great degree 
fixed" (Carpenter 345). Bain agrees that the early years are favourable to forces of 
plasticity (S&J 448-9), but that the alteration of habits in later life requires near 
impossible amounts of self-control; it involves "terrific struggles, which prove how hard 
it is to set up the volitions of the day against the bent of years" (E&J 515). Subsequently, 
James specifies that between the ages of twenty and thirty, one's character essentially 
congeals into fixed habits: 
Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking 
bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their conduct while in the 
plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be 
undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little 
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a scar. The drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself 
for every fresh dereliction by saying, 'I won't count this time!' Well! He 
may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being 
counted none the less. Down among his nerve-cells and fibres the 
molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up to be used against 
him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, in strict 
scientific literalness, wiped out. Of course, this has its good side as well as 
its bad one. As we become permanent drunkards by so many separate 
drinks, so we become saints in the moral, and authorities and experts in 
the practical and scientific spheres, by so many separate acts and hours of 
work. (Principles 130-31) 
The double discourse surrounding habit is stated overtly: it "has its good side as well as 
its bad one." Habit, for James, as well as for Victorian mental-physiologists, is a psycho-
physical mechanism most changeable in youth, acquiring its force by incremental action 
and serving either to elevate or to destroy morality and constructive action. Once 
entrenched, however, its influence for good or ill is ominously immovable. As James Mill 
( 1733-1836) asserts, "trains of association" may become "so habitual as to be 
uncontrollable by any habits which the subsequent period of life could induce" ( qtd. in 
Carlisle 19). Within this framework, the goal of all education is to instill the paramount 
virtue of self-control; in this way, volitional agency is maintained over the wayward 
forms of association. Victorian discussions of habit, to which James generally assents, 
are, in Aristotelian fashion, generally skeptical of changing bad habits once they are 
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installed in the character. For James, "Dr Carpenter's phrase that our nervous system 
grows to the modes in which it has been exercised expresses the philosophy of habit in a 
nutshell" (Principles 117). Writers such as Samuel Smiles capitalized upon the double-
edged possibilities of habit and promoted the overarching importance of "training the 
young to virtuous habits. In them they are the easiest formed and then formed they last 
for life; like letters cut on the bark of a tree grow and widen with age" (Self-Help 220). In 
nineteenth-century habit theory, dystopic fears regarding the very physical implacability 
of bad habits that are "never to be undone" in the character are palliated by near utopian 
hopes attached to the grace period when character is pliant and educable 
Furthermore, James selects Carpenter to reinforce his views on habit because 
Carpenter explicitly champions free will in the formation of character. In this, Carpenter 
continually opposes himself to T. H. Huxley (whose name became a catchword in 
psychology for radical materialism) as being a believer in the volitional nature of human 
action and not an advocate of the "Determinist doctrine" (Carpenter xxv ), which 
annihilates human moral judgment. Importantly, Carpenter acknowledges the "palpable 
inconsistency" between the idea that the automatic activity of the mind exists alongside 
the controlling power of the "Will" (liii-liv). Yet, he asserts that despite "congenital 
Constitution and external influences," the individual's character is significantly formed 
by the power of the will (Carpenter 366.); so that, ultimately, human beings are not "mere 
thinking automata, mere puppets to be pulled by suggesting-strings" (Carpenter 27). 
Paradoxically, however, the ascendancy of the will must be "habitually maintained" 
(Carpenter 366). The "Will," Carpenter argues, "may either oppose or concur with the 
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automatic tendencies," but it only renders the individual a ''free agent," "according as it is 
habitually exerted" (27): "There is, in fact, a continual action and reaction between Habit 
and Will, in our mental, just as there is in our bodily life" (366). 107 Such statements by 
Carpenter inform the central tenets of William James's theories of the human mind. 
James rejects the Lamarckean view (held by Spencer and others) that acquired habit may 
become a congenital tendency, holding instead that "in man the negation of all fixed 
modes is the essential characteristic" (Principles 990). This is humankind's 
distinguishing characteristic; man, James declares, is "par excellence, the educable 
animal" (Principles 990). Repetition alone is insufficient to explain that which prevails 
upon one's consciousness; it does not account for the spontaneous forces of "selective 
attention," subjective interest, and association by similarity that shape human thought and 
volition (Principles 380). 
Complicating and even contradicting James's belief in the relative permanence of 
acquired habits is his theory of "selective attention": it is more likely to be the novel 
thing, rather than the habitual thing, that captures our attention and interest. Attention 
renders the least frequent associations more vivid in our consciousness; and, as Bain had 
argued, fixing attention is the "main function of volition" in intellectual association (S&/ 
560). James posits that association by similarity (as opposed to frequency and contiguity) 
is absent in so-called "brutes": "They are enslaved to routine" (Principles 977). 108 
Habitual actions have an "appointed order" (Principles 120) unlike "strictly voluntary 
act[s]," which are guided by ideas and perceptions (Principles 120). Consciousness is 
only concentrated "when nerve processes are hesitant"; in automatic, habitual action it is 
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diminished (Principles 145). For James, the dynamic, conscious, centrifugal forces in the 
human mind oppose habit; yet, ironically, they must be habitually maintained by attention 
(a habit of the will). Habit, with this qualification, is not a mono logic force controlling 
volition; it operates in dialogic tension with more pluralistic forces in the human mind. 
The natural flexibility of human thought, however, must be protected from the enslaving 
automatism of habit by an education which instills the habit of self-discipline. 109 
Victorian mental physiologists agree about the consummate importance of self-
discipline. In Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical (1861), Spencer endorses 
"self-development" (99) through an education which creates "moral culture": "Human 
beings are at the mercy of their associated ideas," he acknowledges and thus, "grave 
moral consequences depend upon the habitual pleasure or pain which daily lessons 
produce" ( 101-2). The improvement of knowledge must be made "habitually gratifying" 
and not "habitually repugnant" (Spencer, Education 103). Repetition is, in Spencer's 
opinion, crucial for producing "deep ... impression[ s ]" (Education 113) on the mind 
about consequences. Children should be accustomed to the daily practice of self-control; 
they must "habitually experience the true consequences of their conduct" (Spencer, 
Education 117). Similarly, Carpenter advises duty and restraint in a household or a 
school so that "the preference of duty to pleasure comes to be the general habit" (358). 
He recommends the use of military drill exercises in order to instill self-discipline, and 
Samuel Smiles concurs: "Habit is formed by careful training. And it is astonishing how 
much can be accomplished by systematic discipline and drill" (Character 159). 
According to Bain, in both mind and body, "the present is the resultant of the past" (MS 
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351 ). Thus an individual cannot escape the "unconscious persistence of early habits" (MS 
354). This theory posits the extreme moral importance of "orderly discipline" (MS 354). 
Cultivation of emotional restraint is critical to "every well-ordered mind" (MS 388), for 
"a bad set of Habits," once established, requires "far stronger effort of Volition" (MS 
351) to deracinate. The individual, Bain posits, will be particularly subjugated to bad 
habits of an emotional nature. To dissociate thoughts that have "grown together in the 
mind" (Emotions 580), one requires a powerful will. 110 Within this psychological 
framework, the goal of all education is to instill the paramount virtue of self-control; in 
this way, volitional agency is maintained over the habit-based mechanisms of 
"associative growth." 111 This near-proverbial associationist wisdom informed utilitarian 
educational theories of education (put forth by Mill himself, Jeremy Bentham, Joseph 
Priestly) that capitalized on the idea of controlling habitual mental associations in the 
individual for universal social advancement (Olson 169-73; I expand upon this branch of 
utopian habit theory, and its dystopian practice, in my discussion of Charles Dickens's 
Hard Times.) 112 James's view of the primacy of the will, through the mental process of 
association by similarity, and selective attention and interest, aligns with that of Victorian 
mental physiologists, who stress the moral need to preserve the power of the will through 
the disciplined habits of a "well-ordered mind." 
An evocative word circulating in habit-based discourses is energy. The 
productivity of good habits is linked to their role in conserving intellectual energy: "habit 
diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed' (James, Principles 
119). Energy is saved as our "lower centres" manage daily routines automatically, while 
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our "higher thought-centres hardly know anything about the matter" (James, Principles 
115).1 13 James cites Henry Maudsley's playful observation that, without the benefit of 
habit, a man could exhaust himself getting dressed for the day (Principles 113-114). 
Spencer's analogy between a drainage-system and the nervous system is also quoted 
approvingly by James: streams of water will drain efficiently through the unclogged paths 
of escape (Principles 113). Similarly, productive habits "economize the expense of 
nervous and muscular energy," keeping certain knowledge in the "effortless custody of 
automatism" (James, Principles 18, 126). 
Discourses of mental science, defining the mind as energy to be harnessed, also 
reinscribe notions of virility and mental cleanliness (codified masculine). Psychologists 
assert that it is noble and manly to economize productive energy though prudent habits; 
yet, ironically, habit itself - considered an unconscious and non-rational process - is 
coded feminine. Nowhere is the representation of habit as a feminized mental function 
more overt than in James's theory of volition. With his doctrine of energetic, intellectual, 
and volitional action he argues that women are closer than men to "brutes" with regard to 
the limitations of their mental plasticity and their ready consolidation into mere bundles 
of habit. In Chapter 5, I discuss in detail James's explicit and implicit analogies between 
the mental functioning of women and that of "brutes" or "lower species"; what is relevant 
to this immediate discussion is the way in which James deplores the enervated, "nerveless 
sentimentalist" who "never does a manly concrete deed" (Principles 129). 114 Effort, 
along with attention, is thus an enabling "habit of the will," producing action, whereas 
desultory habits of inaction enervate the masculine will (Principles 130). James offers 
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practical maxims about how to keep the "faculty of effort alive ... by a little gratuitous 
exercise every day" (Principles 130). 115 His formula for productive masculinity is 
unattached to a Victorian doctrine of sympathetic, moral concern for others; instead, it 
encrypts competition between men. James argues, for example, that a man who has "daily 
inured himself to the habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-
denial ... will stand like a tower when everything rocks around him, and when his softer 
fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff in the blast" (Principles 130). Habit, although 
feminized for its negative aspects, is nevertheless presented as the mechanism driving the 
practical competitive economy of masculine character. 116 
J. S. Mill, although not invested in the masculinist gender encoding of habit, also 
bases theories of character formation on concepts of habitual energy aligned with 
volition. Like James, Mill promotes methods of education aimed at preserving the will 
through energy, action, and practical self-improvement. As an avid supporter of 
associationism and physiological psychology, Mill is necessarily steeped in habit theory. 
Psychology, for Mill, is a moral science (along with economics, sociology, and political 
science) concerning the "Laws of Mind" and "Ethology" - his name for the science of the 
formation of character. "Ethology," he proposes, could be developed as an "ulterior 
science" to psychology, which would "correspon[ d] to the art of education; in the widest 
sense of the term, including the formation of national or collective character as well as 
individual" (SL 8: 869). 117 His ultimate rejection of Auguste Comte is spurred by the 
philosopher's refusal to accept psychology as a science; for Mill, this entails a rejection 
of investigations of the degree to which mental character is created by circumstances: 
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"since no one supposes that cerebral conformation does all, and circumstances nothing" 
(ACP 10: 297). Comte fails, in Mill's view, to accept the "twofold point of view of 
physiology and psychology" (ACP 10: 298). For Mill, the mental mechanisms of habit 
are critical to this "twofold point of view." 
Mill identifies individual freedom to form one's own character as the basis of 
human moral freedom (SL 8: 841). 118 In Mill's estimation, human behaviour can be 
explained by invariable laws of causality, but this does not obviate free will, since 
decisions are a product of an individual's character and one's character is changeable. 
"[W]e have real power over the formation of our own character," he insists; "by 
influencing some of our circumstances, [we] can modify our future habits or capabilities 
of willing" (A 1: 177). 119 Mill defines philosophical necessity as the notion that, given the 
character of an individual, his or her actions "might be unerringly inferred" (SL 8: 837). 
He clarifies that the word "Necessity," when applied to the will (and actions, "when 
habitual" [SL 8: 839]), misleadingly implies "irresistibleness" as well as "uniformity of 
sequence" (SL 8: 839), whereas in fact human actions are not ruled despotically in this 
way. For not only are human beings are more than the sum of their sequential, atomistic 
mental associations and "Necessity" is "very remote from fatalism" (SL 8: 839). Mill 
objects to the extreme determinist idea that there is no use struggling against one's 
environment (education and circumstance) as strongly as he rejected the dominant 
metaphysical assumption that mental differences are an unexplainable, "ultimate fact" of 
one's character (SL 8: 840, 859). In both A System of Logic and his Autobiography 
(1873), the word habit appears at key points in Mill's discussion ofNecessity to support 
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his notion of the non-deterministic pliability of human character. When "our habits are 
not too inveterate," he asserts, we can will to "make ourselves different" (SL 8: 840): 
A person feels morally free who feels that his habits or his temptations are 
not his masters, but he theirs: who even in yielding to them knows that he 
could resist; that were he desirous of altogether throwing them off, there 
would not be required for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows 
himself to be capable of feeling. (SL 8: 841) 
Feelings of pleasure and pain create mental associations, but become secondary to 
the association; this explains why "habits of hurtful excess continue to be practised 
although they have ceased to be pleasurable; and in this manner also it is that the habit of 
willing to persevere in the course which he has chosen, does not desert the moral hero" 
(SL 8: 842). This statement expresses clearly Mill's sense of the paradox of habit as it 
applies to a doctrine of causation. Thus, through a theory of habit, Mill negotiates a place 
for individual agency within a Necessitarian doctrine of causation. Mill's "habit of 
willing" (SL 8: 842), offered as the secret to self-discipline and control over the formation 
of one's moral character, aligns with the thought on habituation of Carpenter, Bain, 
Spencer, and James. Yet, underneath the hopes Mill places on the humanizing "habit of 
willing," there is an unflinching acknowledgment of the ease with which bad habits 
insidiously and inveterately wreck one's moral disposition. 
Physiological psychology, Vanessa Ryan observes, became popular due to a 
cultural need for a practical science to strengthen the culture of self-education ("Material 
Mind" 107). Victorian periodicals were replete with articles aimed at improving one's 
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moral habits (Smith 71 ); as well, numerous youth societies formed to promote habits of 
Christian manliness. 120 Manuals advising domestic self-help were also popular: for 
example, Sarah Stickney Ellis's The Women of England (1838), Maria Grey and Emily 
Shirreff s Thoughts on Self-Culture, addressed to Women (1850) - a tract suffused with 
maxims concerning habit that promote it as a kind of miracle cure for women's socially 
weakened faculties (63) - and Elizabeth Beaton's Book of Household Management 
(1859-60). It is, however, Samuel Smiles's best selling work Self-Help (1859) that best 
demonstrates the prevalence of common-sense notions of productive habit. 121 Habit is 
promoted by Smiles as the magical ingredient required for the moral and economic 
success of the individual and the nation. As Anne B. Rodrick observes, Self-Help 
"codified the supremacy of aspiration over occupation as a maker of identity for 
thousands of readers" (39). Smiles (who, of course, tells his reader that "man is a bundle 
of habits" [319]) articulates an optimistic theory of habitual self-help that eradicates any 
need for radical social change. Ironically, however, Smiles's mobilizing habit of self-
assertion requires a habit of acquiescence to the status quo. 
Smiles claims that productive habit is the mechanism behind the maxim that 
character is fortune - in other words, economic success is proportional to the 
industriousness of one's character. To illustrate this, he selects heroes of habit liberally 
from the peasant class to the aristocracy, providing a democratic theory of heroism which 
advocates the ease with which one can traverse the road from factory boy to Member of 
Parliament with the right habits in hand - particularly perseverance. Smiles's text is 
saturated with anecdotes of successful soldiers, scientists, inventors, and literary men, 
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whose indefatigable industry has been the secret to success. The biographical sketches 
and maxims of famous men illustrate the "power of self-help, patient purpose, resolute 
working, and steadfast integrity, issuing in the formation of a truly noble and manly 
character" (Self-Help 21). Smiles's ideal man, supposedly a real and possible 
"Everyman," raises his social rank by "preserving application and energy" (Self-Help 28); 
he operates mechanistically by utilizing methodical habits to conserve energy. Even the 
structure of Self-Help illustrates the power of habituation; the book's "iterative mode" 
and "loose structure" encourage repetition as a mode of effective instruction (Sinnema 
xvi-xvii). 
Imported (in part) from discourses of physiological psychology, the habit of self-
discipline is the mechanistic basis of the Smilesean moral man. In fact, "the machinery of 
moral existence should be carried on principally through the medium of the habits, so as 
to save wear and tear on the great principles within" (Smiles, Self-Help 252). Smiles 
engages overtly with habit theory in his final chapter, "Character - the True Gentleman," 
in which he defines character as "moral order embodied in the individual," and asserts 
that good habits are mandatory, as they "compose the best part of a man's moral conduct" 
(314). Synthesizing conventional wisdom and contemporary psychology, he reminds his 
readers that man is said to be a "bundle of habits," that habit is "second nature"; for a 
contemporary source, he cites Bishop Butler's idea that virtue itself can become a habit 
(Self-Help 319). Enthralling powers of habit are highlighted: "a portion of our free 
activity and individuality becomes suspended in habit" (Smiles, Self-Help 320). Habits 
are "benefactors or tyrants, according as they are good or evil" (Smiles, Self-Help 320). 
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Smiles's axioms are a hodgepodge of philosophical, psychological, and proverbial 
theories of habit; they are amassed to create a rhetorical barrage promoting the habits of 
self-help - producing a textual effect that emulates his figuration of habit as a powerful 
avalanche. 
In Self-Help, moral success, and its attendant economic success, are paradoxically 
rooted in the anti-materialist idea that character is the noblest of possessions. Yet despite 
his moral framework, Smiles promotes the self-interested, self-promoting character 
(particularly his pragmatic man of business) that Thomas Carlyle and John Ruskin would 
find hard to distinguish from their detested "Mechanical man" - the anti-hero of the 
theories of political economy that they despised. An acknowledgement of the human 
propensity to act habitually or mechanically is central to the social and aesthetic thought 
of Carlyle and Ruskin. 122 In "Signs of the Times" (1829), Carlyle condemns his own era 
as the "Age of Machinery" (34), in which a transcendental moral sense reflecting the 
"dynamical" nature of men has been overpowered by mechanizing forces of 
utilitarianism (inferring associationist assessments of the human mind) and laissez-faire 
capitalism. All institutions have been mechanized, including religion and education: 
"[ f]or the same habit regulates not our modes of action alone, but our modes of thought 
and feeling. Men are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand" (Carlyle 
"Signs" 37). 123 In tandem with the gospel of work and duty, Carlyle had hoped that great 
men, specifically literary men, would act as anti-materialist prophets rekindling the lost 
emotion of the populace. He particularly approved of the humourist' s power to generate 
sympathy. Rhetorically engaged in equating habit with the anathema of mechanism, 
Carlyle did not emphasize a positive doctrine of habit. Ruskin, however, sees habit as 
both social curse and panacea. 
Ruskin joins Carlyle in blaming the science of political economy (the 
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individualist creeds of Smith, Bentham, and Malthus) for replacing social sympathy with 
avarice. In Ruskin's words, expressed in "The Roots of Honour" (1860), the desire for 
economic gain reduces men to "covetous machine[s]" that are "all skeleton"; accordingly, 
political economy is "an ossifiant theory of progress" based on the "negation of the soul" 
(Unto This Last 17: 25-6). Ruskin's writings espouse a hatred of mechanized habit 
similar to Carlyle's, yet he promotes curative habits in the form of enlightened thought 
and sympathy. Healthy habits of thought are Ruskin's mode of resistance to "Economic 
man" - an automaton created by the soullessness of habitual money-getting. In his lecture 
"Of Kings' Treasuries" in Sesame and Lilies ( 1865), he decries the immorality of a nation 
in which men pour their "whole masculine energy into the business of money-making 
and have no other true emotion" (18: 97). The working poor are as lobotomized by this as 
are the middle class: "they are only the body and nervous force of [the nation], acting still 
from old habit in a convulsive perseverance, while the mind is gone" (SL 18: 96-7). 
According to Ruskin, lack of thought, and particularly of feeling, engenders "every sort 
of bestial habit and crime .... It is in the blunt hand and the dead heart, in the diseased 
habit, in the hardened conscience, that men become vulgar; they are for ever vulgar, 
precisely in proportion as they are incapable of sympathy" (SL 18: 80). For Ruskin, only 
moral, intellectual, and aesthetic habits (based on sympathy with fellow men and nature 
itself) 124 can counter the vulgar, puerile habits (such as materialism, selfishness, and 
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mindlessness) of Englishman who evince "childish illiterateness and want of education in 
the most ordinary habits of thought" (SL 18: 98). Enfolding a rant against an epidemic of 
insensibility, "Of Kings' Treasuries" begins and ends by asserting the importance of 
books to the sympathetic habits of the nation. 
Many others joined Ruskin in the hope that literature could aid in the battle 
against utilitarian values through the "cultivation of the sympathies and imagination" 
(Houghton 267). The "Religion of Humanity," in which humanity replaces God as the 
object of love and service, attracted the English followers of its "High Priest" (according 
to Mill [ACP I 0: 328]), Auguste Comte - John Morley, Harriet Martineau, Mill, Lewes, 
and Eliot -who embraced its doctrine of sympathy (Houghton 271). 125 The moral 
function of literature, these writers postulate, is to heighten sympathy. William 
Wordsworth, in preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802), theorizes that the duty of the poet (in 
the modern age of habituated desensitization) is to promote the "habitual and direct 
sympathy" that will connect "us with our fellow beings" (52). Famously, Wordsworth's 
poetry had this inspiriting effect on J. S. Mill. Mill confesses in his Autobiography that 
reading Wordsworth taught him that the "habit of analysis," despite its centrality to 
"dissolving" prejudice and specious associations, "has a tendency to wear away the 
feelings" (1: 141 ), creating a mechanical engagement with life (1: 142). Contrarily, the 
"habitual exercise of the feelings" leads to passion and virtue (A I: 61 ). 126 George Eliot is 
the novelist who theorizes most explicitly that "awakening social sympathies," the key to 
social amelioration, is the moral duty of the novelist ("Natural History" 111). Eliot's 
novels evince that "[t]here is no general doctrine which is not capable of eating out our 
139 
morality if unchecked by the deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with individual 
fellow-men" (M 582). She perceives in Dickens's works a lack of psychological realism 
which, she argues, dilutes the sympathetic effects and social impact of his novels. As 
George Levine, Gillian Beer, Sally Shuttleworth, and many others have observed, Eliot 
participated in debates concerning physiological psychology; certainly her promotion of 
habits of sympathy dovetail with the then-current assessment of altruism in psychology. 
The doctrine of sympathy was also well-supported by physiological 
psychologists. Carpenter, for example, affirms the necessity of social sympathy as 
expressed by "habitual kindness" (360). As well, Bain argues that the "Sentiment of 
Power" (which drives material desires, egoism, jealousy, and vanity) should be 
undermined by empathetic habits: the "strongest counter-forces are the sympathies with 
other men's feelings and freedom of action; and by entertaining these habitually, we may 
keep a check upon the domineering spirit, and at least attain a habitual control over 
ourselves" (Emotions 512). Sympathy, he asserts, is a natural endowment, which may be 
improved by education (MS 393). Similarly, Lewes insists that, "Moral life is based on 
sympathy: it is feeling for others, working for others, aiding others, quite irrespective of 
any personal good beyond the satisfaction of the social impulse" (PLMJ 153).127 He 
equates sympathetic feeling (as does Ruskin) with intelligence, finding that altruistic 
mental impulses require more cognitive power (than the more emotional egoistic forces): 
"Hence so much immorality is sheer stupidity" (P LMJ 153). 128 
According to Darwin's evolutionary psychology, explicated in Descent of Man 
( 1871 ), sympathy "is the "foundation-stone" of the social instinct and therefore of 
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morality (122). Ambitiously, Darwin interweaves psychology, ethics, and evolutionary 
science together in this treatise through a theory of habit, arguing that the higher faculties 
(ratiocination, abstraction, self-consciousness, and morality) develop through social 
instinct (Descent 163). Importantly, the instinct of sympathy was "originally acquired, 
like all other social instincts, through natural selection" (Descent 156); our moral 
conscience "originates in the social instincts" and is then "confirmed by instruction and 
habit" (Descent 157). The notion that sympathy is reinforced by habit recurs in Descent: 
"habit in the individual would ultimately play a very important part in guiding the 
conduct of each member; for the social instinct, together with sympathy, is, like any other 
instinct, greatly strengthened by habit" (122). Darwin postulates that moral action 
depends on the "strength of [a man's] innate or acquired feeling of sympathy; and on his 
own capacity for reasoning out the remote consequences of his acts" (Descent 138) - like 
Lewes, he finds morality to be proportional to intelligence. The "higher" moral rules 
"relate to the welfare of others" and the lower ones "relate chiefly to self' (Descent 14 7). 
As Darwin explains: "the habit of performing benevolent actions certainly strengthens the 
feeling of sympathy which gives the first impulse to benevolent actions" (Descent 148-9). 
Darwin places utopian hopes in the inheritance of good habits (such as temperance), 
postulating that individuals possessing such habits will succeed in the struggle for life: 
"[W]e may expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by 
inheritance. In this case, the struggle between our higher and lower impulses will be less 
severe, and virtue will be triumphant" (Descent 148-150). Darwin's hopes for an evolved 
humanity, "triumphant[ly ]"virtuous and moving towards moral perfection through 
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evolution, is, as I will discuss shortly, tempered by his observation about the regrettably 
slow rate of intellectual evolution. 
Victorian educational, moral, and scientific discourses (evolutionary psychology 
and biology), by promoting ameliorative habits of self-disciplined volition, and 
sympathy, aim to subdue the dehumanizing mental mechanics of habit. Such positive 
approaches to habit were theoretically less disruptive to the cultural status quo than the 
intellectual and moral habit of non-customary thought. 
2.iv Custom and Habit 
In his controversial "Conclusion" to The Renaissance (1873), Walter Pater re-
emphasizes the Lockean estimation of habit as a source of prejudice when he proclaims 
that habit kills perception: "To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain 
this ecstasy, is success in life. In a sense it might even be said that our failure is to form 
habits, for, after all, habit is relative to a stereotyped world" (60-1 ). 129 For Pater, habit is 
speciously conventional, and "what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us" (60-
1 ). In keeping with this sentiment, Pater commends Wordsworth in Appreciations ( 1889) 
for being a critic of habit/received ideas and the "value placed on customariness, upon all 
that is habitual, local, rooted in the ground" (134). Within Pater's aesthetics, the practice 
of fine, passionate, original perception is the only habit (if it can even be termed a habit) 
worth having. In his approving assessment of Charles Lamb (also in Appreciations), he 
lauds the humourist for the "habitual apprehension" of fine perceptions (176). Habit, in 
the conventional sense is, according to Pater, an obstacle to thought, just as the 
systematization of philosophical speculation deadens perceptions. 
Matthew Arnold predates Pater in his unhesitating contempt for habit. 130 
Throughout his writings, the word habit is a synonym for the axiomatic, stereotypical, 
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and unreflecting thought that is the antithesis of culture (which is founded on "a stream of 
fresh and free thought" (Culture 6). 131 Repeatedly in Culture and Anarchy (1869), Arnold 
accuses the English of following "stock notions and habits ... staunchly but 
mechanically" (6). Habit is associated with "unintelligent routine" (Culture 162), 
provincialism, Philistinism (defined as the worship of machinery), and Puritanism; it is 
the substance of the mundane, "ordinary self' (Culture 202) that follows conventional 
wisdom, instead of the disinterested "right reason" of the "best self' (Culture 202). 
Arnold regrets that the English, unlike the French, are not characterized by the free play 
of the intellect: "We like to be suffered to lie comfortably in the old straw of our habits, 
especially of our intellectual habits, even though this straw may not be very clean and 
fine" ("Academies," Works 3: 235). Arnold's livestock metaphor for his habit-based 
countrymen is strikingly unflattering. In another rhetorical attack, habit becomes the 
mental engine of the thoughtless "mob" which Arnold fears will destroy the framework 
of society. Throughout Arnold's defense of culture, habit is rejected as a principle of 
stasis; yet, ironically, the social change which he approves is lawful, slow, and does not 
advocate a radical break from the status quo of habit. Arnold's theories of original 
perception (like Pater after him) remain divorced from the messy, aggressive realities of 
class strife and political change. 132 
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Victorian psychologists, as well as cultural critics, carefully examine the role of 
habituation in cultural transmission and social regulation. William Carpenter, for 
example, argues that custom, transmitted by tradition, becomes part of one's unconscious 
nature, "a standing habit of mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies" (362-3). Policed by 
fear of judgment by the "orthodox public," the individual generally assents to social creed 
(Carpenter 363). Similarly, for Lewes, habits of thought are gleaned from the "Social 
Medium" (PLMJ 118). As a believer in an a posteriori assessment of character, Lewes 
concludes that the current state of social evolution "wi11 be one of the necessary 
determinants in every individual mind" (PLMJ 148); the intellect and conscience are 
"social functions" (PLMJ 160): "We breathe the social air; since what we think, greatly 
depends on what others have thought" (P LMJ 160). Furthermore, Lewes' s theory of 
social inculcation accords with Darwin's argument that habits of belief, like physical 
habits and instincts, undergo intergenerational transference. Darwin found scientific 
support for agnosticism in his certainty that "unnatural," "inculcated" beliefs (such as 
those of Christianity) are transmitted in an "inherited effect" (Autobiographies 54). 
Unsettling, however, to Darwin's counter-faith in social evolution is the fact that 
"senseless customs" and "senseless habits" - the example he gives is the "horror of the 
Hindoo for unclean food" - are often transmitted along with the sensible ones (Descent 
148-149). As well, in On the Origin of Species, Darwin repeatedly voices his regret that 
old traditions are inveterately impervious to new knowledge. The persistent authority of 
the doctrine of special creation, for example, illustrates the ascendancy of inflexibility, 
prejudice, and received opinion (Origin 453). Cannily, at the close of Origin, Darwin 
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blames social habit as the reason why his theory of natural selection is resisted; as 
creatures of habit, human beings are "slow to admit change" ( 452). In the evolutionary 
psychology of Darwin, Lewes, and others, habit is synonymous with custom. 
Habituation, and not the noble, a priori principles of nature or reason, is established as 
the logical foundation of social custom. 
To return to William James, it is significant that, after outlining the physiology of 
habit, he shifts his attention to its "numerous and momentous" (Principles 124) social, 
political and ethical implications. To illustrate that habit functions ideologically like a 
cage - paradoxically a place of safety and confinement, a sanctuary and a prison - James 
tells the story of a tiger who, upon his release, surprisingly creeps back into his cage. 
Interestingly, at this point in his discussion, when habit is politicized as a structure which 
restrains and controls, James' s authorial voice emerges clearly from the discursive 
environment of quotations from earlier writers on habit. Whereas Smiles postulates that 
habit could be the tool for social progress, and others select its mechanics for social 
sympathy, James seizes upon its convenience in social constraint: 
Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us within the bounds of 
ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of 
the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life 
from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the 
fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner 
in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely 
145 
farm through all the months of snow .... It dooms us all to fight out the 
battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make 
the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we 
are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata 
from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional 
mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveler, on the young 
doctor ... You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, 
the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the 'shop,' in a word, 
from which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve 
can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is best that he 
should not escape it. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the age 
of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again. 
(Principles 125-6) 
In James's evocative language, habit "prevents," "holds", "nails," "dooms," and entraps 
all individuals from escaping their social and economic "folds." Read alongside his belief 
in the fundamentally alien nature of rigidity and confinement to the human intellect and 
will (the "essential" "negation" of "fixed modes" [Principles 990]), his promotion of 
habit as a "fly-wheel" supporting the engine of society is a deeply ironic, even satiric, 
assent to conservatism. Despite James's overarching machine metaphor, habit functions 
in this passage as a kind of mass anaesthetic, easing the social pain of the unnatural 
calcification of the human will. This numbing of the democratic will might be "we11 for 
the world" (or things as they are), but it is unhealthy for the individual. Arnold, in his 
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denunciation of habit, ignores what James recognizes: its authoritarian utility as a yoke 
on free thought in the populace. 
In his Autobiographies, Darwin emphasizes the sheer hard work of free thinking: 
"I have steadily endeavoured to keep my mind free" (56). The mental difficulty of free 
thought is assessed by Bain as being linked to the laws of association: "The mere effort of 
analysis [or dissociation] is itself something considerable, so much so, that this is not a 
favourite avocation of the untutored mind, with which associative growth is more genial 
than disassociating surgery" (S&J 581). The fact that disassociative thought is even 
possible, is, James argues, a distinctively human phenomenon, for other animals are 
incapable of non-habitual, creative associations (association by similarity not contiguity). 
Mill concludes that original thought, and the tremendous energy it takes to maintain it, is 
the vital quality without which men and women are merely machines of habit. Although 
Mill subscribes to associationist mental theory based on the utility of habit, his ideal of 
the energetic individual (of either sex), unanaesthetized by habit, opposes the Smilesean 
ideal - a man whose character is a collection of moral habits. In Comte's religion of 
humanity, Mill finds the same "ethical mistake as the theory of Calvinism": too much 
energy expended on self-restraint and altruism (ACP I 0: 337-38), resulting in the 
diminishment of individualism, and thus free thought. Thus, his oxymoronic ideal for 
humanity is the habit of non-habitual thought. 
Mill theorizes that human character is formed mainly by circumstances - even 
instincts can be changed or eradicated by "other mental influences, and by education" (SL 
8: 859). This belief prompts him to provide the pedagogical example of his own especial 
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education in his Autobiography. Revealingly, Mill asserts that his own "natural" ability 
was below average, but his education (as directed by his father) James was not one "of 
cram"; it did not involve imbibing received opinions and thinking like those who do not 
think "except in the furrows traced for them" (A 1: 33-35). From his father's "mode of 
education," he learned the "habit of thinking for [him]self'' - specific proof of this being 
his lifelong disagreement with his father on the issue of suffrage for women (A I: 189, 
106). The socio-political and moral teaching of Mill's "Ethology" is that ignorance about 
the a posteriori formation of human character has prohibited a universal habit of 
freethinking. Ignorance, he declares, is the "greatest stumbling block" to the moral and 
"rational treatment of social issues" (A I: 270); as a result, the conservative interests 
(served by "intuitional metaphysics") have inflexibly ruled the thought of Europe through 
the philosophy of innate ideas (A I: 270). 
Mill's On Liberty exposes the tyranny of the majority over the individual through 
the power of prevailing opinion. Mill's central thesis is that uncontested, received 
wisdom violates true liberty, which resides in the "inward domain" - characterized by 
consciousness and by liberty of thought, feeling, and opinion (18: 225-35). To achieve 
this true liberty, Mill advises the "steady habit" of correcting, correlating, and collecting 
opinions (18: 232), after the free-minded manner of Socrates, Jesus, Marcus Aurelius, 
Luther, and those who have been persecuted for their "free and daring speculation" (18: 
242). It is a vested interest of ruling powers to inculcate habitual thought based on 
simple, passive, hereditary truths (to create what Mill terms, following Sir Arthur Helps, 
the "deep slumber of a decided opinion" [18: 250]), instead of active, progressive, and 
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competing partial truths. Mill regrets that the quality of "many-sidedness" which is 
required for non-habitual thought is rare, for in society as it stands, eccentricity is 
practically a crime (particularly for women) (18: 252, 265). Individual minds are clipped 
and cut like trees (or bound like women's feet are in China), and individuality is 
destroyed, "maim[ ed] by compression" (18: 271 ). Like other Victorian organicists, Mill 
believes that the quality of the state is that of the sum of its individuals. It is thus "the 
fatal tendency of mankind" that habituated mediocrity is routinely ascendant (18: 250, 
253). In essence, Mill's polemic of progress and liberty opposes customary ideology 
through the habit of mental freedom. His grandest oxymoronic ideal for humanity 
(despite his deep cynicism about the ability of his generation to think freely [Carlisle 
13]), is the habit of non-habitual thought. 
As in On Liberty, the main arguments of Mill's The Subjection of Women (1869; 
created in collaboration with Harriet Taylor) are based on the notion that human beings 
cannot be extracted from their social condition or "the whole habit of a life" (21: 320). 133 
The refusal to acknowledge this logic in the case of women, he proclaims, is one of the 
"chief hindrances to human improvement" (21 : 261) (Mill and Taylor are in awe of the 
sheer stupidity of banning "one-half of the whole sum of human intellect" from 
contributing to the service of society [21: 326].) The polemical treatise opens with a 
complaint against the near-smothering weight of customary, "universal opinion" 
upholding the a priori justification of women's oppression through artificial conceptions 
of their innately inferior character. In Mill's estimation, the fundamental premise of 
modem society - the fluidity of social position - requires an a posteriori "Ethology" and 
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a corresponding politics. For Mill, unlike Arnold and Pater, it is impossible to divorce a 
belief in the necessity of free thought from a belief in necessity of political action, in the 
form of either polemical tracts or direct action. Inspired by Wilhelm Humboldt's 
reformist aim to give political voice to minorities, Mill became a Member of Parliament. 
As a member of the House of Commons during the sessions of Parliament which passed 
the Reform Bill of 1867, Mill strove to gain suffrage for working men and defended their 
right to protest in parks (A I: 278-9). Interestingly, he declares that his most important 
public service as an MP was his motion to strike out the words limiting the electoral 
franchise to males (A I: 285); this engagement of his most unconventional idea is self-
confessedly his proudest political moment. Parliamentary experience confirmed Mill's 
contentious view that "stupid persons are generally Conservative" (A 1: 277) - for Mill, 
stupidity is not ignorance or lack of intelligence per se, but automatic, habit-bound 
thinking. Mill's social and political ideas are underpinned by a paradoxical assessment of 
habit as being both critical to the maintenance of conservatism and vital to the 
preservation of free-thinking radicalism. 
As I have discussed in Chapter 1, no genre or mode of literature is more 
predicated in attacking the stupidity of authoritative custom from the point of view of free 
thought than satire. Northrop Frye, for example, personifies satire as the forces of 
intelligence engaged in battle with the monster of stupidity ("Nature" 80). As well, 
Hume's observation that habits of thought can only be leveled by "sensible violence" 
(Treatise 175) justifies the aggressive habit-breaking agenda of satire. Association 
theories "carried radical hopes" (Ry lance 61) in ascribing so much of human thought to 
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customary experience. Spencer, despite his notorious anglophilia and racism, was both a 
dedicated association psychologist and a political radical. 134 He observes that "the 
questioning habit" (Principles of Sociology 133) is the key to social evolution; it works 
against individual "submission" to political or ecclesiastical powers. Two core beliefs of 
Spencer's social psychology, expressed in "On Manners and Fashion" (1854), are that 
"political independence and independence of personal conduct are linked," and that for 
society to develop, old social forms must be "thrown off' (Essays 199-200). 
Consequently, Spencer declares a need for "protestantism in social issues," identifying 
satire as a harbinger of revolutionary change: 
Signs are not wanting that some change is at hand. A host of satirists, led 
on by Thackeray, have for years engaged in bringing our sham festivities, 
and our fashionable follies, into contempt; and in their candid moods, 
most men laugh at the frivolities with which they and the world in general 
are deluded. Ridicule has always been a revolutionary agent. That which is 
habitually assaulted with sneers and sarcasms cannot long survive. 
Institutions that have lost their roots in men's respect and faith are 
doomed; and the day of their dissolution is not far off. (Essays 234) 
The habitual assaults of satire both signal and prompt revolutionary change. Spencer 
praises a "host of satirists" for seeing through the sham and delusion of current customs 
and institutions. His approval of satire as a literary form associated with the mental habit 
of seeing clearly accords with Pater's later compliment to the humourist for the ability "to 
look upon the tricks and manners of the life about him with that same refined purged sort 
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of vision, which will come naturally to those of a later generation" (Appreciations 176). 
Although Pater is against explicit political agendas in art, his praise for a de-habituated, 
"purged sort of vision" aptly describes the project of satire. Certainly William James 
approves of the mental clarity (which he calls "focalization") that satire entails. In his 
discussion of the marvel of conscious thought in human beings, he associates satire with 
the voluntary, non-habitual thought that epitomizes selective attention. The state of mind 
of the satirist best approximates clear, free thought: 
When not 'focalized,' we are scatter-brained; but when thoroughly 
impassioned, we never wander from the point. None but congruous and 
relevant images arise. When roused by indignation or moral enthusiasm, 
how trenchant are our emotions, how smiting are our words! The whole 
network of petty scruples and by-considerations which, at ordinary languid 
times, surrounded the matter like a cobweb, holding back our thought, as 
Gulliver was pinned to the earth by the myriad Lilliputian threads, are 
dashed through at a blow, and the subject stands with its essential and vital 
lines revealed. (Principles 990) 
With words commonly ascribed to satire ("indignation," "moral enthusiasm," 
"trenchant," and "smiting") and with a reference to Swift's Gulliver's Travels, James 
signals a generic subtext to his opposition of "focalized" and vital reason to the network 
of restraining mental habits. Satire is implicitly evoked as a genre morally engaged in an 
anatomy of habit. 
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To summarize, this chapter explores the "law of habit" in associationism and the 
Victorian physio-psychological discourses that emerged from it, in order to provide the 
foundation for my argument that Victorian novelists continued the traditions of satire (as 
an evolving mode or genre) through an engagement with omnipresent theories of habit. 
Although authoritative discourses (both of science and of moral/social science) implicate 
habit in the forces of determinism (and also in the dehumanization that accompanies 
materialist culture), contradictory theories inveterately identify habit as a locus of moral 
hope (through habits of sympathy, self-control, free will, and free thought). Generally 
speaking, satire, as Chapter l outlines, is a mode or genre founded upon notions of moral 
judgment; fittingly, moral conceptions of habit are intrinsic to Victorian satiric novels. 
Narratives satirizing habit expose prevailing ethics as little more than regimes of habit; 
custom and ideology, like habit itself, may operate unconsciously within the individual. 
Victorian novelists make persistent rhetorical and symbolic use of the fact that habit 
describes both individual and social custom. Furthermore, the "focalization" (James), 
"dissociating surgery" (Bain), and "dissociating force" (Mill), all of which describe free 
or anti-habitual thought in psychology, complement both Bakhtin's notion of the 
dialogizing, dehabituating, and Menippean forces of the novel, and Frye's concept of 
"anatomy." In the chapters that follow, I examine the ways in which many Victorian 
novelists, critically engaged with culturally flourishing theories of habit, use satire to 
interrogate the customary associations of what Lewes evocatively terms the "Social 
Medium." 
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Chapter 3 
"Making habit omnipotent": Satire on Habit in Cranford, Silas Marner, 
The Way of All Flesh, and New Grub Street 
"I have at least succeeded in establishing a habit of mind which keeps watch against my 
self-partiality and promotes a fair consideration of what touches the feelings or fortunes 
of my neighbours." (George Eliot, Theophrastus Such 10) 
The habit was ominous. (George Gissing, New Grub Street 104) 
Victorian satiric texts, while demonstrating a plethora of Menippean 
characteristics, frequently utilize Horatian and Juvenalian modes of social critique. 
Anatomies of habit vary in both their assessment of the degree of individual and social 
damage created by bad habits, and also in their optimism concerning the curative 
possibilities of good habits. Edward Bulwer-Lytton's increasingly Juvenalian cast, 
observable in the contrast between Pelham's jaunty Horatianism in 1828 and The Coming 
Race's expression of vitriolic disillusionment in 1871, encapsulates the general trend in 
Victorian satiric novels towards a decidedly non-utopic view of habit. George Eliot's 
Silas Marner (1861) and Samuel Butler's The Way of All Flesh (written between 1873 
and 1884, published 1903) explicitly engage with contemporary scientific conjecture on 
habit, whereas Elizabeth Gaskell's Cranford (1851-53) and George Gissing's New Grub 
Street (1891) satirize habit without overtly signaling contemporary scientific or economic 
discourses. In critiquing habits of genteel illusion, puritan moralism, and habits of 
misplaced industry and materialism, the novels I explore typically suggest palliative, 
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even productive, habits to counter humanity's psychological propensity to acquire and 
maintain destructive behaviours. In New Grub Street, however, neither the counteractive 
habit of industry, nor of free-thought, nor even of sympathy alleviate Gissing' s 
Juvenalian negativity. 
In Chapter I, I posited that Victorian novelists (even in the middle decades of the 
era) are as much satirists as realists; in order to qualify this expansive claim, I identified 
one possible cause of satire's general neglect in studies of Victorian novels to be the 
theory of "classic realism." By invoking this embattled subject, my project joins current 
critical efforts to widen conceptions of nineteenth-century realism. 
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Matthew Beaumont 
has recently suggested that all-encompassing arguments about formal and ideological 
naivete in canonical Victorian texts have succeeded in narrowing definitions of Victorian 
realism. The idea that many canonical Victorian "realist" novels are considerably satirical 
undercuts not only elements of "classic realism," but also theories of sentimental comic 
realism, and assumptions regarding satire's modal relation to the novel. Critics who 
attempt a taxonomic reconciliation of satire with the novel, including Paulson, Palmeri, 
and Dyer, conclude that when criticism of society is ascendant in a text, satire dominates; 
when psychological descriptions of character predominate (along with other moderating 
and domesticating factors), satire has become eclipsed. Yet, what happens to this 
distinction when individual psychology is revealed to be socially inscribed is a question 
that leads to a re-negotiation of satire's relationship to the novel. I began this 
investigation with an attempt to reconcile classical definitions of satire with Victorian 
novelistic practices through Frye's and Bakhtin's theories of Menippean satire. To 
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summarize, both theorists view the central goal of Menippean satire - and in some sense, 
satire in general - to be the exposure and defamiliarization of habit (personal, social, and 
literary). Hence, in Chapter 2, I explored the Victorian preoccupation with the moral 
repercussions of habit, a philosophical concept increasingly understood as a psycho-
physical force directing human behaviour for good or for ill. Paradoxically, habit is 
theorized across multiple discourses (most notably in physiological psychology) as both a 
force mechanizing the human will (and reinforcing soulless egotism and materialism) and 
a force which preserves humanity through habits of an empowered will, industry, free-
thought, and, most importantly, sympathy. This chapter focuses on four Victorian novels 
in which habit is a key site of the recuperation of Menippean satire and Horatian and 
Juvenalian modalities of satire. Arguably, as these texts imply, satire does not simply re-
emerge late in the period; it shifts, substantially in accordance with its representation of 
habit, from a predominantly Horatian investment in habits of sympathy to a more 
Juvenalian suspicion of altruism - and this shift is notable even at mid-century. 
As I outlined in Chapter I, numerous critics, including Sutherland, Paulson, Tave, 
Palmeri, and Dyer, argue that satire, having been overpowered by amiable humour, all 
but disappeared after the death of Byron in 1824.
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This is currently the dominant 
position regarding novelistic satire in the Victorian period - adjusted slightly by Palmeri, 
who extends the date of satire's "occlusion" to the 1840s, but maintains its reemergence 
in the 1880s ("Narrative Satire" 371, 361 ). Eliding the contentious issue of satire, Robert 
B. Martin influentially argues that genial humour is characteristic of early Victorian texts, 
and harsher wit and paradox are prevalent later in the period. Trajectories of satire's 
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decline, however, may be challenged by the supposition that satire exists in the early and 
mid-nineteenth century as a narrative component that is difficult to distinguish from 
genial comic humour, but which is recognizable as Horatian or Menippean satire. Critics 
tend to classify less overtly indignant Horatian satire as comic realism, tacitly importing 
the Victorian identification of satire proper with the Juvenalian mode. Horace was valued 
as a benign humorist more than as a satirist per se, but Juvenal was regarded (negatively) 
as a thoroughgoing satirist. 
Michael Wheeler describes the 1830s and 1840s as experimental decades in prose 
fiction, in which novel sub-genres proliferate, including historical, silver-fork, Newgate, 
social problem, and sporting texts (15). 137 William Thackeray, for example, experiments 
with a variety of forms in order to "observ[ e] the social hierarchy from a wide variety of 
angles" (Wheeler 20) and to parody the sub-genres he rejects on moral grounds. 138 
Dickens's Pickwick Papers (1836-37), rambling in form and theme and jovial in its social 
criticism, is a key Horatian text from this period. The most influential model of satiric 
fiction before mid-century, however, is Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus (1833-34): the 
magnitude of its influence is avowed by writers such as George Eliot, who declares in 
1855 that even for writers who disagree with Carlyle, the book "was an epoch in the 
history of their minds" ("Thomas Carlyle" 344). 
Sartor Resartus is a paragon of relentlessly intellectual and comical Menippean 
satire; its meditations upon metaphysics, the philosophy of science, ethics, education, and 
politics, are, as the Editor admits, often inscrutable, like Professor Diogenes 
Teufelsdrockh himself. Sartor Resartus is "like some mad banquet" (SR 26) or satiric 
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farrago, written in a fittingly "piebald, entangled, hyper-metaphorical style" (SR 215). 
Teufelsdrockh' s "Philosophy of Clothes" addresses a vast array of satiric targets - from 
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literary genres to materialism and Utilitarian philosophy - culminating in the famous 
injunction: "Close thy Byron; open thy Goethe" (SR 143). The Professor demands a 
rejection of self-involved melancholy, isolation, and bitterness, not an abandonment of 
satire - at least not in its conciliatory, non-Byronic, Horatian form (it is rumoured that 
Teufelsdrockh laughed only once, and that "was of Jean Paul's doing" [SR 25]). As John 
Reed verifies, the text's central lesson is the promotion of self-disciplined subordination 
of the will to higher duty and social connectivity (Victorian Wil/ 15-16). Teufelsdrockh 
asserts that even "splenic humour" is the result of "inverted Sympathy" (SR 181), for 
"Mankind," like nature, is "an indivisible whole" (SR 182). Those who deny sympathy, 
and who do not "habitually wonder" (SR 52), have traded "Mysticism and Mystery" for 
worthless clothes - the habits of materialism. Carlyle's "mad banquet" of a text provides 
a template for subsequent (and diverse) Victorian satires. Before proceeding to a detailed 
discussion of the novels featured in this chapter, all of which carry forward Carlyle's 
critique in both Horatian and Juvenalian-themed, Menippean satires on habit, a glance at 
Bulwer-Lytton's shifting satiric practices, as reflected in Pelham (1828) and The Coming 
Race (1871), will demonstrate the shift from Horatian to a Juvenalian representations of 
habit. 
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3.i From Horatian Hopes to Juvenalian Disillusionment: Habit in 
Bulwer-Lytton's Pelham and The Coming Race 
Carlyle denounces and parodies Pelham; or the Adventures of a Gentleman 
(1828) in Sartor Resartus by personifying Bulwer-Lytton's text in as a "Mystagogue" of 
the "Dandiacal Body" who clarifies for Teufelsdrockh the "Articles of Faith" for clothes-
worshiping - such as "There is safety in a swallow-tail" (SR 204-205). Ironically, 
however, Bulwer-Lytton's novel sustains a Carlylean-compatible Horatian goal (as 
expressed in the 1828 preface to Pelham): "every weed in the great thoroughfares of life 
has a honey, which Observation can easily extract; and we may glean no unimportant 
wisdom from Folly itself, if we distinguish while we survey, and satirise while we share 
it" (P 5). Carlyle, it seems, ignored the many self-reflexive announcements in Pelham 
declaring the text's status as satire - including footnotes by the "author" which plainly 
refer to the "satire of this chapter" (P 79). Pelham even signals that his list of the twenty-
two articles of faith is satirical; he expresses confidence that the "sagacious reader" will 
determine what is ironic and "what is in earnest" (P 94). 140 The final article of faith 
announces Pelham's true opinion: one who esteems fashion for itself"is a trifler," but he 
who "esteems" it for "the advantage" it can give "is a philosopher" (P 94). Pelham's 
statement confirms Lauren Gillingham's observation that he "keeps himself distinct from 
the social forms in which he traffics" (77); in effect, he re-inscribes the figure of the 
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dandy with habits of sympathy. 
Of Henry Pelham's many personae, one is that of the Horatian, self-critical 
satirist. Admittedly, Pelham is at first more of a voluptuary than a moralist. Addicted to 
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change and also to fashion (an ideal register of change), he decides strategically to "set up 
'a character"' (P 24) as a means of resisting the cultivation of a characteristic disposition. 
Settling upon a type that is most generally offensive, he styles himself as an "egregious 
coxcomb: accordingly, I arranged my hair in ringlets" (P 25). Obnoxious self-satisfaction 
is a theatrical choice to register himself as one of the "dissenters of society" (P 50); his 
hedonistic philosophy is essentially a vow to defy socially and mentally constricting habit 
-which he mocks continually (the parochial habits of the English and the snobbery of the 
French are frequent subjects of his condescension). His addiction to observing the 
character of others, his ensuing chameleonic social savvy, his utter lack of a moral 
education at Eton or Cambridge, and his mother's advice "'to never have a single idea 
which does not terminate in yourself" (P 23), lead him to campaign for a seat in 
parliament. He attains the borough ofBuyemall by the typical means: committing to no 
principle "yet profess[ing] principles which all parties would allow were the best" (P 76). 
Yet, his subsequent authentic education - undertaken. by Lord Glenmorris, who directs 
him to read James Mill's On Government and Jeremy Bentham's theory of political 
economy - leads him to a radical shift in his habits of thought: he "obtained a clear 
knowledge of moral principle" and "no longer divorced the interests of other men from 
142 [his] own" (P 81-82). Like Russelton, Pelham remains strategically "coated and 
cravatted' (P 73) to perfection, but unlike Russelton, he keeps his "mind not only 
capable of the most solid and important affairs, but habituated by reflection to consider 
them" (P 170). 
160 
Regarding the secret to noble character, Bulwer-Lytton's advice in Pelham is 
similar to the "true secret of creative genius" developed in his 1838 essay "On Art in 
Fiction": "the intenseness of [the] sympathies" (38). Underneath its many surface forms, 
Pelham is a Horatian-themed satire that complements Bulwer-Lytton's belief, expressed 
in "Faith and Charity" (1863), that authors- after the manner of Horace and Cervantes-
should "conciliate our sympathies even where they expose our infirmities" ( Caxtoniana 
320-21). In sharp comparison, The Coming Race (1871) is Juvenalian satire, uninterested 
in promoting the habit of sympathy as a locus of utopian hope. 
Emphasizing Bulwer-Lytton's awareness of cultural currents, Christopher Lane 
playfully calls him "a Victorian weather vane" (35); certainly he participated in the 
pervasive debates about habit that, as Vrettos asserts, were "operative in [Victorian] 
culture as a whole" (404). Typically, Bulwer-Lytton's earliest writings, such as Pelham, 
reveal a fairly straightforward acceptance of notions of habitual self-control and 
sympathy. His Caxtoniana: A Series of Essays on Life, Literature, and Manners (1863) 
also contains multiple meditations on the utility of habit. The "habit ofloving [one's] 
neighbor as himself," for example, is described in "Faith and Charity" as the key to 
mental and moral "grandeur" ( Caxtoniana 191 ). Another article, aptly entitled "On 
Monotony in Occupation as a Source of Happiness," asserts that "for health," the mind, 
like the body, "needs a certain clockwork of routine; we like to look forward with a 
tranquil sentiment of security" (Caxtoniana 31-2). Importantly, however, a more ominous 
tribute to the psychology of habit informs the argument of "On the Spirit of 
Conservatism," an essay in which Bulwer-Lytton justifies conservative political practices 
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on the basis of the obduracy of a nation's customs or habits. In brief, the government of a 
nation (its "dynasty" and "institutions" [ Caxtoniana 434]) determines the habits of its 
citizenry, which in turn maintain the governing structures. The habituated individual, 
Bulwer-Lytton argues, necessarily experiences a salutary fusion of social liberty and 
order. Habit is therefore a nearly imperturbable mechanism (William James will later 
agree) of conservatism, for enforced sudden change brings instant social chaos. 
Demonstrating this idea in The Coming Race, Bulwer-Lytton describes a people whose 
habits are radically incompatible with and thus inimical to humanity - despite the fact 
that they are also descendents of the "great Aryan family" (CR 134). The text's political 
moral is that the English should avoid democracy as they would hell itself. Yet, 
complicating matters in Bulwer-Lytton's ambivalent estimation, habit is at once a 
foundation for social liberty and a dangerously mechanizing force in the human 
personality. 
Unlike T. H. Huxley's later vision of a new garden of Eden ("Evolution & 
Ethics," 1893), in which the civilized world suppresses acrimony through the forces of 
habitual altruism, The Coming Race inverts the chaotic and overtly despotic underworld 
(envisioned, for example by John Milton in Paradise Lost, 1667), describing instead a 
version of hell that is peaceful and utterly civilized. The desultory American narrator falls 
down a mine-shaft and finds himself to be "alone in [a] strange world, amidst the bowels 
of the earth" (CR 5); during his adventures in Vril-ya, he fluctuates between being the 
target of and the vehicle for a satire on progressive Victorian thought: democracy, 
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Darwinism, and feminism. The text's anti-utopian argument reflects not only Bulwer-
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Lytton's altered political philosophy (from the radicalism of Godwin and the Mills, to the 
conservatism of Benjamin Disraeli [Campbell 13]), but also his thoughts on the 
psychology of habit. Convincingly, Christopher Lane argues that this text demonstrates 
"humanity's failure to sustain its best ideals, including sympathy and disinterestedness" 
(37). I would add that for Bulwer-Lytton, William Paley's axiom, "man is a bundle of 
habits" (48), a philosophical and psychological truism upheld by Victorian moral science, 
offers prospects that are more destructive than ameliorative. 
In the labyrinthine crevices beneath the earth (analogous to the nervous networks 
of the brain that conduct unconscious, habitual impulses) Bulwer-Lytton imagines a new 
humanoid species that has harnessed the forces of habit (what they term vril) to a 
superhuman degree. 144 The Vril-yans appear to have achieved the habits of self-control 
idealized by Victorian psychologists and social critics. In contrast to the "wholesale 
immorality" of the human race, all Vril-yans are "tacitly habituated" (CR 72, 34) to 
conduct that is so uniformly good that the human moral scale is rendered meaningless. 
The population is "temperate" in its emotional comportment and even children are easily 
taught to avoid strong emotion. Furthermore, immaculate self-possession results in 
faultless control over all physical and social environments. Yet this transformation of 
habit into an overriding coercive power magnifies the undignified fact that the vaunted 
will of the Vril-yans is not free, but utterly mechanical. Aph-Lin explains: "We are all 
formed by custom - even the difference of our race from the savage is but the transmitted 
continuance of custom, which becomes, through hereditary descent, part and parcel of 
our nature" (CR 107). The Vril-yans have been dehumanized by inherited mental habits 
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of rational egalitarianism. Imperturbable, they have evolved to manifest perfectly the 
energizing forces of habit (or vril), but unappealingly utopic habits have mechanized 
volition, gutted sympathy, and lobotomized thought. Through this satire of a lifeless 
underworld, Bulwer-Lytton devastates Hegelian and evolutionary concepts of 
"theoretical perfectibility" (CR 131) and assails the mental understructure of habit for its 
insidious ability to naturalize custom into instinct. Ultimately, egoistic habits - the 
Hobbesian "vanity and ambition [in] our upper world" (CR 109)- remain the only viable 
and truly human habits. The Coming Race is a Juvenalesque Menippean satire concerning 
the failure of utopian hopes placed by numerous Victorian writers (from novelists to 
physiological psychologists) on the powers of habit. Yet, as Pelham and The Coming 
Race reveal, habit is a key site for the recuperation of Horatian and Juvenalian and 
Menippean satire. 
3.ii The Horatian Anatomy of Gentility in Elizabeth Gaskell's Cranford 
Contemporary reviewers of Cranford (1851-53) praised its moral and domestic 
lessons; tellingly, the novel was admired by Ruskin and never held to contain offensive 
satire. 145 Critical consensus remains that it is a light-heartedly affectionate critique of 
parochial values in pre-industrial rural England. Critics observe narrative "tension 
between sympathy and judgment" (C. Mitchell xxi), 146 but typically, the novel's satiric 
elements are not discussed in depth or linked with any particular tradition of satire. 
Barbara Hardy, for example, although agreeing with Arthur Pollard's conclusion that 
Gaskell is "a propagandist for sympathy," observes in her canon an "absence of satire": 
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"Mrs Gaskell is unusual as a social novelist in her avoidance of satire" (l 7 4 ). Despite 
David Cecil's sexist assessment of Gaskell in 1934 - both she and her novels are, he 
concludes, "gentle, domestic, tactful, unintellectual" (l 94) - he does acknowledge her 
position within satiric traditions. Her "snobbish small-town spinsters," he contends, 
represent snobbery "as well as Thackeray himself' - although Gaskell has a "rosier 
outlook on human nature" (l 98). Referring to Mrs Forrester's desperate lace economy 
(its rescue from her cat's intestine), he observes: "This is not the caustic satire of Emma, 
but the sympathetic satire of Tristram Shandy and The Vicar of Wakefield. Like theirs, 
too, its humour is not exclusively satiric. It has ... a strong strain of the whimsical, 
exuberant 'pure' humour of Lamb or Dickens" (210). Effectively, but not influentially, 
Cecil situates Gaskell' s novels within traditions of novelistic Horatian satire.
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Arguing in favour of sympathetic satire, Horace asserts, "what harm can there be/ 
in telling truth with a laugh, as teachers sometimes give/ their children biscuits to coax 
them into learning their ABC?" (I.1.23-25). The satirical subject, according to Horace, 
should be gently chastised, as if by a parent. Cranford's infantilized population is also 
. instructed, yet it is through the maternal reprimands of its satiric narrator Mary Smith. 
Cranford is a Horatian text primarily because it offers benign and ultimately conciliatory 
criticism of socially-supported human foibles. The Horatian satiric rule is moderate, 
friendly criticism that avoids socially divisive, angry satire. Horace, for example, warns 
against habitually criticizing one's friends behind their back and advises instead the 
practice of tolerant understanding of their bad habits - even trying to see the positive side 
of faults: "l really believe that this habit both joins and cements friendships" (l.3.54). 
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Snobbery, in particular, is frequently mocked by Horace as an alienating social practice; 
he praises his noble friend Maecenas for not "curl[ing] his nostril, as most people do" at 
men (like Horace) who have "freedman fathers" (1.6.5-6). Similarly, in Gaskell's 
novelistic satire, habitual snobbery (which is systematized in communal codes of 
gentility) is the central fault of the Cranford population that is singled out for benign 
criticism. Judgmental adherence to regulatory social forms, as Herbert Spencer argues, 
destroys "sympathetic converse with our fellow-creatures" (Essays 232). Gaskell's satire 
on snobbery in Cranford, however, is tempered by a W ollstonecraftian understanding 
that superficialities, such as codes of propriety, are among the few socially condoned 
varieties of knowledge for female minds.
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Complementing its Horatian mode, Cranford is a Menippean text in several of its 
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key formal features, but also in an overarching Bakhtinian sense, in that it exposes the 
mentally restricting "habitual matrices" (sosedstva) of society. Gaskell's Cranford is less 
engaged in science-of-mind debates than, for example, the novels of George Eliot or 
Samuel Butler, but fixity of mental habit is detailed in the text through the unchanging 
manners and fashions of Cranford's inhabitants, each of whom is obsessed with genteel 
codes of behaviour.
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Household items appearing in the novel, from iron fire-shovels to 
new rugs (which must be ritualistically preserved), signify the immovability of customary 
behaviour and can be interpreted as metaphors of habit replacing the tracks, grooves, and 
paths of physiological psychology. Deborah Jenkyns's copy of Rasselas (emblematic of 
her infallible taste), Mrs Jamison's sedan chair (symbolic of her worship of aristocracy), 
and Miss Matty's precious candles (on which her eyes are "habitually fixed") denote the 
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communal obsession with "genteel" economy (C 24). Yet, from Mrs Forrester's precious 
lace collars to every woman's carefully chosen caps, brooches, and dresses, articles of 
fashion are the primary signs of Cranford's envelopment in habits of gentility. 
Of all the fashionable accessories showcased in Cranford, the cap is the most 
extensively detailed. (Mary explains that new caps, unlike new dresses, were affordable 
in the "elegant economy" [C 3]) Certainly, few emblems could be more appropriate to 
evoke mental culture than that of a covering for the head. The narrator observes, "If the 
heads were buried in smart new caps, the ladies were like ostriches" (C 73); the ostrich, 
hiding its head in the sand, is another perfect symbol for blind habit. Miss Deborah 
Jenkyns, the town's "dragoon" of decorum, appropriately wears a formidable black silk 
bonnet, which looks like a helmet to Mary. Miss Matty's bonnet-wearing habits also 
expose her mental machinery. Grieving Mr Holbrook's death, she routinely wears a cap 
in public like Mrs Jamieson's widow's cap. In private, however, she wears Deborah's 
best cap. Matty's mind is so laden with social strictures that one day she receives an 
unexpected guest with both caps on. Furthermore, Miss Pole determines to attend the 
insultingly belated invitation to meet Lady Glenmire mainly because of her purchase of a 
new cap for the occasion; in this instance, moral censure of unkind behaviour is 
overpowered by habitual vanity. The nuances of bonnet selection narrated in Cranford, 
far from being trivial, reflect the psychological limitations of characters whose thoughts 
are continually directed by inflexible social custom and whose lives are circumscribed by 
gender-inflected emphases on physical appearance. 
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Cranford's population is surveyed by Mary Smith, who, acting as a humble, self-
critical Horatian commentator, observes their "daily habits" (C 10). As the complicit 
friend of her satirized subjects, Mary is implicated in her own ironical observations. Self-
reflexive knowledge of Cranford's cap-propriety, for example, is evident in her insistence 
that Matty wear a cap that is age-appropriate; Mary herself wears the outmoded "ca lash" 
(C 65) over her genteel bonnet. Although Mary, as revealed by her often repeated (and 
confessional) "even I," is also addicted to Cranford's status quoisms, she is like a typical 
Menippean ingenue - an outsider who becomes a temporary insider, but never fully fits 
in. Also, like Horace in Maecenas's circle, her status is somewhat subservient. As 
Gillooly points out, Mary is frequently told to fetch items such as Deborah's Rasselas 
and the encyclopedia (133). Therefore, despite Mary's frequent use of the inclusive 
pronoun - "we ... always," "we constantly," "we felt very genteel" (C 25-26) - she 
occupies a social position that preserves the ironic perspective of an outsider. In her 
perennial visits to Cranford ("'I had vibrated all my life between Drumble and Cranford"' 
[C 154]), she critically, but fallibly and fondly, observes the customs of the small town. 
As I argue in Chapter 5, satiric texts that ridicule patriarchy typically utilize the 
figure of the female satirist; Mary Smith is an example of this tradition. Like the humble 
Horatian persona, Mary, despite her self-depreciation, is an opinionated and deliberately 
literary observer. Just as Horace's capacity for literary allusion undercuts his prosaic 
claims, Mary's narrative is highly intertextual. Her account of "the honorable" Mrs 
Jamieson's tea party is teeming with mock-heroic allusions. Like Odysseus, who 
famously steers a course between Scylla and Charybdis, all guests must carefully "steer 
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clear between Mrs Forrester's deafness and Mrs. Jamieson's sleepiness" (C 67). As Mrs 
Jamieson's crimes against decorum mount, the scene culminates with Mary's satiric 
apostrophe: '"Oh, gentility!. .. can you endure this last shock?"' (C 67). Mary's domestic 
satire on a world in which bread-jelly and cherry brandy have precise social meaning 
functions like Alexander Pope's in "The Rape of the Lock" (1714) (a satire that also 
targets the vanities of the feminized private sphere) through inverted epic hyperbole. 
Mary's comment that "[g]reat events spring out of small causes" (C 72) echoes the 
opening lines of Pope's poem: "What mighty Contests rise from trivial Things" (2). In 
her comprehensive, Augustan-like survey of Cranfordian vanity, Mary is particularly 
angered at social insults to Matty, on whose behalf she becomes "very indignant and 
warm" (C 70). Her anger has been interpreted psychoanalytically as female defiance 
(Gillooly); yet in her role as a satirist, anger is both a traditional and productive emotion. 
Being a satirist, Mary is necessarily capable of non-habitual/non-customary 
thought (and, as I discuss in Chapter 5, the figure of the female satirist is unsettling to 
masculinist conceptions, both of society and satire itself). Appropriate, however, to the 
Horatian and non-radical nature of the novel's feminist critique, it is typically Cranford's 
male visitors and inhabitants who demonstrate the ability to dissent from the overriding 
ethos of gentility and who think somewhat freely. Although, as critics have noted, male 
characters have a high mortality rate in Cranford, they at least tend not to be automatons 
of Mrs Grundy. Interestingly, Mary, who loves to report that Cranford is "going on much 
as usual" (C 149), and "dread[s] the changed aspect of things" (C 23) after Deborah's 
death, is associated nonetheless with custom/habit-breaking male characters who disrupt 
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Cranford's intricately harmonized systems of propriety. For example, Mary sympathizes 
with Captain Brown, who is accused of "disregard of the genteel proprieties of life" [ C 
157]), and enjoys his reading from Pickwick Papers far more than Deborah's reading 
from Rasselas. (Deborah classifies the democratic tendencies of Dickens as vulgar, 
favouring her precious and proper Dr Johnson.) As well, Mr Holbrook, who defies 
current codes of gentlemanly dress and manners, is emulated by Mary, who follows his 
lead by eating her peas on the unrefined two-pronged fork ('"I saw, I imitated, I 
survived!"' [ C 33]). As well, Mary overlooks fashionable prohibitions and joins him on 
an after-dinner walk. Significantly, Mary's fault of "indiscretion" (C 111) is arguably 
related to her habit of uncustomary behaviour. Her secret letter to Peter Jenkyns, her 
business plan for Matty, and her strategic orchestration of Cranford's social atmosphere 
in general, align her with the masculine sphere of action, industry, and freedom from 
habits of gentility. As the voice of Horatian moderation, Mary resists parochial terror of 
the new. 
As an honorary drone in the Cranford hive, Mary accesses the private thoughts of 
"all our minds" (C 77). Similar to many Menippean texts, Cranford is less about 
individual characters than about the ascendant social script to which individuality has 
been sacrificed. As Bakhtin argues generally of the comic novel, Cranford parodies and 
de-familiarizes the "going point of view" (Dialogic 301). Mrs Jamieson, Miss Pole, the 
Miss Jenkynses, and the Miss Barkers are practically interchangeable; all possess the 
"self-control which seemed habitual to ladies of Miss Matty's standing in Cranford" (C 
125). Their notions accord with the feminized (though, of course, patriarchal) voice of the 
170 
Victorian propriety, Mrs Grundy, whose despotism, as Spencer claims in his discussion 
of social restraints, is "worse than any other tyranny we suffer under" (Essays 226). 
Mary, whose own voice often merges with the conspiratorial and judgmental "we" of Mrs 
Grundy, recasts the words and even thoughts of her friends by ironically accenting their 
exact lexical choice with quotation marks. In addition, subversions of Cranfordian habits 
of speech and thought are frequently found in parenthetical commentary. Mary observes, 
for example, how Matty obsesses about the visitors who "might come in ... (but who 
never did)" (C 41). Repeatedly, Mary substitutes euphemistic with mundane language; 
for example the delicately named "Over Place" is deflated by her word "suburb." 
Effectively, Mary de-genteelizes the world of Cranford. 
Demonstrating Bakhtin' s observation that dialogization (of literary genres) in the 
novel exposes the mental habits of a society, Cranford contains quotations from Samuel 
Johnson, Alfred Tennyson, and, most revealingly, private letters. 151 Mary juxtaposes the 
language of the love letters exchanged between Matty's father (a conceited rector) and 
mother (a childish bride). The mother's missives are full of simple diction, spelling 
errors, and present-tense constructions, which reflect the daily realities of the household 
(like Bakhtin's chronotype of novelized discourse itself) and her lack of formal 
education. The rector's prose style, on the other hand, like his "stiff and stately" [C 43] 
portrait, is monologic, abstract, and full of what Mary terms "that tiresome Latin" (C 50). 
Eventually, the de-sensitizing language of the rector finds its way into the young wife's 
lexicon, epitomized by her transition from "my dearest John" to "my honoured Husband" 
(C 45). The son's letters, although also garnished with Latin, occasionally reveal his 
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"animal nature," which "broke out" (C 49) with expressions like "mother, dear." Peter's 
subversive (even Rabelaisian) jester's antics of impersonating his father and Deborah to 
mock their egoism destroy his gentlemanly prospects. Upon being caught by his father, 
he receives a public flogging which leads to the eventual break-up of the family. Yet the 
rector, unlike Samuel Butler's Pontifex patriarchs, is repentant, and reforms his system of 
values to prioritize love. In short, Cranford's dialogic narrative anatomizes the codes of 
conduct which demote and destroy emotion. 
As Bakhtin clarifies with regard to Dostoevsky, it is important to note Gaskell 
does not necessarily rework the Menippean genre purposefully, but many of its 
characteristics are renewed in Cranford. Several of the constituent elements of Bakhtin 
and Frye's definitions of Menippean satire are absent in a strict sense from the novel; for 
example, there is no fantastic journey to a netherworld, nor are intellectual issues of the 
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day showcased. In fact, far from a Peacockean parody of philosophical and scientific 
debates, Cranford is a resolutely non-intellectual satire (but not for Cecil's misogynistic . 
reasons); arguably, the text is a parody of traditional, masculine Menippean colloquy. 
Cranford's female citizens are as oblivious to the intellectual debates of the day as they 
are to the mysteries of commerce. Mary, in fact, complains that her friends are inveterate 
non-readers and consequently their conversation is often lacking. The "literary dispute" 
(C 14) between Miss Jenkyns and Captain Brown concerning which novel is superior, 
Rasselas or Pickwick Papers, is the most authentically Menippean dialogue in the novel. 
Deborah is Cranford's sole intellectually aspiring woman, but her life's aspiration, like 
Dorothea Brooke's in Middlemarch, is pure bathos: to be the letter-writing wife of an 
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archdeacon. Instead of debating political matters, the women debate the "etiquettes of 
high life" (C 70) and hold a "great Cranford parliament on the subject" (C 78) of the 
correct term of address for Lady Glenmire. Even without the intellectualized conversation 
of traditional Menippean satire, however, Cranford's discourses on the minutiae of 
gentility tackle the same general target: the vanity and futility of prescribed thought. 
The Cranford women are termed Amazons by Mary, in her role as mock-epical 
narrator, less because of their fabled self-sufficiency, but because of their "unfeminine" 
lack of sympathy - unfeminine by the standards of the woman-as-domestic-goddess cult 
of Ruskin, Smiles, Patmore, and others. Gaskell invokes the dominant Victorian ethics of 
gender to create further irony in her Horatian satire on the heartlessness incurred by 
habits of gentility. Several key episodes reveal how the women, despite their habitually 
enacted charities, are not as kind-hearted as they strive to appear. Upon the death of her 
father, Miss Jessie Brown, instead of being the recipient of affectionate empathy, is 
inundated by Miss Jenkyns's rules of funereal propriety. As well, the social ostracism of 
those considered ill-bred is common practice in Cranford. Mrs Fitz-Adams, for example, 
is ritualistically excluded by Miss Jamieson, Miss Pole, and Miss Betty Barker (the 
daughter of a servant, and thus a complete hypocrite). Similarly, Cranford's surgeon, Mr 
Hoggins (of farmer stock like Mrs Fitz-Adams), is condemned for his coarse manners. 
Ironically, the text's sole aristocrat, Lady Glenmire, far from being a snob, is 
industriously occupied with little "errands of kindness" (C 93); like Captain Brown (with 
his "infinite kindness of heart" [ C 8]), she is subjected to alienating social scrutiny. The 
most morally condemning instance of Amazonian coldness is Miss Pole's decision to 
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shut the door in the face of an Irish beggar (with starving children). Repeatedly, the 
Cranford women demonstrate a lack of communal feeling and honest, charitable industry. 
Instead their social and moral energies are directed to upholding a warlike code of 
gentility. 
Genteel habits of mind have disabled the women's morality; yet, befitting an 
ultimately optimistic satire, they are redeemed by their love for Matty. The moral climax 
of the narrative involves the formal gathering of Matty's friends in "unaffected sorrow" 
(C I 09) and their generous resolution to help her financially. The satiric narrative itself is 
a product of the friendship between Matty and Mary: '"We all love Miss Matty, and 1 
somehow think we are all of us better when she is near us"' ( C 128). Initially, however, 
Matty is unworthy of such high praise, for her own values are warped by those of her 
gentility-obsessed family. Abiding by her family's judgment, she rejects her youthful 
lover Mr Holbrook for his low rank and "uncouth habits" (C 27). Ironically, Holbrook is 
the ideal Horatian-Victorian gentleman, noble in spirit, if not in birth. Furthermore, 
Holbrook is associated with a developed sense of sympathy that corresponds with his 
literary imagination and love of nature. His death inspires Matty's moral rebirth. 
Immediately, she allows Martha to have "followers," bums the family letters, and begins 
to undo a lifelong practice of concealing her true feelings and thoughts. Her confession to 
Mary about her sadness confirms the bodily evidence of her destructive mental habits: 
her tremulousness and the "well-worn furrows of [her] cheeks" (C 35). Matty's 
unhappiness, like that of many women in Cranford, is the product of the reflexive 
repression of authentic, spontaneous emotions. She is the first of the Amazonian clan to 
find in sympathetic action a true source of happiness. Her first significant act of 
sympathy is her offer of money to the poor farmer ("'I saw my duty this morning"' [ C 
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I 01 ]). Amidst her own financial ruin, Matty fixates on the feelings of others. Her journey 
from childlike self-absorption and snobbery to the healthy habit of sympathy is catalyzed 
by the dramatic change in her material means, which transforms her genteel parlour to a 
tea shop and brings her "into kindly intercourse with many of the people round about" (C 
119). As the emotional centre of the community, Matty's mental and moral reform 
initiates the reform of the Cranford collective. 
The fact that Cranford is ultimately a satire that rejuvenates the community aligns 
it, not only with the conciliatory Horatian tradition, but also with Bakhtin' s productive 
"Menippea." Both affirm social interconnections and depict the rebirth of a society. Bad 
habits of gentility are demonstrably reformed in the final chapter of Cranford, for the 
entire community, including Mrs Fitz-Adams, is peaceably brought together at a merry 
feast. Miss Matty is delivered from the tea-trade and social order is restored. 
Furthermore, like the Horatian Holbrook, Cranford remains peacefully secluded from the 
divisively Darwinian world of Drumble. The evolution of custom, the narrative suggests, 
will take place at the conventional Cranford pace - a moral revolution is the Horatian 
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"just enough" for now. 
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3.iii "The seed brings forth the crop after its kind": Horatian Satire on 
Habit in George Eliot's Silas Marner 
Virginia Woolfs assessment of George Eliot's attitude to her characters expresses 
succinctly the critical view that sympathy moderates and even overwhelms Eliot's ample 
social satire. Eliot, Woolf insists, "makes us share [her characters'] lives, not in a spirit of 
condescension or of curiosity, but in a spirit of sympathy. She is no satirist" (186). 154 Yet 
such firm distinctions leave little room for the reconciliation of judgmental criticism with 
sympathy that characterizes Horatian (and even Juvenalian) satire. Initially, it is baffling 
that current-day discussions of Eliot continue to minimize her satirical bent, but it appears 
that her clearly-stated doctrine of sympathy dissuades discussions of satire in her 
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fiction in conjunction with her avowed doctrine of sympathy. 
Matz astutely notes that Eliot's programmatic statement in Adam Bede (1859) 
concerning moral realism - that realist fiction does not gloss over human imperfection, 
yet affirms that human nature is "loveable" and brimming with "sublime mysteries" (AB 
183) - is echoed in her evaluation of satiric modes in Theophrastus Such (1879), her last 
and "most explicitly satirical work" (Matz, "Satire" 30-31 ). Specifically, Matz references 
the chapter entitled "Debasing moral currency," in which Theophrastus (an archetypical 
Menippean scholar and narrator) upholds the dignity of humour that is void of"habits of 
contempt" (Eliot, Theophrastus 85). Without invoking the terms Horatian or Juvenalian, 
Matz argues that sympathetic perception co-exists with satire in Eliot's canon. Certainly, 
Theophrastus utters what amounts to an Horatian apology for satire: 
Why should we make our delicious sense of the ludicrous, with its 
invigorating shocks of laughter and its irrepressible smiles which 
are the outglow of an inward radiation as gentle and cheering as 
the warmth of morning, flourish like a brigand on the robbery of 
our mental wealth? - or let it take its exercise as a madman might, 
if allowed a free nightly promenade, by drawing the populace with 
bonfires which leave some venerable structure a blackened ruin[.] 
(Eliot, Theophrastus 83) 
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Instead of Juvenalian disdain, Theophrastus (like the narrator of Adam Bede) advocates 
moderate criticism, "sympathetic insight," and "justice of perception" (Eliot, 
Theophrastus 85). Despite occasional Juvenalian "bonfires," Eliot's satiric preference 
and practice is generally compatible with Theophrastus's Horatian ethic. Matz interprets 
Theophrastus's statement as "the clearest statement of satirical attitude" in Eliot's writing 
("Satire" 30). Yet a more direct expression of Eliot's satiric theory is found in her article 
"German Wit: Heinrich Heine" (1856). In this essay, wit is aligned with ratiocination, 
and described as being "an electric shock, which takes us by violence" (71). Humour is 
related to the "sympathetic emotions" and "continually passes into poetry" ("Heine" 71 ). 
Ideally, for Eliot, wit and humour "overlap and blend with each other" ("Heine" 72), as 
they do in Heine's writing. Thus, as the "Heine" essay confirms, the Horatian blend of 
sympathy and satire, evident in Silas Marner, is Eliot's theoretically preferred mode of 
social satire. She wishes, following the epigraph of Theophrastus Such (the prologue to 
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Phaedrus's Fabulae), not to "brand any individual person,/ But rather truly to show life 
itself and the habits of men." 157 
While supporting Eliot's Horatian satiric theory, Silas Marner is Menippean in its 
generic plurality. U. C. Knoepflmacher determines this novel, with its echoes of the book 
of Job and Paradise Lost, to be both a fable and a myth - a "medium of timeless legend" 
(Early Novels 231 ). But equally present is Eliot's brand of moral real ism, which 
celebrates the "sublime mysteries" (AB 183) of the commonplace. In a February 1871 
letter to publisher John Blackwood, Eliot expresses her belief that the psychological 
matter of Silas Marner is best suited to metrical form; yet, in order to achieve a "more 
realistic treatment" and "an equal play of humour," she ultimately chose prose (Letters 3: 
475). Interestingly, Eliot's generic selection complements Bakhtin's notion of 
novelization and his insistence that Menippean comic writing, with its engagement of 
everyday life, suits prose. Fittingly, the epigraph for Silas Marner is from Wordsworth's 
"Michael, A Pastoral Poem" (1800), which installs an implicit allusion to Wordsworth's 
poetics of habitual sympathy. Importantly, the epigraph also announces a psychological 
and biological "law" that is upheld in the novel: humanity's saving grace is the fact that 
offspring function to unsettle devolutionary, or unprogressive mental habits by inspiring 
"hope" and "forward-looking thoughts." Silas Marner (the novel in which R. H. Hutton 
could not find "a single cynical Thackerayism") 158 is a formally multifaceted Menippean 
text that is distinctly Horatian in its sympathy and optimism. 
The narrator, far from being a practitioner of Juvenalian aloofness, is self-
implicated in habits of egoism. Frequently, inclusive pronouns such as "we" or "our" 
populate descriptions of bad habits - particularly of egoism - observed in the rural 
community of Raveloe: 
I suppose one reason why we are seldom able to comfort our 
neighbours with our words is, that our goodwill gets adulterated, in 
spite of ourselves, before it can pass our lips. We can send black 
puddings and pettitoes without giving them a flavour of our own 
egoism; but language is a stream that is almost sure to smack of 
mingled soil. There was a fair proportion of kindness in Raveloe; 
but it was often ofa beery and bungling sort[.] (SM75) 
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In this self-inclusive, moral assessment of Rave loan moral mediocrity, the narrator adopts 
the Horatian ethic of an enlightened, un-self-righteous understanding of folly. "For," 
Horace claims, "no one is free I from faults; the best is the man who is hampered by the 
smallest./ A kindly friend will weigh, as is fair, my virtues against my failings" (1.3.67-
69). The narrator of Silas Marner, like that of Cranford, aims to be a "kindly friend" to 
the persons satirized. Additionally, one notable instance of the narrator's playful 
representations of animals' thoughts reinforces the interpretation of the novel as Horatian 
satire. For reasons related to the etymological slip linking satire with satyrs, donkeys are 
a traditional literary code for satire. (Thackeray's narrator in Vanity Fair, for example, 
dons his "ass's ears.") Thus, the sudden appearance of a Horatian satirist in the form of a 
donkey allusively announces Silas Marner's satiric philosophy: "Eppie was now aware 
that her behaviour was under observation, but it was only the observation of a friendly 
donkey, browsing with a log fastened to his foot - a meek donkey, not scornfully critical 
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of human trivialities, but thankful to share in them, if possible, by getting his nose 
scratched" (SM 136). "Scornful" or Juvenalian criticism, by this logic, signifies 
withdrawal from affectionate social connection. The satirist/narrator of Silas Marner, like 
the "friendly donkey," is "thankful to share" in human society and unwilling to take a 
fully pessimistic view of human psychology. 
As Sally Shuttleworth and others have observed, debates concerning 
physiological psychology were of particular interest to Eliot; certainly, her belief in the 
ameliorative effects of sympathy was well-supported by physiological psychologists such 
as Carpenter, who promoted the individual and social need for "habitual kindness" (360). 
Shuttleworth finds Eliot's organicist evolutionary philosophy and connections to 
physiological psychology (emphasizing the influence of Comte, Carpenter, Maudsley, 
Spencer, Lewes) to be reflected in her novelistic vocabulary of forces, channels, and 
pathways (Shuttleworth 22, 72). 159 Eliot's engagement with habit exists in necessary 
conjunction with the theories of physiological psychology articulated and evaluated in 
her fiction. Silas Marner, in particular, with its allegorical brevity, is her most 
streamlined anatomy of habit. 
In its depiction of the "the slow current of Raveloe conversation" (SM 73), Silas 
Marner is not an overtly Menippean satire brimming with learned, topical debates. The 
mock-Menippean colloquy at the Rainbow Inn, where the rural inhabitants gather to re-
articulate opinions and anecdotes like "familiar tune[s]" (recalling similar scenes in 
Cranford and Pickwick Papers), and the convivial exchanges of the more affluent at the 
Red House, where the "annual Christmas Talk" (SM 85) is changeless, convey the 
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thoughtless nature of thought among all classes in Raveloe. Arguably, the ludicrous 
debate as to whether the "tinder-box" theory (SM 73) or the supernatural theory best 
explains the disappearance of Silas's money is a parodic rendition of the century's most 
fraught epistemological divide: the materialist/spiritualist debate. Silas Marner is thus, 
like Cranford, a Menippean satire in terms of its overall focus on mental inflexibility. 
The narrator of Silas Marner is both an Horatian satirist and physiological 
psychologist whose satiric target is the mental landscape of Raveloe's habit-driven 
population, of which Silas Marner - despite his seeming eccentricity- is representative. 
Psychology of habit is examined through the lens of the "primitive" past of rural Raveloe, 
which provides an almost allegorical distance from urban mid-Victorian England. Habit 
is further evaluated as it functions specifically in the mind of two human specimens: Silas 
Marner and Godfrey Cass. Failing to evaluate Silas's mind as an appropriate case study 
of the human mental constitution, E. S. Dallas in The Times (April, 1871) was mystified 
as to why Eliot would choose to delineate "a hero whose mind is nearly a blank" and who 
is "a singularly unaccountable being" (Carroll 183, 182). Nevertheless Silas's character, 
when viewed representatively, provides non-hyperbolic evidence that human beings are 
"bundles of habit." The narrator's anatomy of the mind-states of Silas and (the more 
socialized) Godfrey exposes the typical moral war that takes place on the ground of habit 
between one's dialogic, "better self'' (the ascendant and morally directed will theorized 
by Bain, Carpenter, Mill, and James) and the version of oneself that is a monologic, 
"thinking Automat[ on]" (Carpenter 27) - the battle between the search for greater truth 
and human connectivity, and grooves of destructively self-focused habit. Silas and 
Godfrey, in their pre-reformed states, are exempla of the solipsistic folly of habit. 
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The opening pages of Silas contain a satirical meditation on the regularity of life 
experienced by the rural generations of "Merry England" (SM 5) in the "early years" (SM 
4) of the nineteenth century. It was a life of ceaseless toil characterized by the fear of 
change - of all that was "unwonted, or even intermittent" (SM 3). The narrator's 
assessment is verified experientially: "I once" asked an ill labourer if he could imagine 
something that he would like to eat, but without the faculty of "fancy" he could not 
summon "the phantasm of appetite" (SM 5). This anecdote illustrates how customary 
thought precludes imaginative and un-habitual thought (what Bain would term 
association by similarity). Similarly, the fact that "no brain in Raveloe" can imagine the 
thief of Silas's money to be a member of the blue-blooded Cass family (despite obvious 
incriminating evidence) underscores how custom (here, in the form of class ideology) 
mobilizes thought: "Christmas puddings, brawn, and abundance of spirituous liquors, 
throwing the mental originality into the channel of nightmare, are great preservatives 
against a dangerous spontaneity of waking thought" (SM73). The narrator's assessment 
of the individual psychology sustaining the status quo is reminiscent of the phrase that 
John Stuart Mill adopts for this eradication of free discussion though the somniferous 
force of cultural habit: the "deep slumber of a decided opinion" (On Liberty 18: 250). 
Furthermore, Silas's especial formative social context, the even-more remote Lantern 
Yard (where the minister "delivered unquestioned doctrine" [SM 14]) explains why he 
does not rebel against the drawing of lots: "this would have been an effort of independent 
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thought such has he had never known" (SM 13). Silas, whose habit-constricted mind is 
offered as a distillation of the human mind in general, is one of "many" who suffer 
inculpably from "false ideas" (SM 13). His solitary existence, like life generally in 
Raveloe, is without new events or people to counter the narrowing "influence of habit" 
and "keep alive ... the idea of the unexpected and the changeful" (SM 39). In line with 
mid-century physiological psychology and its emphasis on habit's socializing role, Eliot 
explains how custom becomes, in the words of Carpenter, "a standing habit of mind, or 
fixed set of mental tendencies" (363). The social creed that takes root in individuals 
through the force of repetition prescribes and circumscribes individual thoughts, 
entrapping them in a set of habitudes that influences all social relations. 
The "logic of habit" (SM 39) - automatic inferences that characterize habitual 
thought - is targeted by the narrator as being responsible for a ubiquitous anaesthetizing 
of active thought and feeling. By opposing change, habit denies time itself and the 
changes that time brings. It is therefore formally fitting that a narrative exploring habit-
submerged personalities operates though an accelerated chronology: the story begins 
fifteen years after Silas arrives in Raveloe and eventually jumps forward to sixteen years 
after Eppie is found. Representation of protracted time in condensed terms is a formal 
enactment of the theme of timeless habit. As well, it demonstrates textually Silas's 
removal (like all mono logic forms in life and literature) from an evolving and dialogic 
lived reality (Bakhtin, Dialogic 312). The narrator, once again linking Marner's 
seemingly eccentric condition of isolation with that of general humanity, describes how 
habit enables and sustains the transfer of the energetic and passionate regard human 
beings ought to have for one another to inanimate objects: 
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Do we not wile away moments of inanity or fatigued waiting by repeating 
some trivial movement or sound, until the repetition has bred a want, 
which is incipient habit? That will help us to understand how the love of 
accumulating money grows an absorbing passion in men whose 
imaginations, even in the very beginning of their hoard, showed them no 
purpose beyond it. (SM 18) 
Both popular and academic discussions of habit in nineteenth-century texts propound, in 
similar terms, the soul-deadening effects of the habit of money-getting. Samuel Smiles, 
for example, echoing Carlyle, warns against the destruction of moral character by 
following "no higher logic than that of the shilling" (257). Silas's mental and emotional 
machinery is likened to that of even "wiser men, when they have been cut off from faith 
and love - only, instead of a loom, and a heap of guineas, they have had some erudite 
research, ... or some well-knit theory" (SM 19). Again following a discussion of Silas's 
reflexive weaving, the narrator concludes: "Every man's work, pursued steadily, tends in 
this way to become an end in itself, and so to bridge over the loveless chasms of his life" 
(SM 15). Although not addicted to gain in the typical sense of money-love (he is not 
interested in the status and goods that money buys), Silas's miserly materialism is equally 
selfish and emotionally misguided; money has, as in the minds of all jaded materialists, 
become "an end in itself."160 Eliot joined Ruskin, Carlyle, and others in determining an 
endemic lack of empathy to be the malady of the age; thus Silas's habitual thoughts of 
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money-getting, devoid of "love and fellowship" (SM 15), are satirically representative of 
the more general psychological condition of the English, addicted, like the ancient 
Romans (according to both Horace and Juvenal), to "'misery-making money'" (Dickens, 
OMF379). 
To elucidate the function of habit, Eliot's narrator employs the metaphorical 
language of associationist-inflected physiological psychology: channels, pathways, 
grooves, and tracks. Silas's thought, for example, is described as being stuck: "its old 
narrow pathway was closed, and affection seemed to have died under the bruise that had 
fallen on its keenest nerves" (SM 15). Also, Dunstan's disappearance is described as 
being "away from the track of every one's thought" (SM 72). Yet, such delineations of 
mental linearity are only one metaphorical strand in the text. Figures for habit fluctuate 
between inorganic and organic objects. 
Dramatizing the fact that habit is, in James's words, "a physical law" (and also 
Sully's observation that the "characteristic note of habit is mechanicality" [Human Mind 
225]), Silas's physical form reflects his machine-like mind: "Strangely Marner's face and 
figure shrank and bent themselves into a constant mechanical relation to the objects of his 
life" (SM 19). Silas's loom is an extension of his body. Furthermore, his "catalyptic fits" 
render his body inanimate. During one fit, for example, his arms clutch his bag of gold 
"as if they'd been made of iron" (SM 6). The gold coins Silas that worships in heretical 
service to Mammon instead of humankind are the perfect symbol for habit-bound lack of 
plasticity - recalling that for James, the quality of plasticity defines living matter. 
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Epitomizing the fact that Silas is "thinking without thinking" and living without living, 
the gold he loves is a "dead disrupted thing" (SM 74). 
As effective as such inanimate metaphors are for invoking the sheer mechanism 
of habit, it is possibly the text's botanical metaphors that accrue greater satirical and 
rhetorical force for conveying the deadening effects of habit. Words associated with the 
death and decay of organic matter, such as "withering" "shrinking," and "bending," 
describe the barrenness of Silas's "inward life" (SM7) so long as he remains un-vitalized 
by any connection to other human beings. Silas weaves "like the spider, from pure 
impulse, without reflection" (SM 15). In opposition to the self-directed industriousness 
celebrated by psychological discourses of habit, his version of industry is akin to the 
"unquestioning activity of a spinning insect" (SM 15). Similarly, after the loss of his 
money, his mental state is compared to that of a confused insect: his "thoughts could no 
longer move in their old round, and were baffled by a blank like that which meets a 
plodding ant when the earth has broken away on its homeward path" (SM74). Silas's 
affinity with such "lower species," which (in Darwin's assessment) function purely by 
instinctive habit, is a paradoxical kinship: it suggests humanity's biological, insect-like 
reliance on habit for survival while also denoting a devolutionary perversion in a human 
organism's unrealized potential for imaginative, non-reflexive thought. De-vitalizing 
impulses of habit dominate Silas's life (before Eppie), which is "like a rivulet that has 
sunk far down from the grassy fringe of its old breadth into a little shivering thread, that 
cuts a groove for itself in the barren sand" (SM 21 ). Few sentences could more 
comprehensively evoke the vocabulary of psychological psychology. Bain's and 
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Spencer's "grooves" of habit are evoked along with Lewes's "stream of 
consciousness." 161 Appropriately as a novelist and spinner of tales, Eliot is partial to the 
words "thread" and "fibre" (for Silas, Eppie "stirred fibres that had never been moved in 
Raveloe" [SM 109]) for associative thought patterns of thought and feeling. 
Alternating between an analysis of the habitual thoughts of Silas and Godfrey, the 
narrator reveals that susceptibility to habit transcends differences of class and 
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education. Godfrey's habit-driven conduct, however, is actively damaging to the lives 
of others. This is a key moral difference between Silas's hermetic miserliness and 
Godfrey's chronic lying. Godfrey's hope that his opium-addicted wife is dead is 
explained by the narrator's wide view of human fallibility: "no disposition is a security 
from evil wishes" (SM 112). Furthermore Cass, being himself indisposed to sympathy, 
does not attribute depth of emotion to the labouring classes and cannot imagine Silas's 
love for Eppie. The psychological satire on Godfrey's equivocation between noble and 
ignoble thoughts and actions, though tending at times to Juvenalian cynicism and 
determinism, is ultimately Horatian, as he eventually does "stop short" (SM 64) of 
complete scoundreldom by belatedly beginning to practice truthfulness and sympathy. 
Particularly through the delineation of Godfrey Cass, Silas Marner illustrates the 
constant tension between habit and will that characterizes mid-Victorian psychological 
discourses. Unlike his brother Dunstan Cass, whose dull mind operates exclusively 
through habit and egoism, Godfrey at least struggles against the loss of his self-directing 
will. Dunstan walks to his death holding Godfrey's whip; the latter, a classical symbol of 
the moral lashings of satire, also alludes to the Platonic analogy of a horse and rider 
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popular in nineteenth-century psychology texts to explain the battle in the human mind 
between thoughts and emotions and the will. 163 It is appropriate that, lacking a controlling 
will, Godfrey loses his whip; Dunstan,, having lost his human emotions, remains an 
unseated rider. Both brothers were deprived of a moral education, but only Godfrey has a 
"vague looking for some discipline that would have checked his own errant weakness, 
and helped his better will" (SM 69). Nonetheless, his "better will" is continually reined in 
by his practice of "prevarication and deceit" (SM 69, 71 ), his "habitual irresolution" (SM 
64-5), and his "usual" hope that some "favourable chance" (SM71) will rescue him from 
the consequences of his actions. His mental state of "bitter rumination" is "unbroken 
from day to day save by the excitement of sporting, drinking, card-playing" (SM28). 164 
In other words, bad habits are mutually reinforcing; as psychologists frequently warned, 
reformation and re-education are rare achievements. Importantly, the symbolic portrayal 
of Godfrey's nearly-lost battle against selfish habit culminates in the paradoxical 
metaphor of the seed. 
The morally explicit and satiric passage comparing Godfrey's bad habits to seeds 
is rhetorically distinctive. Invoking a preacher's rhetoric of forceful anaphora, numerous 
sentences begin with the imperative word "Let." The narrator follows an imaginary 
"Everyman" down Godfrey's path and finds that "his mind will be bent" worshipfully on 
the same hope of being delivered by that "same cunning complexity called Chance" (SM 
72). The "evil principle," or rather, the psychological principle, "deprecated in that 
religion [of "blessed Chance"], is the orderly sequence by which the seed brings forth a 
crop after its kind" (SM 72). Recalling that for James the philosophy of habit is 
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encapsulated by "Dr Carpenter's phrase that our nervous system grows to the modes in 
which it has been exercised' (Principles 117), and that Mill refers to the "Laws of Mind" 
which are the basis of psychology as being "the uniformities of succession" (SL 8: 851 ), 
Eliot's organic metaphor of the seed which grows incrementally into the plant is ideal for 
the formative power of habit. Furthermore, the seed motif evokes both Horace's 
Aristotelian philosophy of habit and Christ's New Testament injunctions: "So give 
yourself a shaking I in case the seeds of wickedness have already been planted in you/ by 
nature or by some bad habit" (I.3.34-36; Matthew 13: 31-32). At the same time, seeds of 
habit, although associated with the irrevocability of succession, also intimate the 
possibility of change. Ultimately, shocked by the discovery of his brother's crime and 
awed by a new understanding that"' [ e ]verything comes to light"' (SM 157), Godfrey 
confesses to Nancy and is unburdened of his habitual guilt. (It is also implied that Nancy 
primes her husband for this revelation by having successfully domesticated his wild oats.) 
In keeping with text's implicit assent to physiological psychology's "laws of habit," and 
also to organicist laws of growth and evolution of character, natural motifs (such as the 
seed) representing the inveteracy of self-diminishing habit are alternatively suggestive of 
the possibility of life-affirming habit. 
"That Life is Change, and that Consciousness is Change, has always been 
affirmed" (PLMJ 111), observes G. H. Lewes, as if offering the psychological lesson of 
Silas Marner. The novel's botanical metaphors, while effectively signaling the negative 
trajectory of habit, also serve to support its fundamentally positive evolutionary belief: 
"human beliefs, like all other natural growths, elude the barriers of system" (SM 152). 
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Physiological psychology, in conjunction with evolutionary theory, also informs the 
narrator's observation of the beginning of Silas's transformation. By parenting Eppie, 
Silas necessarily becomes connected to the Raveloe community and to "the fountains of 
human love and divine faith" (SM 84); reciprocally, the community displays "kindlier 
feeling" towards him (SM 74). The process is incremental: "Our consciousness rarely 
registers the beginning of a growth within us any more than without us: there have been 
many circulations of the sap before we detect the smallest sign of the bud" (SM 54-5 5). 
As Bain argues, a "sea change" of habit is rare and likely to happen only once in one's 
life (Emotions 503). From the instant of Eppie's introduction into the story as the "bright 
living thing" (SM 107) toddling in the snow, she is associated with images of nature; 
fittingly, by becoming Silas's "precious plant" (129), she literally reunites him with 
nature. As a child, she drags him though the meadows; as a young woman she insists that 
he help her to grow a garden. Through association with Eppie, seeds of good, empathetic 
habit grow in Marner's character, connecting him both to Raveloe and to nature. A 
liberating habit of sympathy is successfully cultivated in Silas (and his hermetic rigidity 
is rooted out) by the act of parenting a little girl, who in words redolent of the 
Wordsworthian epigraph, is "compacted of changes and hopes" (SM 123). As an adult 
Eppie, like all human beings, is habit-bound; for example, she dreads any change in her 
happy life with Silas and her social station in Raveloe. Yet importantly, habit functions in 
Eppie's mind to produce healthy habits of love and duty. Reflexively, her moral choice to 
remain with Silas is made by her habitually ascendant "better will," thereby countering 
the culturally ascendant and adverse social habits of material aspiration. Thus, habit in 
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Silas Marner is championed as having paradoxical potential; if properly channeled, it 
counters life-denying and will-destroying habit. 165 
Eliot's fable of habit- the aim of which, as she declares in her letter to February 
1861 letter to Blackwood, is to demonstrate "the remedial influences of pure, natural 
human relations" (Letters 3: 4 75) - closes with a community-consolidating wedding feast 
ordered by Godfrey, the newly benevolent patriarch. Harmoniously, Silas, Eppie, and 
Aaron happily inhabit their cottage (with its pretty garden) and their humble social 
station, bound in sympathetic connectivity with the inhabitants of Raveloe. They enact 
the Horatian ideal of rural contentment from "a piece of land - not so very big,/ with a 
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garden," and are "spared the accursed struggle for status" (Horace 11.6.1-2). In Silas 
Marner's conclusion, the garden (T. H. Huxley's symbol for the stabilizing force of 
habitual altruism) is shown to dominate the mental wilderness of solipsistic habit. 
Keeping in mind William James's unsettling politicization of habit's utility as a "fly-
wheel" of conservative ideology, Eliot's satiric ethic, enacted in Silas Marner, is to 
promote not radical change, but "the deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with 
individual fellow-men" (M 582); although not directly political in its effects, habit in its 
positive incarnations, in Eliot's view, provides a moral counter to the regrettably slow 
rate of social evolution. 
3.iv "Reflex reflections": Butler's Juvenalian The Way of All Flesh 
Children in Silas Marner tend to inspire "forward thinking," whereas in Samuel 
Butler's The Way of All Flesh, offspring as a rule reinforce the backward thoughts and 
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customs of the preceding generation. In contrast to Eliot's text, the evolutionary 
theories informing The Way of All Flesh postulate biological forces requiring a near-
exterminating degree of wasted human life. The Horatian bent of Silas Marner, 
encapsulated by Silas's statement, "'There's good i' this world"' (SM 141), is opposed by 
Edward Overton and Ernest Pontifex's contemptuous, Juvenalian view that the world, as 
it currently stands, is essentially void of systems supporting goodness and truth. Butler, 
whom Frances T. Russell observes to be "more a Juvenal," comes nearer than other 
Victorian satirists to "an unqualified pessimism" (67, 273-274). Russell's pronouncement 
that he is "more akin to Swift than to any Victorian" alludes implicitly to Butler's scorn 
for "things as they are," his devaluation of human reason, and his notorious anger (145). 
Leaving aside the question of Butler's own alleged Swiftian or Juvenalian personality 
traits, 168 anger decidedly informs Ernest Pontifex's development as a satirist. Ernest 
confirms that he has the prerequisite habit of "a sense of humour and tendency to think 
for himself' when his "blood began to boil" with indignation at his parents' ill-treatment 
of a pregnant servant ( WAF 229, 181 ). Ultimately, 1 ike Edward Overton, Ernest remains 
aloof from the social institutions that he criticizes (including the literary industry), 
especially his most hated organization: the "family system" (WAF 388). Significantly, 
Ernest, like Overton, and like Juvenal himself (who denounces Roman habits from a 
similarly removed yet scornful perspective), preserves his bachelorhood as a symbolic 
reminder of his disconnectedness from the ignorant and materialistic, dogma-addicted 
society surrounding him. 
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Lacking Juvenal's nostalgia for the past, Ernest and Overton place their modicum 
of hope in the future. Convinced that the falsehoods of Christian teaching have "blighted" 
the lives of too many and that it is "worthwhile to be angry," Ernest tries to "do 
something towards saving others from such years of waste and misery" (WAF 284). His 
effort, revealing a belief in the efficacy of satire, amounts to writing a book of satiric and 
philosophical essays that parodies the voice of cultural authority and interrogates subjects 
from multiple viewpoints. Yet Ernest implicitly denies Juvenalian extremity and claims 
to be writing Horatian satire: "we become persecutors as a matter of course as soon as we 
begin to feel strongly upon any subject; we ought not therefore to do this" (WAF 393). 
The ideal of "lukewarm" or "indifferent" opinions, though consonant with Victorian 
anxiety about the propriety of harsh satire, conflicts with his previous expressions of 
outrage. Certainly, Overton finds his godson's book to be "conservative, quietistic, 
comforting" (WAF 395) and "abounding with humour, just satire, and good sense" (WAF 
396). Importantly, however, Butler's (and Overton's) satiric production, The Way of All 
Flesh, is a predominantly discomforting Juvenalian text - regardless of its suggestion of 
potential mental evolution. The novel's depiction of the sheer tortuousness of the struggle 
against convention, and the rarity of success, outlines a pessimistic, even dystopic, view 
of the present. 
Like Ernest's subversive first book, The Way of All Flesh is itself a literary 
hodgepodge, a generic farrago: it is a motley text of fictional biography (an education 
novel, or Bildungsroman; a transparent autobiography of Butler; an epistolary novel; 169 
and also an historical novel that charts broad shifts in Victorian intellectual paradigms, 
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documenting successive "storms" of heterodoxy (the Tractarian movement, German 
Biblical criticism, and, most importantly, Darwinism). As a pointedly intellectual novel, 
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The Way of All Flesh is a Menippean satire par excellence. Its characters are, as Frye 
observes, animated by "Menippean blood" (Anatomy 309). Reverend Hawke's 
(Evangelical) sermons, and Pryor's (high Anglican) lectures are parodically presented. 
Such characters, including Mr Shaw the free-thinker, are Menippean mouthpieces for the 
intellectual trends that Ernest zealously embraces on his "snipe-like flights" (WAF 227) 
from one belief system to another. Overton's essayistic meditations linking Ernest's 
exploits to his (and Butler's) "freethinking evolutionism" (Paradis 315) enact a central 
feature ofBakhtin's Menippea: "the adventure of an idea or truth in the world" 
(Dostoevsky 115). Within its Menippean generic variegation, The Way of All Flesh - the 
manuscript adds, "A Story of English Domestic Life" - anatomizes an all-inclusive satiric 
target: systematized deception. According to the narrator, an "atmosphere of lying and 
self-laudatory hallucination" (WAF 274) mandated by the dogma-producing authorities of 
England legitimates and perpetuates morally unsound cultural practices, "whether it be 
cannibalism, or infanticide, or even habitual untruthfulness of mind" (WAF 281 ). 
Consonant with Frye and Bakhtin's notion of Menippean traditions, Butler's text 
defamiliarizes the habitual truth claims of Victorian society. 
Like Erewhon (1872), The Way of All Flesh is what Matz would term 
comprehensive or absolute satire. It consigns an all-inclusive effigy of Victorian habits of 
thought (that are foundational to institutions of family, education, and religion) to the 
bonfire of satire, as symbolized by the portrait of Theobald Pontifex burned at 
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Roughborough. Overton, like the narrator of Erewhon, is mortified by the degree to 
which the culture in which he finds himself displays an "extraordinary obliquity of 
mental vision" (Erewhon 92). Erewhonians and bourgeois Victorians alike embrace 
customs that are so arbitrary and cruel that all citizens are required to be reflexive 
dissemblers, who, suppressing any originality, function automatically by habit. Instead of 
"Musical Banks," Overton describes an epidemic of Mammonism among clergymen; in 
place of the Colleges of Unreason, which "do more to suppress mental growth than to 
encourage it" (Erewhon 192), Overton describes Ernest's education at Cambridge (and 
elsewhere) as being designed "not so much to keep him in blinkers as to gouge his eyes 
out altogether" (WAF267). Finally, instead of the Ydgrundites, cant is represented in The 
Way of All Flesh by the "compound animal" (WAF 102) Pontifex. Overton describes the 
culturally sanctioned practice of physically beating the willfulness out of children as a 
kind of trans-generational habit. Similarly, inherited habit is a mechanism assuring that 
social customs are mindlessly and globally accepted, and that free will is eradicated 
through a false "equilibrium of habit" (Notebooks 50). 
Cultivating habits of sympathy is not Butler's solution for the suffering of 
humanity. In The Way of All Flesh, wasted and painful human lives are depicted as being 
the necessary byproduct of the laws of human development. The evolution of the human 
race is detectable only in the pitifully incremental advances made by singular individuals 
in whom the habit of free thought and will has, against all odds, become unconscious and 
inveterate. Butler, Overton, and Ernest put their "faith" in this practically miraculous 
achievement. As if to demonstrate Butler's assertion in Life and Habit (1877) that "[i]t is 
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one against legion when a creature tries to differ from his own past selves" (52), Ernest, 
despite painful and continual backsliding, manages Gust barely) to extricate himself (with 
the aid of luck) from convention. Dissenting from the religion of humanity, sympathy is 
not his salvation. The Horatian-compatible, Ruskin-endorsed gentlemanly ideal of 
habitual sympathy is only one aspect of Overton's "perfect gentleman" (WAF 299), who, 
regardless of his system of beliefs, is ennobled by the mental practice of "charitable 
inconsistency" (WAF 299). This principle of mental generosity requires the automatic 
avoidance of dogma and "uncompromisingness" (WAF 299). The culturally advanced or 
evolved gentleman, like Overton's description of Ernest's book, automatically steers 
"between iconoclasm on the one hand and credulity on the other" (WAF 395); in his 
paradoxically habitual plasticity, the gentleman remains "far too consistent not to be 
inconsistent consistently" (WAF 318). Habit therefore has the potential to consolidate not 
only dogmatic thought, but also original, flexible, evolved thinking; it is a mechanism 
both of stasis and extinction, and of evolutionary vitality. Just as chance is a lesser factor 
than habit in evolutionary processes, the habit of sympathy is secondary to the mental 
habit of anti-dogmatism and "amiable indifferentism" (WAF 300). Significantly, Ernest 
rejects the Christian model of empathetic engagement with the poor; instead he elects to 
travel the world to exercise his "sympathetic curiousness" (WAF 355). For Overton and 
Ernest sympathy is less an emotional sentiment connecting human beings than a 
necessary mental disposition for intellectual leniency and liberation from cant - which is, 
however, a first step toward authentic human connectivity. Freedom from false systems 
of belief precedes sympathy. 
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Like his character Ernest, who decides to dissent from culturally ascendant creeds 
and to differ from those who "shir[k] difficulties instead of facing them" (WAF284), 
Butler voiced his antagonism to the newly-consolidated regime of Darwinism. "It is 
impossible," Sally Shuttleworth observes, "to separate Butler's scientific writings from 
his novel: the same anxieties, and sheer love of paradox fuel both forms of experiment" 
(148). Bernard Lightman situates Butler's four popular-science books -Life and Habit 
(1879), Evolution, Old and New (1879), Unconscious Memory (1880), Luck, or Cunning? 
(1886) - and his essay "The Deadlock in Darwinism" (1890) within the context of 
Victorian popular-science writing that opposed the "new pseudo-priesthood of 
scientists": "In each of these books Butler returned repeatedly to the development of his 
own neo-Lamarckian theory of evolution and to a critique of Darwin's theory of natural 
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selection" (Lightman, "Conspiracy" 117). Specifically, he refused to assent to the 
glorification of luck implied by natural selection. According to Butler, Darwin's theory is 
"dysteleological" (Lightman, "Conspiracy" 120), and thus denies evolving organisms 
intelligence, will, memory, "heroism," and "all the elements of romance" (Life 253). 
Appropriately, given that William B. Carpenter's physiological psychology preserves 
volition, Butler quotes Carpenter extensively in the fourth chapter of Life and Habit to 
support his notion that all habitual or unconscious actions of an organism (such as an 
amoeba, embryo, or chicken) are a kind of "reasoning power" (73). Expressing Butler's 
dismissal of non-volitional natural selection in The Way of All Flesh, Overton evokes 
Juvenal's rejection (in the last line of Satire X) of the conventional wisdom that Fortune 
is "a blind and fickle foster-mother, who showers her gifts at random" (WAF 17). 172 
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Quoting Juvenal's proclamation, "it is we who make thee, Fortune, a goddess" (WAF 18), 
Overton adds that we make ourselves as well. 
Specifically, Butler scorned Darwinism's diminishment of the agency of habit. In 
brief, Darwin isolated natural selection, and not inherited habit, as the salient mechanism 
of evolution. In Luck, or Cunning?, for example, Butler accuses Darwin of mistakenly 
rejecting habit as the source of instinct and trying to "obliterate the doctrine of inherited 
habit as advanced by Lamarck" (59)- to which Darwin himself, in Butler's view, 
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subscribed hypocritically in 1839. In Life and Habit, Butler claims to update the work 
of Buff on, Erasmus Darwin, and particularly Lamarck with the ideas of Ewald Hering 
and his theory of inherited memory (Lightman 121 ); his thesis is that instinct consists of 
hereditary habits which become "deeply impressed upon the memory" (Life 221 ). Habit, 
as a form of inherited reason, volition, and memory, is, in Butler's estimation, 
omnipotent. Darwinian dogma, The Way of All Flesh insinuates, forces the will out of the 
evolutionary equation, just as belligerently as middle-class Christians thrash the will out 
of their children. Life and Habit, along with The Way of All Flesh, upholds the central 
tenets of Victorian physiological psychology: that habit is a physical phenomenon, and 
that repeated actions are inscribed by habit and remembered unconsciously. Thus, the 
older the habit, the "less power of conscious self-analysis and control" (Life 13) an 
organism has over it. Importantly, habit functions simultaneously in The Way of All Flesh 
as a neo-Lamarckian mechanism of evolution, and as the enabler of adherence to the 
status quo. 174 
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In The Way of All Flesh, character is delineated through the associationist 
language of habit. For example, Theobald's jealous remarks about Ernest's fortune 
"instantly brought the whole train of ideas which in Ernest's mind were connected with 
his father" (WAF 369). As well, Overton frequently uses the word "groove" to explain his 
characters' behaviour (his own included); for example, his friendship with Theobald 
continues only because he is caught in a "groove" (WAF 56). Also in keeping with the 
language of Victorian psychology, Dr Skinner is rumoured to have "stamped an 
impression" (WAF 111) on his students' minds, and Mr Shaw's words concerning the 
gospels left a "deep impression" (WAF 279) on Ernest. In short, Overton explains much 
of his characters' behaviour though concepts of association and habit. He describes his 
hero in the mock-epical dilemma of being held captive on his mother's sofa "through the 
sheer force of habit" (WAF 173). As well, the unconscious "momentum of old habits" 
(WAF 262) overpowers the influence of Mr Shaw. Upon leaving prison (wearing his old 
clothes, and walking in old surroundings), Ernest is "carried away by association" and 
"dragged back to his old self' (WAF 304). Explicitly, Overton concurs with Victorian 
psychology's investment in notions of "unconscious cerebration" or reflexive thought: 
How little do we know our thoughts - our reflex actions indeed, yes; but 
our reflex reflections! Man, forsooth, prides himself on his consciousness! 
We boast that we differ from the winds and waves and falling stones and 
plants, which grow they know not why, and from the wandering creatures 
which go up and down after their prey, as we are pleased to say without 
the help of reason. We know so well what we are doing ourselves and why 
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we do it, do we not? I fancy that there is some truth in the view which is 
being put forward nowadays that it is our less conscious thoughts and our 
less conscious actions which mainly mould our lives and the lives of those 
who spring from us. (WAF 22) 
With his final emphasis on offspring, disavowal of pride in conscious reasoning, and 
assertion of the ascendant agency of reflexive mechanisms of thought, Overton articulates 
a neo-Lamarckian physiological psychology compatible with Butler's. Updated by 
Victorian mental science (of "nowadays"), Overton's conclusions about the pre-moulded 
nature of human lives anticipate William James's pronouncements on habit's clandestine 
ruling function. 
In both his literary and scientific works, Butler is the most theoretically explicit 
Victorian satirist of habit. The impetus behind Butler's works of literature and popular 
science parallels the bluntly expressed corrective aim of Ernest's essays: "there are a lot 
of things that want saying which no one dares to say, a lot of shams which want 
attacking, and yet no one attacks them" (WAF 387). According to Lightman, Butler 
became the "most outspoken critic of scientific naturalism from the secular wing of the 
British intelligentsia" ("Conspiracy" 132). In Luck, or Cunning?, Butler even mocked his 
scientific critics (who advised him condescendingly to confine himself to literary satire) 
for not recognizing their status in the work as satiric subjects (Luck 35). James Paradis 
notes that in Life and Habit, "satirical digressions" constantly "erupt" throughout the 
work in "a demotic language of jokes and witty asides," which disrupt the decorum of 
scientific language (312). Emphasizing the "biting" tone of attacks on Darwin's 
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"scientific and moral stature" in Evolution, Old and New, Lightman highlights Butler's 
insult to Darwin and his Origin: it was "'discharged into the waters of the evolution 
controversy, like the secretion of a cuttle fish"' (qtd. in Lightman, "Conspiracy" 129). 
The comparison of Darwin's work to the cuttle fish's paralyzing poison is a debasingly 
apt analogy. In this instance, Butler's rhetoric embodies the general satiric method of The 
Way of All Flesh: the use of deflating and deliberate anticlimax involving surprising 
analogies. "[U]nexpected analogy" is, in George Eliot's definition of wit, "the enemy of 
monotony" ("Heine" 70, 72). Thus, Butler's satiric tool to undermine convention is, in 
principle, antithetical to customary habit. 
Butler's characteristic method of satiric exposure is also, confusingly enough, his 
method for theorizing evolution. Butler's analogies "satirize the abuses and follies of the 
age" (Luck 35) while also expressing his evolutionary, non-Christian cosmology. 175 In 
what Lightman refers to as Butler's "fantastic vision of the unity of all life" 
("Conspiracy" 118), the human organism is unconsciously connected to, even "fused" 
with, all of creation (Life 200). As Hans-Peter Breuer suggests, Butler "invest[s] all 
matter with an increment of mind" (366). Knowledge and volition are not exclusive to the 
higher species, but (in an analogy that is deliberately mundane) they "slee[p] in every 
hen's egg upon a kitchen shelf' (Life 75). It is not surprising, therefore, that in all 
seriousness, Butler refers to the "gorillahood" (Notebooks 48) of the human race. His 
seemingly playful comparisons between the mind and body, and between humans and all 
creation, demonstrate his evolutionary theories while humorously defying traditional 
exemplars of the sublime. In a similar manner, Ernest finds the dogs at Mount St. Bernard 
201 
to be more awe-inspiring than the Alps. Similarly, Overton is not wholly in jest when he 
expresses regret for the "indelible impression" left on Ernest's character by his 
regrettable prenatal experiences, including his experiences as a "little zoosperm" (WAF 
276) suffering from Theobald's drinking bouts. Unreservedly, Butler's texts explore the 
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comic implications of his own evolutionary beliefs. The comparison, for example, 
between disowning Ernest's parents and losing "an aching but very loose and hollow 
tooth" (WAF 296) is a scientifically sound satiric conflation of human life (Theobald and 
Christina) with rotten matter. Paradoxically, this satiric analogy devaluing the clergyman 
and his wife invokes the biological dignity of the evolutionary process. Furthermore, in 
keeping with his rhetoric of unexpected analogy, Overton likens Ernest's developmental 
acceleration in prison to that of silkworms, which, when "sent by rail, hatch before their 
time through the novelty of heat and jolting" (WAF 278). Again, this comparison deflates 
human superiority over the natural world and at the same time expresses Butler's 
evolutionary thought. 177 Finally, Overton's seemingly ludicrous meditation on the 
unconscious knowledge of survival that drives the progeny of a fly to engage in an heroic 
battle with death in a cup of coffee articulates (in a burlesque manner) Butler's theory of 
inherited memory. Throughout The Way of All Flesh, Butler's teleological, evolutionary 
theories inspire playfully eccentric and frequently non-Juvenalian analogies which 
concurrently satirize human vanity. 
Yet The Way of All Flesh, being a predominantly Juvenalian satire, contains 
unequivocally condemnatory analogies. When Theobald ("red-handed" from thrashing 
Ernest) reads his daily batch of punishment-themed prayers, the congregation - and by 
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extension, all who believe in the Bible's literal truth - are likened to the bees that 
fruitlessly search the flowered dining-room wallpaper for honey. In Notebooks (1912), 
Butler asserts that the bee, remaining stuck in its "unchanging civilization" (50), has 
reached the apex of its evolution. These creatures of habit and "fixity" (Notebooks 50) are 
akin, not so much to humankind, but to the average citizen of England, especially 
clergymen who mechanically adhere to the "mean" (in both senses), non-evolving moral 
ideals of the "happy, united, God-fearing family" (WAF 27). Also, likening Ernest to a 
foal that eats garbage because it is the only food it has ever known illustrates the degree 
to which middle-class Victorians are debasingly habituated to the mental refuse of cant. 
Young people, Overton observes with cynical admiration, adapt easily to the "absence of 
a congenial mental atmosphere" (WAF 26). Continuing his analogy of starvation, he 
observes Ernest's obsession with the painting of ravens (perpetually) "trying to feed 
Elijah" (WAF 376) that hangs in the dining-room - the symbolic locus of violent 
patriarchal practices. As a child, Ernest expresses his latent satiric inclination by 
attempting to feed Elijah (tracing a "greasy line" of bread and butter to his mouth); as an 
adult writer, he ultimately offers the lanx satura or "mixed mash" of satire as mental 
nourishment for his starving culture. 
Ernest's story of becoming a social satirist (significantly, a well-dressed one, 
whose excellent tailoring accurately reflects the quality of his mental fabric) is at once an 
illustration of the habit of human evolutionary development, and a Juvenalian satire on 
Victorian moral, social, and intellectual habits. To achieve de-habituation from prevailing 
opinion, the "true self' must be free to express and discuss opinions (Mill, On Liberty 
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225-35). As an aid to unconventional thought, J. S. Mill advises the "steady habit" of 
collating and collecting opinions (On Liberty 18: 232). Overton, who extols Mill's On 
Liberty for its participation in the "storms" of dissent, approves of Ernest's habit of 
writing in his notebook in order to exercise his "literary instinct" (WAF 377); the 
notebook is a tool to catch routinely his real thoughts. Rather cryptically, Overton 
personifies these honest thoughts as being Ernest's true god - a god whose injunction 
parodies the retributive register of the god of the Old Testament: "'Obey me, your true 
self,' do not listen to your father or '1 will rend you in pieces even unto the third and 
fourth generations as one who has hated God; for 1, Ernest, am the God who made you"' 
(WAF 131). Through Overton's developmental bildungsroman, Butler suggests a kind of 
secular Calvinism in which only a select number of "embryo minds," or "zoos perms," 
will, given current cultural circumstances, evolve enough to break into the "Kingdom of 
Heaven" - into a life of free, honest thought. There is a cynical Juvenalian exclusivity in 
Overton and Butler's notion of human dignity as the exclusive property of a small 
number of elite thinkers-for-themselves who are, more often than not, defeated in their 
battle against the ascendant mental and moral habits of their culture's incarnation of 
Roman hypocrites, the Theobald Pontifexes of the world. 
3.v Seedy Habits: Juvenalian Satire in George Gissing's New Grub Street 
In a gesture to discard idealizing notions of reflexive heroism, Edward Overton 
imagines the real St. Michael to be an apathetic procrastinator who tried to "shirk his 
famous combat with the dragon" (WAF 173). Overton's deflation of a heroic archetype 
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recalls Frye's and Bakhtin's shared conclusion that satire is a genre or mode that 
discredits, and even discards heroism. Along similar lines, Walter E. Houghton identifies 
Victorian literature's broadest thematic preoccupation to be the disappearance of heroism 
(320). Certainly in 1841, Carlyle famously proclaims his age to be deficient in heroes, 
expressing a hope that the "Man of Letters" would fight a modem-day battle against 
materialism (Heroes 157). Fulfilling their Carlylean duty to "resist despair," mid-century 
novelists, according to U. C. Knoepflmacher, refuse to "make negation the essence of 
their work" (Religious Humanism 203), whereas late Victorian novelists, such as Samuel 
Butler (and also Thomas Hardy), descended closer to unmitigated despair. Arguably, 
George Gissing completes the fall. Unconvinced by a Lamarckian theory of human 
agency - in fact, rejecting evolutionary science as a source of hope whatsoever - Gissing 
demonstrates in New Grub Street (1891) that the "humane order of society" (NGS 352) is 
beyond recuperation. In New Grub Street, the figure of the would-be hero/writer is 
transposed from a mid-Victorian context that offers a tolerably sympathetic audience to a 
late-Victorian environment in which the writer and the reader (like the idealist Edwin 
Reardon and the pragmatic John Yule) have "no common criterion" available for 
communication. Their moral systems of reference are like "alien tongues" (NGS 209). 
The question of whether literary realism (let alone satire) will appeal to a nation in 
confirmed denial of day-to-day social realities is answered in the novel with an emphatic 
no. In the dominant moral order, virtue is identified with practicality, money, and fine 
clothing, whereas vice is akin to idealism (impractical creativity, conscientiousness, and 
unconventionality), penury, and seedy attire. New Grub Street's "Men of Letters," Edwin 
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Reardon and Harold Biffen, do not belong to the "heroic class" (NGS 108); instead, they 
are foolish idealists whose novels are forgotten, and whose dead bodies are, as Reardon 
had speculated, trampled by those (like Jasper Milvain) who are "borne onwards by the 
resistless pressure" (NGS 212) of the inhumane march of (so-called) progress. The final 
chapter of the novel, anticipating Hardy's Jude the Obscure (1895)- in which crass 
cultural forces (symbolized by Arabella Fawley) vanquish the hero's "fantasy of a 
mighty undertaking" (Jude 60) - presents the most selfish un-idealistic characters 
thriving in "dreamy bliss" (NGS 425). 178 New Grub Street is a text that is Juvenalian and 
anti-heroic in the most extreme sense of the terms. 
Any attempt to connect New Grub Sreet with traditions of satire must commence 
with an exploration of Gissing's involvement with theories of "realism" and 
"naturalism." Critics vary in their assessments of Gissing's pronouncements concerning 
"realism" (in the novels themselves, and in his essays and letters) and the relevance of the 
term to his novelistic practice. Accordingly, the label "naturalist" is either applied or 
removed. Sally Ledger, for example, includes Gissing as a practitioner of literary 
naturalism, a school influenced by Darwinian tenets: humans are not divine and existence 
is a struggle ( 69). As well, the "poverty, brutality and drunkenness of the urban poor" 
(Ledger 69-70) are presented as being inescapable and hereditary. 179 Similarly, Constance 
Harsh finds that Gissing, if "classified as an English naturalist" (912), produced "an 
essentially determinist literature that focuses on the impingement of natural processes on 
human agency and consciousness" (912). For both critics, deterministic themes are 
enacted formally in "naturalism" through a narrative method of scientific detachment. 
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Countering this view of Gissing, Jacob Korg insists that the novelist aimed "to achieve, 
not mere objectivity, which he distrusted as a literary counterpart of science, but the 
personal and self-exposing variant of it which is called honesty" (242). According to 
Korg, Gissing rejected Emile Zola's "self-effacing" version of naturalism, which "limits 
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itself to flat observation and forbids interpretation" (267). Importantly, Korg's analysis 
of Gissing's "naturalism" leaves room for a view of Gissing's style as being ambivalent, 
idiosyncratic, and even satiric. Indeed, New Grub Street, after the manner of Sartor 
Resartus 's Diogenes Teufelsdrockh, exposes the "fair tapestry of human Life" by 
"turn[ing] out the rough seems, tatters, and manifold thrums of that unsightly wrong-side, 
with an almost diabolical patience and indifference," while also suggesting '"something of 
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intended satire" (SR 210). 
Harold Biffen's "mission of literary realism" (NGS 495) is frequently used as a 
spring-board for general discussions of representational strategies, and also for evaluating 
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Gissing's equivocal position as a naturalist and satirist. Stephen Arata, for instance, 
posits that Gissing's novel contains both a Biffen-approved "narrative stance of studied 
detachment" (179) and a parody (through Biffen's extremism) of the scientific method of 
the new realistic mode. Similarly, Aaron Matz argues for Biffen's status as both a satiric 
and a sympathetic subject. Matz finds that Biffen's questionable theories (including the 
suspect title of his novel), his dismal life, and inevitable suicide function to satirize the 
viability (even desirability) of realism; this criticism is, however, "counterbalanced by 
[Biffen's] very real suffering" (Matz, "Ambivalent" 219) and his valiant artistic sincerity. 
Matz's interpretation of Biffen as the embodiment of Gissing's "ambivalent realism" 
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("Ambivalent" 246) is informed by the novelist's words about the illusion of objectivity 
in "The Place of Realism in Fiction" (1895): "'Realism, then, signifies nothing more than 
artistic sincerity in the portrayal of contemporary life; it merely contrasts with the habit of 
mind which assumes that a novel is written 'to please people,' that disagreeable facts 
must always be kept out of sight"' (220). Unlike Biffen's systematic, impartial realism, 
Gissing's expansive definition does not disqualify satire and its opinionated exposure of 
"disagreeable facts" and illusory habits of thought. 
Biffen 's version of literary realism aims to depose idealizations (particularly the 
Smilesean social myth of a journey from rags to riches fueled by moral character) by 
demonstrating (in excruciatingly precise detail) the "paltry" material circumstances that 
determine "unheroic" (NGS 119) human lives. Biffen's theory of abject verisimilitude 
requires the absence of a satiric narrator, for he positions himself as an anti-humourist, 
rejecting Reardon's notion that "'[l]ife is a huge farce"' (NGS 120). Instead, he intends to 
write novels from a serious, "'impartial standpoint"': "'I want to take no side at all"' 
(NGS 120). Although Reardon never explains his theory of realism - Biffen pronounces 
his fellow writer to be "'a psychological realist in the sphere of culture'" (NGS 120)- he 
rejects Biffen's version of realism in favour of maintaining a mocking view of the 
"monstrously ludicrous" (NGS 120). Arguably, New Grub Street itself, in both its 
Biffenesque reportage of mundane subjects (such as where to find twopence halfpenny 
bread in London) and its Reardon-approved "psychological realism" that details 
characters' habits of thought, embodies the theories of both unconventional writers. The 
combination creates a Juvenalian satire that exposes the unpleasant minutiae of then-
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contemporary urban life (matching Juvenal's grubbiest depictions of Rome), while 
differentiating the mental habits of both its conventional and its iconoclastic characters. 
Just as Biffen abandons his neutrality, and comes to view the world with "resentful 
scorn" (NGS 374), New Grub Street, as a satiric text, must take sides. Just as in a farce, a 
noble genre is travestied by the introduction of degraded subjects, so in life high-minded 
human ideals (such sympathy, art) are travestied by what Hardy will later term "the grind 
of stern reality" (Jude 4 73). 
New Grub Street's characters reveal their mental constitutions mainly through 
their chapter-long conversations and the focalized discourse of the narrator. The 
narrator's direct and omniscient evaluations are thus rare and pointed. An important and 
glaring instance of an opinionated address to the reader occurs in the opening sentence of 
Chapter 31 (in which Biffen risks his life to save his manuscript). 183 The reader, 
addressed jarringly as "you," is asked to temper her or his "unmingled disdain" (NGS 
352) for Reardon and Biffen. Matz interprets the plea as authorial advice not to 
emphasize the text's satire at the expense of its sympathetic realism. Yet this passage 
makes plain the narrator's cynical assumptions about the reader's crass and chronic lack 
of sympathy for non-materialistic values: 
The chances are that you have neither understanding nor sympathy for 
men such as Edwin Reardon and Harold Biffen. They merely provoke 
you. They seem to you inert, flabby, weakly envious, foolishly obstinate, 
impiously mutinous, and many other things. You are made angrily 
contemptuous by their failure to get on; why don't they bestir themselves, 
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push and bustle, welcome kicks so long as halfpence follow, make a place 
in the world's eye- in short, take a leaf from the book of Mr. Jasper 
Mil vain? 
But try to imagine a personality wholly unfitted for the rough and 
tumble of the world's labour-market. From the familiar point of view these 
men were worthless; view them in possible relation to a humane order of 
society, and they are admirable citizens. (NGS 351-2) 
The narrator's dialogic parody of commercial jargon ("push and bustle," "rough and 
tumble") reveals an assumption that the reader is an average devotee of the "world's 
labour-market" - part of "the great new generation" (NGS 379), fit only to consume 
mindless periodicals such as Chit-Chat - and thus comprehends a moral language that is 
alien to that of the "kindly," "imaginative," and "admirable" (NGS 352) protagonists. In 
the futile interests of satire, New Grub Street's narrator breaks the realist illusion in order 
to announce that novel's readers are incapable of sympathy- and of the redemptive act of 
recognizing themselves in the mirror of satire. 184 
New Grub Street's Juvenalian affinities are further substantiated by Gissing's 
analysis of Dickens's own interfusion of realism and satire. In both Dickens, A Critical 
Study ( 1895) and Immortal Dickens ( 1903 ), Gissing aims to reconcile Dickens's 
commercial success with his subversive status as an artist and satirist. In doing so, he 
isolates two habits - in both works, Gissing refers repeatedly to Dickens's "habits of 
mind" - of Dickensian literary representation: his realism (defined as his persistent 
representation of characters, especially lower-middle-class Londoners, not as "types" or 
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"abstractions," but as "aggressively individual in mind and form, in voice and habit" [CS 
12-13]), and his irrepressible "comic vigour"(CS 201). According to Gissing, this 
alchemical combination of traits permits Dickens's dual success as a realist and 
"England's satirist" (CD 128). Gissing insists upon both Dickens's unflagging moral and 
satiric purpose and the realistic nature of his portraiture of human beings and their social 
conditions (CD 12). 185 He finds Dickens's narrative practice to be guided by a 
"sympathetic vision" (Immortal 214), one which dispels "gall" with the humour created 
by "farcical extravagance to soften the bitterness of truth" (CD 20 I). A memorable 
example of this alleviating strategy, for Gissing, is the depiction of the starving child 
Sally Brass cutting out "two square inches of cold mutton." Gissing maintains that it is 
the "two square inches" that "makes all the difference between painful realism and fiction 
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universally acceptable" (CD 20 I). In New Grub Street, however, Gissing refuses to 
offer the "two square inches" of Dickensian optimism, humour, and sympathy - which 
essentially translate to Horatian critique. Instead, he devises a predominantly 
"unlaughing" and "negative satire" (Bakhtin, "Discourse" 3 72) that complements the 
J uvenalian mode. 
According to Gissing, the "habit of mind" that opposes the democratic, sympathy-
cultivating forces of realism and Dickensian satire is that which characterizes laissez-
faire commercialism. In the competitive, Darwinian culture of late-Victorian society, 
New Grub Street attests, the seedy ethics of business have replaced sympathy as the 
foundation of positive morality. In many ways, the novel pillories the conventional satiric 
subject: the inordinate value of appearances in materialistic society and the attendant 
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habits of solipsism and enmity. The satiric portrait of Mrs Edmund Yule, for example, 
describes not just a particular individual, but a representative psychological template; like 
the "majority of London people" (NGS 195), she fears poverty and the accompanying 
social scorn. Thus, "[l]ike her multitudinous kind, Mrs Yule lived only in the opinions of 
other people" (NGS 199) and in habitual "bold denial of actualities" (NGS 199) (such as 
the poverty of her "domestic slaves" [NGS 198]). She is an avid Darwinist, for whom 
"life was a battle. She must either crush or be crushed" (NGS 195). Amy Reardon, also an 
exemplary citizen of her time, is cold, practical, and glares at her husband "like the 
animal that defends itself with tooth and claw" (NGS 189). As well, the summary of 
Amy's reading tastes alludes to the application of evolutionary laws to the social state, 
and also to the tenets of physiological psychology. A "typical woman of the new time ... 
who has developed concurrently with journalistic enterprise" (NGS 298), Amy reads 
articles of "specialism popularised" (NGS 298). As a result, for example, she is 
"intelligently acquainted" with the ideas of Herbert Spencer, and her knowledge of 
Darwin's "main theories and illustrations was respectable" (NGS 298). Thus, Gissing's 
text suggests that the popular consumption of evolutionary sociology functions to 
reinforce the culturally prevalent habit of viewing society as a collection of self-interested 
combatants - a perversion of Spencer's own altruistic moral science.
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In a society of 
Mrs Yules, Amy Reardons, and Jasper Milvains, realism and satire, both of which expose 
and question "the brutal realties of life" [NGS 205], are (to use Jasper's words regarding 
· satire) "little profitable" (NGS 5). 
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Asserting that the "the sum of [Biffen and Reardon's] faults was their inability to 
earn money" (352), New Grub Street's narrator confirms Edward Overton's cynical 
conjecture in The Way of All Flesh that human beings would be better off entering the 
world wrapped in Bank of England notes. Throughout the novel, precise tabulations of 
characters' fluctuating annuities match graphic depictions of their attire. The text's 
emphasis on the sartorial habits of materialism echoes not only Carlyle's Sartor Resartus 
(and the religion of the "Dandiacal Body"), but also Juvenal's Satire III. Adeline Tintner 
argues that Gissing reworks the "classical form" of satire in his "realistic novel" (3); 
specifically, she identifies the influence of Satire III, which describes the effect of 
188 (specifically urban) poverty on the poet Umbricius. Tintner's original insight has 
abundant intertextual implications. In Juvenal's poem, the satirical writer Umbricius 
explains why he must flee to the country. In the city, he complains, people are valued 
only for their material possessions - slaves, property, dinner-services, and particularly 
their clothes (3.162-82). In the country, even a magistrate will wear a plain white toga, 
"[b ]ut here in Rome we must toe I The line of fashion, living beyond our means, and/ 
Often on borrowed credit: every man jack of us I Is keeping up with his neighbours" 
(3.182-85). As well, Umbricius identifies an epidemic of misplaced satire: "[t]he poor 
man's an eternal I Butt for bad jokes, with his tom and dirt-caked top-coat, I His grubby 
toga, one shoe agape where the leather's I Split" (3.149-52). Gissing's New Grub Street 
describes the same social and moral dilemma (created by an ascendant ethos of 
materialism) and examines its sartorial expression. 189 
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Clothing in the novel signals social branding as well as self-inscribing habits of 
thought. Like "habit," the word "seedy," which recurs in the text, contains both material 
and moral connotations; it refers either to one's external appearance (clothing or physical 
state) or to one's internal, moral disposition. Seedy clothing is unkempt or of poor quality 
and associated with poverty. To have a "seedy" appearance implies a lack of health (often 
from excessive drinking); to have a "seedy" character is to be disreputable, or derelict in 
one's moral conduct (OED). A sustained irony in New Grub Street is that seedy clothing 
is not an accurate signifier of seedy morality. Yet the conventionality of characters' attire 
does accurately declare the nature of their habitual thoughts. Clothing reflects the 
physiological psychology of Jasper, Biffen, and Edwin. This symbolic strategy recalls 
William James' s identification of sartorial habit as the symbol for the social function of 
psychological habit. Habit, James determines, maintains the conservative framework of 
society by "keep[ing] different social strata from mixing" (Principles 126). It achieves 
this socio-political function by preserving the prejudicial, customary thoughts "from 
which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into 
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a new set of folds" (Principles 126). Habit is thus as constraining as the material 
conditions of life. Reardon's anti-Darwinian, non-seedy habits of mind are as unlikely to 
render him a man of fashion as they are to fashion him into a successful writer, whereas 
Jasper's habitual upkeep of both his personal appearance and his confident view of 
himself assures his success - "however seedy" (NGS 8). 
Jasper's sartorial habits, reflecting his materialistic mentality, are engineered to 
announce and attract success. He is introduced the opening chapter, "A Man of His Day," 
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as being an exemplary modern man who self-consciously "cultivates the art of success" 
(NGS 216). Appropriately, even before he is actually successful, he wears clothes that are 
made of "expensive material" (NGS 5). Significantly, the fact that "his necktie was lilac-
sprigged" (NGS 5) flags his Dandiacal inclinations; yet unlike Pelham's superficial self-
presentation, which masks hidden reformist sympathies, Jasper flagrantly (even semi-
satirica11y) commodifies his own humanity, and that of others, without a more noble 
motive than to avoid the further degradation of his character. In a moment of self-
mechanizing parody, for example, he expresses a hope that his future wife will 
continually prompt him to make money and '"keep [him] at it like a steam-engine"' (NGS 
345). As well, he admits that he "'disregarded priceless love ... to go and make himself a 
proud position among fools and knaves'" (NGS 415). Boasting that he "'isn't a heroic 
type"' (NGS 99), he incessantly takes pride in his lack of idealism and artistic 
conscientiousness. During his frequent, self-analytical monologues, he tilts his head back 
haughtily - "a habit of his" (NGS 153). Cannily, Jasper habitually discourses upon his 
"'good deal of will"' (NGS 410) as a method to maintain it: "'Never in my life shall I do 
anything of solid literary value; I shall always despise the people I write for. But my path 
will be that of success. I have always said it, and now I'm sure of it'" (NGS 62). Without 
genius, and in fact being '"rather despicable"' (NGS 152) in his own estimation, he 
becomes a reputable literary man by the sheer force of his will to look and act the part. 
Furthermore, having abandoned Marian Yule (repulsed by her weathered clothing and 
ink-stained fingers), Jasper ultimately adorns his success with a wife who routinely 
dresses with "scrupulous personal refinement" (NGS 41) and "consummate grace" (NGS 
215 
422), and whose mind is equally habituated to thoughts of productive sociability. 191 The 
union of Jasper and Amy is the fittest to reproduce the sartorial and self-representational 
values of a materialistic environment. 
The Jamesian "lines of cleavage" (Principles 126) running throughout Reardon's 
character also determine the condition of his attire and his social standing. Unlike 
Jasper's "bureaucratic" (NGS 5) mindset and appearance, however, Reardon's habits of 
thought are (in Jasper's words) "'hopelessly unpractical"' (NGS 419); not surprisingly, he 
spends the bulk of his life "shabbily attired" (NGS 49), carrying books with him at all 
times. "The habit was ominous" (NGS 104). Reardon's statement, "'I never in my life 
encountered and overcame a practical difficulty"' (NGS 66), reflects his routine manner 
of speaking and thinking about himself as a failure. The narrator observes, "[h ]e had got 
into the way of thinking of himself as too weak to struggle against the obstacles" (NGS 
185). Confident thoughts are a laborious effort for Reardon, for he thinks of himself 
automatically as being a doomed idealist. Biffen's metaphor for the self-destructive 
mental propensities of his friend is that of a razor (Reardon persists in cutting his bread, 
pauper-style, with a razor). Upon hearing yet another of Reardon's rants about poverty, 
Biffen exclaims, "'There goes the razor again!"' (NGS 364). 192 In contrast to Jasper's 
programme of self-aggrandizement, Reardon is committed to self-pathologizing. 
Referring to his artistic conscientiousness, Reardon laments, "'This habit of mine is 
superstitious"' (NGS 45). His hopelessness is registered physically, not only by his ratty 
and dwindling wardrobe (which "began to declare him poverty-stricken" [NGS 158]), but 
also by his prematurely aging and ailing body. Reardon's constant colds ("'my old 
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habit'" [NGS 367]) mirror his beleaguered mental condition. His habit of refusing 
"adapt" inwardly and outwardly to the "inferior public" (NGS 171) that desires piecemeal 
articles about Gladstone's collars, is registered by his bodily enfeeblement and his 
sartorial declarations of unconventionality. 
In New Grub Street, clothes both create and signal the farce that Reardon and 
ultimately Bi ff en determine human life to be. The condition of their clothing plays a role 
in each of their untimely deaths, dramatizing Biffen's belief in the "'fateful power of 
trivial incidents'" (NGS 120). When Reardon visits Amy for the purpose of 
reconciliation, she is physically repulsed by "the seedy habiliments" which are "tokens of 
his degradation" (NGS281). Finally, Amy decides that her husband's "livery of poverty" 
actually "symbolise[ s ]" (NGS 286) his mental disease - his non-survivalist habits of 
mind. The narrator links this failed encounter explicitly to Biffen's theory of realism, by 
confirming that if Reardon had worn a "decent suit of clothes for this interview, that 
ridiculous trifle might have made all the difference in what was to result" (NGS 287). In 
short, Reardon's fatal journey (poorly clad) in the snow to visit his dying child would 
never have occurred. 
Biffen's death is equally farcical. Before the "fatal day" (NGS 402) when he falls 
in love with Amy, he is all but oblivious to his lack of decent clothing; in fact, he is 
pleased to have a second-hand overcoat with "starting seams" (NGS 176) and an ill-fitted 
morning coat, rather than none at all. Ironically, Biffen, who lacks "conventional 
clothing" (NGS 174) and therefore cannot find a "decent position" (NGS 174) in society, 
owns instead a relatively worthless "cultivated mind and graceful character" (NGS 117). 
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Once before he had felt '"too seedy in appearance"' [NGS I 75] to approach Amy, but 
smitten with lovelorn sympathy, he "don[s] his best clothes" (NGS 404) to visit her; 
however, because of his "shabbiness" (NGS 404), he is not warmly received. 
Sardonically, the narrator observes that Biffen is, like many unfashionable types, 
"permitted to perish" (NGS 409). Biffen's realization of his (and his friend Reardon's) 
worthless ideals of love and sympathy, together with his "inflamed imagination" (NGS 
402), cause him to lose the habitual self-control that permits him to "think with 
resignation of the injustice which triumphs so flagrantly in the destinies of men" (NGS 
374). This leads to the inevitable loss of his "innate will-to-live" (NGS 405), a phrase that 
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invokes the language of Schopenhauer. The morbidly farcical, wardrobe-related deaths 
of both writers epitomize Frye's definition of satire as a genre committed (more than 
realism) to exposing the "seamy side" of tragedy. 
Corresponding with its Juvenalian tendencies, New Grub Street is, in many ways, 
a Menippean satire that depicts the "adventure of an idea"; in this case, the idea 
narrativized is the effect on humanity of the interfusion of Darwinism and laissez-faire 
capitalism (accompanied also, as Fredric Jameson proposes, by the bourgeoisie fear of 
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declassement). The novel's opening sentences describe Jasper in the act of consuming 
a "fresh egg" (NGS 5) at the moment that city-bells announce that a man is being hanged. 
Jasper further reveal his self-centred and predatory character by declaring the particular 
pleasure he takes in being alive at such moments. Similarly, when he discovers that his 
literary friends have '"fallen in the battle"' (NGS 4 I 2), he is unaffected emotionally (nor 
does he care about Marian's impending penury). Instead, his sense of himself as a select 
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individual is augmented, and he formulates new mercenary plans. Jasper's lack of 
sympathy attends his fear of poverty. By being a mouthpiece for the ethics of social 
Darwinism, Jasper joins other characters who also reveal tell-tale Menippean blood by 
partaking in topical debates about the production and market value of emergent and 
ephemeral literary genres, and the backstabbing rituals of periodical politics. Biffen and 
Reardon's debates about Sophocles, Greek metrics, and the nature of realism provide an 
ironic foil to such pragmatic discussions. Many New Grub Street-themed conversations 
revolve upon one overarching subject: the "rough and tumble" commercialism of London 
(described as being "only a huge shop, with an hotel on the upper storeys" [NGS 362]). 
The social, economic, and psychological environment in which New Grub Street's 
characters "(go] forth to fight for daily food" (NGS 50) is as mono logic and inescapable 
as any allegorical hell; condemned to the historic reality of fin de siecle London, where 
evolutionary ideology merges with capitalism, they need not travel to a fantastical 
Menippean inferno. 
Stuck in fog-infested "lodgers' London" (NGS 146), Reardon is incessantly 
harassed by the dual bells of the nearby church and workhouse, which spark his 
sympathy for the "wretched millions" (NGS 184). Despairingly, he estimates the numbers 
of "hopeful" writers like himself who fall into the "abyss" (NGSl 64 ): "Penury and 
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despair and a miserable death" (NGS 164). London's "Men of Letters," in New Grub 
Street, are the antithesis of Carlyle's vision; they are voiceless and obsolete. The 
"habitual gloom" (NGS 86) of Alfred Yule (a model ofliterary failure) matches the 
atmospheric gloom of the main Grub Street haunt: the British Museum's Reading Room. 
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With its fog-laden atmosphere, the Reading room is the "true home" (NGS 50) of 
Reardon, Hinks, and other abandoned and condemned literati, but far from providing a 
sanctuary from the literary market, it is figured as the intellectual graveyard of the 
English nation: the "valley of the shadow of books" (NGS 18) (invoking the desert 
inimical to human life in Jeremiah 2:6 and stripping Psalm 23:4 of the comforting offer 
of godly guidance). Marian Yule, a daily resident of the library, recurrently meditates on 
the futility of a literary life. Her visions of literature "threatening to become a trackless 
desert of print" (NGS 89) are reminiscent of the chaos imagined in Pope's Dunciad, in 
which literary hackwork is described as an apocalyptic threat. Another subtextual allusion 
to Augustan (and Juvenalian) representations of corrupt literary production occurs in 
Marian's fantasy that Edison will create a "Literary Machine" (NGS 89), her speculation 
recalling the book-creating machine that Gulliver encounters in Laputa. This "true 
automaton" (NGS 89), she fantasizes, would rescue her from her own mechanistic non-
life. The fog that encumbers the Reading-room forebodingly hinders Marian and Jasper's 
initial courtship-walk (the "lurid fog" gets in their throats), and invades her night's vigil 
upon the loss of her fortune, providing tangible evidence of Marian's mental and material 
hell. 
While Marian, Reardon, Biffen, Hinks, and Yule are associated with the hellish 
atmospheres of London and New Grub Street, "Jasper of the facile pen" (NGS 3 75) is 
linked with perverse energy and the "sunshine of progress" (NGS 185). Fittingly, the 
chapter confirming Jasper's consummate success is titled "The Sunny Way," whereas 
Reardon, with his habit of sitting in the dark, and Biffen, in his dim-lit lodgings, are 
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associated with the fading light of sunsets. Reardon dies remembering a sunset in Athens; 
Biffen extinguishes his own life while contemplating the sunset. Their deaths, juxtaposed 
ironically by Jasper's effulgent prosperity, illustrate what Jameson identifies to be a 
"narrative paradigm" of naturalism, in which the "dynamic of capitalism" is "registered 
as progress," while "the deepest social anxieties take the form of an omnipresent 
perception of entropy on all social levels" (NGS 266). In a society ruled by the 
"gladiatorial principle" (Huxley), entropic habits that dissipate rather than conserve life 
energy, are those of conscientious, sympathetic, artistic, and moral striving. To have a 
characteristic habit of "native delicacy" (NGS 409) or "bookish habits" (NGS 105) 
translates to extinction (Reardon and Biffen are without progeny, and the children of the 
kind Christophersons are all "happily buried" [NGS 85]). Edwin Reardon explains that 
empathetic pursuits are futile, and against all reason, for the cultivation of altruism 
requires '"twice as much faith in it as is required for assent to the Athanasian Creeds"' 
(NGS 282). New Grub Street pessimistically observes that in a materialistic society, 
altruism is equivalent to non-sobriety - and the perpetual seediness of alcoholism. As if 
to announce the text's mordant message, which is an absolute perversion of Carlyle's 
moral hopes for literature, John Yule (a successful businessman and hater of literature) 
advises that the populace "abstain" from reading and writing, just as alcoholics are 
banned from liquor (NGS 17). According to Frye, the most advanced stage of negative 
satire embodies a confirmed lack of hope; New Grub Street, in its categorical pessimism, 
describes an inescapable social environment stripped of sympathetic heroism and 
restorative, humane satire. 
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The variable, yet all-important role of habit in both specialized and popular 
Victorian discourses has a complex connection to sustained generic/modal resuscitations 
of satire - Menippean, Horatian, and Juvenalian - in Cranford, Silas Marner, The Way of 
All Flesh, and New Grub Street. The conventional binary ofHoratian and Juvenalian 
themes and devices is sustained by the texts themselves and to some extent by the satiric 
theory of the authors. Cranford and Silas Marner accommodate Bakhtin' s notion that 
remedial, laughter-infused deheroization is central to novelistic (or Menippean) discourse 
(Rabelais 35), and evince a Horatian view of habit; whereas, complementing Frye's 
observation that satire's function is to announce the disappearance of the heroic (Anatomy 
228) with "more than comic seriousness" ("Nature" 85) and even grimness, The Way of 
All Flesh and New Grub Street cultivate Juvenalian pessimism towards habit. As Bulwer-
Lytton's satiric trajectory (from Pelham to The Coming Race) suggests, Carlylean 
reformist hopes in anti-materialistic habits of wonder, sympathy, and thought are eclipsed 
by cynical satires that announce a (near) irreversible decline of non-mechanical values. 
Although Gissing insists that Dickens's satire was fundamentally uplifting in contrast to 
his own non-jovial brand of realism, revealingly, Gissing declares that he was haunted 
throughout his writing career by the image of Amy Dorrit staring from her little window 
at the rooftops of London - a moment echoed in New Grub Street by Reardon's garret-
view of the Crystal Palace. 
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Chapter 4 
The Dearth of "every-day virtues": Dickens's Metaphorical Satire on Habit 
in Hard Times, Bleak House, and Our Mutual Friend 
We cannot, however, assent so easily to his habit of interspersing controversial remarks, 
and direct passages of social criticism and remonstrance, through his fictions .... Prison-
discipline, the constitution of the ecclesiastical courts, the management of schools, capital 
punishments: Mr. Dickens's opinions on these, and many other such topics of a practical 
kind, are to be found explicitly affirmed and argued in his novels. Nor is he content with 
expressing his views merely on practical points. Modes of thinking, doctrines, theological 
and speculative tendencies, likewise come in for a share of his critical notice. (David 
Masson, North British Review, 1851; Collins 258) 
"Who is this man who is so much wiser than the rest of the world that he can pour 
contempt on all the institutions of his country?" (James Fitzjames Stephen, Saturday 
Review, January 1857; Collins 348) 
In Chapter 3, I situated Cranford, Silas Marner, The Way of All Flesh, and New 
Grub Street within culturally embedded discourses of habit and argued that each text's 
thematization of habit reveals a distinctive deployment of satiric traditions - Menippean, 
Horatian, and Juvenalian. Metaphors for the psychology of habit, from relatively benign 
bonnets and seeds to more ominous objects such as refuse and razors, were evaluated as 
key rhetorical indications of each satire's optimism or pessimism regarding the 
plausibility of reformation. Habit is presented in each novel as an agent that determines 
individual and social conditions and tends either to be ameliorative or to be an anathema 
from which only the rarest of individuals escapes. This chapter focuses on Charles 
Dickens as a Victorian novelist whose analysis of habit is distinctively inveterate and 
metaphorically diverse - a novelist who, in fact, declares a writer's addiction to 
observing habit. 196 The link between habit and perceptual distortions - and the resulting 
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multiplicity of psychic and social disorders - is Dickens's overarching satiric interest, 
particularly during the phase of novel-writing typically referred to as his "darker" 
period. 197 Representatively, in Hard Times, the personified World is depicted as wearing 
a monocle and still "scarcely" being able to perceive its inhabitants accurately (HT 302). 
Dickens's acrid satires of the 1850s and 60s reinforce John Locke's suggestion that there 
may in fact be little difference between entities that operate through "bare mechanism" 
(14 7) and human beings, whose precious potential for complex ideas (by virtue of their 
faculty of perception) has been mechanized. Dickens's Lockean pronouncement on the 
"association of ideas" confirmed by habit is that human beings generally do not alter 
perspectives with which they have become familiar. Just as Coketown admits the sun for 
a meagre half an hour each day, Bleak House, Hard Times, and Our Mutual Friend barely 
allow the possibility of individual, let alone societal, redemption through the 
counteractive habit of sympathy. 
Given the plentitude of Dickens's metaphorical, satiric rhetoric for repetitive 
mind-states and behaviour, this chapter could restrict its focus to just one pervasive and 
multivalent metaphor for habit. Sartorial details, for example, constantly convey the 
phenomenon of mental fixation - from Mr Vholes' s appropriately vampiric attire to every 
aspect of Bradley Headstone's "decent" clothing. 198 In this chapter, however, in order to 
reinforce my argument that Dickens's later novels are, on balance, Juvenalian (intensely 
rhetorical, hyperbolic, miscellaneous, allusive, and pessimistic), I will identify the 
foundational metaphors for habit in three of his most condemnatory texts. 
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Before commencing this analysis, however, it is instructive to situate the critical 
reception of Dickens's novels within the context of Victorian generic ambivalence to 
satire. As well, the persistent image of Dickens as a non-intellectual is relevant to the 
author's surprisingly precarious status as a satirist. Furthermore, it is necessary to discuss 
Dickens's apologetics (in his novels' prefaces) for satire, to address his Juvenalian 
deployment of visual detail and metaphor, and finally to illustrate his awareness and 
acceptance of the centrality of habit to the psychological and socio-economic discourses 
of his day. 
4.i Dickens and Satire: Critical Predicaments 
Dickens's critics tend to equivocate about his status as a satirist. This hesitation is 
typically founded upon a view of satire as being not only too harsh a tradition to describe 
the work of such a genial and comic novelist, but also as too intellectual and self-
conscious a genre or mode to describe accurately Dickens's "instinctive" art. G. K. 
Chestert9n, for example, was one of the first twentieth-century critics to promote the 
implicitly condescending myth of Dickens as a natural genius - a "lonely and unlettered 
man of genius" who hated Utilitarians "instinctively" (Victorian 23). 199 Humphry 
House's disparaging summation of Dickens's intellectual powers - "[he] did not 
understand enough of any philosophy even to be able to guy it successfully" (24)- has 
been widely reinforced by critics who emphasize Dickens's lack of formal education. 
In 1863, Hippolyte Taine's influential complaint against affective excesses in 
Dickensian narration helped to set in motion an academic habit of de-intellectualizing, 
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feminizing, and infantilizing200 not only Dickens's writings, but also, following the 
tradition of conflating an author's personality with her or his writing, Dickens himself. 
Taine regrets that Dickens's satiric and sentimental excesses betray "the feverish 
sensibility of a woman who laughs loudly, or melts into tears at the sudden shock of the 
slightest occurrence" (349). (In Chapter 5, I shall discuss the gendered paradoxes of satire 
- a genre persistently tagged as feminine in its associations with immoderate emotion and 
artistic weaknesses and yet considered to be masculine in its associations with intellectual 
clarity.) "'Who, it may be asked, takes Mr. Dickens seriously?"' (Collins 345), quarreled 
James Fitzjames Stephen in his famously derisive article for the Saturday Review 
(January 1857), in which he pronounced Dickens to be as scatterbrained and unruly as a 
female gossip (Collins 347).201 Thus, despite Dickens's many supporters among the 
literati (Francis Jeffrey, Thomas Hood, Sydney Smith, and Walter Savage Landor [56-57 
Ford]), he was often regarded by the intellectual elect as an unmanageable interloper on 
the literary scene, who needed to be kept in his place - like the uneducated and children, 
like women, and like satire itself, given that for many Victorian writers and critics, "satire 
may be very well in its place" (Trollope, Thackeray 93).202 
Although George Gissing reverently dubbed Dickens "England's satirist" (CD 
128), many readers ignored the "astringent" social satire in the novels and Dickens's 
"reputation for cheerfulness persisted" (Ford 82, 86).203 Many reviewers, however, did 
note the ascendancy of caustic criticism in his novels of the 1850s and 60s, and many 
regretted the loss of Pickwickian "zestful humour" (Ford 4) - specifically, the 
"Pickwickian bonhomie of feasting, sporting, and courting" (Pykett 39).204 Richard 
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Simpson's oft-quoted chastisement of Dickens's new-found seriousness (The Rambler, 
October 1854) reveals anxiety about the presumed intellectual superiority of the 
novelist's self-appointed status as a social critic: "It is a thousand pities that Mr. Dickens 
does not confine himself to amusing his readers, instead of wandering out of his depth in 
trying to instruct them" (Collins 303). Also drawing upon a classist view of Dickens as an 
undereducated man elevated to prominence by an ignorant populace, Stephens (revealing 
his anxiety about satire) fearfully asked: "Who is this man who is so much wiser than the 
rest of the world that he can pour contempt on all the institutions of the country?" 
(Collins 348). Similarly, Edwin P. Whipple responded to the novels' increased theoretical 
and politicized social content by negating Dickens's intellectual grasp of "generalities" 
and "abstractions."205 In a similar vein, Justin McCarthy complained of Dickens's "want 
of analytical power" (Collins 448) and expressed a generically explicit fear that he was 
"perverting the novel from a work of art to a platform for discussion and argument" 
(Collins 447).206 In short, Taine speaks for many critics (past and present, from Henry 
James to Harold Bloom) when he identifies a problem of compatibility between satire 
and the novel: to "transform the novel" (a psychological form) into satire (a moral and 
didactic form characterized by anger) is to "deform it" (390). Thus, the status of 
Dickens's novels as satire is complexly and detrimentally affected not only by Dickens's 
own self-authorizing, pariah-like presence in the world of belle letters, but also by the 
generic predicament of satire's customary relegation to the status of unruly, second-rate 
art. 
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It is, of course, absolutely commonplace to refer to Dickens's satire. From Trevor 
Blount' s historicizing assessments of topical satire in Bleak House in the 1960s, 207 
through Michael Cotsell's elaboration, in the 1980s, of Dickens's specific targets in Little 
Dorrit and Our Mutual Friend,208 to current contextualizing articles by David M. Wilkes 
(Dickens's mockery of temperance societies), Holly Fumeaux (the centrality of the New 
Poor Law satire to Oliver Twist),209 and Leslie Mitchell (Dickens's indictment of 
administrative ignorance, Red Tapism, and jobbery),210 numerous essays uncover the 
rhetorical tactics and historical specificities of his expansive topical satire. Generally, 
though, such studies aim to contextualize the abuses that Dickens satirized, and do not 
tend to delve into the taxonomic problem of the novels' relation to satire. 211 An 
exception is Alexander Welsh's historicizing examination of Dickens's criticism of 
London. Welsh describes Dickens's initial approach to the metropolis as satiric, but 
ultimately argues that satire (on account of the satirist's necessary detachment) became 
an inadequate literary vehicle for Dickens's mature understanding of the city. Michael 
Hollington, also interested in Dickens's representation of the city, finds that in the novels, 
"the romantic, the fantastic or the gothic comes into collision with the 'real' world of the 
city to produce the paradoxically mixed and contradictory art of the grotesque" (24). His 
theoretical study of Dickens's rhetorical use of the grotesque for satire utilizes Bakhtin' s 
novel theory (and earlier theories of the grotesque), but does not specifically address 
traditions of satire.212 Intriguingly, the most thorough attempts - for example, by Sylvia 
Manning and Frank Palmeri - to situate Dickens's novels formally within a history of 
satire have shied away from pronouncing satirical traditions to be dominant in the works, 
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even when satire is held to be, as Manning states, the "main stem" of his novels of the 
l 850s.213 One symptom of this trend is the characterization of Dickens's satire as being 
fundamentally moral and ethical rather than political, pragmatic, or philosophical. In this 
light, his novels are often considered to be less taxonomically authentic "satire." But, as 
Chapter 1 outlines, satire's moral emphasis is one of its few formal markers. Moreover, 
satire's political and pragmatic aims are usually allied with its moral claims. Recurrent 
and restricting qualifications of Dickens's use of satire, I contend, stem not only from the 
generic chaos obfuscating satire's links with the novel in general, but are also rooted 
substantially in the resilient tradition of de-intellectualizing Dickens, and the novels by 
extension. 
Taxonomic assessments linking Dickens's novels to satiric traditions must 
contend with the general debates that have informed critical discussions of his works, 
while keeping in mind the dominant theoretical postulation of an exclusively modal 
existence of satire after the 1830s. Satire's perpetual underdog position, both classically 
and in the Victorian period (reflected in one of its key elements, the programmatic 
defense), illuminates the perplexing question of what happened to satire when the novel, 
overturning its own subordinate status, became the dominant literary form. In Chapter 1, I 
discussed ascendant critical trends that reinforce the generic exclusivity of the novel and 
satire. In brief, an oppositional positioning of satire and the novel, promoted by Tave, 
Martin, Paulson, Dyer, Palmeri, and others, is generally understood to be a clash between 
"amiable" and "sentimental" humour, and the crueler criticism of satire or wit. Reflecting 
and sustaining this binary, influential critics (from then-contemporary reviewers to 
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current studies) tend to isolate two central and ostensibly contending forces in Dickens's 
canon: genial comic sentimentalism and acerbic satire. The apprehension of a bifurcation 
in the novels between their comic, sentimental, or even "realistic" content, and their 
objectifying satire, has inspired decades of critical wrangling over the precise degree of 
satire in each novel. 
Early in the Dickens critical tradition, Gissing forms a notion of the split identity 
of the novels. Puzzling over Dickens's nearly alchemical ability to combine appealing 
good-humoured and sympathetic "realism" with disturbing satiric realism, Gissing 
creates a theory of Dickensian satire based on the "two square inches" of sympathetic 
humour that he argues undercuts the novels' satiric pessimism (CD 201).214 Dickens's 
novels, he concludes, are defined, above all else, by a "sympathetic vision" (Immortal 
214). (He implies that Dickens would be incapable of the sustained acerbity of New Grub 
Street.) Gissing's critique offers an early example of what could be called a proportional 
approach that aims to measure the amount of comic and sentimental material in 
Dickens's novels, in opposition to the content deemed to be satire - often tagged "set-
pieces." Many Dickens critics follow a similar model. F. R. Leavis, for example, opposes 
the texts' "satiric irony" against their other "modes" - "melodrama, pathos, and humour," 
that are all "thrown together" in a "large and genial Dickensian way" (228). H.P. 
Sucksmith contrasts the novels' satire with their "higher forms of comedy" (318); Robert 
Newsom describes a narrative alternation between "skepticism and sentiment" (67), and 
Welsh finds generic or modal divisions between the narrative moments involving the 
"affective" centres of the novels (usually female characters such as Amy Dorrit or Esther 
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Summerson) and the disaffected critical content found in the jaded omniscient narration 
(Redressed 19).215 Kate Flint also subscribes to the idea of a Dickensian divide: in the 
novels, "[t]he satiric is juxtaposed with the coyly sentimental; the censorious with the 
frivolous" (Dickens 6). The works reflect a "duality" between belief in the human heart 
and change and despair (Flint, Dickens 42-3).216 Atypically, Martin Price finds the comic 
and satiric "exuberance" in the novels "to be equal": Dickens, he asserts, is at once the 
"strongest satirist in the language" and the most overtly compassionate (2). A. 0. J. 
Cockshut, however, preserving the notion of Dickens's genius as more comic than satiric, 
observes that Dickens's "best humourous writing is only mildly satirical. When he 
became deeply satirical, his humour declined" (16). 
Recently, Frank Palmeri describes the competing poles of non-satiric and satiric 
elements or features in Dickens's narratives as the presence of comic reconciliation (and 
acquiescence to middle-ground positions) in opposition to the inhospitable extremes of 
unmediated satire. Maintaining his previous claim that Dickens's novels of the 1850s and 
1860s are not "primarily concerned with satiric critique of institutions or dominant 
ideologies," however "dark" in "tone" ("Thackeray" 772), Palmeri concedes that in Bleak 
House, satire "comes close[r]" than in the other novels to "determining the genre" of the 
text ("Narrative Satire" 368).217 Yet, there is simply not enough satire in the novels to 
define them as such: "Although narrative satire does not extend beyond passing and 
localized effects in most of Dickens's novels, satiric social criticism of institutions does 
play an important role in the plot and the significance of several of them. Nevertheless, 
even in most of the novels where it is employed, the satire does not exert a constitutive 
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effect on the genre of the narrative" (Palmeri, "Narrative Satire" 367-68). Thus, in terms 
of the dominant trends in Dickens's critical heritage, the genial, comic, and sentimental 
aspects of the texts are considered to outweigh (constitutively) their satiric elements.218 
Sylvia Manning's full-length analysis of Dickens's novels in relation to satire, 
Dickens as Satirist (1971) - the sole study of its kind - also promotes a ratio-based 
approach to the satiric and comic-novelistic elements of the texts. But for Manning, satire 
surpasses comic realism in the majority of the later novels.219 It is important to note, 
however, that Manning accepts the dominant theory of satire in the 1970s, which defines 
satire as having an unequivocally modal existence after the eighteenth century. She is 
also indebted to Price's observation of the affinity between Dickens's satire and that of 
Hogarth and Swift. 220 Offering a thorough exposition of Dickens's knowledge of satire, 
Manning gleans evidence from his novels, shorter fictional pieces, journalistic articles, 
letters, and prefaces. With the aid of Harry Stone's 1965 dissertation, "Dickens's 
Reading," Manning amasses a plethora of overt and subtextual allusions to satiric 
traditions. Among the highlights: Dickens's 1841 Preface to Oliver Twist, in which he 
aligns his work with that of the English satiric, comic and novelistic tradition through 
"Fielding, Defoe, Goldsmith, Smollett, Richardson, Mackenzie" ("Preface" 53); 221 in 
terms of graphic satire, he identifies the influence of "Hogarth, the moralist and censor of 
his age" (35). For examples of classical influences, Manning showcases Stone's finding 
that Dickens not only read Juvenal, but habitually read Juvenal (on his travels through 
Italy). In a June 1845 letter to John Forster, Dickens muses about why Juvenal "(who I 
have been always lugging out of a bag, on all occasions) never used the fire-flies for an 
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illustration" (Letters 4: 322-23).222 Moreover, Manning buttresses Dickens's link with 
Juvenalian satiric tradition (while simultaneously downplaying it as merely a "hint of felt 
relationship" [234]) with a weighty example from Martin Chuzzlewit, in which an 
American warns Martin: "'I believe no satirist could breathe this air. If another Juvenal or 
Swift could rise up among us to-morrow he would be hunted down"' (237).223 
Furthermore, Manning affirms that Dickens's reading of Horace, Swift, and Pope was 
extensive. Surprisingly, however, as if to undermine her own exhaustive evidence, she 
concludes that "Dickens did not see himself as the inheritor of their tradition" (7). This 
pronouncement is anchored both in a steadfast view of Dickens as an unconscious artist, 
and also in a theoretical understanding of satire as part of novelistic discourse exclusively 
as a "tone or attitude" - or in Dickens's case, a "distinct satiric vision":224 
Classical satire is a highly literary genre whose practitioners are very 
conscious and proud of its long tradition. In this regard Dickens's work is 
not satire. In the sense, however, of the term satire as a mode of vision, 
defined less formally by tone and attitude, the work does have 
fundamental affinities with what is accepted as traditional satire, 
exhibiting satiric traits that in the later novels become dominant. (Manning 
7) 225 
Regardless of the limitations of Manning's theoretical model, and the contradiction 
between her view of Dickens as a singularly unselfconscious satirist and the bounty of 
learned evidence, her study provides an important acknowledgment of the prevalence of 
satire in Dickens's later novels. 
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To complement the contextualizing arguments of Chapter 1, I propose that it 
would be productive for Dickens studies, and for studies of satire generally, to break with 
the customary binary of satire and sentiment, or satire and novel - divisions encoded with 
ambivalence towards satire. A more comprehensive, dialogic view of the novel and 
satire, as forms syncretically engaged, would accord with Dickens's own understanding 
of their coalescence. Dickens, as many of his novels' prefaces reveal, did not perceive a 
rift between the satiric and the sympathetic, comic, or "realistic" aspects of his novels. 
Remarks in an 1843 letter to Douglas Jerrold, regarding his ridicule of the Young 
England movement in Dombey and Son, that '"[t]here is nothing in it but wrath; but that's 
wholesome - so I send it to you"' (Letters 3: 481), intimate the view set forth in 
Dickens's prefaces: the moral wrath of satire is not destructive. For Dickens, even 
Juvenalian satiric rage is not unwholesome, unsympathetic, or unsuited to the novel form. 
His prefatorial pieces offer a non-antagonistic theory of satire and the novel that defends 
his narrative methods and the moral necessity of satire. 
4.ii Dickens's Apology for "extreme exposition" 
Lyn Pykett, in her superb analysis of the divisions propelling the Dickens critical 
industry, concludes that debates generally centre upon the formal enigma of his novels -
what F. R. Leavis terms their "varied characteristic modes" (228). Incisively, Pykett 
identifies the key conundrum of the texts to be their "failure to conform to the aesthetics 
of realism" (Dickens 7) - particularly with respect to the delineation of human character. 
Pykett's observation clarifies the relation of Dickens's fiction to satire, for satire is 
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customarily one of the "otherized" genres or modes in Dickens's writing that are 
"variously termed unreal" (romance, melodrama, sensation) (10).226 Furthermore, Ford, 
upon examining mid-Victorian reviews of Dickens's novels, concludes that an increased 
awareness of the "aesthetics of fiction," which "[b ]ecause it was often associated with the 
development of realistic standards ... generally tended to Dickens's disadvantage" (128). 
Satire, known for its production of less "lifelike characters" (215 Taine), is reputed to 
exist at generic cross-purposes with the novel for the fundamental reason of its aims and 
methods of representing human character.227 In essence, Dickens's literary misdemeanor 
amounted to a transgression of the aesthetics of realism promoted by Trollope, Eliot, 
Lewes, and others. Their notion of a writer's moral duty to copy nature without 
exaggeration necessitated a rejection of Dickens's flagrantly grotesque satiric methods. 
Constant accusations of implausibility with regard to the characterization of both 
human beings and social institutions compelled Dickens to defend his representations of 
important social and moral truths (Ford 132). Dickens's satirico-realist project is to 
expose social structures and discourses (political, legal, and educational) as agents that 
induct human character into dehumanizing habits of solipsism and materialism. 
Contentious prefaces, reminiscent of classical apologies for satire, argue for the validity 
of satire as a literary vehicle for delineating such a "stem truth" (Oliver, Preface to the 
Third Edition 35).228 Dickens's Oliver Twist, like Henry Fielding's Tom Jones (174), was 
attacked upon "moral grounds" because of its "low subjects" (criminals). In Dickens's 
judgment, expressed in his Preface to the third edition of Oliver Twist, by presenting their 
"miserable reality" and "show[ing] [criminals] as they really are," he (along with 
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Fielding) provides a "service to society" (35-36). Arguably, this preface is a landmark 
nineteenth-century proclamation of the moral "need" for the continuance of the 
eighteenth-century English comic-satiric novel and its tradition of presenting sterner and 
uglier truths than the "going point of view" will authorize. I will briefly address 
significant prefaces that argue for the legitimacy of satire's place in the novel. 
The several prefaces for Martin Chuzzlewit (1844)- the first of Dickens's novels 
to receive severe censure for "violent exaggerations" (1850; Preface to the Cheap Edition 
716)- stage a more detailed defense of Dickens's novelistic satire. Dickens's 1844 
preface explains the irony of the satiric novel's magnifying brand ofrealism: "the 
commoner the folly or the crime which an author endeavours to illustrate, the greater is 
the risk he runs of being charged with exaggeration; for, as no man ever yet recognized 
an imitation of himself, no man will admit the correctness of a sketch in which his own 
character is delineated, however faithfully" (xxiii). This reader-satirizing statement 
cannily echoes Jonathan Swift's realization of satire's (interpretive) precariousness in the 
preface to The Battle of the Books (l 704): "Satire is a sort of glass, wherein beholders do 
generally discover everybody's face but their own" (l). Dickens, however, one-upping 
Swift, doubts the reader will even discover "everybody's face." He charges his readers 
and critics with impercipience in yet another preface for Martin Chuzzlewit (Charles 
Dickens edition; 1867): 
What is exaggeration to one class of minds and perceptions, is plain truth 
to another. That which is commonly called a long-sight, perceives in a 
prospect innumerable features and bearings non-existent to a short-sighted 
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person. I sometimes ask myself whether there may occasionally be a 
difference of this kind between some writers and some readers; whether it 
is always the writer who colours highly, or whether it is now and then the 
reader whose eye for colour is a little dull? (719) 
In this remonstrative assertion of the underlying "plain truth" of his satiric realism, 
Dickens accuses readers of having "dull" perceptions.229 The preface justifies Dickens's 
intention to expose a cultural phenomenon of myopic moral vision and the foreshortening 
of the human personality (not to mention bad literary criticism) that accompanies it.230 
Furthermore, in the 1850 preface to Martin Chuzzlewit Dickens reveals that his 
satiric method and satiric subject are conjoined. "Selfishness" (718), the universal cause 
of impercipience, is his central target. He reiterates that it is impossible for the real-world 
"Pecksniffs" to recognize themselves in fiction as realistically portrayed human beings -
although supposedly, Pecksniff admires '"a habit of self-examination, and the practice of 
- shall I say of virtue?"' (MC 415). As well, Dickens grounds his claim that Jonas 
Chuzzlewit is a plausible being in a theory of habit. Having been taught vice "in the 
cradle" (MC 716), Jonas' s "early education" secures his inveterate viciousness. Dickens 
stresses that the social ramifications of an individual's early induction into 
unsympathetic, solipsistic habits cannot be underestimated as a social catastrophe: "there 
is nothing more common in real life than want of profitable reflection on the causes of 
many vices and crimes that awaken the general horror. What is substantially true of 
families in this respect is true of a whole commonwealth. As we sow, we reap" (MC 717) 
(This parabolic view of habit resonates throughout the later novels.) The preface not only 
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suggests that acquired bad habit is a cause of moral distortion, but it also contains a 
theory of satiric representation (of both characters and institutions) in opposition to 
dominant notions of the desirability of strict verisimilitude in prose fiction. Dickens 
declares his narrative method to be the "extreme exposition of a plain truth" (Preface, MC 
717). Satire, this implies, in its severity does notfundamentally distort or deform its 
target (for example, "American character"), but offers an "extreme exposition" of the 
worst or "most ludicrous" "side" or "truth" of a character, institution or society.231 For the 
sake of clarity, this intensified mode of representation magnifies psychological and social 
realities that are radically out of focus to the general perception. In an 1867 Postscript to 
Martin Chuzzlewit, Dickens declares that it is his authorial "duty" to present "profitable 
reflection" on the institutions of any society (English, American, French or otherwise). 
Similarly, many of his paratextual pieces argue for the moral need for the novel to expose 
vice stringently for social betterment; they justify the emboldening methods of satire that 
jar and disrupt habitual perceptions, and declare them to be consonant with the novel 
form and the avowed imperative of its practitioners to represent "things as they are." 
As with Horace and Juvenal's apologetics, Dickens's prefaces themselves are 
satiric. The oft-quoted 1853 preface to Bleak House, for example, opens with the 
dramatic address of a Chancery Judge (a personal satire on Vice Chancellor Sir William 
Page Wood) to a large audience on the subject of Chancery and the "trivial blemish or 
so" (a tactical litotes) "in its rate of progress," that was "exaggerated" by a certain author 
at whom he glares (the homodiegetic Dickens) (5). With the aid of a quotation from 
Shakespeare's "Sonnet 111," the authorial Dickens accuses the ostensibly fictional judge 
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of habitually deformed perceptions: "My nature is subdued I To what it works in, like the 
dyer's hand: I Pity me then, and wish I were renew'd!" (qtd. in Preface BH 5). Although 
the judge is mentally "subdued" by the perversions of his profession, the public "should 
know" that "everything set forth in these pages concerning the Court of Chancery is 
substantially true, and within the truth" and in "no essential altered" (5). Threatening a 
Juvenalian superfluity of incriminating evidence, Dickens offers to "rain on these pages" 
further "authorities" for Jamdyce and Jarndyce (6). Next follows his novelist's pledge 
"not [to] abandon fact," despite having "purposefully dwelt upon the romantic side of 
familiar things" (6). Dickens once again defends his position as a satirical novelist who 
has a generic license for the emphatic elaboration of "essential," "substantial," and 
"familiar" but unacknowledged and out-of-focus truths. 
Dickens's rebuttals to his critics insist that the "extreme exposition" of satire 
comes closest to achieving the "the faculty (or the habit)" of "correctly observing the 
characters of men" (Dombey, 1867 Preface 43) and institutions. They announce a formal 
and thematic coherence: a defamiliarizing or "extreme" delineation of things "as they 
really are" (Oliver Preface 34) is required to capture the attention of impercipient readers. 
4.iii Dickens as a Metaphorical Satirist 
Sergei Eisenstein famously assesses "the keenness of perception" (210) that 
characterizes Dickens's omniscient narrators as the literary equivalent of a camera lens. 
As well, J. Hillis Miller influentially stresses Dickens's visual emphasis when suggesting 
that Bleak House's impersonal narrator is a kind of impressionist painter (177). Bleak 
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House's opening description of Thebes-like London plagued by retrogradation spans the 
entire city, yet also describes such minutiae as fog invading the "stem and bowl of the 
afternoon pipe of the wrathful skipper" (BH 11 ). A comprehensive albeit shifting view, 
Alvin Kernan argues, is a "primary quality of formal satire," in which a key rhetorical 
strategy is to present the whole through a great number of its parts (73). As Thomas 
Lockwood notes, satirists represent their subject "kaleidoscopically, setting it forth in all 
its special habits and forms" (13). Dickens's delineations of crowded London, with its 
"quickly changing and ever-varying" "procession" of life roaring through the city streets 
"mingled up together in one moving mass like water" (Nicholas Nickleby 488), are 
similar to Juvenal's vivid descriptions of Rome's tumultuous, "narrow twisting streets" 
(3.235). To demonstrate the pervasiveness of corruption, Juvenal and Dickens's satiric 
personae offer endless and farraginous evidence of greed and selfishness. 
It has often been noted that (as with Dickens) Juvenal's representations "foretell 
the techniques of cinematic montage" (Green 44). Both satirists anatomize their urban 
environments and seize upon manifold evidence of contradiction, injustice, corruption, 
and suffering. Also akin to Juvenal's often indignantly aloof satiric persona, Dickens's 
over-seeing narrators are at once detached recorders of a community's daily rituals and 
enraged declaimers of vice; they enact what Paulson identifies as Juvenal's 
"presentational and objective" (Fictions 29) mode, in contrast to Horace's "subjective," 
personalized mode. Furthermore, Green observes that Juvenal's authoritative voice 
imitates the scope and point of view of epic: "the world at large his subject-matter" (23), 
and Dickens is similarly ambitious: "From Oliver Twist to Edwin Drood, this satirist 
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spreads his attacks over more ground ... than anyone else" (Russell 270). Bagehot 
backhandedly praised Dickens's ambitious (though immoderate) attempts to delineate the 
frenzied entirety of British national life (Collins 391 ). The Juvenalian narrators of 
Dickens's late novels, with their posture of visual and moral objectivity, and resulting 
over-abundance of examples of injustice, access a narrative field of vision that contrasts 
radically with the fallible perceptions of the novel's characters. Thus, from their epic-like 
vantage-point they provide, akin to Juvenal's lofty persona, the ideal vehicles to expose 
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Arthur Pollard categorizes Dickens's brand of satire as symbolic and pictorial 
(51 ). As many critics observe, Dickens's characteristic visual emphasis supports his 
relentlessly emblematic methods. William Hogarth - the pictorial satirist who most 
influenced Dickens - uses emblems as his main "weapons of graphic allegory" to 
demonstrate that "human beings have permitted themselves to become stereotypes" 
(Paulson, "Pictorial" 294, 296).233 Michael Steig usefully assesses the Hogarthian-
emblematic influence in Bleak House, noting that the novel's frontispiece displays a 
symbolically apt game of blind man's buff across the top of the illustration (165).234 
Dickens's use of pictorial symbolism complements the general analogical satiric method 
of his written texts. In the novels, scenic descriptions abound - in Walter Bagehot' s 
phrase, "telling minutiae" (Collins 393) provide a surplus of material for expansive 
metaphorical analogy. Steven Marcus observes that Dickens's "satiric mode" dramatizes 
and symbolizes "abstract ideas" and themes "through locally related images" and through 
the analogical "modulation of one theme and image into another (63, 295). Moreover, 
Marcus characterizes Dickens's prose as being "poetic" in its use of repetition and 
"emphasis on objects and images" (297). 
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H. M. Daleski, following Marcus, finds that the full development of Dickens's 
narrative machinery is observable in the complex "analogical strategy of the late novels" 
(167). Analogy, he explains, is implicit metaphor, thus "images and symbols are used 
analogically as ... unifying devices" to emphasize the constant relation of "individual and 
social spheres" ( 48). Numerous critics refer to the dense matrices of metaphor that 
characterize Dickens's later satires. Ford, for example, summarizes Dickens's critical 
method as an oscillation between "crude, direct sermon" and the "masterful channeling of 
comparable indignation into symbolical devices" (82). His examples include Bleak 
House's fog, Our Mutual Friend's dustheap, and such "symbolical characterizations" as 
the Murdstones and the Grad grinds (82). The structural importance of the hyper-
generation of metaphor to Dickensian narrative is reminiscent of Juvenal's satire. 
Juvenal, as Green postulates, structures his satire "through images rather than by logic" 
and through the "vivid and often haphazard accumulation of examples" (43-44). Again, 
the catalogue of "quickly changing and ever-varying" objects that "flit by in motley 
dance" ( 488-9) of life and death in the marketplace depicted in Nicholas Nickle by comes 
to mind as one of many examples of the cataloguing habits of Dickensian narrators. Ford 
discovers a thematically apt justification for Dickens's rhetorical reliance on de-
humanizing and objectifying metaphors for human life in a letter that Dickens wrote to 
Forster describing the core theme of Our Mutual Friend. Dickens condemns the English 
paintings on exhibit in Paris in 1855: "There is a horrid respectability about most of the 
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best of them - a little, finite, systematic routine in them, strangely expressive to me of the 
state of England itself' (Letters 7: 743). The "horrid" circumscription of human 
multifariousness into the "finite, systematic routine" that Dickens scorns is tantamount to 
habit.235 
Importantly, Northrop Frye, in "Dickens and the Comedy of Humors," analyses 
habit both as a Dickensian thematic and a mode of characterization with generic 
implications. He explores the novels in terms of their re-deployment of classical New 
Comedy.236 Dickens's characters, he posits, "are humors, like the characters in Ben 
Jonson"; "humors" that support a New Comedy plot and are wholly "identified with a 
characteristic, like the miser, the hypochondriac, the braggart, the parasite, or the pedant." 
Such a character "bound to an invariable ritual habit" is "obsessed by whatever it is that 
makes him a humor" (Frye, "Dickens" 56). As well, applying Henri Bergson's idea that 
an "obsessed person" inspires laughter, Frye adds that in Dickensian narrative there is a 
tacit recognition that we are all "creatures of ritual habit" ("Dickens" 59). 237 Without 
Vrettos's historicizing context, Frye pinpoints habit to be Dickens's central subject, 
suggestive of generic implications.238 His observation that "[s]tock-response humors" 
such as Podsnap or Gradgrind "represent the fact that an entire society can become 
mechanized like a humor" ("Dickens" 77) explains why what Van Ghent terms being 
"thinged" 239 is a universal social-psychological reality in Dickens's texts - a reality 
depicted through extensive objectifying tropes.240 
It is pertinent to note that David Masson, in his contrast of Dickens's "luxuriant" 
prose style to Thackeray's "Horatian strictness" (British Novelists 246), implicitly links 
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Dickensian copiousness to Juvenalian rhetorical plentitude. Masson finds that 
Thackeray's association with the "Real school" affirms his "sure habit" of correctness, 
"self-possession," and "habitual" "knowingness," in contrast to Dickens's more 
"original" and "poetic mind of looser and richer, and freer texture" (British Novelists 253, 
246). Significantly, Masson's assessment of Dickens's artistic mind and method 
corresponds intriguingly with nineteenth-century habit theory. Metaphor, a product of 
"association by similarity," is a rhetorical figure that embodies anti-habitual thought. 
Appropriately, the association of ideas by similarity, Bain argues, is particularly 
ascendant in artists; Shakespeare, he insists, had the "greatest intellectual reach of 
similarity that the mind of man ever attained to" (S&J 534). For Bain, and later for 
William James, mental forces such as "association by similarity," as opposed to 
mechanical association by contiguity, contravene fixity in the human mental constitution. 
Thus, metaphor, in literary terms, is the equivalent of the mental process of "association 
by similarity." Conceived of as an enactment of unhabituated thought, it is the ideal 
formal device for satires on habit. 
4.iv Dickens and Theories of Habit: Mental Science and Utilitarianism 
Vrettos's watershed essay on Dombey and Son argues for a conception of habit as 
"operative in the culture as whole" ( 404 ). 241 Interested in situating Dickens's texts within 
a generic and historical context of the development of psychological realism, Vrettos 
outlines a general cultural discussion of habit that Dickens absorbed and to which he 
contributed. Her work is part of a large array of recent historical and context-focused 
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studies - by scholars such as Gillian Beer, George Levine, Jenny Bourne Taylor, Sally 
Shuttleworth, and Bernard Lightman - who find that Victorian discursive practices 
encouraged the cross-fertilization or "two-way traffic" (Lightman, "Introduction" 9) of 
science and literature. Self-consciously, Dickens contributed to the myriad forms of 
Victorian discourses linking individual, social, and medical pathologies. 
G. H. Lewes, keenly aware of Dickens's lack of formal education, appraised the 
popular novelist's library and pronounced his knowledge to be "'completely outside 
philosophy, science and the higher literature"' (qtd. in Sanders, Dickens 81).242 Recent 
assessments contradict this famous conclusion. The supposition of Dickens's lack of 
erudition in literature and science has been strongly contested, not only by the well-
known fact that Dickens read voraciously in the British Reading room from the age of 
eighteen, when he acquired his reading ticket, but by scholars who have produced 
evidence of his wide-ranging reading habits. Susan Shatto notes that Dickens "read 
widely in the literature of psychopathology" ("Havisham II" 81 ); his library at Gads Hill 
had numerous volumes on the subject (Oberhelman 10). Joanne Eysell's A Medical 
Companion to Dickens's Fiction (2005) lists numerous medical and "medicine-related" 
books from both the Devonshire Terrace house and Gads Hill (241-244). 243 Furthermore, 
Michael Kearns situates Dickens in the trans-generic exploration of physiological 
psychology; and David Oberhelman elucidates his active support for John Conolly's 
theories of moral management (instead of the use of restraints) in asylums ( 11 ). 
Dickens's enthusiasm for asylum reform is reflected in multiple articles on subjects of 
psychological interest in Household Words.244 "A Curious Dance Round a Curious Tree" 
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(Household Words, January 1852), which records an admiring visit to St Luke's, was 
reprinted as an advertisement for the institution in 1860 at the asylum's request (Shatto, 
"Havisham" 44 ). In Dickens and Mesmerism, Fred Kaplan explores the connections 
between Dickens's fiction and the mesmerism of John Elliotson. Having cultivated a 
friendship with the Professor of Medicine, Dickens attended mesmeric experiments and 
even became a mesmeric operator himself (acquiring Madame de la Rue as a patient) 
(Kaplan 52). Dickens's interests in the curative potential of the self-developed will were 
fuelled by a key notion of the physicians he admired: there is no firm division between 
the sane and the insane. With his informed interest in mesmerism, phrenology, and 
associationist theory, Dickens was definitively engaged in shrewd analyses of 
psychological debates. Thus, his assessment of human psychology is inadequately 
described by the word instinctive. 
Dickens was incisive in his understanding of the interrelations between theories of 
human mind and ascendant political and economic theories. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
notions of habit as a force influencing (even determining) morality and rationality derive 
from associationist philosophers John Locke and David Hume, and become, John 
Passmore argues, central to Enlightenment notions of perfectibility (162-3). "Locke-
based perfectabilism" (Passmore 166) supported the limitless possibilities of education, 
reinforcing that, to use William James's optimistic phrase, "human beings are ''par 
excellence, the educable animal" (Principles 990) Practical progress of both the 
individual and the state was regarded as the inevitable result of a will disciplined by 
habit. The centrality of habit to theories of education was touched upon in Chapter 1, but 
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here I would like to emphasize that Utilitarian theories of education (articulated by 
Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Priestly, James Mill) capitalized on the idea of controlling 
habitual mental associations in the individual for universal mental and moral 
advancement (Olson 169-73). Dickens understood this pedagogical project to be harmful 
indoctrination. Revealing Dickens's thorough knowledge of Utilitarian writings, Newsom 
discusses an allusion, in the preface to Oliver Twist, to Thomas Malthus's Population: 
The First Essay (1798), a classic text that influenced the New Poor Law of 1834. 
Although Malthus admits that his ideas have a "melancholy hue," he insists that this is 
not the result of '"jaundiced eye or an inherent spleen of disposition"' ( qtd. in Newsom 
76). Echoing this ironically, Dickens asserts that the "real hues are delicate, and need a 
clearer vision" (Oliver Preface 34). In summary, although Whipple's 1849 conclusion (in 
the North American Review) that Dickens's "fellow-feeling with his race is his genius" 
(Collins 238) appears to be the satire-diluting general consensus regarding Dickens's 
novels, his satires consistently yoke individual mental imbalances and moral failings to 
institutional malpractice and political and philosophical "modes of thinking." 
4.v "They took De Foe to their bosoms, instead of Euclid": Hard Times's 
Satire on Utilitarian Habits 
Just as Silas Marner is George Eliot's most distilled examination of habit, Hard 
Times is Dickens's most concentrated anatomy of destructive habit. Although it was 
published one year after Bleak House, I shall discuss Hard Times first, as not only is it an 
overtly philosophical and Menippean satire on materialist habits, but because it is also a 
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revealing locus of Victorian (and beyond) distrust of satire. Finding the novel singularly 
illustrative of the fact that "[a]t bottom, Dickens is gloomy, like Hogarth," Taine 
pronounces it an "abstract of the other novels" (446, 455). For Taine, this text convicts 
Dickens of committing the key aesthetic error of a satirist: being more of a moral judge 
than an artist. Opposing Taine's condemnatory view, F. R. Leavis elevates Hard Times 
above Dickens's other novels, based on its "comprehensive" and "critical vision," 
something which is merely "casual and incidental" (229) in the other novels. Put 
differently, he praises its sustained satire.245 Significantly, both of these landmark 
criticisms are rooted in an assessment of Dickens's satiric method. With its notoriously 
compressed scope and emphatically satirical characterizations, metaphors, and dramatic 
incidents, Hard Times is decidedly unmediated by Gissing's "two square inches" of 
Dickensian humour. 
Victorian critics reacted to the unrelenting gloom of Hard Times with an array of 
politicized aesthetic complaints. Dickens's representation of industrial life and political 
economy was attacked for being untruthful by critics such as Richard Simpson, who 
charges Dickens with an inability "to pierce the depths of social life, to fathom the wells 
of social action" (Collins 319).246 Moreover, Hard Times inspired Whipple's harshest 
assessment of Dickens's intellectual limitations. Whipple, who, as I have outlined, 
questions the validity of satire in general, accuses Dickens (in company with Arnold, 
Carlyle, and Ruskin) of being an embarrassingly "unscientific" writer, blind to the 
"beneficent" and "scientific" truths and laws of political economy (Collins 331 ).247 In 
addition, an important review by Jane Sinnett in the October 1854 Westminster claims 
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that Dickens's satire on education is entirely fallacious.248 Tellingly, Sinnett denounces 
the novel's "cold and uncongenial atmosphere" and the "disfigurement" of its characters 
(Collins 306). Her resistance to Hard Times's satiric method is evident in her 
denunciation of Gradgrind as the most implausible of Dickens's "puppets." An 
intellectual, "cultivated" man, she argues, requires complex representation: "Beneath the 
apparent uniformity lurk thousand-fold shades of difference, indicative of the mind 
within" (Collins 307).249 In essence, Sinnett attempts to undermine Dickens's criticism of 
Utilitarianism by attacking his satiric mode - his aesthetics of "extreme exposition." 
Assessments of Hard Times continue to bear the critical imprint of Dickens's reputation 
as a non-intellectual, and of general anxieties regarding the unsettling and uncongenial 
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4.vi Hard Times's Anatomy of Utilitarianism 
Although it is not episodic after the manner of classical Menippean satire, Hard 
Times is structured upon the genre-constitutive component emphasized by both Frye and 
Bakhtin: the "adventure of an idea or truth in the world" (Dostoevsky 115)- in this case, 
the misadventures of Utilitarianism (Coketown provides the requisite journey to Hell). 
Understood to be Dickens's most "philosophically ambitious" novel (Goldberg 79), Hard 
Times attacks reformist schemes for the cultivation of exclusively rational habits of 
thought in the working population. As Vrettos convincingly argues, an acknowledgement 
of habit, or the power of reiterated mental associations to determine thought and 
behaviour, is fundamental to Dickens's view of human character. In Hard Times, 
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Benthamite James Mill's most important doctrine is condemned by Dickens as being the 
most dangerous: the utopic possibilities of education based "formation of all human 
character by circumstances, through the universal Principle of Association" (J.S. Mill, A 
I: 111 ). In essence, Hard Times indicts indoctrination and the Utilitarian abuse of 
association psychology.251 In Tom and Louisa Gradgrind's cave-like bedroom, the 
narrator outlines a "shadow" (allusively linking Utilitarian precepts to the false reality 
described by Plato's "cave" allegory) that descends upon the children's lives "in the form 
of a lowering association" (HT 68): the mental disfigurement of a rationalist education. 
Tom's moral debauchery and Louisa's living death illustrate that the "graft of 
circumstances upon nature" (HT 280) destroys human character when Utilitarian habits 
provide the "graft." The text offers at once a quintessential Menippean satire on the 
absurdity, vanity, and folly of systematization, and a Juvenalian indictment of a 
catastrophic social and moral error. 
Hard Times exposes and condemns the interrelationship between associationist 
Utilitarian pedagogy and mid-Victorian economic and industrial practices. Paul A. Olson 
succinctly explains the link that Dickens apprehended: "Bentham's pedagogical 
principles derive from the school application of an Associationist psychology, 
reformulated by James Mill and perfectly suited to the construction of a regime of 
surveillance, temporal control, rote drill, and examination. This psychology empowered 
the dream that education could reinvent human nature for the machines of industry, 
science, and competitive work" (169). Hard Times is a satiric anatomy of this dream. The 
text's exposure of the dehumanizing material and commercial values installed by 
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Benthamite education begins with a dramatic teaching performance by Utilitarian 
systematizers Thomas Gradgrind, Mr M'Choakumchild,252 and Josiah Bounderby. To 
these men, the children are "little vessels" to be "arranged in order" and "filled with 
facts" (HT 2). Book One's title, "Sowing" (an allusion to the Biblical parable, and 
another allusion to the "seed" mofif), is itself an irony-laden condemnation of the 
unnatural, unfruitful habituation of human beings into money-making machines.253 Often 
found in Hard Times's chapter titles, biblical allusions provide the overarching 
intertextual condemnation of the Utilitarian assault on "immaterial" values .254 A plethora 
of fairy-tale allusions provide the next level of attack. The multi-discursive echoes -
religious, folkloric, philosophical, and economic - of Hard Times are one of its 
Juvenalian features, for the ancient satirist's "stuffed-to-the-gills" style is distinguished 
by "massive intertextuality" (Hooley, Roman Satire 115). Chapter Two, entitled 
"Murdering the Innocents" (a bloody allusion to the slaughter of the first-born children of 
Israel by Herod [Matthew 2: 16-18]), depicts object lessons in the unpardonable sin of the 
cult of Fact. "Girl number twenty" (HT 5), Cecilia Jupe, having grown up around horses, 
is confounded by the fact that their existence is officially summarized by the phrase 
Graminivorous quadruped.255 Appropriating (and mocking) the delusively objectifying 
language of Utilitarians, the narrator extends his attack to political economists (referred 
to as numbered bodies): "Body number three, wrote leaden little books for them, showing 
how the good grown-up baby invariably got to the Savings-bank, and the bad grown-up 
baby invariably got transported."256 This parody of Utilitarian reformers (such as Harriet 
Martineau) and their "leaden" replacements for fancy- and empathy-enriching fairy tales 
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also charges political economy with promulgating the fiction that "good conduct" is 
rewarded monetarily. Habit was the "how to" of such myths of market capitalism.257 
Rather than being "a little simplistic" (Humphreys 191) in his criticism of Utilitarians, 
Dickens interrogates the ethic that necessarily (if not consciously) informs and 
undermines their theories and good intentions: "the Good Samaritan was a bad 
economist" (HT 398, 286). To demonstrate this un-Christian and unacknowledged truth 
of political economy, Stephen Blackpool's seemingly model conduct leads to poverty, 
ostracism, and death. In Dickens's moral philosophy, virtue - associated with mysterious, 
immaterial human qualities (empathy, imagination, and love)- cannot be cultivated by 
inducting the population into a material estimation of life. 258 
The narrator dialogically enacts the Benthamite's systematic scorn for wonder, 
referring to "the spring of the mechanical art and mystery of educating the reason without 
stooping to the cultivation of the sentiments and affections. Never wonder" (HT 64). The 
paradoxical absurdity of the phrase "mechanical art and mystery" alludes to Professor 
Teufelsdrockh's argument, in Carlyle's Sartor Resartus (1833), that "Wonder" - an 
ineffable sense that activates imagination and creates receptivity to "Mysticism and 
Mystery" - opposes the mechanizing forces which seek to destroy it (SR 52). 
Significantly, the Gradgrind children's first mental "association" is the "black Ogre of a 
chalkboard," and "[ n ]o little Gradgrind had ever associated a cow in the field with that 
famous cow with the crumpled horn ... or with that more famous cow who swallowed 
Tom Thumb" (HT 12; my italics). Deprived of fanciful stories their "minds," modeled 
upon the Utilitarian educational ideal, were "practically formed by rule and line, from the 
252 
cradle upwards" (HT 25). Not surprisingly, Louisa is banned from associating with Sissy 
Jupe. Hard Times's circulating lexicon of habit (cultivate, associate,form, accustom, and 
train) creates a multitude of ominous narrative connections. As well, Louisa Grad grind' s 
graduated "descent" down Mrs Sparsit's imaginary "spiral staircase" into adultery 
provides a metaphor that enriches physiological psychology's horizontal images of tracks 
and pathways by suggesting the gravitational pull of habitual associations. Louisa 
confesses that it was by insensible "'degrees"' (HT 290) that she descended. 
Analogously, the British social system, seduced by "hard philosophy," is envisioned as 
being close to a "pit of ruin" (HT273). Dickens's satire on Utilitarian perversions of the 
associationist philosophy of habit warns against the replacement of habitual, sympathetic, 
imaginative thought by self-interested and material fixations (to be made, as 
M'Choakumchild hopes, as automatic as walking). Because of the potency of habit, the 
narrator prophesizes the permanent loss of humane qualities and practices. Encrypted on 
the human mind, constricting habit is the "Writing on the Wall." 
In keeping with Whipple's reluctant praise for Dickens's "wonderful power of 
individualizing abuses in persons" (Collins 316), Hard Times' s Utilitarian characters are 
self-incriminating Menippean mouthpieces who reveal reductive views of psychology, 
politics, morality, education, and economics.259 In particular, Thomas Gradgrind is a 
multi-faceted symbol of Unitarian philosophy and practice. In what Newsom identifies as 
the "central intellectual debate of the age," the "contest between the mechanicals and the 
spirituals" (61), the mechanical contingent (Gradgrind, M'Chokumchild, Bounderby, 
Tom, and Bitzer) is the dominant power. Michael Goldberg observes that "Signs of the 
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Times" (1829), the tract in which Carlyle defines the contemporary "Mechanical Age," is 
"an ideological prospectus to the novel" (79).260 More specifically, in Hard Times, the 
machine is the keynote emblem for the Utilitarian abuse of the power of habit. Human 
beings, like all aspects of Coketown - except Steven, Rachel, Sissy, and her Circus 
family, who are associated with fugitive nature and "immaterial" values - are 
mechanized. Coketown's citizens, like its Utilitarians, are connected with manifold 
linear, inflexible objects that suggest mechanization. The text's Juvenalian surfeit of 
incriminating detail - its repetition and associative expansion of anatomizing figures - is 
its central method of critiquing dehumanizing habit.261 Hard Times's profound reliance 
upon repetition and mechanistic metaphor, some critics find, undercuts its own anti-
mechanical moral; it "defeats itself' (Welsh 155). But, rather than narrative hypocrisy, 
repetition, viewed as a textual enactment of the force of habit, is a rhetorical strategy to 
counteract Utilitarian induction. Through the re-habituation of the reader to anti-
mechanical thought, Hard Times aims to enlist the laws of association on the side of life, 
literature, and satire itself. 
Thomas Gradgrind, like the text's proliferating machine emblem, has a manifold 
existence: he is an intellectual, an education reformer, a statistician, a former man of 
commerce, and an M.P. As such, he is a composite symbol, or rather, a complex 
Menippean and Juvenalian exemplum of the philosophical, educational political thought 
behind Utilitarianism. 262 Gradgrind and Josiah Bounderby - a man-machine who 
allegorizes the lies of the laissez-faire system - are symbolically appropriate 
associates.263 Through his "square wall of a forehead," "square forefinger," and "square 
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coat, square legs, square shoulders" (HT 2, 4, 1 ), Gradgrind corporealizes what Carlyle 
terms the "vast blockheadism" of the "mechanists."264 Every physical aspect of 
Grad grind functions as a perfectly anatomizing signifier of his devitalized existence, for, 
as Steven Connor phrases it, he is steeped in "an excess of metaphor" (115). His 
symmetrical physicality, the narrator insists, gives "emphasis" to his unbending 
philosophy. Ironically appropriating Gradgrind's rote method of teaching his students, the 
narrator (employing satiric anaphora) begins four sentences with the word "emphasis." 
As well, the narrator parodies Gradgrind's "dry and dictatorial" (HT I) language: "With a 
rule and a pair of scales, and the multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to 
weigh and measure any parcel of human nature and tell you exactly what it comes to" 
(HT 3). Being a "man of Realities," Gradgrind is associated with various codifying tools, 
graphs, "Blue books," and "tabular statements" (HT 3, 65). Appropriately, as he aims to 
control, quantify, and therefore dominate the external world, he is likened to a military 
weapon: a "cannon loaded to the muzzle with facts" (poised to "blow [his students] clean 
out of the regions of childhood" [HT 3]). Obliviousness to his systematic inhumanity 
allows Grad grind to function as an unwitting murderer, not only of his students, but also 
his wife (who is "crushed" by his "ological studies" [HT 136]), his children (Tom's 
disgrace, illness, and death, and Louisa's "conscious death" [287]), and (through his 
status as a "deaf, honourable" M.P.) the population at large. His "inflexible theory" is 
articulated in a series of Menippean conversations - the most critical of which is his 
interview with Louisa, in which he discounts love as a "misplaced" expression in the 
scientific question of matrimony (HT 130).265 Ironically, Gradgrind "meant well": "In 
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gauging fathomless deeps with his little mean excise-rod, and in staggering over the 
universe with his rusty stiff-legged compasses, he had meant to do great things. Within 
the limits of his short tether he had tumbled about, annihilating the flowers of existence 
with ... singleness of purpose" (HT 295). Gradgrind's "tethered," one-track mind is a 
multivalent emblem of the misguided mental, ethical, and practical habits of Utilitarian 
reformers of all kinds. 
The annihilating amalgamation of Utilitarian theories and practices symbolized by 
Gradgrind are figured textually not only by the matrix of empirical devices associated 
with Gradgrindery, but also by the industrial wasteland that is Coketown. Like The 
Coming Race, Hard Times is a dystopic text; but unlike Bulwer-Lytton's Vril-yan Hell, 
there is, as yet, "No Way Out" (as a chapter describing Coketown proclaims) of the 
"muddle." 266 The "Keynote" chapter represents Coketown as both a "triumph of fact" 
and "a town of machinery": "Fact, fact, fact, everywhere in the material aspect of the 
town; fact, fact, fact, everywhere in the immaterial" (HT 28-29). This forceful claim 
justifies the narrative's recurring "de-anthropomorphizing comparisons" (Lane 80)267 
between the Coketown inhabitants (aptly signified by the class-inflected, dehumanizing 
synecdoche, "the Hands") and the machines. 
The machine operating Coketown's mill is presented in the form of a simile that, 
in its non-rejuvenating (and therefore non-Bakhtinian) grotesque hybridity, suggests the 
populace's mental enslavement to habit, and counterpoints the jubilant life and habits of 
Sleary's Circus: the "piston of the steam-engine worked monotonously up and down like 
the head of an elephant in a state of melancholy madness" (HT 28). The mad machine 
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symbolizes both the insanity of viewing the human mind as a machine and the distortion 
of the human mind by an excess of automatic and singular thought. The melancholy 
machine also suggests that human and machine life are indistinguishable under Utilitarian 
rule. Like the steam-powered piston, the people work "long and monotonously" (HT 32) 
and are also possessed by sullen discontent that is, as Tamara Ketabgian argues, 
potentially violent and rooted in automatic action.268 Moreover, the narrator employs 
zeugma (a favourite Popean device) to equate further machine and human existence: 
"The looms, and wheels, and Hands all out of gear for an hour" (HT 92). Finally, the 
physical aspects of the town provide apt metaphors for the effect of industrial-capitalist 
practices: the narrow, labyrinthine streets; the trains running along iron roads, coal-paths, 
and pits; the mine shafts that threaten the inhabitants with the same living entombment 
that Steven experiences. Appropriately, the melancholy river, "black and thick with dye" 
(HT 148), is the antithesis of the rivers that, in discourses of Victorian mental science, 
symbolize rejuvenating and changeable habit. Moreover, the town's interchangeable red-
brick buildings provide a suitable habitus for the de-individuated minds of the citizens.269 
The summary of Coketown as a place of "wholesome monotony" (HT 149) betrays its 
antiphrastic monotony by recalling the "monotony" of the melancholy machine that is the 
text's central symbol for diseased Utilitarian habits, or humours. 
Despite the "triumph of fact" (HT 28) in Coketown, a small cluster of characters, 
including Sissy Jupe and her horse-riding family, embody the counter-philosophy: "the 
Sleary philosophy" (HT 54).270 Sleary reminds Gradgrind of the need for a balance 
between practical occupations and the fact that '"[p]eople must be amuthed"' (HT 53-54). 
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Later he will explain to Gradgrind that there is "'a love in the world not all Thelf-interetht 
after all, but thomething very different,"' that '"hath a way of ith own"' and is '"hard to 
give a name to"' (HT 390). Sleary's philosophy, which opposes limiting codifications, is 
not only modeled, as Manning argues, upon "the fluidity of life itself' (142), but is also 
informed by a theory of habit. The story of Merrylegs's unflagging devotion to his master 
epitomizes the "'athtonithing"' power of habit to reinforce love. Mr Grad grind calls 
Merrylegs's devotion "instinct," but Sleary is unwilling to classify this mysterious 
combination of habit and love (HT 388). Providing a radical contrast to Coketown 's 
"unnatural family" (perpetually "shouldering, and trampling, and pressing one another to 
death" [HT 83]), the circus family is structured upon mutuality: "the father of one of the 
families was in the habit of balancing the father of another of the families on the top of a 
great pole" (HT 45; my italics). Circus life, the narrator declares, is founded upon "every-
day virtues" that stem from an "untiring readiness to help and pity one another" (HT 46). 
The Sleary or circus philosophy is an ethics of habitual sympathy.271 
Although Sleary articulates the counter-philosophy of habit to Gradgrind, Sissy 
Jupe embodies the philosophy. Unfathomable and disruptive, she baffles her would-be 
indoctrinators. In a Menippean conversation with Louisa (in the Hogarthian chapter, 
"Sissy's Progress"), Sissy is the agent of the text's most condemnatory satire on political 
economy. Her lesson to "Hard Fact men" (HT 340) begins with a Christianizing 
redefinition of the "first principle" of political economy in terms of Matthew 7:12: "'To 
do unto others as I would that they should do unto me"' (HT 73). Subversively, she 
renames "National Prosperity" "Natural Prosperity" (HT 74), implying that it is the 
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prosperity of the common citizen that measures the nation's prosperity. Her next blow to 
the "deadly statistical" basis of political economy is her insistence that the starving 
population "matter[s]" and that its suffering is not "nothing" (HT 127, 76). Gradgrind is 
correct that Sissy's "early life" is "unfavourable" (HT 121) to her acceptance of 
Utilitarian precepts, for her intelligence, imagination, and "multitude of emotions" (HT 
137) are immovable. Her character signifies the rare paradox of healthy and anti-
mechanical habit. Just as she asks for her father's letters "over and over again," so she 
vows that she will always try to be closer to Louisa: "'I will never tire of trying'" (HT 82, 
299). Not only does Sissy win Louisa with her "sympathetic hand" (HT 299), but 
heroically (in the fairy-tale role of Louisa's knightly saviour), she "vanquishe[s]" habitual 
cynicism incarnate "at all points" (HT 312), in the form of James Harthouse, Esquire. 272 
Like the satire itself, she functions through her habit of "truthfulness" (HT 307) to make 
villainy ("the very Devil") "ridiculous" (HT 239). Counteracting Coketown's mechanistic 
keynote, Sissy - Cecilia is the patron saint of musicians - strikes the vital note of clear-
sighted humanizing habit. 
As an agent of sympathetic imagination, truth, and satire, Sissy also symbolizes 
an ideal of reparative communication between the classes. In her empathetic habits, she 
not only "tr[ies] hard to know her humbler fellow-creatures," but she also manages to 
"modifty] by daily associations" the Gradgrind system, creating "some change" (HT 397, 
297, 298). Sissy's character is a metaphor for a paradoxically fluid, imaginative, and 
benevolent form of habit. She demonstrates an alternative application of association 
theory that is, as in Silas Marner, socially ameliorative. In her active sympathy for 
259 
Stephen and Rachael, and her astute observation of Tom's middle-class culpability, she 
demonstrates enlightened interclass communication. With habitual resilience, Sissy 
attempts to subvert mechanizing routine: 
Day and night again, day and night again. No Stephen Blackpool. Where 
was the man, and why did he not come back? Every night, Sissy went to 
Rachael's lodging, and sat with her in her small neat room. All day, 
Rachael toiled as such people must toil, whatever their anxieties. The 
smoke-serpents were indifferent who was lost or found, who turned out 
bad or good; the melancholy mad elephants, like the Hard Fact men, 
abated nothing of their set routine, whatever happened. Day and night 
again, day and night again. The monotony was unbroken. Even Stephen 
Blackpool's disappearance was falling into the general way, and becoming 
as monotonous a wonder as any piece of machinery in Coketown. (HT 
340) 
Sissy's methodical consolation of Rachael is presented as a singularly healthy routine. 
The rhetoric of repetition that typifies the text is abundantly evident in this passage. 
Reduplication of "day and night again" naturalizes the force of habit in terms of the 
rhythms of the earth; yet not only are the text's keynote images for unnatural habit 
present in this passage ("melancholy mad elephants" and "smoke serpents"), the text's 
resonant lexicon of habit is also present- "routine," "monotony," and "machinery." 273 
Demonstrating another of the text's satirical practices, Tom's recurring guilty thought, 
"where was the man?," is diaJogically imported into the narrator's voice. As well, the 
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theme of habitual indifference and apathy (antonyms of wonder) is reinforced by the 
declaration that Stephen's disappearance has become a "monotonous wonder," further 
revealing the inhumanity of the "general way." Also, the "smoke-serpents," "indifferent" 
to who "turned out bad or good," are symptomatic of the cultural decay of interest in 
morally enriching stories, a regression that is accompanied by a loss of sympathy and 
imagination. This paragraph exemplifies the multivalent forms of repetition that 
characterize Dickens's extreme exposition. Sustained thematic, imagistic, and linguistic 
repetitions function rhetorica11y to re-induct the reader to the Sleary Philosophy, rather 
than to implicate the narrative in a complicit use of Utilitarian methodology (as some 
critics have argued).274 The satire's main rhetorical strategy, echoing Sissy's strength, is 
to harness the power of habit. In the same way that Louisa's discontented repetition of the 
question "'What does it matter?"' strikes "some little discord on [Gradgrind's] ear" (HT 
134), the persistent repetitions of the narrative serve to disrupt Utilitarian indoctrination 
by dissonantly reinforcing the association by similarity that characterizes imaginative 
narrative in general. 
Hard Times consistently suggests flexible, imaginative mental associations 
through fairy-tale language and stories. Circus members ritualistically celebrate an un-
Benthamite quality of wonder though their love of the very narratives that Gradgrind 
denounces as "'imaginative sentimental humbug"' (HT 42). From their mythically named 
tavern, the Pegasus Arms, to fairy-tale pantomimes, their lives reveal a communal 
practice of imaginative association. Sissy, a lover of "childish lore," is in the "habit" of 
reading Arabian Nights to her father (HT 63). Revealingly, the narrator also demonstrates 
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allegiance to the party of lore-lovers by excoriating Utilitarian wickedness in fairy-tale 
terms. The factory contains malevolent "Fairy palaces" (HT 84); Utilitarianism is a 
"monster in a lecturing castle, with Heaven knows how many heads manipulated into 
one" (HT 11 ), and Gradgrind is likened to Bluebeard; Mrs Sparsit is (as one of her evil 
incarnations) a "Bank Dragon" (HT 149); and Bounderby's coarse anti-aestheticism is 
summarized by his similarity to a commercial Aphrodite "who had risen out of the mud 
instead of the sea" (HT 327). Implicitly, the Utilitarian reformers (infantilized for their 
ignorant philosophies) are collectively likened to Little Red Riding Hood: 
Utilitarian economists, skeletons of schoolmasters, Commissioners of 
Fact, genteel and used-up infidels, gabblers of many little dog's-eared 
creeds, the poor you will have always with you. Cultivate in them, while 
there is yet time, the utmost graces of the fancies and affections, ... 
or ... [r]eality will take a wolfish tum, and make an end of you." (HT2l6) 
This angry warning echoes the psychological assessment of Louisa's habituation to 
selfishness and nihilistic apathy: "All closely imprisoned forces rend and destroy" (HT 
298). Louisa's request that her father nurture the "immaterial part of [her] life" (HT 288), 
which has been starved of narrative sustenance, parallels Hard Times's version of the 
Carlylean injunction to "close thy Byron; open thy Goethe" (SR 143): close thy Euclid; 
open thy Defoe.275 Significantly, the individual and cultural need to "habitually wonder" 
(SR 52) is evidenced by the working populace's persistent attraction to imaginative works 
- especially subversively parodic and satiric forms. Yet laughter, as Sissy Jupe's 
quipping and significantly absent father laments, is diminishing in his audiences. 
Similarly, the narrative associations that oppose mechanicality in Hard Times are 
persevering but not predominant. 
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Despite the attempts of Sissy and the narrator to counteract bad habit with good, a 
Juvenalian pessimism prevails in the satire about the inevitable ruin of Coketown, of 
London, and even of the British empire. Ultimately, Sissy's indefatigable goodness does 
not eradicate the material habits that make Coketown a "town of machinery" (HT 28). 
Unpolluted nature, for example, survives in a small portion of land outside Coketown; 
however, even this fragment of land is infiltrated by treacherous coal pits. Furthermore, 
Tom, in his defeat, is an atypical representative of his fellow rose-destroying, self-
interested Smilesean men habitually "at work on number one" (HT 81 ). The "honourable 
gentlemen" - like James Harthouse, ultimately not morally reclaimed by Sissy - who 
remain in Parliament, victoriously laughing at train accidents (and likely the mill 
accidents too), are more representative. As well, Stephen Blackpool (his name alludes to 
the 'first' Christian martyr) is depicted as a moral rarity- although even he finds that 
circumstances alter "his character for the worse every day" (HT I 08). Ultimately, 
regardless of Stephen's loyal participation in the cult of self-discipline, culturally 
ascendant habits of self-interest reduce him to a "poor, crushed, human creature" (HT 
361). Significantly, the human circle that unites in a futile attempt to rescue him, like the 
fringe-dwelling Circus community, appears miniscule and precarious next to the giant 
forces of political and economic coercion. Finally, although her heroic appearances 
punctuate the narrative, and she provides a kind of anti-mechanical dea ex machina to 
cure Grad grind, Sissy is absent for the bulk of the narrative. Throughout Hard Times, 
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examples of the defeat of good habit, like the forceful thoughts of Bounderby, 
"accumulate[ e] with turning like a great snowball" (HT 391 ), overwhelming the instances 
of defeated mechanical habit. 
The narrator's effort to revive wonder seems doomed, for wonder is repeatedly 
personified as a dying creature. Fancy, defeated by "somethingological" forces, is 
depicted as "struggling on in convulsions," "strangled in his cradle" or "hiding in solitary 
places" like a "banished creature" (HT 23, 32, 175, 76). Like Mrs Gradgrind herself, 
"propped up, from mere habit, on a couch" (HT 263), wonder is in a chronic state of 
decline. Ultimately, it is likened to Mrs Gradgrind's "feeble" voice, which echoes faintly 
as if from the bottom of a well when she is "nearer Truth than she ever had been" (HT 
264). Her weak utterance of an indecipherable but transcendent principle implies there is 
scant hope for altruistic, imaginative habits. The hexis of the narrative itself, with its 
combination of rage and elegiac pessimism, is well-summarized by Leavis: "No simple 
formula can take account of the various elements in the whole effect, a sardonic-tragic in 
which satire consorts with pathos" (242). Leavis' s final assessment of the novel could be 
a definition of Dickens's reformulation of Juvenalian satire. Certainly, Hard Times closes 
with a slew of rhetorical questions - a tactic that Juvenal favoured to convey his near-
incredulous horror at the pervasiveness of corruption. The narrator wonders about 
England's future, what "things shall be or not" (HT 398), and in doing so, considers the 
respective fates of key Menippean characters. As Harold Bloom suggests, the novel's 
final words, "to see the ashes of our fires tum grey and cold" (HT 398), affirm the text's 
ultimate negativity - though, for Bloom, the "horror" of Hard Times lies in its 
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psychological implications and not in its satiric "social vision" (10). The final image of 
ashes, however, recalling hellish soot-blackened Coketown, confirms that the textual 
constitution of Juvenalian trenchancy presides over the narrative embodiments of 
sympathetic (or Horatian) habit.276 
4.vii "Bitterly satirical truth": Disabling Habits of Perception in Bleak 
House 
Immediately preceding Hard Times, Bleak House (l 852-53) is less concentrated 
in its Menippean elements. Rather than attacking the contradictions of Utilitarian 
philosophy, it focuses on the links between institutional and bureaucratic ineptitude and 
the psychology of the individual. Anticipating the "muddle" of Hard Times, the majority 
of Bleak House's characters suffer from the habitual inability to perceive clearly. For 
Dickens, viewing the world myopically is an aberrant perceptual habit - a form of 
blindness engendered by malfunctioning social-political institutions whose unjust 
ideologies co-opt the individual.277 Just as the machine is Hard Times's enveloping 
emblem for destructive habit, in Bleak House, illness (of mind and body) is the 
foundational metaphor for disabling habits. Blindness and darkness are used as metaphors 
for institutionalized impercipience; fittingly, an elaborate ocular symbology of mental 
myopia suffuses the text. Those who are connected with Chancery, the Gorgon's head of 
the British judicial system, gaze ritualistically at one object of study and assume a 
paralytic state of moral insanity. In addition, a motif of caged birds emphasizes the 
carceral effect of the social medium upon the individual mind. A character's fixated and 
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feverish gazes reveal her or his degree of induction into the caged-bird psychosis 
(frequently some variety of materialistic addiction). Forecasting Hard Times's Juvenalian 
satire, the Horatian habits of duty and empathy that are embodied in Esther Summerson's 
autobiography are severely undermined in the face of unalterable habit. Ultimately, her 
character does not straightforwardly provide an example of the potential victory of 
healthy habit. In a culture catastrophically occluded by perceptual disabilities, the feat of 
changing destructive habit is nearly impossible. Perhaps more disturbingly, sympathetic 
habit is equally unmanageable and damaging to personal happiness. 
Much has been written about the fervent topicality of the novel. John Butt and 
Kathleen Tillotson investigate the text's expansive engagement with contemporary 
abuses in politics, law, and social welfare; they declare Bleak House to be a "fable for 
1852" (108) - a fable that does not significantly distort the facts of reform issues 
discussed in The Times (123). Butt and Tillotson view the novel as a kind of anti-Great 
Exhibition, a notion inspired by Dickens's "Last Words of the Old Year" (Household 
Words, 1851 ), in which he asserts (revealing his preoccupation with perception) the need 
for an alternative spectacle "of England's sins and negligences, to be, by steady 
contemplation of all eyes, and steady union of all hearts and hands, set right" (110).278 
Furthering the generic truism that satire drags the real world into art, Susan Shatto, in her 
Companion to "Bleak House," resorts to using a chart in order to describe the complex 
topicality of the text. From the personal satire directed against philanthropist Caroline 
Chisholm (Mrs Jellyby) and artist Leigh Hunt (Harold Skimpole ), to the reformist anger 
directed at inept sanitary systems, an inert legal system, and electoral and Parliamentary 
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corruption, Bleak House is saturated with topical allusion (Shatto 1-4), centred 
particularly on the ills of London.279 Dickens, like Juvenal, attacks the corruption that is 
evident everywhere in crowded, Rome-like London. 
Bleak House satirizes the distorted perceptions of social reality that inscribe 
London's institutions in the same manner that grooves of habit impress upon the brain. 
Tangible results of the diseased minds and morality of the ruling classes are evinced by 
what John Jarndyce describes as the "'Great Seal's impressions .... all over England,"' 
referring to the fact that his great uncle's property in London (now the ruin that is Tom-
all-Alones) and the country estate, Bleak House, are '"stamped with the same seal'" (BH 
110). In Bleak House, thoughtless routine characterizes all realms of power - aristocratic, 
political, and legal. Chesney Wold and Chancery are both depicted (in refrain) as places 
of languid repose and restless, unprogressive repetition.280 Lady Dedlock, with her 
"habitual air of proud indifference" (BH 536), and Tulkinghorn, with his unremitting 
mechanical reserve, engage customarily in a cat-and-mouse game of reticence; this 
pastime is described in appropriately anaphoric sentences beginning with "Every day" 
(BH 175) or "Daily" (BH 595). The "Dedlock mind" (of which Sir Leicester is the 
mouthpiece) daydreams of "Merry Old England" and lives in perpetual and passive fear 
of middle-class (or worse) threats to the framework of society. The Carly lean third-
person narrator labels this ruling delusion "Dandyism," which, in its customary blindness 
to all but fine surfaces, "would make the Vulgar very picturesque and faithful, by putting 
back the hands upon the Clock of Time" and serve to "put a smooth glaze on the world, 
and to keep down all its realities" (BH 173).281 The impassive Dedlock set, including 
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parliamentary luminaries (as predictable and linear as the alphabet) such as Lord Boodle, 
Coodle, and Doodle, and William Buffy, M. P. Cuffy, and Duffy, are, like all monologic 
forms, careful not to "receive any impress from the moving age" (BH 173). Constrained 
by hierarchic notions and practices, the controlling corporate mind of England is depicted 
as being suspended in a necromantic circle (BH 1 7 4 ). The judicial system is 
conspiratorially habituated to the circularity and stasis of unproductive routine: 
The one great principle of the English law is, to make business for itself. 
There is no other principle distinctly, certainly, and consistently 
maintained through all its narrow turnings. Viewed by this light it 
becomes a coherent scheme, and not the monstrous maze the laity are apt 
to think it. (BH 573) 
Self-interested institutions, satirized for being self-conscious "circumlocutory agencies" 
(D. A. Miller 143), create and maintain an incessantly self-consuming society through 
their "narrow turnings." 
"Smouldering combustion" (BH 583) describes the perennial state of all hermetic 
institutions, for there is a similarly suffocating "want of air" in Chesney Wold, Chancery, 
and the slum district Tom-all-Alone's. As Krook (a Bakhtinian, honorary Lord 
Chancellor) insists, participation in the Jarndyce and Jarndyce suit - and, by implication, 
the society it represents - guarantees incremental decline, like "being drowned by drops; 
it's going mad by grains" (BH 65). The narrator pronounces Krook's spontaneous 
combustion to have been inevitable: "inborn, inbred, engendered" in the closed system of 
"the corrupted humours of the vicious body itself' (BH 4 79). With his "intemperate 
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habits" (BH 480) of gin consumption, Krook, a character that Frye would term a "pure 
humor" ("Dickens" 56), expresses in microcosm the destructive habits of the social mind 
and body politic of England. This is "baldly asserted" (Daleski 176) in the narrator's 
irreverent claim that Krook "has died the death of all Lord Chancellors in all Courts, and 
of all authorities in all places under all names soever, where false pretences are made, and 
where injustice is done. Call the death by any name Your Highness will" (BH 4 79). 
Krook, in his retributive anatomization, is the text's centripetal figure for bad habits. 
Bleak House's depiction of an entropic culture consumed by habit corroborates Vrettos's 
observation that Victorian "[t]heories of habit conceptualized the mind as a closed system 
driven to repetitive, automatic behaviors in order to conserve energy" (400). England's 
imprudent central institutions are depicted as having over-conserved their energy; 
consequently, they have disabled and shut down the nation. Thus, atrophy, suffocation, 
and subsequent combustion are Bleak House's apocalyptic answer to "the Condition of 
England Question." Krook's death is a comprehensive Juvenalian exemplum of Britain's 
infrastructures, which, though variously figured as enclosures such as mazes and circles, 
are rendered conspicuously horrific when depicted as an incurable perversion of the 
nervous and circulatory systems of the human mind and body. 
4.viii Habit as Illness: Mental, Physical, and Moral 
The psychology of habit is critiqued in Bleak House through dominant metaphors 
of physical and mental illness.282 Mental physiology's conception of the brain's neural 
paths imprinted by habit is echoed by the narrator's prediction that "not a drop of Tom's 
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corrupted blood but propagates infection and contagion somewhere," and that it will 
"work its retribution, through every order of society ... to the highest of the high" (BH 
654-57) via the "pestilential" channels in the slums. In this prophesy, bloodstreams, 
blood-lines, and grooves of thought are ominously analogous. The pathways of the ruling 
apparatus, traversed in corrupted institutions, inveterately transmit diseased mind-states 
to all necessarily associated social levels. Furthermore, as Graham Benton suggests, the 
text's dominant present-tense narration (Esther Summerson' s narrative is only partially in 
the past tense) emulates syntactically the suspension of time that a person experiences 
when sick (75); thus, the use in both narratives of the historic present reinforces the 
theme of paralyzing habit. Esther feels estranged from her life during her illness, not due 
to the "effect of time, so much as of the change in all [her] habits" (BH513). 
Convalescing, Esther expresses a habit-disrupting thought: '"I had never known before 
how short life really was, and into how small a space the mind could put it"' (BH 513). 
Esther's revelation about the de-vitalizing and numbing effects of habit applies not only 
to her own life, but also to her country's political and legal habit (akin to Mr Podsnap's 
mortality-rate-denying arm flourishes in Our Mutual Friend) of dismissing human life 
from consideration. 
Deservedly, the double narrative structure of Bleak House has received much 
critical attention.283 Lyn Pykett effectively explains its key function, arguing that Bleak 
House's social criticism functions by structurally defamiliarizing the "world of habit," 
forcing the reader to participate in the perceptual shifts between two narrators ( 131 ). 
Fittingly, the narrators represent extremes of visual and mental perception. The 
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omniscient narrator is capable of mythic flight from one social world to another (from 
aristocratic parkland retreats to maggot-infested slums), and observes both unflinchingly. 
Surprisingly, Esther's earthly and subjective observations (often of people's eyes and 
gazes) serve to corroborate this authoritative account of universal mental malady. For 
example, she predicts Richard Carstone's decline by noting how his eyes, like those of 
Miss Flite, have a "clouded, eager, seeking look" (BH 548); she perceives that Hortense 
has "too-eager eyes" (BH 338) that always look sideways with jealous alertness. 
Allusions to aberrant gazes or obstructed vision permeate Bleak House, as both narrators 
(engaged in directing the gaze and responses of their readers) take particular note of the 
perceptual follies of their characters and critically assess the information contained in 
eyes and eye contact. The text aligns with Locke's view that, "Perception is the first 
Operation of all our intellectual Faculties, and the inlet of all Knowledge into our Minds" 
( 149); its ocular emphasis signals diseased perception to be the overarching illness of 
humanity in general. 
Given that Dickens observed the principles of phrenology to be more or less true 
(Kaplan 69), the phrenological notion (held by John Caspar Lavater) that "the intellectual 
life has the eye for its centre" (Taylor and Shuttleworth 8) resonates in Dickens's 
novelistic psychology- in Hard Times, for example, Louisa's seduction is "plain to the 
dark eyes of [Mrs Sparsit's] mind" (HT 279). In Bleak House, the omniscient narrator's 
observation that Mrs Snagsby's gaze "enters at [Mr Snagsby's] eyes, the windows of his 
soul" (BH 382), is comically truthful. As well, the eye is a "key organ of transmission" 
for the "visual ray" of mesmeric influence (Kaplan 128). Fred Kaplan compellingly 
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tracks the language of mesmeric attraction in descriptions of the Jarndyce and Jarndyce 
case; it entrances people and "[d]raw[s] peace out of them. Sense out of them" (BH 523). 
Appropriately, the monstrous legal case is personified as a Gorgon whose eye in the head 
of Chancery casts a daemonic gaze on its victims. Miss Flite knows that she is "drawn" 
against her full consent to "look at the Monster" (BH 523). The case is described as 
contaminating Richard's blood and causing "objects [to] lose their natural aspects in his 
sight" (BH 517) - including his love for Ada and his guardian, John Jarndyce. Dickens 
frequently employs the language of mesmerism to suggest the unconscious, almost 
somnambulistic operations of habit. Just as hypnotic repetition immobilizes thought and 
suspends perception, the habit of hoping for justice is the source of Chancery's mesmeric 
power. 
Connected to the case or not, most characters in Bleak House are transfixed by a 
single object. Tony Weevle observes Krook's obsessive behaviour: '"It's a monomania 
with him, to think he is possessed of documents'" (BH 475). Mr Smallweed's "secretly 
glistening eye" (BH 488) glows with a lust for money, as do all of his "phrenological 
attributes" (BH 307). Mr Tulkinghom is preoccupied by the wills upon which he secretly 
meditates; Mrs Jellyby, whose myopia is paradoxically "telescopic," has a "curious 
habit" (BH 4 7) of fixating on a mental picture of Africa and not on her children. Vholes, 
Snagsby, and Guppy, all affiliated with the law, are blinded by the "distrustful eye of 
business" (BH 576). Monomaniacal habits are detectable in Sir Leicester as he fusses 
abstractedly with his double eye-glass (a symptom of habitual self-involvement), as do 
other bespectacled personages such as Conversation Kenge and the Lord Chancellor 
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himself. Harold Skimpole's childishness is, like the old man in "A Curious Dance Round 
a Curious Tree," "so dreadfully-unchildlike" ("Curious" 325). His commitment to 
irresponsibility blinds him to a moral life, much like the text's other flagrant dandy, Mr 
Turveydrop (whose "puffed-out eyes," Esther observes, reflect his "absorbing 
selfishness" [BH209]). Most characters, excepting those with "bright" eyes (such as 
George Rouncewell, John Jamdyce, and Mrs Bagnet), are stuck in the murky perceptions 
of excessive subjectivity. Their eyes and gazes reveal their perception of a singular, 
solipsistic reality. Habitual selfishness, resulting in perceptual and moral opacity, is a 
near-universal condition in Bleak House. 284 
Metaphors of blindness and darkness permeate the novel, augmenting its visual 
focus. Jarndyce's description ofTom-all-Alone's as "'a street of perishing blind houses, 
with their eyes stoned out"' (BH 109) mirrors this condition. The omniscient narrator, in 
an initial survey of London (in which mud and fog make everything indistinguishable), 
notes that "the death of the sun" (BH 11) is a plausible fancy. In keeping with the theme 
of poor visibility, a series of dark plates literally darken the published text.285 Chancery's 
courtroom is dimly lit with wasting candles and stained-glass windows that "admit no 
light of day" (BH 12) (like Coketown's sooty windows that keep "sun eternally in eclipse 
though a medium of smoked glass" [HT219]), and the High Chancellor peers into an 
unlit lantern. Even spiritual light is out of bounds in this hellish underworld, in which 
Reverend Chadband, with his "pulpit habit" (BH 3 78), blocks the light of divine truth 
from Jo, and St. Paul's is "the crowning confusion of the great, confused city" (BH 290). 
Inescapable darkness is an appropriate analogue to the habitual obstructionism of British 
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jurisprudence. Just as the human eye adjusts to a lack of light, the citizens of London are 
habituated to corrupt political, economic, legal, and ecclesiastical practices. 
4.ix The Caged-Bird Phenomenon and the Problem of the Human Will 
Stuck in what the narrator of Little Dorr it calls the "prison of this lower world" 
(102), individuals in Bleak House are circumscribed materially and perceptually by 
political and legal systems.286 One key motif for characters thoroughly entrapped in the 
morally blinding customs of the nation is that of a caged bird. Appropriately, given that 
birds in Egyptian and Christian mythologies symbolize the human soul, and that until the 
late nineteenth-century, psychology was closely associated with discourses of the soul 
(Rylance 24), a caged bird epitomizes the idea of humanity's spiritual and/or mental 
aspect cruelly restricted by its material conditions. The first notable appearance of this 
motif is Miss Flite's bird collection. Each bird has a name (appropriately, one is named 
Madness) and only sings when exposed to light. In an especially resonant gesture, when 
the case ends the birds are set free. Aptly, all lawyers are "dingy London bird[s]" (BH 
611) who nest in documents. Vholes is a "bird of ill-omen" (BH 643); Tulkinghorn is 
"like a larger species of rook" (BH 175). "[L]ike a hideous bird of prey" (BH 489), Mr 
Smallweed entraps George with money; Rosa, who does not benefit from Lady 
Dedlock's attention, is her little "bird" (BH 414). The previous John Jarndyce "blew his 
brains out" sitting in a chair that looks to Esther like "a great bird-cage" (BH 78). 
Repeatedly, bird-cages and caged birds in Bleak House signify the mental habits that 
accompany social strictures. 
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Demonstrating Dickens's habit of maximizing metaphor, the Dedlock family, 
under the spell of class ideology, are not even live birds, but rather "a large collection, 
glassy eyed, set up in the most approved manner on their various twigs and perches, very 
correct, perfectly free from animation, and always in glass cases" (BH 559). Fittingly, the 
mercurial satirist and liberal aristocrat, Boythorn, does not cage his pet canary but lets 
him perch on his head. Finally, as if to summarize the bird motif, a bird looms 
emblematically over Jo's head in the illustration "Jo, the Crossing-Sweeper," signaling 
his social entrapment and vulnerable "mental condition" (BH 236). When stricken with 
fever, Jo holds his hat as if it were a mangy bird that he plucks to eat raw. The mangy, 
bird-like Jo, himself consumed by social forces, claims that he "'don't know nothink"' 
(BH 235); yet, being one of the few characters in the novel who is morally intact, he 
manages to be clear-sighted about who is good to him and who is not. Nonetheless, after 
having been relentlessly persecuted, his will is finally broken like a cart "shaken all to 
pieces" (BH 677). He cannot overcome the chronic mental and bodily state that society 
has manufactured for him; nor can the multitudes of the dispossessed, whom the narrator 
didactically asserts are "dying thus around us, every day" (BH 677). The caged-bird 
epidemic is a habit-based disease that physically and mentally disables and de-animates 
all social levels, from paupers to aristocrats.287 
4.x Esther's Problematic Horatian Habits 
Armed with her "noticing way" (BH 24), Esther Summerson is not only immune 
to the materialistic attractions of Chancery, but exhibits the superior mental and moral 
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perspicacity of a satirist.288 Repeatedly, Esther's judgments - for example, her 
inadvertently sardonic and scathing catalogue of old Mr Turveydrop's artificialities -
harmonize with the satiric evaluations of the omniscient narrator. But, because of her 
contrastingly autobiographical, conciliatory, and consistently sympathetic viewpoint, 
Esther's narrative could be described as being Horatian. 289 The conversational Horatian 
"sermo" (Rimell 86) is a moderate, colloquial, and even equivocal register compatible 
with Esther's narratorial voice, contrasting with the emphatic, grandiloquent, and 
condemning third-person narration - what Welsh terms the "satirical overvoice" 
(Redressed 126). Given her steadfast perception of light (symbolic of intellectual and 
moral clarity) in the darkened settings of the novel, it is tempting to view Esther as the 
text's Horatian locus of humanitarian hope. Esther is, for example, happy to leave the 
metropolis which she associates with darkness - the site of Juvenalian satire - to follow 
the light that she associates with John Jarndyce: "all this happiness shone like a light, 
from one central figure" (BH 638); she sees the windows of his country estate "sparkling 
on the top of a hill," "beaming brightly" (BH 75). Noticing how light hurts Richard's 
eyes, she predicts his decline, but when he is morally redeemed at his death-bed, she 
observes a "light in his eyes" (BH 857, 904). In her sympathy for Ada and others, Esther 
catches glimpses of the "clear light of integrity and love" (BH 869) in the moral darkness 
of her surroundings. She herself, as her surname implies, reminds others of "sunshine and 
summer air" (BH 448). D. A. Miller finds in Esther's "absolute refusal to be touched by 
the suit," "another line of attack" on Chancery (along with the "Detective Police)" 
(l 34).290 Miller envisions Esther, not as a genial satirist who is self-inclusive (to a fault) 
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in her observations of human fallibility, but the locus of a non-socially critical, domestic 
safe-haven.291 Welsh, however, does posit a generic interpretation of the two narrators. 
He identifies Esther's autobiographical narrative as both the "affective center of the 
novel," and also the generic site of a new comedic mode (Redressed 124 ). Contrastingly, 
the "primarily visual ... impersonal present-tense narrative" is timeless and satiric; thus, 
formally, the novel is structured by "a generic division between comedic and satiric 
modes" (Welsh, Redressed 26-27, 133). Ultimately, however, Welsh diminishes the 
satiric authority of both Esther and the omniscient narrator, finding that in the final 
chapters, "the satirical present-tense voice relents and relinquishes its authority to 
comedy" (127).292 Arguably, when considered within the text's discourses of habit, 
Esther's character and her narrative (if not her moral observations) confirm the 
predominance of the text's Juvenalian psychological, social, and moral pessimism. 
In Bleak House, the rarity of an individual's self-willed escape from the (internal 
and external) forces of automatization is illustrated primarily by Esther's narrative. 
Esther's own view of habit is reminiscent of William B. Carpenter's; for example, 
idealist notions of volition are reflected in her response to John Jamdyce' s assessment of 
Richard's "indecision of character" (BH 180).293 Richard's lack of self-directing will is 
interpreted by Jamdyce as having originated in the impressions of Chancery that branded 
him in his boyhood and "'engendered or confirmed in him a habit of putting off" (BH 
180). (Jamdyce insists that the character of "much older and steadier people may be even 
changed by the circumstances surrounding them" [BH 180].) Esther, who believes in the 
efficacy of a well-trained will, thinks that Richard's bad habit could have been changed: 
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"I felt this to be true; though, if I may venture to mention what I thought besides, I 
thought it much to be regretted that Richard's education had not counteracted those 
influences, or directed his character" (BH 180). In Esther's view, it is not surprising that 
Richard, untutored as he is in "habits of application and concentration" (BH 244), is 
unable to re-channel his misdirected constancy into productive work. Instead, Richard 
detests the notion of steady application: "'it's monotonous, and to-day is too like 
yesterday, and to-morrow is too like to-day'" (BH248). Esther's response to Richard's 
horror of routine further reveals her religion of habit: '"But I am afraid,' said I, 'this is an 
objection to all kinds of application - to life itself" (BH 249). For Esther, productive 
habits are fundamental to life and virtue. This doctrine, compatible with Aristotelean and 
Victorian mental physiology, is expressed in her '"quiet habit of method and usefulness'" 
(BH86). 
Routinely, Esther attempts to be rid of her old sense of being unlovable and sinful 
by conditioning her mind to re-encode these "shadowy speculations" (BH 95) with a 
productive script of "duties and accountabilities" (BH 83). Repeatedly, she commands 
herself, "'Esther! Duty, my dear!"' (BH 95). This injunction stems, in her own 
estimation, from her individual will and her "childish prayer" to "be industrious" and, if 
possible, to "win some love" (BH 520). Yet in her sympathetic and dutiful good will 
towards others -Richard and Ada, the brick-makers' wives, Charley, Jo, Caddy, and 
Peepy - she habitually obviates her own troubles. Gradually, her "childish prayer" warps 
into a dogmatic gendered mandate of self-sacrificing sympathy and dutifulness. It 
becomes a version of Mrs Rachel's puritanical pronouncement of the need to counter 
278 
sinfulness with a woman's only tools: "Submission, self-denial, diligent work" (BH26). 
As Janet Larson suggests, Esther's faith in redemption through duty and love is a way of 
using religion to "authorize her mechanisms of evasion" (110). Throughout her narrative, 
Esther follows Carpenter's edict to "divert the current of [her] thought and feeling from a 
morbid into a healthful channel" (674). For example, when Lady Dedlock's name is 
mentioned, Esther practices conscious thought-control: '"I mentally counted, repeated 
something that I knew, or went out of the room"' (BH 618). As a result of her mental 
drills, Esther fluctuates between clear-sightedness and a myopic fixation on her house 
keys. 
The productive habits that Esther has acquired do not fully erase her inscribed 
guilt - having been indoctrinated by Puritan notions of essential female sin. Old 
associations of her birth with sinfulness are inexpiable and linked to her "old face" and 
"old self' (BH 639, 653). Ironically, this self, which she envisions as being dead, is also 
the vital and desiring self. Standing before her looking glass after Jarndyce's proposal, 
she considers "how often had I considered within myself that the deep traces of my 
illness, and the circumstances of my birth, were only new reasons why I should be busy, 
busy, busy - useful, amiable, serviceable" (BH 640). Her temporary blindness from 
smallpox is symbolic (as is her habit of hiding her face) of her trained self-effacement. 
Habituated to her fairy-tale identity of the "methodical, old-maidish" (BH 105) Dame 
Durden, she suppresses an authentic and spontaneous self; but, just as Esther "can't be 
kept out" (BH 126) of her own autobiography - for writing is an expression of agency -
she cannot prevent Allan Woodcourt (who represents her deeper desires) from entering 
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her thoughts and narrative. No matter how often she asserts that she has "nothing to 
regret or to desire" (BH 868), still her desiring, guilt-ridden self, analogous to (but more 
permanent than) the "deep traces" left by her illness, remains to be detected by the reader, 
and fleetingly by Esther herself. Esther is able to ignore the "first wild thought" (BH 869) 
of accepting W oodcourt' s proposal only because - reflecting Lewes' s proposition that the 
mind is like a palimpsest - she has written over her authentic, willful self.294 
Esther's self-habituation to virtuous duty and her enduring guilt both serve to 
dramatize William James's reaffirmation of nineteenth-century psychology's consensus 
regarding the difficulty of altering nerve channels in the brain: "that nerve-currents 
propagate themselves easiest through those tracts of conduction which have been already 
most in use" (Principles 531) - routes that Alexander Bain terms "preference track[ s ]" 
(Mind 117). By training her thoughts to follow a "preference track" of duty, Esther 
bypasses the channels of thought traversed by her perspicacious self - which had already 
been inducted into a narrative of female guilt and self-immolation. Virtuous mental 
myopia is expressed most acutely when, as Mrs Woodcourt, she maintains her habitual 
relationship with Jamdyce: "I have never lost my old names, nor has he lost his; nor do I 
ever, when he is with us, sit in any other place than in my old chair at his side. Dame 
Trot, Dame Durden, Little Woman! - all just the same as ever; and I answer, Yes, dear 
guardian! - just the same" (BH913). Patricia Ingham classifies Esther as one of 
Dickens's "nubile" or de sexualized girls, who provides an "unsullied page" for the author 
to as a medium for the transmission of gender ideologies (Dickens 3 7). She concedes, 
however, that Dickens's texts often suggest the "undesirable implications that underlie 
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his own sexist representations" (Ingham, Dickens 38). Arguably, through Bleak House's 
satire on habit, Dickens (in a move akin to unconscious cerebration) critiques Esther's 
(and his own) self-suppressing, automatizing ideal of productive femininity. Frye argues 
that Dickensian "norm-figures" such as Esther generally do not "appear in the ridiculous 
or self-binding role of the humor" ("Comedy" 70). Yet, by rejecting Esther's renunciation 
of W oodcourt, the narrative implicitly discounts Esther's doctrine of habit and the 
mechanicality of her female self-erasure. Fittingly, Esther is not exempt from association 
with the entrapped-bird motif, for she leaves Mrs Rachel's with her caged bird as her 
companion, symbolic both of the puritanical imprint of sinful womanhood and the 
trappings of habit. So thoroughly is she imprisoned by her mental habits that, despite 
urgings towards her truer impulses, she accepts Jamdyce's marriage proposal. It is only 
because Jamdyce, the novel's Horatian country-gentleman and "superior being" (BH 
913), overcomes the negative habit of his East wind syndrome and reverts to his 
temperate "bachelor habits" (BH 891 ), that Esther does not become a gendered caricature 
of moral mania perched on her usual chair in the cage of Bleak House. 
The relentless physicality of habit, as it is depicted in Bleak House, renders 
mental programming ominously obstructive to individual and social change. The novel's 
opening description of London's melancholy, ill-regulated populace slipping and sliding 
in post-deluvian levels of "ooze" and "mud" suggests the devolutionary failure of the 
English to find "regulated channels" (Eliot, Daniel Deronda 132) for habit.295 As well, 
the "muddle" of British culture is blatantly analogous to Krook's reduction to a "stagnant, 
sickening oil" and "hateful soot" (BH 476, 474). The social body and environment in 
281 
Bleak House are depicted as being "nervous throughout" (Van Ghent 132), but like the 
neural networks of a mind formed by habit, they are more grossly physical than 
metaphysical. Ultimately in Bleak House, a Juvenalian and apocalyptic position within 
competing mechanistic and metaphysical assumptions about the mind and will leaves less 
determining power for the will than for social forces. Narrative representations of the 
machinery of the mind seem to accord with Henry Maudsley' s philosophy of social 
determinism: "Lunatics and criminals are as much manufactured articles as are steam-
engines and calico printing machines" (Responsibility 28). 
In dialogue with Victorian debates about the physiological basis of the mind, 
Bleak House targets habit as the key mechanism circumscribing and anaesthetizing 
human identity. Steeped in political and social contemporaneity, the satiric novel exposes 
and denounces the demented ideologies and infrastructures which carve correspondingly 
pathological grooves in the individual mind. Influenced by associationist and 
physiological psychology, phrenology, and mesmerism, Dickens is skeptical about the 
regenerative powers of moral habit (in contrast to his asylum journalism); in Bleak House 
he postulates a state of near-universal psychiatric disability. The hopeful Horatian 
position of moderation and faith in the habit of sympathy is left, like the last words of 
Mrs Gradgrind, and like Esther Summerson's authentic self, trying unsuccessfully to be 
heard. England's "smouldering combustion" reveals a "bitterly satirical truth" (BH 20 I) 
about the implacability of habit, and the crass materiality of the human mind and its ready 
adaptability to an insane social world. 
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4.xi "The Roman yoke": Juvenalian Reflections on Habit in Our Mutual 
Friend 
Bleak House depicts madness as implacable habit; its critique of habit is 
ensconced in an overarching trope of illness that relies heavily on the ocular imagery of 
myopia, blindness, and darkness. In Our Mutual Friend, however, Dickens returns to 
Hard Times's explicit parallels between capitalist processes and the mechanizing 
tendencies of habit. But whereas Hard Times scrutinizes the various dehumanizing 
fictions of Utilitarianism with fable-like focus (London is an indirect target), Our Mutual 
Friend crowds its satiric canvas with the multitude of ways that the collective mental life 
and habits of Londoners (and the English generally) betray their ruling obsession: 
'"money, money, money, and what money can make of life!"'(OMF 460). The "depraved 
appetite" (OMF 654) for money is exposed to be a self- and society-consuming habit. 
Yet, importantly, Our Mutual Friend emphasizes that human beings are dehumanized not 
just by the desire for money, but all things that are thought about to the exclusion of all 
else. Monstrous Silas Wegg, murderous Bradley Headstone, and devilish Eugene 
Wrayburn are socially representative in being "chained heavily to" an overriding idea and 
exhibiting "ungovernable selfishness" ( OMF 709-11 ). As in Bleak House, Dickens's 
satire suggests that the human mind, in its neural proneness to "irresistible tricks of 
thought and act" (Lewes, PLM3 54), adapts readily to caricatural circumscription. In Our 
Mutual Friend, the English empire, like its Roman predecessor, is depicted as declining 
into corruption in the same way that "many a man lapses into many a condition, without 
perceiving the accumulative power of its separate circumstances" (OMF 379). Just as an 
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individual over-determined by habit loses command over her or his will, the nation loses 
its ability to self-govern. 
Our Mutual Friend contains Dickens's bleakest deployment of habit as a mode of 
characterization. Not surprisingly, the novel's contemporary critics tended to depreciate 
its characters as humours, caricatures, or, in Bagehot' s words, "monstrous exaggerations" 
(Collins 394). Henry James's condemnation in The Nation (21December1865) was 
famously wholesale: "every character put before us is a mere bundle of eccentricities, 
animated with no principle of human nature whatever" (Collins 470)- an echo of Paley's 
"bundle of habits." More unforgivably, in James's view, characters such as Eugene 
Wraybum and Bradley Headstone fail, not simply because they are the "the habitual 
improbable of Mr. Dickens," but because their stories centre upon "complete and 
unconscious subjection" to "elementary passions" (Collins 4 73). James insists that to 
explore successfully such profound subjects in fiction, an author must be a philosopher, 
and Dickens is "nothing of a philosopher." As a result, Our Mutual Friend is "infinitely 
depressing and unprofitable" (Collins 4 72-3). Essentially, James (like Bagehot, Whipple, 
and Lewes before him) denies simultaneously the intellectual and literary legitimacy of 
Dickens's satiric characterization, and Dickens's philosophy of habit as an all-powerful 
and "unconscious" "principle of human nature." As if to summarize James's resistance to 
Dickens's satiric project in Our Mutual Friend, Eugene Wraybum complains of the 
"'unlimited monotony of [his] fellow-creatures,"' who "'are so incessantly boring and 
buzzing at their one idea till Death comes upon them - that don't you think they overdo 
it?"'(OMF 145, 94).296 Just as Lewes's complaint that Dickens's characters are wooden is 
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an unwitting echo of the novelist's own satirical pronouncements concerning Mrs 
Podsnap (who is "like a rocking-horse" [OMF 10]) and Silas Wegg (who is "so wooden a 
man that he seemed to have taken his· wooden leg naturally"[OMF 46]), so James's claim 
that "one of the chief conditions of [Dickens's] genius is not to see beneath the surface of 
things" (Collins 4 72) absolutely misses the moral message of Our Mutual Friend: human 
beings lack psychological depth (or "moral being" [OMF 13]) once they have 
succumbed, through the mental mechanism of habit, to a materialistic and solipsistic 
"Social Voice." They become like Rogue Riderhood, who, in both his death-like and 
living state, is an anatomizable "lump of humanity," fit only to be hung like "mutton in a 
butcher's shop" (OMF 443-4). Despite his distinct social station as a "Waterside 
character," Riderhood's recurrent hypocritical cant about the "'sweat of an honest man's 
brow,"' (OMF 150, 144) and his predatory greed, represent all social levels (Rogue's 
fac;ade, like Bradley's, is merely less polished than that of a Veneering guest). Just as the 
Inspector's intimate knowledge of Gaffer's daily habits, right down to the characteristic 
way that he carried his rope, aids in the diagnosis of the cause of the waterman's death, 
Our Mutual Friend, an "infinitely depressing" exposition of English habits of life and 
mind, serves as a coroner's inquest into a dead civilization. 
Two of the central symbols for habits of mental and moral insolvency in Our 
Mutual Friend are food (or feasts) and mirrors (or reflections). Both arch-metaphors for 
destructive habit are also generic, taxonomic symbols for satire itself, recalling on the one 
hand Roman satire's "stuffing" (jarcimen) or lanx satura, and on the other, Swift's 
famous view of satire as a mirror: "wherein beholders do generally discover everybody's 
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face there, but his own" (1 ). Figuratively, food and the act of consumption are associated 
with such objects as money (targeted in Victorian psychology as being supremely 
dangerous), drugs, alcohol, and various other commodities, from fiction itself, furniture, 
and palatial residences, to dead bodies and live human beings. Furthermore, the text's 
rhetoric of generalized zeugma formally underlines the fact that humanity is absent in 
human beings, who have through habit become utterly predictable, interchangeable, 
replicable, and marketable. Grotesquely, English society is depicted as the colossal 
waste-product of "omnipresent cannibalism" (Stone 158) - signified by a series of 
Juvenalian satiric feasts, and also by the ever-present dust mounds containing the by-
products of consumption. Another of the text's main motifs for solipsistic English habits 
is that of reflective surfaces. Throughout the novel, surfaces - either human-made (shiny 
objects such as varnished furniture, mirrors, and windows) or natural (rivers, human 
eyes) - act as a matrix of personified mirrors depicting the product of, or process of, 
identity formation though habit. Our Mutual Friend's narrator-satirist (whose direct, 
trenchant voice rarely surfaces) is a near redundancy in a world where every reflected 
image is itself a satire of human vice and folly. Few of the text's "principals" escape an 
annihilating merger with their mirror image. Bella Wilfer manages to escape, but her 
victory requires not only sympathetic habit (and an element of free will), but also the aid 
of John Harmon's (ominously obsessive) moral ambition and Boffin's pantomimic satire 
of avarice. Bradley Headstone and Eugene Wraybum, both of whom are associated with 
the forceful current of the river, mirror one another in their incapacity for self-willed 
moral transformation. Their characters symbolize England's decline and fall into self-
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consumption and inanition. Furthermore, the moral energies of Juvenalian satire -
exemplified by Jenny Wren - are crippled in a nation beyond curative satire, doomed by 
habit, and, like Mr Doll's, "every day grew worse and worse" (OMF714). 
4.xii The Juvenalian Perspective: Feasts as Fasts 
H. M. Daleski suggests that "Dickens's major theme from Martin Chuzzlewit 
onwards is the corrupting power of wealth, and this theme is constantly developed and 
amplified until its conclusive statement in Our Mutual Friend' (14). Similarly, Peter 
Green identifies Juvenal's overarching concern to be the destructive power of money 
(24). Like Dickens, Juvenal aimed his satire at both aristocrats and the "get-rich-quick 
crowd" and was morally outraged at the governing elite's "abrogation of responsible 
behaviour" (Green 24). For Juvenal, Rome's political habit- successions of corrupt 
emperors who exploit rather than protect their citizenry - epitomizes the patron-client 
relationship in a materialistic society (Green 31 ). 297 The cultural crisis Juvenal describes, 
in which "genuine mutual relationship based on trust, obligation and service" (Green 32) 
is replaced by money-based relations, 298 complements the social milieu in Our Mutual 
Friend, in which Podsnappery (the social irresponsibility of the rich) and Weggery 
(fortune-hunting retainers) are omnipresent. The novel's ironic title alone satirizes 
chronic disingenuousness. Dickens shares with the Roman satirist a hatred of "pernicious 
Cash" (Juvenal l.113), an awareness that '"misery-making money"' (OMF 379) destroys 
human happiness, and the belief that "virtue" is the "one true nobility" (Juvenal 8.21-22). 
Bella Wilfer turns out to be "'true golden gold at heart"' ( OMF 772); Lizzie Hexam, 
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who, in her low social station, is deemed "worthless" by her brother, is, in terms of 
virtue, the novel's richest character. Explicitly, through the constant intertextual presence 
of Edward Gibbon's The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-
1788), the novel promotes a return to the lessons ofRome.299 Thanks to Boffin's interest 
in how Rome "worked out its destruction" (OMF 476), Gibbon's historic profligates are 
mythopoeically depicted in the historic present tense, alongside Our Mutual Friend's 
own swindlers, who are constantly legacy-hunting, murdering, and "declining and 
falling" (OMF 52). 300 
In a telling slip, Boffin refers to his eight "gorging" volumes of Gibbon's 
masterpiece ("misled by association of ideas" [OMF 50]), initiating the text's relentless 
conflation of materialistic habits with food. Juvenal's Satire IV describes an emergency 
Privy Council, convened, not in responsible reaction to "[p Janie-stricken dispatches [that] 
might have been pouring in I From all parts of the empire" ( 4.149-50), but to address the 
bathetic dilemma of how to serve a gigantic fish to the emperor. Daniel Hooley explains 
that the fish, which exceeds the bounds of any plate, is emblematic of Rome's 
monstrously corrupt political and social body/state (Domitian himself is "soon to be cut 
up") (Roman Satire 112). The topos of the satiric feast (cena) recurs in Juvenal's satires; 
for example, Satire V depicts a dinner party in which luxurious dishes are served to the 
magnate Virro, while his guests, "well inured to the whip," are fed such rank foods as a 
"grey-mottled river-pike, born and bred in the Tiber, I Bloated with sewage" (5.103-4). 
The satire's main message is that Rome's citizens are abject slaves (Hooley, Roman 
Satire 119).301 In Our Mutual Friend, Mr Veneering's servant, a "melancholy retainer" 
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(like Juvenal himself, and like the guests in Satire V), is a gloomy, satiric presence (an 
"Analytical Chemist") at the Society feasts. His announcement, '"Dinner is on the 
table!,'" is translated to the morbid injunction: "'Come down and be poisoned, ye 
unhappy children of men!"' ( OMF 9). Satura, a literary form designed to accommodate 
the miscellaneous overabundance of moral wrongs that characterize a declining society, 
is well-suited to Dickens's aim in Our Mutual Friend, which, as Knoepflmacher states, is 
to "portray the debility of an age" (Laughter 137).302 The text is a Juvenalian satire 
complete with a "gaping salmon" (which looks at wealth admiringly) and a mock privy-
council. (In the final satiric feast, a "Committee" forms in judgment of Eugene's "bad 
catch," Lizzie Hexam.) Ostensibly, satire offers corrective nourishment to society, or at 
the very least, like the pill Twemlow takes to ease his digestion of society dinners, aims 
to moderate the ill effects of over-consumption; Our Mutual Friend, however, offers the 
indigestible fact of an unsalvageable civilization - a society more moribund than that 
represented in either Hard Times or Bleak House. 
4.xiii Victorian Psychology: Habit and Cravings for Money, Food, and 
Other Substances 
A significant root meaning of habit is habere, to "have or hold"; thus, 
etymologically, habit is linked to the desires, pleasures, and practicalities of possession. 
"[A]ll-purchasing Money," observes Alexander Bain, is "the institution of civilized 
communities" (Emotions 428). Furthermore, Spencer warns: "[W]hen money comes to be 
the representative of value in general - value as abstracted from special objects - the 
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miser shows us how the desire of possession in the abstract may become almost 
independent of those from which it arose; and may exceed in strength any of them 
individually" (PP 1: 489). In Victorian psychology texts, money is frequently targeted as 
the object that best exemplifies the morally and mentally ruinous potential of habit; the 
figure of the miser is paramount. Alexander Bain summarizes the habit-based pathology 
of avarice thus: "The sum total of purchasable enjoyments becomes linked in the mind 
with the universal medium of purchase, and this medium grows into an end of pursuit" -
and "sordid avarice" is its most extreme form (S&J 398).303 Desire for money, Bain 
asserts, is easily detached from original ends or associations. In Our Mutual Friend, 
Bella's fear that she will no longer be able to keep the avarice out of her eyes, as she is 
"'always avariciously scheming"' (OMF 320), illustrates in microcosm, as does Silas 
Wegg's insomniac and malnourished condition, the psychic unmanageability of money-
love. The narrator's ironic injunction - "Have no antecedents, no established character, 
no cultivation, no ideas, no manners; have Shares" (OMF 114)- satirizes not only the 
mid-century mania for capital and unstable investments in "these times of ours," but also 
the assertion that character is money (parodying Samuel Smiles' s axiom that "character is 
habit"). Reinforcing culturally prevalent notions about miserliness, Our Mutual Friend 
finds the intrinsic value or "moral being" ( OMF 13) of human beings to be particularly 
endangered by money. 
Moreover, in a capitalist system, money, replicating the self-propulsive process of 
habit itself, generates money; Dickens's assault on economic practices in Our Mutual 
Friend is thus linked to his anatomy of habit. P. Jarvie argues that the text's critique of 
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capitalism "is rooted in the difference between use-value and exchange-value and in the 
difference between productive circulations and mere accumulation" (2).304 Dickens's 
rejection of empty accumulation "parallel [ s ]" Karl Marx's idea (in Capital, 1867) that, 
under capitalism, distinctions between things of differing intrinsic value (such as corn 
and iron) are lost in their equalizing reduction to "exchange-value" (Jarvie 120). As 
Jarvie observes: "Our Mutual Friend presents the Marxian nightmare of an irretrievably 
commodified world where capital is autonomous, self-referential, and self-replicating, 
and where humans have been all but absorbed into an all-encompassing circulation 
turning everything into money" (123). Dickens's depiction of the habit-like mechanisms 
of capital production resonates with the representation of money in key texts of Victorian 
social criticism and psychology (including Past and Present, Sesame and Lilies, and 
Senses and the Intellect), in which the desire for money is analogous to perverted eating 
habits - either starvation or gluttony.305 The "phenomena of habit," Spencer concludes, 
deaden the feelings that accompany our actions - even repugnance; as a result, unhealthy, 
self-destroying habits remain unchecked, and human vitality is perversely siphoned into 
habit (PP 1: 579-80). 
Overtly thematizing the controlling power of habit, the majority of the characters 
in Our Mutual Friend have substance addictions (to tea, wine, snuff, opium). For 
example, Mr Venus daily submerges his lovelorn thoughts by "floating his powerful 
mind in tea" (OMF 780) (and roasting muffins). More fatally, characters like Riderhood's 
wife "succum[b] to ... snuff and gin" ( OMF 350). Such addictions, the narrator warns 
summarily, are "incompatible equally with coherence and existence" (OMF 350). A 
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legion of alcoholics, from the "shrieking" liver that disrupts the Inspector's office, to the 
"drunken tribe" in Covent Garden, are represented by the text's central alcoholic, Mr 
Dolls - for whom "rum [is] the only meaning of which he [is] capable" ( OMF 24, 729). 
In his non-human status as "[t]he wretched spectacle" ( OMF 241 ), he, like Krook in 
Bleak House, is the text's centerpiece figure of ruinous habit. His "mental decrepitude" 
( OMF 729) is visible; he is seen "dropping half-a-dozen pieces of himself while he trie[ s] 
in vain to pick up one" ( OMF 539). Since money-getting is figured as alcoholic addiction 
throughout Our Mutual Friend, it is appropriate that Mr Dolls crashes the dinner 
celebrating the Lammles' "total smash" (OMF 626) in order to collect money from 
Eugene. Moreover, alcohol flows at the Veneering table to blur reality further (such as 
debt) and fictions (such as Veneering's Parliamentary campaign), and Wegg plies Venus 
with rum and water "again and again" to facilitate the "friendly mov[ e ]" ( OMF 306). 
Further signifying the general loss of social sobriety and coherent consciousness, 
Veneering is a speculator in drugs; the town of Mill bank (like the "drug-flavoured" 
Mincing Lane), has an atmosphere of"a deadly kind ofrepose," as if it had rather "taken 
laudanum than fallen into a natural rest" ( OMF 603, 221 ). Disorienting substances 
function, as John Harmon knows from having consumed "hocussed wine" ( OMF 363), to 
destroy or submerge the conscious self. ln a dizzying blend of substance metaphors, the 
narrator likens the societal mania for money (and shares, its adulterated equivalent) to an 
addiction to "henbane or opium," which causes "us smaller vermin" to "cry out night and 
day, 'Relieve us of our money, scatter it for us, buy us and sell us, ruin us, only we 
beseech ye take rank among the powers of the earth, and fatten on us!"' (OMF 114). 
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Dickens's satire associates habit with an assortment of "artificial cravings" analogous to 
the desire for money which mechanize, deaden, and consume human consciousness. 306 
4.xiv The Satiric Procession of Cannibalic Feasts 
Silas Wegg's protest, "'You can't buy human flesh and blood in this country, sir; 
not alive, you can't"' (OMF 297), is ironized throughout Our Mutual Friend. 
Cannibalism epitomizes the inhumanity of the habit-perpetuated and money-inspired 
practices that capitalism condones. The miser Fledgby, who is the "perfection of 
meanness," is described as a strange kind of cannibal. Love for money has replaced his 
desire for food; he often "half starve[ s] himself' on "scanty rashers of bacon" ( OMF 268, 
271, 269). Instead, the bill-broker's hunger is transposed onto cruel bargains that bring 
"somebody's ruin" (OMF 271). 307 His derogatory nickname, "Fascination Fledgby," 
mocks his lack of social instincts, but also underlines his predatory use of the near-
mesmeric, coercive force of habit. Although Fledgby is not the text's most conspicuous 
cannibal (Lammie, Wegg, and Riderhood are more violent), his occupation as a discount 
bill-broker is iconic. His character symbolizes the general financial mayhem of the I 860s 
- what Mary Poovey describes as the dangerously "unregulated system of discounting to 
generate a self-perpetuating cycle of borrowing and debt" (Making 158). 308 Not simply an 
individual, Fledgby is a cultural phenomenon: the world has much "stock in hand" of his 
kind (OMF 432). A foggy tour through London ends at its hellish, dead centre: Fledgby's 
company Pubsey and Co, where "flayers" and "grinders" of human skin have their 
victims "peppered and salted and grilled on a gridiron" (OMF 427-28). The narrator's 
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Juvenalian depiction of "unpromising" London with its "giant" "money-mills" ( OMF 
603) that (metaphorically speaking) eat its inhabitants alive, supports the text's central, 
horrific syllogism: money is food; human beings are a source of money; therefore human 
beings are food. 309 As Harry Stone argues, cannibalistic motifs are central to Our Mutual 
Friend (156). 
Both the feast-as-generic topos and the routine nature of eating render dinner 
scenes an ideal locus for a satire on humanity-consuming habits. Our Mutual Friend 
depicts a series of perverse feasts (six major society dinners and breakfasts) at which 
guests maintain an ironic social habit: "the calamity of being in the society of everybody 
else" (OMF 410). Veneering's dinner-parties "habitually star[t]" with Twemlow, who 
exists tenuously in a chronic invitation to dine, and "Mr Podsnap [goes] out to dinner, 
and to dinner, and yet to dinner" ( OMF 6, 255). The well-oiled "dinner society" is 
composed of friends who are "old and dear" in proportion to the ever-shifting amount of 
money each is worth. In multiple satiric feasts, characters like Mr Podsnap, who is 
observed "prosperously feeding" ( OMF 10), are not only figured as cannibalistic, but are 
equated with consumable substances (food, money, and other objects). Dinner guests, in 
their "showy and gaudy" ( OMF 411) materialism, are metonymically equivalent to the 
pretentious objects in the dining room.310 Reflected in Veneering's side-board mirror (a 
satirizing medium to which I will return), dinner-guests are not only objectified as mere 
reflections, but their physical features are itemized in sentence fragments that lack 
personal pronouns: "Reflects mature young lady; raven locks, and complexion that lights 
up well when well-powdered" ( OMF 10). Significantly, the food offered at this dinner is 
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not mentioned; instead, guests gobble up Mortimer Lightwood's scandalous story about 
the miser John Harmon, which culminates in the meal's final offering: a drowned human 
body. Veneering profits from sating his financial connections' unwholesome appetites for 
human suffering. In this initial feast, an explicit parallel is formed between elite 
businessmen and lower-class dredgermen who traffic in dead bodies: human beings 
provide "meat and drink" for everyone (OMF 15, 3).311 
The Lammles' wedding provides the next excuse for a society dinner. Again, 
human beings, and not the "indigestible" cake ( OMF 122), are the real food consumed at 
the feast. Initially the festivities are described from Lady Tippins's cutting point of 
view.312 Although she herself is not an appetizing candidate for consumption (Gaffer's 
decomposing body is described as being "'[n]ot much worse than Lady Tippins"' [OMF 
24]), she enjoys dismembering others.313 Aptly, as she herself is entirely self-consumed, 
her report contains no autobiographical "I". As well, the mutilated victims in her report 
lack personal pronouns or definite articles: "Bride; five-and-forty if a day, thirty shillings 
a yard, veil fifteen pounds" ( OMF 119). Once again, a scene of feasting displays English 
habits of consumption, and the perfunctory wedding echoes Gaffer's "business-like" 
( OMF 2) habit of dredging human corpses from the Thames. 
The third society dinner marks the occasion of Georgina Podsnap's eighteenth 
birthday. In her "pinioned attitude," Georgina is "swallowed up" by the Lammles - who 
are always "scheming together for to-day's dinner and to-morrow's breakfast" (OMF 
13 7, 624 ). 314 Guests, depersonalized as "bathers," "take a haunch of mutton vapour-bath 
at half-past nine" and dip equally into their food as they do into the "waters" of the 
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Harmon murder (OMF 130,134). The guests anatomize one another: "bathers of the 
gentler sex sat silently comparing ivory shoulders" ( OMF 135). (As Alfred complains to 
Sophronia, '"We have both been biting, and we have both been bitten"' [ OMF 125].) In a 
grotesque epitome of Dickensian satiric parallelism, the guests are equated through the 
verb "to bathe" with the mutton, while the meat enjoys the upper-class activity of a social 
bath. Furthermore, mutton is a perfect signifier for the dehumanizing indoctrinations of 
capitalism, for Boffin equates a sheep's market-value with that of a secretary.315 Even the 
dinner plate is personified as cannibal-bait: "Wouldn't you like to melt me down?" ( OMF 
131 ). 
Importantly, it is at this feast that an anonymous, "meek" man mentions the 
people who have lately died of starvation in the streets; for Podsnap, "[i]t was clearly ill-
timed, after dinner" ( OMF 140). The Juvenalian context of an opulent meal for attacking 
the upper class's neglect of the starving poor creates a Swiftian accusation: the rich, like 
the absentee English landlords in A Modest Proposal (1729), are more than 
metaphorically feeding off of England's poor (the victims of political economists, poor 
laws, and laissez-faire ethos). Also anticipated in this feast is the forthcoming exposure 
of murderous governmental fictions (such as the humanity of the Poor Law) through 
Betty Higden's Hogarthian moral "progress" towards death-by-starvation. Conclusively, 
the national pastime of exploiting the poor is targeted in the novel's final dinner, when 
Mortimer Lightwood comments to Lady Tippins that, on his last adventure, he noted that 
the island savages "'were becoming civilized .... At least they were eating one another, 
296 
which looked like it"' (OMF 816). Our Mutual Friend's procession of satiric feasts 
provides a Juvenalian indictment of the cannibalizing materialism of English society.316 
4.xv The "moral sewage" of British Habit 
Not only are there intimations of Swift's A Modest Proposal in Our Mutual 
Friend's critique of the fatalities and moral horrors of the free-market economy, but the 
"excremental vision"317 of Gulliver's Travels is also implicitly evoked. The Dust Mounds 
- which, as many critics have noted, are a symbolic constant in the text - contain "[ c ]oal-
dust, vegetable-dust, bone-dust, crockery-dust, rough dust, and sifted dust - all manner of 
Dust" (OMF 13), including human and animal excrement. 318 As Harmon's enormous 
mounds are carted off piece-meal, the image of Gulliver (the humiliated representative of 
British pride) shamed by his colossal pile of excrement (as it is painstakingly removed by 
the Lilliputians) resonates subtextually. At one level, Our Mutual Friend's "dust" 
signifies the inescapable "intersection of capitalism and biology" (Jarvie 128). Catharine 
Gallagher notes that Dickens's depiction of the mounds contributed to then-current moral 
criticisms of political economy by writers such as Ruskin (who argued that wealth and 
value are linked fundamentally to human vitality) (107).319 Yet I would like to emphasize 
the mounds' metaphoric function of linking habit (itself a physiological process) and the 
necessary by-products of over-consumption. In Our Mutual Friend, Dickens recycles the 
image of the garbage mound that he had previously used in Hard Times to satirize 
systematic governmental ineptitude and the "sifting and sifting" at London's 
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"parliamentary cinder-heap" (HT 202) that reduces and equates human life with waste-
matter - the true product of England's so-called progress. 
Mr Podsnap, a Menippean mouthpiece for the cant of progress, routinely 
dismisses repellant subjects (such as the mortality rates of the poor) with an ostentatious 
flourish of his right arm. With his characteristic gesture, he dramatizes that habit is the 
crux of Podsnappery: the ideology proclaiming English moral and financial superiority. 
Podsnap is an anglophile who ritualistically performs and promotes the "stock notions 
and habits" (Arnold) of Englishness: "the world got up at eight, shaved close at a quarter-
past, breakfasted at nine, went to the City at ten, came home at half-past five, and dined 
at seven" (OMF 128). This invariable sequence (a "grand chain riveted to the last link") 
is narrated four times to convey textually the "dead-weight" and "thraldom of 
Podsnappery" (OMF 138, 129, 255). Like Gulliver in Lilliput, who cannot be 
"disemburthened" of his "uneasy load" (Gulliver's 12) beyond the limits of his chain (his 
English habits), the English, Dickens suggests, cannot flee the noxious products of their 
monstrous national machinery. Appropriately, the French dinner guest enrages Podsnap 
by noting, not London's greatness, but the abundance of horse dung in the streets. As 
well, the tales of escritoires found in Boffin' s books of abject misers provide further 
proof that all that separates human beings from the merely physical - the dung, dust, and 
habit to which they are biologically yoked - are qualities that do not define English 
character and conduct: morality, sympathy, and benevolence. 
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4.xvi Moral Transformation and the Mirror of Satire 
In Chapter 1, I suggested congruencies between "realism" and satire; now, 1 
would like to borrow the symbolic mirror from the repertoire of Victorian "realism" in 
order to highlight its role in satire's representational rhetoric. In Chapter 17 of Adam 
Bede, the narrator, echoing the novel's introductory sentence that presents the novel as "a 
single drop of ink for a mirror" (AB 5), influentially defines the highest duty of the 
novelist as the rendering of the "most faithful account of men and things as they have 
mirrored themselves" in their minds (AB 75).320 Among the many genres and modes 
"lurking in realism" (Levine, "Literary Realism" 16), satire offers an equivalent 
epistemological claim to mirror social reality. Satire's mental mirror, however, is 
conspicuously coloured by authorial moral anger (indignatio ); rather than aspiring to 
"exact likeness" (AB 177), it claims to offer (as Dickens's prefaces insist) a magnified, 
but not necessarily distorted, version of the truth. In their programmatic defenses, satiric 
writers boast a singular accuracy of vision. Thus, in traditions of both realism and satire, 
the mirror is an important metaphorical tool for genre-based truth claims. Vanity Fair, a 
text which Levine has recently evaluated as an "exemplary realistic fiction" ("Literary 
Realism" 14 ), is also a paramount example of Victorian narrative satire (Palmeri, 
"Thackeray" 770). The novel's title page depicts a satirist (a jester in motley) gazing into 
a mirror; the image reinstates Swift's notion of the incapacity of satire's written 
reflections to dislodge the selfish hypocrisies of the reader/viewer - or even of the 
satirist. Certainly, Becky Sharp sees her own ill-nature reflected back at her, not in the 
form of self-knowledge, but as an overriding perception of ill intent in others. 
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Thackeray's version of Swift's axiom is that "[t]he world is a looking-glass, and gives 
back to every man the reflection of his own face. Frown at it, and it will in tum look 
sourly upon you; laugh at it and with it, and it is a jolly kind companion" (Vanity Fair 
15). Similarly, in Our Mutual Friend, the mirror functions to expose the habit-reinforcing 
and reiterative insularity of the human mind. Charley Hexam, for example, cannot help 
but identify selfishness, his own ruling quality, in others (even in his "self-forgetting" 
sister): "What is there but self, for selfishness to see behind it?" ( OMF 401, 712). 321 In 
Our Mutual Friend, mirrors - reflective surfaces of all varieties from glass windows and 
ornamental mirrors to "the great serene mirror of the river" (OMF 522)- reveal human 
habit.322 
A paradoxical concept of death-in-life is effectively figured in the novel by the 
two- dimensional mirror image. The Lammles, as they scheme before a mirror, illustrate 
the dehumanizing and self-alienating effect of money-mania: "There was a mirror on the 
wall before them, and her eyes just caught him smirking in it. She gave the reflected 
image a look of the deepest disdain, and the image received it in the glass. Next moment 
they quietly eyed each other, as if they, the principals, had had no part in that expressive 
transaction" ( OMF 260). Similarly, in the satiric portrait of the Veneering dinner party, 
reflected in the "great looking-glass above the sideboard" ( OMF 10), characters are de-
personified and introduced as mirror reflections; there are no "principals" present.323 Like 
Fanny Dorrit, whose death-like descent into "society mania" (Little Dorrit 538) is 
reflected by her image in a looking-glass, such characters are defined by a "loss of self-
goveming will" (Little Dorrit 646). 
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Bella Wilfer's moral role in the novel is to overcome narcissistic habits of money-
love. Rather simplistically, materialism alone, without the aid of misogyny, is identified 
as having reduced Bella to "a horse, or a dog, or a bird" ( OMF 3 77) to be purchased. 
Misconstruing her object-status, she regards herself as having the agency to "captivate" a 
good sum/man. Despite her self-consciously mercenary goals, her sympathetic nature 
habitually disrupts her selfish practices. Both her habit of introspection - dramatized in 
her routine of self-scolding before her looking-glass - and her habit of confessional 
conversations with her father contribute to her incremental progress away from 
materialism and self-speculation. Furthermore, she recognizes her shameful reflection in 
the symbolic glass of Lizzie Hexam's noble character. Ultimately, in "great things" such 
as sympathy (evidenced by her outpouring of love for the dying orphan John, her 
affection for Lizzie, and her ultimate defense of Rokesmith), she is not "little" ( OMF 
745). The self-willed moral transformation of Bella Wilfer is the text's most hopeful 
argument for the human will's potential to overcome destructive habit. Yet, importantly, 
her success (highlighted by her emblematic surname Wilfer) requires Harmon's 
protracted pedagogical scheme involving Baffin's dramatic satire. Baffin's parody of 
miserly meanness inspires Bella's angry denunciation of "Pounds, Shillings, and Pence!" 
( OMF 593), demonstrating that in combination with pre-existent habits of sympathy, 
satire may be an instructive mirror to a wayward individual will. 
Lizzie Hexam functions as an ironic mirror not only to Bella, but also to Eugene 
and Bradley. Except for being female, she is a paragon of William James's ideal of 
active, healthy, and virtuous habit: she is "[a]ccustomed from her very babyhood 
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promptly to do the thing that could be done" ( OMF 71 ). As such, she is the antithesis of 
Eugene, who, like James's effete dreamer, installs through his systematic inaction a habit 
of irreversible idleness.324 Lizzie, by evading and challenging masculine injunctions, 
serves to diminish masculine egotism. Through her virtuous self-regulation, she resists 
commodification like no other character in the text. Although Eugene purchases her 
whereabouts for fifteen shillings, and Fledgeby, Bradley, and Charley all try to buy or 
sell her, Lizzie '"cannot authorise"' and "'cannot allow"' (OMF 403) the loss of her self-
goveming will. Two key moral practices idealized in Victorian economic and 
physiological discourses of habit are epitomized by her character: energetic self-reliance 
and active sympathy. In her various vocations (dredgerwoman, seamstress, and factory 
worker) she is indefatigable - even maintaining her goal of literacy. She is "fixed" ( OMF 
67) in her devotion to her father, Charley, Jenny Wren, and Eugene; significantly, it is 
because of her "practised hand" and "[h ]er old bold life and habit" ( OMF 698-99) that 
she unhesitatingly rescues Eugene. A model of industrious, redemptive habit, Lizzie (like 
Sissy Jupe) is also associated with the habit-transcending possibilities of the imagination. 
Her thoughts, for example, "rus[h] out" like the "tidal swell of the river" (OMF 70), 
whereas Eugene's move "like the stream, and all tending one way with a strong current" 
(OMF 698). Fittingly, as a visionary who dreams over fires (not mirrors), she is exempt 
from restless battles with mirroring doppelgangers. Lizzie is a rare embodiment of 
Dickens's utopian hopes for habit, but her less singular suitors, Eugene Wraybum and 
Bradley Headstone, embody the all-too-common extremes of pathological (and, for 
James, emasculating) habit: excessive self-regulation, on the one hand, and wayward 
indolence on the other. 
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Unlike Bella, Eugene is not vainly attracted to mirrors in his lackadaisical efforts 
to understand the "embodied conundrum" ( OMF 286) of his character. Other reflective 
surfaces document his chronically divided identity. In the language of mesmerism, he is 
"drawn" - through a blend of spontaneous sympathy and rakish cynicism - to look "long 
and steadily" ( OMF 164) through the window at Lizzie as she cries in front of the fire. A 
life-long habit of passive spectatorship is suggested by his tendency to gaze aimlessly out 
of windows. At society dinners, Eugene stands moodily by the window; when challenged 
by Mortimer Lightwood to resolve the riddle of his character, he evasively smokes a 
cigar by the window. Furthermore, it is symbolically apt that he routinely stares out of his 
apartment window to look for Bradley. His animosity towards Bradley is like Gulliver's 
aversion to the Yahoos, for he is unable to recognize his affinity with this man whom he 
deems to be a "creature of no worth" and a "curious monomaniac" ( OMF 288, 294 ). 
Staring out of windows that serve as self-satirizing mirrors, Eugene unconsciously 
recognizes both his moral antithesis (Lizzie) and his moral likeness (Bradley). 
Plagued by chronic apathy, Eugene, like James Harthouse Esq. in Hard Times, 
represents a privileged class of men who dissent from the ideals of Utilitarianism, but 
who lack sufficient energy and sympathy for reform. Defined by selfish disaffection, their 
most abominated cultural catchword is "energy." Eugene denounces the cult of 
earnestness as "parrot gabble," claiming that he would be energetic for "'something 
really worth being energetic about."' Yet his vow is undercut by the narrator's startling 
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and cynical judgment: "And it is likely enough that ten thousand other young men ... 
made the same hopeful remark" ( OMF 20). As Eve Sedgwick has shown, gender and 
class ideologies enable Eugene's exploitive abuse of both Lizzie and Bradley; they 
augment his "moral ugliness" (183).325 As well, like Harthouse, Eugene exploits the force 
of habit. He uses his knowledge of Lizzie's daily routines (her routes to and from work) 
to catch her off-guard, and he lures her to accept his patronage by appealing to her love 
for her father (and also Jenny Wren, whom he argues will benefit from her instruction). 
His logic resonates with her habitual associations, causing "subtle string[ s] to sound" 
( OMF 236). Moreover, by virtue of his knowledge of Bradley's Smilesean habits of 
mind, he "goad[s]" the schoolmaster to "madness" (OMF 542). Eugene's most cynical 
acknowledgment of the power of habit is his comment to Mortimer as he washes his 
hands after Mr Dolls's visit: '"Observe the dyer's hand, assimilating itself to what it 
works in"' (OMF 541). Thus, he admits his awareness that his new fixations, that have 
supplanted his fa9ade of a vocation, are dangerously constitutive. Just as Mr Dolls is 
driven to rum, Eugene is addicted to wayward exploitation. In his sadistic power over 
both Bradley and Lizzie, Eugene mobilizes class and gender advantages in conjunction 
with the psychology of habit. Embodying the Victorian moral paradox of habit, Eugene 
(with the satiric narrator's approval) scorns the mechanistic mind-set of Podsnappery and 
Utilitarianism, but is undercut by his own chronic immorality. 
As the physical world in Our Mutual Friend satirizes human habit, it is not 
surprising that "the great serene mirror of the river" (OMF 522) monitors Eugene's 
ethical crisis. After his attempt to seduce Lizzie, Eugene saunters by the riverside, 
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looking at the reflection of the stars in the river. Next, mirroring the motion of the water, 
there is a "correspondent stir in his uneasy reflections" and his thoughts "revea[l] their 
wickedness" (OMF 698). Eschewing, as usual, his moral culpability, he stops to "look 
down at the reflected night" ( OMF 698), which suddenly distorts to match his monstrous 
moral identity. Both his assailant (Bradley) and the river are manifestations of his 
fragmented self. But significantly, the "living waters," which have witnessed many 
"scene[s] of horror or distress" (OMF 751, 522)- including Betty Hidgen's death as she 
stares at lighted windows reflected in the water- reflect not only Eugene's moral errors, 
but also the unsympathetic and irresponsible habits of the ruling classes in general. 
Vrettos argues that Dickens's novels tend to present moral transformation as being not 
merely inhibited, but blocked by the determining power of habit. 326 Eugene, like Bella, 
escapes Gust barely) from a fixedly immoral identity, but he also requires external 
assistance to promote and secure moral transformation. Together Eugene and Bradley 
function as a manifold mirror reflecting an ungovernable, self-consuming "Society"; each 
is an "individual condensation"327 of their nation's bad habits. Despite their idiosyncratic 
traits - Eugene's epigrammatic wit and Bradley's clenching tic - both signify society's 
collective incapacity for self-willed moral transformation. 
Bradley, who is described as having "consumed himself' (OMF 546) in his 
obsession for his rival Eugene, is the most visibly habit-harassed character in Our Mutual 
Friend. "Racked and riven" ( OMF 791) by his repetitive thoughts, he has been primed by 
his education of cram to be plagued by one-track-mindedness: his mind was formed to be 
an anti-Millsean "place of mechanical stowage" ( OMF 217). In fact, his character is a 
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common product of a mid-Victorian pedagogical phenomenon: the Utilitarian 
"Educational Character" (OMF214). The epithet applies to "multitude[s]" with "weak, 
imitative natures" who are "ready to go mad upon the next wrong idea that may be 
broached" ( OMF 341 ). As a "highly certificated stipendiary schoolmaster," his "teacher-
habit" has been mass-manufactured (the word mechanically is used five times in the 
initial summary of his character) (OMF216, 224). Moreover, he demonstrates the 
ineradicability of James's "folds" of habit, for his "decent" schoolmaster's clothes 
(decent is strenuously repeated seven times) fit him awkwardly, like "holiday clothes" 
( OMF 217). Often seen walking with his head bent, "hammering at one fixed idea" ( OMF 
341 ), Bradley's passionate nature is captive to the power of habit; his energy lacks an 
outlet, and, to use Spencer's notion of the physiology of laughter, must therefore 
"overflow" into other "channels" (Essays 300-8). For example, it is physically expressed 
in chronic nail-biting, chair-wrenching, wrist clenching, and finally in "ungovernable 
rage and violence" (OMF 398). Bradley's "horrid," "dreadful" (OMF 397) earnestness 
and routinized respectability are analogous to the national routine of Podsnappery, and 
his "smouldering natur[ e ]" ( OMF 341) is a distillation of the combustible social 
atmosphere that Dickens targeted in Hard Times and Bleak House. Our Mutual Friend 
insinuates that English society is (like Bradley) ritualistically self-mutilating and self-
consumed by Utilitarian doctrines that have backfired. England's genteel, bourgeois 
classes (the Eugene Wraybums) and working classes (the Rogue Riderhoods) alike are 
being borne "down with a dread unchanging monotony" ( OMF 791) of fixed systems. 
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Descending into one's mirror image, according to Frye, involves an exchange of 
the authentic self for the mirror image; drowning is the appropriate end to a narcissistic 
existence, for Narcissus is the child of a river god and "almost drowns in his own 
watching eyes" (Frye, Secular I 08; Ovid 71). Appropriately, once Bradley and Rogue 
become replicas of one another- through Bradley's mimicry of Rogue's appearance and 
Rogue's assimilative desire for Bradley's "'spectable"' goods (OMF 799)- they drown 
together. Riderhood's mania for money and Bradley's obsessive passion for social 
standing are equivalently habit-based and solipsistic. Their dead bodies are practically 
welded together in the "ooze and scum" of the river bed; the words "ooze" and "scum" 
evoke, once again, the predatory "Dismal Swamp" of society, with its "greedy, armour-
plated crocodile[s]" (OMF 802, 409). Rogue's non-moral resurrection from drowning 
(his daughter's hope that "the old evil is drowned out of him" proves to be "short-lived 
delusion" [OMF 445-46]), together with Eugene's passive and precarious moral 
conversion, transmits a nihilistic prophesy of society's moral dissolution in its own 
mirror image. The "iron ring" (OMF 802) of Bradley's earnestness, compounded with 
Rogue's raving materialism and the destructive solipsism of Eugene, implicate all social 
levels in annihilating retrogradation; together they form the novel's Juvenalian position 
on habit. Additionally, Mr Doll's prominence at the end of the novel - his spectacular 
dereliction and public death-march habited in "vegetable refuse" ( OMF 729) is iconic -
encapsulates the satire's moral message: an incoherent nation will follow its habits to 
death. 
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4.xvii Jenny Wren: The Satirist's Opera-glass Vision 
Sylvia Manning finds little direct satire in Our Mutual Friend. In its place, she 
observes that a "good deal of satiric attack and ridicule" is transferred to its characters -
for example, to Jenny Wren (213).328 In Household Words, Dickens expressed a wish for 
his periodical to realize the satirical possibilities of a rehabilitated Asmodeus,329 who, in 
offering a bird's-eye view of London, could expose hidden abuses. Jenny Wren, Our 
Mutual Friend's benign Asmodeus, also has a penchant for roof-top dreaming; daily from 
the roof of Riah's lodgings she surveys London's "close dark streets," where people are 
"alive, crying, and working" ( OMF 281 ). Her fancies of flowers, singing-birds, and kind 
children (who do not mock her crippled body) provide a death-like escape from the 
hardships of her life. Her vital imagination also sustains her "inventive," "catechizing" 
habit of scolding - a practice that Pam Morris argues is a strategy of survival that 
contrasts with Bradley's destructive rage (208-210). The "prodigiously knowing" (OMF 
224) Jenny incisively mocks the self-defining habits of everyone she encounters: "'I 
know their tricks and their manners"' (OMF 234).330 Having been "surrounded by 
drunken people from her cradle" (OMF 227), she comprehends the destructive power of 
habit. Manning places her in the tradition of "primitive" satirists who, as R. C. Elliott 
explains, curse their victims with various physical punishments: "She is honest and good, 
but she threatens with a primitive cruelty and vindictiveness" (Manning 222). Jenny's 
habitual ire, expressed in cutting invective, is matched in regularity and intensity by the 
industriousness with which she plies her art. 
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A "Doll's Dressmaker," Jenny creates her dolls out of scraps of garbage. Like the 
narrator, who is self-styled as a "fanciful observer" ( OMF 46), she employs her dolls as 
tools of satire (in the manner that Dickens uses his characters). When she ventures into 
the streets of London/Vanity Fair, she keenly observes the follies of its citizens, 
"mentally cut[ting] them out and bast[ing] them" (OMF 724). In the personifying lexicon 
of her "doll-fancy," the real "fine ladies" (who are both her patrons and her models) and 
her dolls (their habits and matching habiliments) are utterly conflated. Although she 
mimics female vanity through her art, her satiric anger is pointedly feminist. 
Characteristically, she rages, not at humanity's general sins, but at the specific social sins 
of the male sex; for instance, she constantly infantilizes men to highlight their 
irresponsible selfishness. Along with her father (whom she makes "dismally ridiculous"), 
and her future husband, "Him" (down whose throat she plans to pour scalding liquid if he 
turns out to be a "drunkard" [OMF 242-243]), Eugene, Charley, and Bradley all come 
under the fire of her "vehement sharpness" (OMF 241). Correctly, she foresees that if 
Eugene '"set[s] up a doll,"' he will '"break it. All you children do"' (OMF 238). She 
accuses Charley of selfishness, and she brandishes her doll, the Honourable Judge "Mrs. 
Truth," at Bradley when he denies a selfish interest in Lizzie. Above all, in her relentless 
scavenging for truth, she rejects a view that habit necessarily abnegates "moral being" 
(Mortimer's important phrase, OMF 13). Instead, she insists upon moral accountability-
particularly for the empowered sex. When her father blames "circumstances" for his 
alcoholism, she quips: '"I'll circumstance you and control you too'" (OMF241). As well, 
with her incessant question "'What do you mean by it?"' ( OMF 241 ), she judges her 
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father to be responsible for his loss of self-governance. Combative, commanding, and 
questioning, Jenny, with the "keen chop" (OMF 346) of her jaws (she, like satire itself, is 
associated with cutting instruments, such as scissors and knives), is a mercilessly moral 
Juvenalian satirist. In her rage, she is the antithesis the girl in the Adventures of Little 
Margery who promoted the principles of political economy and "morally squashed" the 
miller with her meekness (OMF214). With her habit of angrily holding up her two hands 
"like an opera-glass" or "double-eye glass" ( OMF 226), she brazenly broadcasts the 
hypocrisy and selfishness of her targets - "as who should moralise, 'Oh this world, this 
world!"' (OMF224). Sedgwick argues that the name Jenny Wren is a "childishly 
deflationary name" ( 180), 331 but this self-selected name connotes not only femaleness -
Jenny is a "prefix to denote a female animal" (i.e. Jenny-wren [bird]), but also, 
underscoring her status as a satiric artist, it is short for Jenny-ass (OED) or donkey: 
satire's iconic animal. Yet for all of her energetic denunciations, in the degenerate 
environment of Our Mutual Friend, Jenny (moral perspicacity incarnate) is a necessarily 
fugitive and relatively powerless character. 
Not surprisingly, as the text's most Juvenalian character ("inclined to be bitter" 
[OMF224]), Jenny's perspective is prominent at the close of the novel. Four of the 
novel's final chapters detail her revelations about Fledgby's villainy, her father's death, 
Riah's enslavement, and her nursing role in Eugene's convalescence.332 Ironically, 
through her prominence in the story's denouement, Jenny's ultimate lack of agency 
assumes a kind of centre stage. Aside from "peppering" Fledgby - with "spiteful 
satisfaction" and a "judicious hand" she puts pepper in his plaster dressings ( OMF 723-
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24)- Jenny's ire is essentially futile. 333 Her father's illness is beyond her healing 
invective, which she defends nonetheless: "But I hope I did it for his good. And besides, I 
felt my responsibility as a mother so much .... Where would have been my duty to my 
poor lost boy, if I had not tried everything?" ( OMF 732). The clashes between Jenny and 
her father exemplify Dickens's rhetorical alchemy of indignant satire and pathos-inciting 
sentiment. In a key scene that makes the intertwining of satire and sentiment dramatically 
apparent, Jenny shares with Lizzie her ecstatic vision of kind children (who, unlike real 
children, do not mock and hurt her), summoning her to play and relieving her of her 
misery. But her happy memory (and the intimacy of the communication) is interrupted by 
the entrance of her drunken father and the "world of scolding" ( OMF 240), for Jenny 
must inveigh against her father with "vehement sharpness," indignant rhetorical 
questions, and punitive threats. Mercilessly, she exposes what the narrator terms the "dire 
reversal" of parental responsibility ( OMF 241, 242). After the scolding, Jenny fulminates 
against drunkards, and the "charm" of her visionary "better state" is "broken" ( OMF 
243). Further fusing the scene's pathos with indignatio, the narrator interposes with an 
anguished apostrophe: "Poor dolls' dressmaker! How often so dragged down by hands 
that should have raised her up; ... Poor, poor little dolls' dressmaker!" (OMF 243). Jenny 
is imaginatively inclined to be "made light" by wonderment and empathy, but she is 
habitually dragged back, like the text itself, to the necessity of satiric rage, to being "a 
little quaint shrew; of the world, worldly" (OMF 243). 334 Manning observes of the novel 
that "there is yet no vision of a reformed society, but the hope of individual regeneration 
is bright" (226). As I have argued, however, individual moral reform is presented in the 
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novel as being tentative at best, even with the aid of satire. Twemlow, Eugene, Lizzie, 
Mortimer, Jenny, and the Harmon and Boffin families form a small, new society of 
mutual friends who resist the loss of their free will to self-centred habit. But, as Manning 
notes, "the 'Voice of Society' is still heard in the present tense at the end of the novel" 
(227). In Our Mutual Friend, "free will," or "the habits of not yielding to our habits, 
when a vision of injurious effects has been connected with the actions" (Lewes, P LM3 
78), is shown to be as impossible for England as it was for ancient Rome. More 
ferociously than either Hard Times or Bleak House, the novel is a pulverizing satire on 
habit. In his insistence upon the novelist's duty of "extreme exposition" (or "opera-glass" 
satire), and in his association with "feminine" sensibilities, child-like wonder, and lower-
class rebelliousness, Dickens himself seemingly has much in common with his satirist-
character Jenny Wren. Most accurately and crucially, their art shares a paradoxical fusion 
of sympathy and incinerating satire. 
Thackeray's praise for Dickens as a humourist who bequeathed to the world a 
"feast of love and kindness" ("Charity" 286) reveals that, like many of his ironically anti-
satiric fellow satirists, Thackeray resisted Dickens's apocalyptic assessments of English 
society - its imminent "spoliation" ( OMF 501) and the invariable cannibalism of its 
commerce. As this chapter has argued, habit in Dickens's "dark novels" is more 
destructive than redeeming; it is like Jenny Wren's father: '"My bad child is always 
dangerous, more or less"' (OMF 434). 
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Chapter 5 
Gendered Habits: Feminist Satire in Charlotte Bronte's Shirley 
and George Eliot's Middlemarch 
Shirley stood behind the Rectors, leaning over their shoulders now and then to glance at 
the rules drawn up, and the list of cases making out, listening to all they said, and still at 
intervals smiling her queer smile - a smile not ill-natured, but significant: too significant 
to be generally thought amiable. Men rarely like such of their fellows as read their inward 
nature too clearly and truly. It is good for women, especially, to be endowed with a soft 
blindness: to have mild, dim eyes, that never penetrate below the surface of things - that 
take all for what it seems: thousands, knowing this, keep their eyelids drooped, on 
system; but the most downcast glance has its loophole, through which it can, on occasion, 
take its sentinel-survey of life. (Bronte, Shirley 273) 
There is no general doctrine which is not capable of eating out our morality if unchecked 
by the deep-seated habit of direct fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men. (Eliot, 
Middlemarch 582) 
In Our Mutual Friend, Jenny Wren's display of satirical resistance notably 
undercuts the patriarchal authority of many of the novel's male characters. But 
unsurprisingly, in a text that is not feminist in its main moral and social criticism, Jenny 
does not fundamentally reject gendered norms/habits. Nevertheless, her status as female 
satirist transgresses a customary generic prohibition, that satire is not a "feminine" 
practice. In Chapter 1, I outlined satire's historical status as a "masculine" genre and 
mode, highlighting not only the exclusively male, educated, and upper-class circles 
within which ancient satirists circulated their writings, but also John Dryden's seminal 
argument that Juvenal's satire demonstrates purer, "more vigorous and masculine wit" 
than Horace's. Thackeray's Victorian quest for a comic and satiric tradition that is both 
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"manly" and moral was also discussed. 335 Similarly, I suggested that discourses of habit 
are inflected by those of gender - from Mill's (and Taylor's) radical argument that a 
priori notions of gender restrict the minds of both sexes (and the nation as a whole) to 
William James's Spencerian proposition that habit is a mental phenomenon more 
debilitating to women than to men. Recalling Frances T. Russell's insight that Victorian 
satire targets the formative contributions of culture to individual and social identities, this 
chapter postulates that Victorian feminist, novelistic satire on habit attacks patriarchal 
doctrines and institutions for circumscribing the "life and habits" of each sex through 
gendered codes that are absorbed, as the narrator of Middlemarch suggests, through the 
"social air" (M 306). In such texts, binary habits of masculine authority and egotism, in 
contrast to feminine self-suppression and subservience, are identified as underpinning 
Victorian separate sphere ideology; they are revealed to be intellectually and emotionally 
stunting to the individual, and politically and socially destructive to the nation. ln other 
words, novelistic satires targeting masculinist ideologies argue that, like generic practices 
(such as satire), gendered identity is substantially habit-based. 
Given that satire has been largely marginalized in discussions of Victorian 
literature, it is not surprising that feminist satire in the Victorian novel has received 
minimal scholarly attention. Although the resistance to patriarchal hegemony that 
saturates Victorian fiction has absorbed the attention of many influential feminist critics 
(Gilbert and Gubar, Showalter, Langland, Armstrong, and Poovey, among many others), 
"satire," if identified as a feminist critical practice, is not typically explored in a detailed 
or generically weighted fashion.336 Thus, the central aim of this chapter is to sketch 
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taxonomic links to satire, as evinced through an interrogation of habit, through the 
examples of Charlotte Bronte's Shirley (1849) and George Eliot's Middlemarch (1871-
72). An exploration of the possibility of generic differences between feminist and 
"masculinist" (or, more accurately, misogynist) satire exceeds the scope of this chapter. 
Furthermore, although patriarchal ideologies and prohibitions have had a distinctive 
impact upon the satiric production of female authors, I do not restrict the term to female 
writers or seek to identify the features of a distinctive "female" tradition.337 Instead, I will 
explore the denaturalizing emphasis that feminist novels -with substantial, even 
dominant, satiric elements - place on the phenomenon of habituation. 
5.i Gender and Satire: Misogynist Traditions and Feminist Revisions 
G. K. Chesterton, referring to satire generally and to Dickens's prophetic satire in 
particular, inadvertently exposes not only why Dickens's "extreme habit of satire" 
(Chesterton on Dickens 96) was transgressive for an informally educated man, but one 
key reason why the very concept of female-authored satire in a culture that systematically 
denied women equal intelligence would be, to use Charles A. Knight's words, "virtually 
unthinkable" (7): 
You may have the dullest possible intelligence and be a portrait painter; 
but a man must have a serious intellect in order to be a caricaturist. ... 
True satire is always of this intellectual kind; true satire is always, so to 
speak, a variation or fantasia upon the air of pure logic. The satirist is the 
man who carries men's enthusiasm further than they carry it themselves. 
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He outstrips the most extravagant fanatic. He is years ahead of the most 
audacious prophet. He sees where men's detached intellect will eventually 
lead them, and he tells them the name of the place - which is generally 
hell. (Chesterton on Dickens 93-94) 
Chesterton's assertions about "true" satire provide an evocative springboard for a 
discussion of satire's gendered associations. He associates satire with powerful and 
masculine authority founded upon a "serious intellect" (excelling in "pure logic") that 
authorizes "audacious" prophetic power. Anaphoristic use of the male pronoun further 
emphasizes his acceptance of the genre's association with exclusively masculine agency. 
Chesterton's praise for the heroically regenerative male satirist augments and exposes 
satire's long-standing status as a gendered discourse - one that reinforces the traditions of 
patriarchy. Feminist theologian Mary Daly asserts that within patriarchy, "plausible" 
authority is constituted exclusively by male/paternal figures (57). Like many Anglo-
American feminist academics of the 1970s, Daly maintains (in an assertion troubled by 
many post-structuralist feminists, who emphasize white middle-class women writers' 
contribution to dominant cultural formulations) that on the whole, "[women] have been 
foreigners not only to the fortresses of political power but also to those citadels in which 
thought processes have been spun out, creating a net of meaning to capture reality" (6). 
Such a comprehensive claim is congruent with the fact that nineteenth-century women 
were systematically denied ecclesiastical, political, and cultural authority.338 The logic of 
this exclusion derived substantially from discourses of biological essentialism defining 
women's "nature" as being weak, susceptible to vice and folly, passionate, unruly, and 
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(with great relevance to their exclusion from satire) profoundly non-intellectual. Within 
the enduring philosophical binary of body/spirit (Block 11 ), misogynist constructions 
position women as body/matter. 339 In masculinist thought, as Alexander Pope memorably 
reveals, women are regarded as "[m]atter too soft a lasting mark to bear, I And best 
distinguish' d by black, brown, or fair" (3-4 ). 340 In short, women, as a sex, are the 
essentialized arch-scapegoat for human weakness, irrationality, and fallibility. Thus, far 
from being the authorized agents of satire, they are its inveterate subject. 
S. E. Jones declares that "one of the perennial conventions of satire as a genre has 
been misogyny" (139). The word misogynistic relates to "or is characteristic of 
misogynists or misogyny; that hates or is prejudiced against women" (OED).341 
Discussing misogyny as a "prominent theme in all periods of English and American 
literature" and all literary forms, Katharine M. Rogers emphasizes that "manifestations of 
misogyny" include "not only direct expressions of hatred, fear, or contempt of 
womankind," but also its indirect expressions (x-xi).342 Her study reveals that although 
misogyny, mercurial like satire itself, covertly inhabits most genres, it ostentatiously 
suffuses satire. Rogers argues that there is a notable proliferation of harsh satire on 
women in the Restoration and the eighteenth century: Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope 
were both "Juvenalian satirists" whose "particular stress on female failings, betray a 
definite misogynistic animus" (K. Rogers xv). Traditional themes of misogynist 
literature, Rogers argues, are abundant in Augustan literature: misogamy (a rhetorical 
tradition of advice against marriage), 343 contempt for women who aspire to learning and a 
vocation, attacks on the shrewish wife or virago, and disdain for old maids. Similarly, 
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Felicity Nussbaum, in her landmark study The Brink of All We Hate: English Satires on 
Women, 1660-17 50, also observes a "burgeoning of satires against women" in the period 
between the Restoration and mid-eighteenth century, rooted in the "patriarchal 
assumption of the natural inferiority of women" (7, 8). Nussbaum also pinpoints primary 
archetypes of "anti-feminist satire" (many of which overlap with Rogers's misogynistic 
themes): the whore, the Amazon, the learned lady or "writing whore," and the angelic 
ideal (Brink 4, 75).344 Many enduring anti-feminist satiric tropes, she argues, were 
consolidated in Juvenal's sixth Satire - a work that "exert[ed] a powerful influence on the 
literary tradition of antifeminism" through various imitations and translations (Nussbaum, 
Brink 92).345 Importantly, women in the "myth of satire" are "a metaphor for all that is 
threatening and offensive to the society at large," indeed, a metaphor for chaos itself 
(Nussbaum, Brink 19-20).346 In addition, Northrop Frye's allegorical vision of satire as 
the definitive male hero (akin to Odysseus, David, St. George)- who represents 
"intelligence" locked in perennial battle with "stupid power" (figured as a "gigantic 
monster") ("Nature" 80) - further suggests how the generic binaries of satire 
conveniently align with those of gender to preclude female writers from satiric 
authorship. From Juvenal to Swift, canonical male satirists satirize women's inherent 
weakness, more than the bad habits or indoctrinations of custom; they do not quarrel with 
the sex-based hierarchy of society. 
It is important to note that the work of Nussbaum and other feminist critics of 
satire remains peripheral to mainstream satire theory.347 In Chapter 1, I sketched a 
canonic-text- and preeminent-critic-based history of satire theory and practice that 
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reflected the masculinist focus of satire studies (past and present). Further, I described the 
satiric tradition as it stands outlined in important theoretical accounts of satire from the 
New Critical studies of the 1960s and 70s to the more historicized accounts of the 1980s 
and 90s. As Lorraine York plainly states, the indices in such key theoretical texts - by 
Pollard, Highet, Test, Kernan, and others - reveal the marginal status of women's satire 
and feminist satire; the gendered history of satire is evident in indexed topics such as 
"Women satirized" or "Women, attitudes toward" (York 44 ). 348 I would also add that the 
concept "feminist satire" is absent.349 In her 2001 dissertation on modernist women's 
satire, Kathleen Lipovski-Helal argues that twentieth-century theorists "have consistently 
avoided discussions of gender," observing a fairly "uncritical acceptance of satire as a 
masculine genre or mode" (5-6)35° Critics of satire tend to note the male-dominated 
history of satire, while deferring a feminist evaluation of the genre and mode. 351 
Nussbaum argues that Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women 
( 1792) "launched an attack aimed squarely at antifeminist male satirists"; in so doing, she 
"dared to intrude into the masculine territory of reasoned public and political debate" 
("Feminism" 83). Wollstonecraft usurped the masculine position of all-knowing authority 
- a claim that is the crux of masculinist satire - through her assertion, "Let me now as 
from an eminence survey the world stripped of all its false delusive charms" (Vindication 
110). Discussing Johnson's elevated register in his imitation of Juvenal's Satire 10, "The 
Vanity of Human Wishes," Nussbaum observes: 
The onlooker whose gaze encompasses the world takes the broad and 
superior view. From his stance on high, he can see the relations among 
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things and can comprehend them whole. This privileged moral stance 
hinges on wide-ranging experience and broad education. It is, thus, a 
gendered one: for many centuries, only the polite and aristocratic 
European gentleman could make claims of impartiality. The special 
insight that writing women demonstrated in reading character and 
reporting intimate private knowledge was culturally authorized within the 
domestic novel [.] ("Feminism" 82) 
Consistently associated with less capacity for the comprehensive knowledge that 
engenders the "broad and superior view" and "serious intellect," women have been 
dissociated and unofficially debarred from intellectual and public discourses such as 
satire. 352 
5.ii Gendered Forms: Satire and the Victorian Novel 
Claudia Thomas Kairoff observes that the novel was indeed a vehicle for women's 
satiric expression: "As women helped develop the novel, satire was among the genres 
they incorporated into this new prose hybrid" (285).353 Arguing that the exclusion of 
women from the public political sphere had "consequences for the genres in which they 
wrote," Frank Palmeri postulates that this exclusion "provided an impetus for their 
continued writing of satire" as a means of accessing the cultural public sphere (Satire, 
History 220). Palmeri finds that British women writers from Manley to Frances Burney 
retain "strong elements of satiric form," for "satire retained its usefulness to a greater 
extent for them than for their male counterparts" (Satire, History 220, 41 ). Critics like 
Palmeri who broach the subject of satire and gender agree that the novel form offered 
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female writers a forum for relatively covert satiric critique. Yet it is important to recall 
that Palmeri regards "narrative satire" as being in a general state of recession for the bulk 
of the Victorian period, as a result of having been "domesticated" by the novel. 354 
Although the novel proved a productive ground for women's satire, critics often 
cite the "growing feminization of literary taste" as a cause of satire's generic decline 
(Jones, Satire 140). "Feminization," from the Augustan perspective, meant literary 
culture's descent into either hack writing or increased sentimentalism (Jones, Satire 
140).355 Gary Dyer affirms that satire was coded masculine and sensibility, feminine; yet, 
significantly, he does not de-naturalize this encoding. 356 Sensibility, he observes, was 
regarded as a "distinctly feminine virtu[e]" that was "incompatible ... with ridicule," and 
its "success" "necessarily restrained satire" in the later eighteenth century ( 152); simply 
put, "traditional satire had become a casualty of the regendering of the reading public" 
(Dyer 167). Eileen Gillooly also notes a gendered literary shift at the end of the 
eighteenth century towards politer forms of expression suited to an "evangelically 
influenced" middle class, in which readers were "disproportionately female" (3). 
Revealingly, Thackeray, in "The English Humourists," simultaneously feminizes the 
novel and asserts the eternal masculinity of satire: "mere satiric wit is addressed to a class 
of readers and thinkers quite different to those simple souls who laugh and weep over the 
novel. I fancy very few ladies, indeed, for instance, could be brought to like 'Gulliver' 
heartily, and ... to relish the wonderful satire of 'Jonathan Wild"' (256). Thackeray's 
words emphasize that the novel was conventionally viewed as a "feminine" form - a 
form which battled for respectability in the masculinist culture of letters. No doubt the 
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persistent gendering of both satire and the novel contributes to the resilient critical view 
of the novel as a mainly non-satiric form. Appropriately, female writers and audiences, 
and that which is symbolically deemed to be "feminine" (including the novel), are the 
scapegoats not only for general human folly, social disorder, and decay, but also for 
satire's supposed decline. 
Given its formal heterogeneity and potentially subversive political, social, and 
moral content, satire was, for many Victorian novelists and their critics, an uncouth, 
improper, and ungentlemanly genre. Contradictorily, though, satire was also regarded as 
being highly intellectual and vigorous, and therefore manly. In either incarnation, satire 
was deemed an improper form of critique or expression for women. Masculinist culture 
prescribed that women and satire, like oil and water, could not mix. Yet, as Laurie Fink 
and others note, ideological disjunctions and contradictions in patriarchal representation 
result in semi-authorized opportunities for writing women. Satire's historical status as a 
moral genre, in conjunction with women's license to write novels - and thereby wield a 
qualified and domestic form of moral authority357 - resulted in partially legitimated 
productions of satire that ran counter to prescriptions of intellectual disqualification. 
The eighteenth-century trend to distance women from satire increased in the 
nineteenth century. Francis Hodgson, in his translation of the Satires of Juvenal (1807), 
insisted that he was not writing for '"the ladies"' ( qtd. in Dyer 151 ). Similarly George 
Gissing, referring to female readers, observed that "the humourist never strongly appeals 
to that audience" (Critical Study 155). Feminine and genteel values were considered 
incompatible with ridicule, and women were thought to be too good-natured to 
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comprehend "masculine cynicism" (Martin 7), or so Leslie Stephen and others asserted. 
358 Satire was positioned as being particularly off-limits to women, due to both its 
"coarseness" and its intellectuality. Thackeray's words once again provide a touchstone 
for the gendered restrictions of satire as an art cleansed of its unruly habits by a feminized 
reading public: 
How savage the satire was - how fierce the assault - what garbage hurled 
at opponents - what foul blows were hit. ... Whilst we live we must laugh, 
and have folks to make us laugh. We cannot afford to lose Satyr with his 
pipe and dances and gambols. But we have washed, combed, clothed, and 
taught the rogue good manners; ... and he has put aside his mad pranks 
and tipsy habits; and, frolicksome always, has become gentle and 
harmless, smitten into shame by the pure presence of our women and the 
sweet confiding smiles of our children .... Comus and his wicked satyrs 
and leering fauns have disappeared, and fled into the lowest haunts; and 
Comus's lady (if she had a taste for humour, which may be doubted) 
might take up our funny picture-books without the slightest precautionary 
squeamishness. (Works 648-49)359 
According to Thackeray, women, like Comus's lady, by their "gentle and harmless" and 
genteel presence, police the rude and "tipsy habits" of satire. As Nancy Armstrong has 
argued, the domestic novel itself was one of the complex discourses orchestrating and 
consolidating the period's domestic ideology and ideal of "bourgeois national hegemony" 
(21)- a fantasy in which the coarseness of masculine competition and capitalism was 
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redeemed by the "pure presence" of women. Other influential feminist critics, including 
Bodenheimer, Ingham, Langland, and Poovey, have argued for the overlapping of class 
and economic ideology and gender in the nineteenth-century domestic novel, noting the 
utility of a peaceful, moral domestic sphere to legitimize and support a burgeoning 
capitalist society. For an examination of the intersections of gender and satire, however, I 
will emphasize the novel's participation in non-hegemonic and subversive practices. 
Feminist satiric novels, for example, question the key masculinist cultural binary that 
supported the gendering of domestic and public spheres as well as women's prohibition 
from writing satire - a binary eloquently summarized by Smiles: "Man is the brain, but 
woman is the heart of humanity; he its judgment, she its feeling; he its strength, she its 
grace, ornament, and solace" (Character 38).360 Smiles, whose words epitomize this 
banal cultural script, argues that women do not need political power, for they exercise 
influence in private life by helping to form the characters of men, and therefore of the 
nation (Character 61).361 Paradoxically, the head/heart dichotomy simultaneously banned 
and sanctioned women's employment of satire - an intellectual but moral genre. 
Gillooly observes that"[ w]hile political satire, comic drama, and the 'Big Bow-
wow strain' remained off-limits to female users for most of the nineteenth century, 
'scenes of domestic life, treated humorously' - that is, with humor that was sympathetic 
and restrained, tender and tactful - came to signify 'the feminine note in fiction'" (4). 
Women were thought of as being "sharp-eyed observers of the social scene," and having 
a "natural taste for the trivial": "Victorian critics agreed that if women were going to 
write at all they should write novels" (Showalter 82). In his 1853 review of Ruth for the 
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North British Review, J.M. Ludlow theorized that the novel was well-suited to the 
delineation of human feeling, "a sympathetic form" addressed more to feeling than to 
"judgment, or reason": '"We know, all of us, that if man is the head of humanity, woman 
is its heart" (qtd. in Showalter 83). In the twentieth century, Chesterton's insistence that 
the novel of the nineteenth-century was a "peculiarly feminine" (38) mode of art (unlike 
the masculine, satiric novels of the eighteenth century), because it was founded upon 
sympathy, has proven to be a resilient masculinist assumption. In this chapter, I argue 
that feminist satiric novelists attempted to dismantle the binary categories of both gender 
and genre, pronouncing them to be substantially based upon masculinist and misogynistic 
habit. 
5.iii The Gendering of Habit 
Just as Victorian feminist satire awaits further investigation, the gendered 
discourses of habit in the nineteenth century have yet to be examined substantially. I will 
therefore offer a brief survey of habit theory's paradoxical utility both to the period's 
misogyny, and also to the feminist thought of Wollstonecraft and Mill and Taylor. In 
doing so, I aim to contextualize the intersections of feminist novelistic satire and habit 
that I pursue in this chapter. As I outlined in Chapter 2, numerous scientists and 
psychologists, sociologists, political economists, and "men of letters" contributed to 
nineteenth-century discussions of culture as being sustained by habit. Powerfully, Darwin 
concluded On the Origin of Species with a lament concerning restrictions placed upon 
intellectual evolution by retrograde habits of thought, such as Creationism. Notions of 
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biological and social evolution catalyzed redefinitions of "man's" relationship to God, to 
the natural world, and to "fellow men," and the formative agency of the "social medium" 
over and above a priori epistemology gained cultural acceptance. Yet, "man's" 
customary superiority over "woman" remained a particularly immovable convention that 
proved useful to what Mill terms "conservative interests" (A 1: 270).362 
Many theorists of habit, who were also inveterate masculinists, postulated a 
scientific loophole through which to maintain customary notions of female inferiority in 
the face of increasingly general acceptance of theories of social habituation. Evolutionary 
sociologists and physiologists such as Herbert Spencer and Henry Maudsley (and later 
William James) proclaimed that although all human beings are subject to mechanistic 
forms of habit, men's brains, being not only larger, but more complex, transcend the 
simple processes of repetitive thought more readily than women's brains. The inferior 
social and biological status of women was thus further fashioned as a logical, intransigent 
reality underscored by the natural laws of habit. Gendered theories of habit 
simultaneously explained women's presupposed weaker capacity for logic, originality, 
and even free will (and thus moral judgment) by claiming their greater mental 
subservience to grooves of habit. Such theories harmonized with what Sally Shuttleworth 
observes generally of the period: "medical science" and "mental science" "presided" over 
theories of gender division, constantly contrasting male self-control with "female 
subjection to the forces of the body" (Bronte 4 ). 
Though not a scientist himself, John Ruskin felt entitled to pronounce women's 
minds unsuitable not for "invention or creation" but perfect for daily conjugal helpfulness 
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and sympathy if "trained in habits of accurate thought" (SL 18: 122, 126). Ruskin's notion 
of the female mind accords with authoritatively scientific mid-Victorian "sex in mind" 
theories; as Rachel Malane observes, "the pairing of scientific findings with cultural 
beliefs made the resulting theories particularly solid and resistant to alternative 
viewpoints" (2). 363 Biological psychologists such as Laycock, Spencer, and Bain were 
influenced by the "phrenological dictum that the brain was the organ of the mind" 
(Russett 109); numerous scientists proffered evidence that men's brains were superior to 
women's. Darwin himself asserted that men's brains will always out-evolve women's, for 
the competitive struggles of men will perpetually "keep up or even increase their mental 
powers" (Descent 565). 364 As well, Russett notes the "almost universal acceptance" in 
evolutionary biology of the "notion of the greater variability of the male" and 
"concomitant, female conservatism": "Masculine variability closed off to women the 
higher ranges of mind" (92, 94) Hermann Schaaffhausen proposed that the diameter of 
the human cranium corresponds with the intellect development of the brain and that the 
female skull showed "more signs" of the "scant development of the mental power" (qtd. 
in Malane 7). This kind of "scientific" evidence of female inferiority routinely appeared 
in the work of prominent physiologists, and buttressed anti-feminist political theory. 
James Allan, for one, argued in "Woman Suffrage Wrong in Principle and Practice" 
( 1890) that women lacked the intellectual capacity for the most abstract virtue, "Justice" 
(219), and therefore for political responsibility. Such theories were invested in the 
inequality of the sexes as a fact relatively untouched by the laws of human changeability 
that evolutionary theory proposes; as George G. Romanes famously observed, it would 
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take '"many centuries to produce the missing five ounces of the female brain"' ("Mental 
Differences Between Men and Women" [1889], 395). Lewes, Darwin, Romanes, and 
others agreed that women's limited accomplishments in literature - their lack of true 
originality or "poetic genius of the first order" (Romanes 384)- provided further 
evidence of their innate mental deficiencies. 365 Thus notions of the female brain's relative 
smallness, reduced intellectual capacity, and evolutionary conservatism buttressed 
misogynist theories of habit. 
Significantly, in Principles of Psychology (1872), Herbert Spencer pronounces 
women to be biologically bound to less sophisticated processes of habit. Displaying his 
characteristic bigotry, he compares women to "lower races," claiming that they are like 
"uncivilized" men when compared with civilized, "larger brained" men; their less 
developed neural systems are less capable of the "habitual representation of more various 
possibilities of cause, and conduct, and consequence." Thus, they are less skilled than 
men in "balancing evidence" and modifying or suspending judgments, for they are quick 
to draw conclusions to which they "pertinaciously" adhere (Spencer, PP 1: 581-3). 
Generally speaking, women are emotionally "impulsive," "simple," and less profound 
(Spencer, PP 1: 583). Crucially, Spencer also insists that intelligence is measured by the 
"degree of remoteness from primitive reflex action" and "irreversible conclusions," for 
"actions become less automatic as they become more complex" (PP I: 584, 580). The 
"growth of intelligence" is dependant upon the laws of association or habit, whereas 
"reflex action" is "the lowest form of psychical life" - instinct, for example, is 
"compound reflex action" (Spencer, PP l: 425, 428, 432).366 In short, Spencer concludes 
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that men are more physically capable of the "comparatively-hesitating" thoughts and 
emotions that characterize advanced intelligence (PP 1: 584), and which are a 
prerequisite for the "questioning habit" (Principles of Sociology 133). Women's minds 
predominantly operate through "uncivilized," uncultivated instinct (reflexive habit): their 
"psychical life" (intelligence and morality) is less evolved. 
Similarly, Henry Maudsley argues in The Physiology of Mind (1877) that 
women's minds, more so than men's, operate through unconscious habit. Maudsley 
distinguishes between two classes of mind, a "subjective class" (feeling-based) and an 
"objective class" that utilizes the "dry light of reason" (Physiology 3 77). The lobes of the 
brain relegated to feeling, "more than the understanding," are larger in women 
(Maudsley, Physiology 261-2). "[U]nconscious factors" of "mental function" (here 
implying the operations of habit) are stronger in those of weaker intellect, "as we plainly 
see by the examples of women and children, of persons labouring under sickness, and or 
those who are dying" (Maudsley, Physiology 378). Women's characters, Maudsley 
acknowledges, are formed by their state of dependence and subjection and have "been 
made feeble by a long habit of dependence"; their sexual nature, he posits, has developed 
at the expense of their intellect (Maudsley, Physiology 203). Like children and animals, 
women are yoked to "present pleasures and present pains" (Maudsley, Physiology 
256).367 The latter point advances David Hume's assertion, in A Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739-40), that women are less endowed with free will - a capacity that involves 
forethought of future repercussions of present temptations. Either explicitly or implicitly, 
women's minds were considered to be intellectually and morally yoked to the more 
mechanized functions and forms of habit. 
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William James, whose chapter on habit in The Principles of Psychology, as I have 
argued, is nearly a compendium of Victorian habit theory, supports the masculinist notion 
of women's greater propensity for simple habit.368 Importantly, James accepts the 
paradox that although human beings are "bundles of habits," "man" "owes his whole pre-
eminence as a reasoner, his whole human quality of intellect, we may say, to the facility 
with which a given mode of thought in him may suddenly be broken up into elements, 
which recombine anew" (Principles 990). By contrast, "fixed habit" in animals "is the 
essential and characteristic law of nervous action," and, similarly, 
A young woman of twenty reacts with intuitive promptitude and security 
in all the usual circumstances in which she may be placed. Her likes and 
dislikes are formed; her opinions, to a great extent, the same that they will 
be through life. Her character is, in fact, finished in its essentials .... [Yet 
in the boy of twenty, the] absence of prompt tendency in his brain to set 
into particular modes is the very condition which insures that it shall 
ultimately become so much more efficient than the woman's. The very 
lack of preappointed trains of thought is the ground on which general 
principles and heads of classification grow up; and the masculine brain 
deals with new end complex matter indirectly by means of these, in a 
manner which the feminine method of direct intuition, admirably and 
rapidly as it performs within its limits, can vainly hope to cope with. 
(Principles 991) 
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According to James, women think and act more automatically (mechanically and 
instinctively); their minds are "formed" earlier, and in "preappointed trains of thought" 
sooner than men's minds. The "masculine brain," with its greater plasticity, is capable of 
more efficient, and unfixed, highly intelligent thought required for generating "general 
principles." Furthermore, in an effort to cull all the positive effects of habit for masculine 
benefit alone, James implies that not only higher abstract reasoning, but productive habit 
(in the form of concentrated attention and energetic volition), are exclusively masculine. 
Thus, when men utilize brute habit, it is a powerful resource for the performance of 
"manly concrete deed[s]" (Principles 129), rather than the mental flaw that it is for 
women. For James, then, habit is simultaneously a debilitating and a feminine weakness 
(in its less productive forms), and a source of masculine endurance, strength of thought, 
and action. In summary, although physiological psychologists agreed that the exact 
degree to which the average man was a "walking bundl[e] of habits" (Principles 130) was 
unclear, masculinist theorists of habit nevertheless asserted confidently that women were 
creatures of habit. 
James's conclusions concerning female psychology and habit are a culmination of 
the position of mainstream Victorian mental science on the subject. Yet, a feminist 
counter-tradition, also grounded upon associationism, developed from the ideas of Mary 
Wollstonecraft, culminating in the conclusions of Mill and Taylor. Wollstonecraft, the 
harbinger of Anglo-American feminist thought (Russett 9), seizes upon Lockean 
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association theory and the liberating possibilities of an empirical science of the mind to 
argue that improvements were vital to women's education. In the chapter "The Effect 
Which an Early Association of Ideas Has upon the Character" in the Vindication of the 
Rights of Women, Wollstonecraft concludes that, although the "animal spirits" determine 
the poetic and sympathetic sensibility of an individual, 
[T]here is an habitual association of ideas, that grows 'with our growth,' 
which has a great effect on the moral character of mankind; and by which 
a turn is given to the mind that commonly remains throughout life. So 
ductile is the understanding, and yet so stubborn, that ... [it] can seldom 
be disentangled by reason. (116) 
Evidence of this, Wollstonecraft posits, is one's "habitual slavery" to "first impressions" 
( 116). She regards the incipient mental science theorized by Hume and Locke as an 
opportunity to argue for the necessity of change in the traditional education and relations 
of the sexes. In this way, she prefigures John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor's utilization 
of habit theory to justify socio-political change. Fittingly, Wollstonecraft concludes this 
chapter - which argues that women's inferior traits have been trained into their character 
through the "cruel" ( 11 7) mental associations enforced by patriarchal society - by 
chastizing the Augustan satirists for ridiculing women for faults that are societal in origin. 
Wollstonecraft's disciple Mill "was among [the] minority who strongly disputed 
the idea that men's larger brains were an indication of higher cerebral activity" (Malane 
9). In The Subjection of Women (1869), Mill (with Taylor) declares the claims of 
physiological psychologists on the matter of "sex in mind" to be entirely specious and 
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"ridiculous," asserting instead that women's minds are shaped by their "entire domestic 
and social position and the whole habit of a life," which provides a "complete 
explanation" for the perceived differences between the sexes (21: 313, 330). Women's 
greater personal sympathy and focus on the present, for example, is a "habit inculcated by 
their whole life" and education rather than inherent qualities of the sex (21: 330). 
Moreover, "if' some of the "hypothetical" observations are "true," Mill suggests, then 
men's brains are demonstrably more habit-based (21: 312).369 This contentious tract 
contests patriarchal a priori philosophical and psychological theories concerning the 
"nature" of women. Far from accusing women of possessing an innate tendency towards 
"preappointed trains of thought," Mill accuses male scientists and physiologists of 
illogical reasoning based on sheer hereditary habits of custom: "so long as the 
psychological laws of the formation of character have been so little studied, even in a 
general way, and in the particular case never scientifically applied at all; so long as the 
most obvious external causes of difference of character are habitually disregarded" (21: 
312), we remain in complete ignorance of human psychology. Mill's radical ethology of 
female character dismantled the misogynist, epistemological habit of "scientifically" 
consigning women to the thralldom of habit. 
As this brief survey of the Victorian gendering of mental science demonstrates, 
habit theory was employed to reinforce women's biologically-based preclusion from 
greater social and political power, and also to disqualify them from the title of first-rate 
practitioners of any art (even the novel) - and implicitly, from the practice of satire, a 
form of art founded upon expansive knowledge, the "questioning habit," and the 
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"sentiment of justice." Ironically, discourses of habit, which more generally 
acknowledged the adaptation of human beings to their social environment, informed 
static and masculinist definitions of female nature. Feminist satirists, following 
Wollstonecraft, seized upon the scientifically and culturally recognized power of habit 
both to attack notions of inherent female weakness, and to expose the destructive egotism 
resulting from masculinist induction. An emphasis on the role of custom in "render[ing] 
habitual, and therefore natural" the character of the sexes (Mill, SW 21: 295), harmonizes 
with Frances Russell's notion of the general movement of Victorian satire towards the 
"democratization" of targets. Feminist satiric fiction resists essentialist ideas that 
women's minds are inherently anti-intellectual and reliant upon the lesser mechanisms of 
habit. Not only are the habits of each sex to a large degree problematized and 
denaturalized, female characters (often figured as satirists) working in concert with 
comprehensively satiric omniscient narrators challenge the mainstream Victorian 
conclusion that women are less capable of the un-habitual thought required for "habit of 
spontaneous criticism" (Spencer, PP 2: 531 ). In fact, following the tradition of the 
marginalized satirist, it is incumbent upon them to attack the "going point of view" 
(Bakhtin, Dialogic 301 ). 
5.iv The "Bitter herbs" of Revisionist Satire in Charlotte Bronte's Shirley 
The current trend in criticism of Shirley is to emphasize Charlotte Bronte's Tory 
and paternalist view of working-class reform over and above the novel's subversive 
arguments. Many critics, it seems, have lost sight of the audacity ofBronte's satiric 
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criticism of mid-Victorian, gendered ideological systems and structures.370 Due to its 
variable narrative voice, dual subjects (historical and domestic), and parodic mode of 
feminism, 371 Shirley (1849) has been cast regularly as a species of the "problem novel" in 
the Bronte canon. I argue that Shirley's generic links with satire, a genre or mode 
regarded by many critics (then and now) with general ambivalence and gender-coded 
anxiety, is an important source of long-standing interpretive confusion. Shirley's 
Menippean critique of totalizing systems, including High Toryism, undermines a myriad 
of inimical social, political, and literary conventions, or "habitual matrices" (sosedstva; 
Bakhtin, Dialogic 169). As the "adventure of an idea," in Bakhtin' s phrase, the novel 
recounts "the condition of women in the English middle-class" (For~ade 143).372 Yet, 
unlike Thackeray's Vanity Fair, with its sexist bachelor narrator and demonized female 
satirist (Becky Sharpe, with her "monster's hideous tail" [Vanity Fair 812]), Bronte's 
social satire undermines the conventional subjects of misogynist literature: misogamy 
(the rhetorical tradition against matrimony), monstrous old maids, an undiscerning Eve, 
and the "unsexed" "Blue Stocking." Such myths are interrogated to expose their social 
destructiveness and artificial basis in convention. As well, gendered divisions of labour 
and love are contested, as Shirley satirizes a cornerstone of patriarchal culture, the denial 
of female intellectuality. 
Shirley's trespass into a customarily masculine genre constitutes both a tribute to 
and a revisionist critique of Thackeray's Vanity Fair (1848)- a novel recently dubbed the 
"the last instance" of "narrative satire in early Victorian Britain" ("Narrative Satire," 
Palmeri 367). In her 1848 Preface to the second edition of Jane Eyre (written during the 
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composition of Shirley), Bronte commends "the satirist of Vanity Fair" for being "the 
first social regenerator of the day." Approvingly, she likens Thackeray to an Old 
Testament prophet who displays "the Greek fire of his sarcasm" "and the "Levin-brand of 
his denunciation" in order to "restore to rectitude the warped system of things." (Preface, 
Jane Eyre 2). In a letter to W. S. Williams (11 December 184 7), she commends 
Thackeray for waging war against the "falsehood and follies of 'the World'" (Letters l: 
627). Thackeray, who did not regard satire as a genre compatible with female writers or 
readers, may have been surprised at Bronte's enthusiasm for his "scalping humour" and 
his "keen, ruthless" satire (Bronte, Letters l: 627).373 But not only did Bronte value the 
socially curative possibility of Thackeray's satire, she attempted in Shirley to expose 
inimical social and literary conventions for the purpose of social regeneration.374 Unlike 
Thackeray's Augustan Vanity Fair, however, with its derisive critique of women's innate 
monomania for love, matrimonial mercenariness, false friendships, and Eve-like 
duplicity, Bronte's satire assails such stereotypes for being the product of societal 
convention.375 As well, Bronte attempts to revise Thackeray's Juvenalian misanthropy in 
favour of a more Horatian humanism.376 Encouraged by Jane Eyre's acceptance by pre-
eminent critics - "Sir John Herschel, Mr Fonblanque, Leigh Hunt and Mr Lewes" (Allott 
172) - Bronte braved the "avenging stones" (S 352) of her censors (the Elizabeth 
Rigbys), and staged the private satire of her heroines Caroline Helstone and Shirley 
Keeldar in the public and traditionally masculine form of panoramic social satire. 
Bronte's novel appropriates Thackeray's Carlylean prophetic and comprehensive register 
(that of the "legitimate High Priest of Truth")377 to threaten a gendered, as well as a 
working-class, "spirit of disaffection against constituted authorities" (S 54). 
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Satire is perennially charged with inartistic disunity and Shirley is no exception. 
Fraser's Magazine (December 1849) declared that the novel was "deficient in connection 
and interest" (Allott 153); The Britannia stated that "more than one half of the work has 
little or no connection with the main story"; and G. H. Lewes found "all unity" "wanting" 
(Allott 139, 164). Similarly, the influential twentieth-century critic Terry Eagleton 
maintains that "formally the book is ripped apart between poetry and documentary" 
(Myths 85). Countering this time-honoured consensus, Andrew and Judith Hook argue for 
a unifying theme: the denial of sympathetic understanding between the middle-classes 
and the working classes, and also between men and women. This overarching theme, they 
propose, conjoins the topic of Luddite unrest with the novel's feminist criticisms.378 
Yet a more formal answer to the charge of disunity - one that does not obviate the 
novel's narrative changeability- is offered by Gisela Argyle in her exploration of the 
"distinct" novelistic subgenres present in Shirley: historical romance, psychological 
romance, and comedy of manners. Argyle proposes that the novel shifts between genres, 
thereby altering the narrator's relation to the characters and to the reader (744).379 
Argyle's assessment of the novel's use of the comedy of manners, however, does not 
accommodate adequately its various satiric modalities (Menippean, Juvenalian, and 
Horatian), which dominate the opening and closing chapters and which consistently 
resurface, not only in the narrator's moral and political commentaries, but also through 
characters' internal monologues and sustained colloquy. In fact, direct and indirect satiric 
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registers permeate the novel, even in Shirley Keeldar' s mystic vision of Eve, a textual 
moment that Argyle classifies as belonging exclusively to "psychological romance," but 
which actually parodies the misogyny of Judeo-Christian traditions. A more capacious 
view of Shirley, one that emphasizes its Menippean qualities, serves both to 
accommodate its generic variability (intertwining novelistic and non-novelistic genres) 
and to highlight its trenchant ironic and parodic representations of literary and social 
convention. Shirley's formal miscellaneity, dense intertextuality (ranging from the Bible 
to Shakespeare and French and English poetry), historical allegory, 380 and, above all, its 
ascendant Menippean theme of the limits of ideological systems and conventions, are all 
narrative dimensions that are reconcilable with both Frye and Bakhtin's conceptions of 
Menippean breadth and parodic criticism. 
Shirley's characters, engaged in explorations of what For9ade termed a "thousand 
moral situations" (145), typically express allegiance to mind-narrowing social ideologies, 
political factions, and religious sects.381 Through extended colloquy, characters reveal 
their restricted and recurrent habits of thought, and are at once satirized for, and 
humanized by, their imperfect judgments and perceptions. Reverend Matthewson 
Hellstone, for example, is a hero-worshiping "high Tory" and "a man almost without 
sympathy" either for operatives, or for women ("he neither respected nor liked the sex") 
(S 37, 114-15).382 His opponent, Hiram Yorke, is a Whig who favours revolt and speaks 
of equality, but lacks an "Organ of veneration" - and "there are many Hiram Y orkes in 
the world" (S 48). Politically inconsistent, Robert Moore will support any party that 
promotes his "own interest" as a tradesman and "thoroughgoing progressist" (S 31 ). 
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Robert discovers that ignoring his affection for Caroline is a "new system" that is "easier 
to practice" in his "mill-yard, amidst busy occupations" (S 122). In the novel's opening 
chapters, the three men assert their political positions in "wordy combat" (S 56), only to 
find unanimity on one subject: women and marriage. Each is a misogamist who mistrusts 
marriage for other than mercenary purposes. Helstone and Yorke's ambivalence towards 
Mary Cave and matrimony in general is echoed by Robert, who reveals, in a chapter-long 
conversation with the ostentatiously misogynist Peter Augustus Malone, that his 
antagonism to the mill workers is equal to his antipathy to domesticity and matrimony. 
There are shades of Pope's "Of the Characters of Women" in Robert's condemnation of 
the "'tribe of the Misses Sykes"' - "first the dark, then the light one. Now the red-haired 
Miss Armitage,"' and in his curse: "'Oh, que le diable emporte - ! "'("the devil take them 
away") (S 23, 25). Each man's views are held "on system," revealing that misogamy, 
unlike Toryism and Whiggism, is a unifying historical and rhetorical practice. 
Other characters, endowed with even more "Menippean-blood" (Frye), represent 
diverse forms of bigotry. The Luddite rebel and religious zealot Moses Barraclough 
predictably delivers his hate-inciting invectives; Michael Hartley, the drunken 
Antinomian and "violent Jacobin" weaver, is particularly maddened by fanaticism ("his 
mind is always running on regicide" [S 15]). Additionally, the Sympsons are "Church 
people" who are caricatured for their "narrow system"; they exhibit "exactly-regulated 
lives, feelings, manners, habits," and their daughters follow "a certain young-ladies'-
school-room code of laws" (S 453-54).383 Yet, despite the narrator's Horatian reluctance 
to curse and condemn characters for their habits of thought, the text alternates between 
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gently rebuking and acridly denouncing figures such as the "Puseyite" curates, who 
epitomize a general social practice: the habitual loss of sympathy to narrow systems and 
selfish interests.384 Shirley's Menippean satire also fluctuates between a lenient Horatian 
analysis of Robert's Smilesean materialism and knee-jerk misogyny, and a comparatively 
Juvenalian denunciation of the mental rigidity of those such as Yorke, Barraclough, 
Malone, and Mr Sympson. In summary, the majority of Shirley's characters express a 
reductively prejudicial and restrictedly sympathetic approach to their many-sided social 
milieu; their dialogic interactions dramatize the dangers of monologic, systemically 
truncated thought. 385 
5.v "Levitical": A Precis of Shirley's Satire 
Not surprisingly, given how forcefully it establishes the overarching satiric tenor 
of the novel, Shirley's archly scornful first chapter, "Levitical," raised a critical storm 
that, in retrospect, revealed a great deal concerning mid-Victorian anxieties about female-
authored and feminist satire.386 Shirley's battle against conventionality is formally 
apparent in the initial chapter's parody of novelistic decorum. The narrator lampoons the 
representational systems of both "romance" and "realism" by abandoning the realist 
illusion in order to warn readers not to expect sensational "romantic" subjects, but 
"something unromantic as Monday morning" (S 5). Moreover, in a classical gesture of 
satire, the novel is offered as a "meal" in which the "first dish" will be ungarnished "cold 
lentiles and vinegar without oil; it shall be unleavened bread with bitter herbs and no 
roast lamb" (S 5). In other words, the novelist promises a lam: satura filled with 
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unappealing but nourishing truths. Along with the characters, the reader is implicitly 
accused of being "starved on a few prejudices" (S 453). The narrator returns to this 
blatantly ironic metafictional mode in the final chapter, "Winding-up," in order to 
"dispos[ e ]" of both the reader and the characters in the crass language of a business 
contract: "Yes, reader, we must settle accounts now" (S 632). Additionally, the narrator 
proposes a contemptuous (more than playful) challenge to the reader, to discover a moral. 
This gesture is very much an attack on convention-bound moralists like Rigby. How 
could critics who wished to avoid "coarse" and "vulgar" subjects (and genres, such as 
satire), and who chastise Caroline Helstone for "the unfeminine display of her 
feelings,"387 comprehend the "moral" of a text that asserts that, to quote Bronte's 1847 
Preface to the second edition of Jane Eyre, "Conventionality is not morality" (1 ). Both at 
the outset and the conclusion of the novel, Shirley's predominantly satirical narrator 
mocks a hidebound readership that will resent and resist unromantic truths. 388 
"Levitical" describes not a sacred, but a satirical feast. Providing a spectacle of 
unruly convivial habits, Joseph Donne, Davy Sweeting, and Malone demonstrate both 
their lack of basic table manners and their ineptitude as curates who "ought to be doing a 
great deal of good," but instead "quibble" routinely over ecclesiastical "frivolities which 
seemed empty as bubbles to all save themselves" (S 5, 9). Inveterately negligent curates 
debase their link to the apostolic dignity of the honorable Levites (priests of Israel). Even 
Helstone regards his curates "sardonically," condemning their lack of "chivalric 
sentiments" (S 18). Thus, Shirley's opening satiric feast displays a perennial theme of 
satire: "the disappearance of the heroic" (Frye, Anatomy 228). Discredited in intellectual 
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and moral stature, the curates are stripped of patristic authority. In their unsympathetic 
insularity, they symbolize the clerical and patriarchal structures of England that are 
systematically blind to the "moral earthquake" that is brewing. And, as the narrator 
cynically observes, "as is usual in such cases, nobody took much notice" (S 30). 
Importantly, "Levitical" adumbrates Shirley's exposure of another bad habit of 
England's patriarchy: misogyny. The first consciousness the satiric narrator focalizes is 
that of Mrs Gale. "[A] spark of the hot kitchen fire is in her eye" (S 7) as she privately 
condemns the curates' scornful, misogynistic ways. Tellingly, the first words spoken in 
the text are Malone's rude demand for more bread - "'Cut it, woman"' - but the 
housekeeper revolts privately: "Had she followed her inclinations, she would have cut the 
parson also" (S 8). The trenchantly satiric treatment of the curates in "Levitical" is carried 
forward in the narrative through Caroline and Shirley's disdain for this chorus of 
unsuitable bachelors. Buffoonishly, Donne (and Malone) attempt to court Shirley for her 
money; however, Donne's anti-Yorkshire egotism and crass materialism spur Shirley to 
evict him from her home. Sustained satirical representation of the curates encapsulates 
the text's anatomy of both public and domestic patriarchal authority. 
G. H. Lewes, among others, did not appreciate the opening chapter's allegory of 
derelict patriarchal authority; instead, he argued that the representation of the "vulgar and 
offensive" curates "betrays a female and inexperienced hand" (Allott I 69). With its 
portentous heading "Mental Equality of the Sexes? Female Literature" (Edinburgh 
Review, January I 850), Lewes's review of Shirley demonstrates his own curate-like 
sexism. The critique begins with the argument that because maternity is women's chief 
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biological function, women's intellectual and artistic achievements are necessarily 
curtailed.389 Significantly, Lewes discredits the possibility of an intellectually 
authoritative female nove1ist (in his pre-George Eliot era), for he dismisses both Bronte's 
subject matter and the novel's aggressive style as expressions of "over-masculine vigour" 
- inexcusable in a "lady novelist."390 Revealingly, Lewes stipulates that women cannot be 
successful humourists; they have never matched Swift, Fielding, Smollett, or Thackeray, 
for they are incapable of "comic energy." At the very most, they can achieve a "quiet 
smile" (Allott 162). In both "Levitical" and the novel as a whole, Lewes disapproves of 
Bronte's "unladylike," satiric representations of historical and political subjects.391 
Furthermore, as his preoccupation with "sex in mind" debates suggest, Lewes is stung by 
Shirley's ridicule of misogynistic myths, particularly the one in which he is so clearly 
invested: female unintellectuality.392 
5.vi Caroline and Shirley's "Bluestocking club" 
Satiric inclination and intellectual affinity are central to Caroline Helstone's 
character and her friendship with Shirley Keeldar. Thus, not surprisingly, Lewes 
denounces the verisimilitude of both Caroline's character and her relationship with 
Shirley, pronouncing Caroline's meditations on the condition of women to be radically 
discordant with her quiescent character. He considers Shirley's "remarkable tirade" 
against Milton to be "destroyed by the unlikelihood" of it occurring in the context of a 
"quiet conversation between two young ladies" (Allott 168). Thus Lewes's negative 
review inadvertently uncovers the degree to which Caroline and Shirley's satiric colloquy 
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subverts culturally current and masculinist notions of realism structured upon the 
assumed general weakness of the female intellect. Fundamentally, Lewes rejects Caroline 
and Shirley's intellectual rapport (their like-minded engagement with literature and 
politics). Yet, their mental connection is praised by the narrator: "The minds of the two 
girls being toned in harmony, often chimed very sweetly together" (S 225).393 
Despite her gentle demeanour and retiring "habits" (S 220), Caroline scorns 
mindless custom. Her thoughts are consistently unconventional and frequently satiric; she 
disdains the curates, the genteel Misses Sykes, and the mindless "feminine" tasks of 
darning and sewing (especially the coercive charity of the "Jew's Basket"). Hortense 
observes that her student is '"not sufficiently girlish and submissive"'; in fact, she catches 
Caroline "'curling her lip, absolutely with scorn"' at Racine's poems 
(S 67-8). Although not formally educated, Caroline is self-taught and "ha[s] a knowledge 
of her own - desultory but varied" (S 76). Thus energetic, amateur intellectualism jars 
with her culture's feminine ideal of being "uniformly sedate and decorous, without being 
unaccountably pensive" (S 67). A key illustration of Caroline's intellectual rigour is her 
instruction to Robert to read "the haughty speech of Caius Marcius" to the starving in 
Shakespeare's Coriolanus, hoping that his identification with the inflexible hero will 
expand his moral sense and help him to "'ste[p] out of the narrow line of private 
prejudice ... [and] revel in the large picture of human nature"' (S 91 ). Essentially, 
Caroline warns Robert of the bad mental habits that undermine his character: "'Certain 
ideas have become too fixed in your mind"' (S 72). Nancy Armstrong regards Caroline's 
(and also Shirley's) moral redemption of Robert as a prime example of the ideological 
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role of domestic fiction to redeem the middle-class capitalist male through the moral 
discourses of domesticity. This view, however, de-emphasizes the fact that Caroline's 
instruction is not solely based upon sentiment: it is philosophical, political, psychological, 
and literary. Externally and superficially, Caroline is regarded by her community as an 
exemplary young lady, docile and gentle; yet privately, she is an "intellectual boa-
constrictor,"394 who rages against the status quo. Both Shirley and Robert are aware (and 
Mrs Yorke learns) that Caroline is not as tractable as she appears. "'I have seen her flash 
out,"' Robert insists (S 363). Caroline's enraged criticism oflife-curtailing convention is 
comparable to what Bronte observes of the surprising severity of Thackeray's satire: the 
"electric-death spark" is hidden by "lambent sheet-lightening" (184 7 Preface, Jane Eyre 
2). 
In her fearless clear-sightedness, Caroline shares with the narrator the stern vow 
of a satirist: "to see things as they [are]" (S 172).395 Juvenalian inclinations surface as she 
ruminates (in a series of Wollstonecraftian internal monologues) upon instituted 
inequities of her social environment. Mainly, she resents the "wide and deep chasm" (S 
102) that exists between the male public domain (rich with varied interests) and the 
female domestic realm (characterized by a "mental condition" of "wondrous narrowness" 
in which love "always" dominates [S 172, 391]). She meditates continually upon the 
culturally entrenched mental estrangement between the sexes. Evincing what Spencer 
regarded as an exclusively masculine trait, the "questioning habit," she spends "long, 
lonely" days "talking inwardly in the same strain" (S 389, 175). In the commanding 
monologue that provides the climax to Volume Two, Caroline denounces the 
complacency with which social "ills" are regarded; she apprehends that social habit 
supports the "stagnant state of things," ironizing the ascendant view: 
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Old maids, like the houseless and unemployed poor, should not ask for a 
place and an occupation in the world: the demand disturbs the happy and 
rich: it disturbs parents. Look at the numerous families of girls in this 
neighbourhood .... The brothers of these girls are every one in business or 
in professions; they have something to do: their sisters have no earthly 
employment, but household work and sewing .... This stagnant state of 
things make them decline in health: they are never well; and their minds 
and views shrink to wondrous narrowness .... The gentlemen turn them 
into ridicule: they don't want them; they hold them very cheap: they say -
I have heard them say it with sneering laughs many a time - the 
matrimonial market is overstocked. (S 391) 
Caroline discredits the logic of her society's misogynistic practices, including the 
commodification and destruction of women ("they are never well"). In classic satiric 
form, her anatomy of inequitable society accrues angry rhetorical questions, and 
culminates in an admonishing and prophetic apostrophe to "the Men of England," 
demanding that they unfetter the minds of their daughters for society's well-being. 
Caroline holds that women have the right to self-improvement, economic self-
sufficiency, and mental culture. Importantly, her angry meditation also demystifies 
chivalry, the crux of masculine heroism. Instead of adoring and protecting women, men 
satirize them with "sneering laughs." In this philosophical tirade, Caroline's ireful 
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contempt for social injustice matches the comprehensive criticism frequently displayed 
by the omniscient satiric narrator. For example, in the Carly lean chastisement of the 
English merchant classes that launches the chapter "Old Maids," the narrator diagnoses 
England as being "sick at heart" from the class-estranging cant of "cold-hearted" 
Mammonism (S 167). Epitomizing Shirley's persistently gendered satire on political (and 
mental) economy, the chapter then shifts to focalize Caroline's assessment of Robert's 
unsympathetic "state of mind" as a "man of business" whose "thoughts were running in 
no familiar or kindly channel" (S 171-72). In a way that typifies the text's dialogic 
interaction between the narrator's satire and Caroline's, the evaluation of the habitual 
intellectual and emotional estrangement of the sexes merges with the narrative's class 
criticisms. Both Caroline and the narrator are critics of the dehumanizing socio-economic 
habit of "Cash-Payment" as the "universal sole nexus" of human relations (Carlyle, 
Chartism 1839;.193).396 
Caroline's satiric acuity is catalyzed by social entrapment and marginality. As a 
woman, not only is she a "cheap" commodity, but by remaining single she will "come 
under the lash of [society's] sarcasm" (S 177). Voicing the "going opinion," for example, 
Robert demonizes the "old maids" Miss Mann and Miss Ainley, calling them monstrous 
Medusas. Caroline confesses that she too accepted this stereotype, but upon visiting Miss 
Ainley ("the complete old maid" in appearance) she realizes that "in real life" Ainley has 
a "serene, unselfish, and benignant mind" (S 181-83). Miss Mann, however, is a fiercely 
retaliative satirist who routinely "flay[ s] alive certain of the families in the 
neighbourhood" with "pitiless ... moral anatomy" (S 179). Recalling that Juvenalian satire 
from Dryden onwards shares a kinship with tragedy, the narrator cautions readers to 
remember that cankers naturally grow in those inured to long suffering, declaring that 
only those who lack a proper sense of truth would find Miss Mann herself "a proper 
subject for satire" (S 182). 
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Caroline's affinity with the bitter Miss Mann, through her own Juvenalian 
insularity and pessimism (Shirley speculates that her friend might "'weep gall"' (S 233]), 
is countered by her hope for curative social change. She predicts that new practices will 
slowly "alter" the malaise of mill-workers and women. In the meantime, she prescribes 
for herself a life of self-sacrifice which "needed only habit to make it practicable and 
agreeable" (S 183). It becomes clear, however, that for Caroline (unlike Dickens's Esther 
Summerson), a regime of self-denial is untenable. Instead, her unsatisfied desire for 
change, which runs counter to Victorian theories of the female mental affinity for 
sameness, guarantees her "habitual sadness" (S 422). It is crucial to note that Caroline's 
despair is not rooted exclusively in unrequited love. Instead, it is catalyzed by the "brain-
lethargy" (S 120) created by her lack of vocation and compounded by the absence of 
parental love. Starved on the "light literature" of her uncle's library, and"[ c ]loseted" in 
the "narrow chamber" of her bedroom at the Rectory, her daily life offers a limited range 
of habitual associations (S 389, 173). Despising the death-like monotony of her life, she 
insists, '"I am not well and I need a change"': "'I wish it fifty times a day. As it is, I often 
wonder what I came into the world for. I long to have something absorbing and 
compulsory to fill my head and hands, and to occupy my thoughts"' (S 229). Prohibited 
by her uncle from seeking "a situation," she resolves to have agency over her habitual 
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thoughts. For example, she trains her mind not to think of her affection for Robert: she 
"always now habitually thought of it and mentioned it in the most scanty measure" (S 
228). Yet, without other "absorbing and compulsory" pursuits, she succumbs to "old 
associations" and the "power of habit," routinely walking by Hollow's Mill and waiting 
by the window to catch a glimpse of Robert (S 233). The power of disciplinary habit 
proves insufficient to "stun" her anguish (S 229, 184), and, true to the axioms of 
Victorian mental theory, her body and mind decline in unison. Interrupting this 
debilitating trajectory, however, Caroline's Horatian hopes materialize through the 
"happy change" (S 223) of meeting Shirley Keeldar. 
The narrator imports the language of Victorian habit theory to describe how the 
friendship gives "a turn ... to [Caroline's] thoughts; a new channel was opened for them, 
which, diverting a few of them at least from the one direction in which all had hitherto 
tended, abated the impetuosity of their rush, and lessened the force of their pressure on 
one worn-down point" (S 223). Shirley, a "gallant little cavalier," functions (in 
conjunction with Mrs Pryor) like a romance hero to save Caroline from what Rose Yorke 
refers to as her '"long slow death in ... Briarfield Rectory"' (S 229, 399). In doing so, she 
parodies defunct masculine heroism. 397 Their friendship, which develops in the natural 
setting of Nunnwood (where, b,oth agree, the "presence of gentlemen dispels the charm" 
[ S 214 ]), permits the exploration of their feminist and satiric inclinations, which are 
prohibited in public. (Even Mrs Pryor wishes to censor their subjects.) Shirley's 
declaration to Caroline summarizes the license of their privacy: "'Cary we are alone, we 
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may speak what we think'" (S 214, 318). In multiple scenes involving extensive and rapid 
verbal exchanges, the friends dismantle their culture's misogynist stereotypes. 
In contrast to Caroline, however, Shirley is typically a light-hearted critic. This is 
exemplified by her attempt to alleviate Caroline's gloominess by proposing an excursion 
to the Faroe Isles; proud of her fanciful efforts, she exclaims,"'! made her laugh: I have 
done her good"' (S 244). Caroline, with her faded appearance and bitter wisdom -
"[w]inter seemed conquering her spring" (S 184)- is reminiscent of Frye's association of 
winter with annihilating irony and satire, whereas Shirley's vibrant appearance signals 
the regenerative, spring-like Horatian mode. She gives Fieldhead' s workers a "good-
humoured rating" (S 355), and similarly rebukes the curates and their rector, while 
offering them nosegays of spring flowers. Importantly, when she upbraids Robert for 
proposing to her like a '"brigand who demanded [her] purse,"' she shames and reforms 
him: "'Her words were like a mirror in which I saw myselr" (S 534). In her habitual 
persona of "Captain Shirley Keeldar, Esquire," she exposes, through mimicry, the 
substantially economic nature of masculine authority. Having been ostracized from 
decisions made by the district's male authorities regarding the Luddite unrest, she 
realizes that, despite her monetary power, her authority in Yorkshire's West Riding is 
merely titular. In retaliation, she attempts to avert an uprising through the domestic 
means at her disposal: "good works." Shirley is transgressively active and opinionated 
(even Helstone enjoys her repartee, despite his fear "that something in petticoats was 
somehow trying to understand and to acquire too much influence" [S 272]). Yet, despite 
Shirley's merry plotting, socially unifying spirit of charity, and outspoken reprimands to 
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Donne, Malone, Yorke, and Sympson, she remains, on balance, immured (like all 
women) in the domestic world - compelled to keep a covert "sentinel survey of life" (S 
273). As Gilbert and Gubar cogently state, "Shirley seems condemned to play the roles 
she parodies" (588). Ultimately, Shirley's clipped freedom (as the mistress and not the 
master of Fieldhead) dramatizes that female social and political authority is, at best, 
inescapably indirect. Her steadfast belief in the goodness of humanity, however, is 
thoroughly Horatian - as is her role as guardian of her beloved Yorkshire community. 
In contrast to Caroline's indignant critique of the "mental gulf' between the 
sexes, Shirley playfully denounces misogynist literary mythography. Agreeing that 
poetry "refines vision," she and Caroline are clandestine literary critics (as well as 
potential poets). Caroline, for example, is merciless in her biographical criticism of 
Cowper and Rousseau: "'I scorn them. They are made of clay and gold. The refuse and 
the ore make a mass of weakness: taken together, I feel them unnatural, unhealthy, 
repulsive"' (S 228). Shirley mimics "masculine" surprise at Caroline's verdict and 
wonders who "taught her" such ideas; Caroline replies that "[t]he voice we hear in 
solitude" told her all that she knows, and returns the masculinist jab: "'you are not 
learned, Shirley"' (S 228, 343). Shirley's reply is a hyberbolic and self-parodic 
contestation of men's estimation of women: "'I'm as ignorant as a stone"' (S 353). 
Undercutting such overstated modesty, Shirley stands before her looking glass and 
anatomizes literary convention. The context of her critique functions to reclaim the 
mirror, a customary symbol of female vanity and masculine satire, for feminist critical 
reflection: 
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'If men could see us as we really are, they would be a little amazed; but 
the cleverest, the acutest men are often under an illusion about women: 
they do not read them in a true light; they misapprehend them, both for 
good and evil: their good woman is a queer thing, half doll, half angel; 
their bad woman almost always a fiend. Then to hear them fall into 
extasies with each other's creations, worshipping the heroine of such a 
poem - novel - drama, thinking it fine - divine! Fine and divine it may be, 
but often quite artificial ... [I]f I gave my real opinion of some first-rate 
female characters in first-rate works, where should I be? Dead under a 
cairn of avenging stones in half an hour.' (S 352) 398 
This disquisition identifies a systematic error across most literature: a mythical evaluation 
of women. Such falsifying patriarchal fantasies, she asserts, "always" impede the 
judgment of the "cleverest of men." Shirley's speech not only contests the exclusivity of 
the masculine capacity for "first-rate" genius - cavalierly insisted upon by Darwin, 
Romanes, Lewes, and others - but charges all literary patriarchs with the habituated 
incapacity to comprehend half the human race. Although the allegorized poet, whom the 
narrator associates with originality and truth, is figured as a man who "laughs in his 
sleeve" (S 49) at the folly of the world, Shirley typically associates women with the truth-
seeking poetic imagination. In the Yorke family, for instance, it is Rose and Jessie whose 
original ideas are "trampled on and repressed" - Jessie, in particular, "had something of 
the genius of humour in her nature" (S 148, 407). Shirley will never write the poems of 
which she is capable (or the magazine article), but in the company of Caroline, she is a 
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secret bluestocking whose feminist criticisms are freely expressed.399 Her hyperbolic 
argument concerning the certainty of public execution if she were miraculously to print 
her literary criticism of the "first-rate" male authors of the day satirically foregrounds the 
mid-Victorian textual necessity of disguising feminist dissent. 
The chapter title, "Which the genteel reader is recommended to skip, low persons 
being here introduced," ironically and self-reflexively announces the chapter's 
heterodoxy to conformist readers who deny rationality to both the "lower" classes and to 
women. Fulfilling its promise of subversion, the chapter showcases Shirley's vision of 
Eve as a powerful Titan, who, being Adam's equal, is not '"Milton's Eve'" (S 319): 
'Milton's Eve! Milton's Eve! I repeat. No, by the pure Mother of God, she 
is not! ... Milton was great; but was he good? His brain was right; how 
was his heart? He saw Heaven: he looked down on Hell. He saw Satan, 
and Sin his daughter, and Death their horrible offspring .... Milton tried 
to see the first woman; but, Cary, he saw her not.' (S 320) 
Caroline is awed by her friend's literary heresy: '"you are bold to say so, Shirley'" (S 
320).400 Implicitly referencing Book V of Paradise Lost, in which Eve prepares "dulcet 
creams" and various refreshments for Adam and the Archangel Raphael, Shirley proposes 
with satiric bathos: "'it was his cook that he saw; or it was Mrs Gill"' (S 320). Eve was 
not a secondary creation, Shirley insists, but a "heaven-born" Titan who "yielded the 
daring which could contend with Omnipotence" (S 320). After this satiric disclaimer of 
Milton's decree that, as Eve is Adam's intellectual inferior, "nothing lovelier can be 
found I In woman, than to study household good" (Paradise Lost IX, 232-3), Shirley falls 
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into rhapsodical contemplation of her matriarchal progenitor.401 Her vision, rather than an 
instance of "embarrassing" visionary feminism (Eagleton, Myths 58), is an excoriating 
feminist exegesis of Milton. Once again, Shirley offers intellectual and moral criticism of 
public patriarchal practices from the margins of the private sphere.402 
Aptly, following Shirley's (re)vision of Eve and rebuke of Milton, the friends 
encounter the misogynist Joe Scott, who rails against "petticoat government" (S 327) and 
refuses to talk to them about politics. Citing Pauline disparagement of the female 
intellect, Joe declares that women lack judgment, because Eve was the first to sin. Shirley 
retaliates by stating, '"more shame to Adam to sin with his eyes open!'" (S 329). Caroline 
is then provoked to reject St Paul's injunctions, insisting on the possibility of wrongful 
translation from the original Greek.403 In this chapter, signaled as being subversive, 
Miltonic and patristic exegesis are satirized for misrepresenting female intelligence. It 
must be emphasized that Caroline and Shirley's mutual vow to marry men whom they 
intellectually esteem - men to whom '"mind is added'" (S 219) - and the scarcity of 
contenders for their respect, rebelliously contravenes Victorian assumptions concerning 
women's inherent (and "scientifically" proven) intellectual inferiority. 
In Shirley's notoriously ambivalent final chapter, Horatian and Juvenalian 
elements exist in tension.404 The metafictional narrator expresses parodic awareness that 
the implicit rules of the nineteenth-century novel militating against satire mandate that 
"the unvarnished truth does not answer" and that "plain facts will not digest" (S 632). 
Unpleasant social facts remain as unpalatable as Malone's debauchery and the "dark 
truth" (S 541) ofHelstone's (and others') misogyny. If temporary peace exists between 
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managers and the operatives in the West Riding, nineteenth-century readers would have 
known that unrest would be reborn in the Chartist agitations of the 1840s. The equivocal 
narrator hints that the economic stabilization from the repeal of the Orders in Council 
"might be delusive" (S 637). Furthermore, the perpetual social grievances of women are 
hardly palliated by Caroline and Shirley's successful marriages to men who are not of the 
Helstone type. Critics such as Juliet Barker, who argue that the feminist trajectory of the 
novel is overthrown by Shirley's protracted, even masochistic, submission to her 
"master" Louis, ignore the narrator's flagrant narrative advice to read the ending 
suspiciously.405 The final chapter's Juvenalian implications are well-supported by Gilbert 
and Gubar's excavation of the "ominous" inferences surrounding Robert's proposal to 
Caroline; for example, he likens her to the Virgin Mary, recalling Madonna-like 
descriptions of the condemned Mary Cave. Thus, in the imperfect social landscape of the 
text, where the "powerful effects of public myths" (Gilbert and Gubar 376) hold sway, 
Shirley and Caroline's relationship is relegated to its socially sanctioned, secondary 
place. Likely, trips to Nunnwood and the Faroe Isles will never materialize. Instead, the 
friends assist with one another's wedding dresses and, rather than embarking upon 
"learned professions" (S 229), they will teach Sunday school. Through the quotidian 
future of its heroines, the narrative tacitly acknowledges the lack of a social place for a 
re-visioned Eve in "mercantile, postlapsarian England" (Gilbert and Gubar 398). As 
Shuttleworth acutely argues, the text "persistently offers radical visions of female 
potentiality ... only to then expose the illusory nature of such dreams" by leaving 
Caroline and Shirley as "rigorous guardians" of the edicts of the male order (Bronte 213) 
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- rather than its satirical censors. In addition, the narrator apocalyptically predicts that 
nature itself, which is consistently feminized throughout the narrative, will be further 
trampled upon by "manufacturer's day-dreams embodied in substantial stone and brick 
and ashes" (S 645). Eventually, the fairies (as figures of the dialogic imagination) will be 
evacuated. 
At one level, then, the stifling of feminist possibility in Shirley is itself the "bitter 
herbs" of satiric realism promised in "Levitical." Yet, amid these signs of social stasis 
and the industrial destruction of nature, Shirley's conclusion simultaneously provides 
evidence of social amelioration. Robert and Caroline's courtship is represented through 
the surprising medium of Martin Yorke's inward reflections as he embarks upon a 
conversion from misogamy and misogyny to non-sexist sympathy. Temporarily Martin 
becomes a central character as he gains affectionate sympathy for Caroline - and, by 
extension, her sex. His original vow - "'I mean always to hate women; they're such 
dolls: ... I'll never marry: I'll be a bachelor"' (S 158) - is broken, and he becomes an 
adoring groomsman at Caroline's wedding. His "transfiguration" (S 151) parallels and 
invokes the text's primary one: Robert Moore's retraction of misogyny and lack of 
general social sympathy. Even Helstone, sobered by the near-death of his niece, 
condescends to make her tea; and Shirley defies socially ascendant bigotry and the 
"domestic vice" of mercenary marriages to wed for love. Arguably, what Forc;ade refers 
to as the novel's "satirical shafts" at the institution of marriage, are, on balance, Horatian, 
for the "young people marry just the same" (Allott 145). As well, the novel's Juvenalian 
rage and pessimism is countered by demonstrations of curative sympathy, for many 
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events within the narrative function rhetorically to moderate the "temper" of overly bitter 
satire, the kind of satire that the narrator implicitly (and rather hypocritically) censures. 
Miss Mann, after all, is chastised for performing her satire "like some surgeon practicing 
with his scalpel on a lifeless subject" (S 179). Thus, the seeming victory of domestic 
novelistic convention and Horatian satire permits the passage of the novel's more 
ideologically disruptive and Juvenalian satire past the "violent censure" (For9ade 145) of 
critics, safely into literary history. A strongly satiric novel, replete with Menippean 
themes, Shirley links the domestic and public social spheres in overarching ideological 
and social criticism, and conducts, through a subversively intellectual female friendship, 
a scathing feminist critique of literary and social misogyny. 
5. vii The Unflattering Mirror of Feminist Satire: Hereditary Habits of 
Masculine Egotism in Middlemarch 
If Charlotte Bronte - of whom it was declared, "[ n ]ever was there a better 
hater"406 - is rarely associated with satire, it is unsurprising that George Eliot, the sage of 
social sympathy, has been critically distanced from the genre. Recalling the discussion in 
Chapter 3 of the traditional taxonomic polarity of satire and sympathy, and also Eliot's 
use of Horatian satire in Silas Marner as a mode compatible with the religion of 
sympathy, I will position Middlemarch as a feminist satire on gendered habits of egotism 
within the Horatian tradition of satire - excepting, as always, occasional Juvenalian 
dialogism. Selfishness is Middlemarch's broad satiric subject; but more specifically, 
inurement to societal misogyny is exposed as the source of debilitating and sympathy-
disabling "spots of commonness" (M 141 ), particularly among the town's male 
population. 
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As I discussed in Chapter 3, critics who focus on Eliot's theory of realism often 
presume her novelistic practice to be antithetical to satire. Yet Eliot's contemporary 
critics were keenly (and adversely) attuned to the satire pervading her novels. Reviewers 
of Middlemarch routinely measured its relative proportions of combative satire and 
disarming sentiment. The reviewer for The Daily News (28 November 1871 ), for 
example, was displeased to find Dorothea Brooke's "fond aspirations" depicted "with 
what looks to the reader painfully like sly and yet half sympathetic sarcasm" (Holmstrom 
and Lerner 78). R. H. Hutton, who commended Silas Marner for its lack of "a single 
cynical Thackerayism," complained that occasionally the "bitterness of [Middlemarch's] 
commentary on life is almost cynical" (Carroll 175, 297). The reviewer for Blackwood's 
Magazine (December 1872) found that the novel reveals the "unrealities of religion" with 
"a satire whose lash is not the less cutting because it is laid on with the most delicate 
wrist-play" (92). 407 Finally, The Academy (1 January 1873) characterized the novel's 
moral and "satirical insight" as being "at once so charitable and so melancholy" (Carroll 
325).408 Recently, Christopher Lane, in his relentless exposure of the unresolved 
misanthropy lurking in avowedly altruistic Victorian novels, persuasively explores the 
dialogic interruptions of enmity within Eliot's amity-promoting texts. Middlemarch, he 
posits, despite the narrator's assertions of the ideal of fellow feeling, "endlessly catalogs 
what destroys sympathy" (Lane 134). Although Lane does not address satire, his 
observations highlight the satiric component of Eliot's realist project. The Horatian satiric 
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ideal - as articulated in Eliot's essay on Heinrich Heine (1856) and by her persona of 
Theophrastus Such - blends the "electric shock" of wit that "takes us by violence" with 
palliating sympathy to produce moral humour ("Heine" 71). Also illuminating Eliot's 
satiric practice is a letter to John Blackwood (11 June 1857) in which she defends the 
verisimilitude of Scenes of Clerical Life (1858) and addresses Blackwood's notion that 
the work is Thackerayan in its view of human nature.409 Eliot defines her true-to-life use 
of irony: "My irony, so far as I understand myself, is not directed against opinions -
against any class of religious values - but against the vices and weaknesses that belong to 
human nature in every sort of clothing" (Letters 2: 513). Her goal, she explains, is not to 
be "offensive," but to "touch every heart among [her] readers with nothing but loving 
humor, with tenderness, with belief in goodness." Trenchantly, however, she insists upon 
the moral importance of presenting "disagreeable truths": "In this respect, at least, I may 
have some resemblance to Thackeray, though I am not conscious of being in any way a 
disciple of his, unless it constitute discipleship to think him ... on the whole the most 
powerful of living novelists" (Letters 2: 513). Eliot's letter suggests that, contrary to 
Jerome Meckier's argument in Hidden Rivalries, she did not radically oppose 
Thackerayan satire in the "realism wars of the 50s and 60s" (8).410 Rather, Eliot's regard 
for the moral importance of sympathetic yet intrepid satire parallels Bronte's notion that 
"sentiment" "extracts the venom from that formidable Thackeray, and converts what 
might be only corrosive poison into purifying elixir."411 
Aaron Matz observes that Eliot's "satirical temper" has been "overlooked or 
misunderstood" in the last century of criticism ("Satire" 6). Interested in the under-
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studied intersection of satire and realism, he argues that Eliot's theory of realism shares a 
complementary goal with satire's moral "obligation" to present a "fundamentally 
accurate view of the world" ("Satire" 32). 412 Also, George Levine's assessment of Eliot's 
"moral realism" implies the imbrication of satire and realism. Levine asserts that "[t]he 
energizing principle of George Eliot's art was realism"; this, he insists, is a "mode that 
depends heavily on reaction against what the writer takes to have been 
misrepresentations" - and is thus a "rebellious mode" ("George Eliot" 7).413 Furthermore, 
Levine links Eliot's "witty and even caustic" critical essays to her fictional method.414 
This gesture recalls a contemporary review of The Impression of Theophrastus Such in 
the New York Times (16 June 1879), which insists that Eliot's later novels, "nine-tenths 
essays," resemble the philosophical and critical mode of Theophrastus Such, with its 
"peculiar kind" of "sub-acid satire" ("George Eliot's Essays"). One target of Eliot's 
persistent satiric interest that also reflects upon her critical method is what Levine 
proclaims to be the paramount theme of her fiction: "There is no general doctrine which 
is not capable of eating out our morality if unchecked by the deep-seated habit of direct 
fellow-feeling with individual fellow-men" (M 582). For Eliot, the humanizing 
importance of habitual sympathy is critical to all "general doctrines" and practices -
perhaps especially to corrosive satire. 
5. viii "[H]ard grains" of Habit 
As revealed by her journalism and letters as well as her fiction, Eliot engages in 
constant dialogue with the intellectuals of the period who are particularly invested in the 
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multivalent role of habit in the processes of social and psychical evolution: Lewes, 
Spencer, Mill, Carpenter, and others. Her writings, like those of her peers, regularly 
investigate the constitutive and habit-sustained links between the individual mind and the 
social medium: "'It is the habit of my imagination to strive after as full a vision of the 
medium in which a character moves as of the character itself. "'415 All of her novels depict 
the minute operation of "irreversible laws within and without [the individual], which, 
governing the habits, becomes morality" (Eliot, Mill 288). Middlemarch's focus on the 
subtle interactions of organic interdependence, however, is so pronounced that Sally 
Shuttleworth terms the text "a work of experimental science" (Eliot 143).416 As Nancy 
Paxton outlines, Eliot supports a theory of science which contests a priori assumptions 
but acknowledges that the human mind is capable of inspired insight. Aptly, Lydgate's 
scientific theory and practice support the notion of an "inward light" that transcends 
tradition (and even reason) to discover truth through the painstaking habit of 
"provisionally framing" the object "and correcting it to more and more exactness of 
relation" (M 154). Ironically, Lydgate's scientific method also comments on his own 
provisional nature, for the formation of his character is described as a kind of gamble, 
based on the probable outcome of the interactions between his inward traits, free will, and 
outward circumstances: 
He was at a starting-point which makes many a man's career a fine subject 
for betting, if there were any gentlemen given to that amusement who 
could appreciate the complicated probabilities of an arduous purpose, with 
all the possible thwartings and furtherings of circumstance, all the niceties 
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of inward balance, by which a man swims and makes his point or else is 
carried headlong. The risk would remain, even with close knowledge of 
Lydgate's character; for character too is a process and an unfolding. The 
man was still in the making ... (M 140). 
The narrator's assessment of Lydgate's character is redolent of J. S. Mill's discussion, in 
System of Logic (1843), of "Ethology," which, as a science of character formation, must 
accommodate both environmental circumstances and the psychological laws of 
association. Mental laws or mechanisms - in Eliot's suggestive phrase, "all the niceties of 
inward balance" - either assist the individual (envisioned as a swimmer) to gain her or 
his destination, or function like a current that "carries [her/him] headlong." The metaphor 
of the current of water, or energy, is common in Victorian psychology texts for the 
pathways or grooves that are the conduits of thought - deepened by habit to become 
"lines of least resistance" (Lewes, P LMJ 134 ). The perplexingly entangled interactions of 
established traits, environmental circumstance, and the laws of habit or association create 
a complex web of association - an oft-noted central metaphor of Middlemarch. The web 
connecting human minds to past and present environments, and to each other, is 
composed substantially of threads (or Carly lean "filaments") of habit. As well, recalling 
Silas Marner' s key traditional, organic metaphor for habit as a germ or seed, 
Middlemarch's narrator sententiously asserts: "the most glutinously indefinite minds 
enclose some hard grains of habit" (M 8). For Eliot, as for many of her contemporaries, 
habit is an inescapable mental function molding human thought and action - that may 
enclose human lives, like all the subjects of science, in "long pathways of necessary 
sequence" (M 154 ). 
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As Vrettos summarizes, theorists of habit ambivalently address its larger function 
as a mechanism of social constraint or conservatism. Bulwer-Lytton, for example, in "On 
the Spirit of Conservatism," justifies his conservative politics on the basis of the 
obduracy of a nation's customs or habits. He reasons that the government of a nation (its 
"dynasty" and "institutions") determines the habits of its citizenry, which in tum maintain 
the governing structures (Caxtoniana 434). The habituated individual necessarily 
experiences a salutary fusion of social liberty and order, but enforced sudden change, 
Bulwer-Lytton warns, brings instant social chaos. Bulwer-Lytton was a liberal politician 
turned cynical conservative, but even the inveterate liberal John Stuart Mill 
acknowledged, in his discussion of "Political Ethology" (the laws of national character), 
that collective character is anchored by customary habit. Thus reformers "should not 
violently shock the pre-existing habits and sentiments of the people" (Variouxakis 396, 
376). 417 Although Eliot and Mill disagreed as to which changes would "violently shock" 
the nation - as a "conservative reformer," she refused to sign Mill's petition for women's 
suffrage (Levine, "Eliot" 2) - she supported graduated evolutionary change. Upon the 
publication of Darwin's Origin, Eliot assessed tellingly: "So the world gets on step by 
step towards brave clearness and honesty!"418 Together with Bulwer-Lytton and Mill, 
Eliot held that the framework of society could not bear a radical alteration of the customs 
that inform and buttress the mental infrastructure of the popular mind. Thus, Eliot's 
social organicism, evolutionary gradualism, and "ethology" are grounded in a psychology 
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of habit. Eliot would likely concur with Mill's pronouncement upon the mental character 
of the English: "England has never had any general break-up of old associations & hence 
the extreme difficulty of getting any ideas into its stupid head."419 
Eliot's understanding of habit sheds light on Middlemarch's "Finale" - an ending 
that notoriously troubles feminist critics. Just as critics of Shirley grapple with the 
narrative's ultimate containment of female rebellion, readers of Middlemarch confront 
Dorothea Ladislaw's failure to fulfill her great potential. The "Finale," however, like 
Shirley's "Winding Up," is a closure replete with ambivalence and "disturbing 
doubleness" (Brady 167) regarding the "Woman Question," rather than a "cop-out of 
some magnitude" (Austen 49).420 Dorothea's complete satisfaction with giving "wifely 
help" to Will Ladislaw's public career and being a "foundress of nothing" (M 783, 4) is 
satirically extreme. Even her rural community finds it "a pity that so substantive and rare 
a creature should have been absorbed into the life of another, and be only known in a 
certain circle as a wife and mother. But no one stated exactly what else that was in her 
power she ought rather to have done" (M783). The syntactical and semantic 
awkwardness of this last sentence underscores Eliot's satire of what is understatedly 
termed the "imperfect social state" (M 784 ). In "Margaret Fuller and Mary 
Wollstonecraft," Eliot praises Fuller's argument for the removal of the "unjust" and 
"artificial" restrictions placed on women, "so that the possibilities of [women's] nature 
may have room for full development" (200). But in Middlemarch, Eliot depicts graduated 
evolution in play; therefore, the most environmentally compatible occupation for 
Dorothea's philanthropic character is to be the wife of an "ardent public man" who seeks 
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reforms for the "immediate good" (M782).421 The narrator refers to the "lives of many 
Dorotheas"; Dorothea's failure thus conforms to the standard of her social environment 
and its characteristic "meanness of opportunity" (M 785, 3). Furthermore, Dorothea's 
ultimate occupation upholds Middlemarch's socio-psychological law: "there is no 
creature whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly determined by what lies 
outside it" (M 784-5). Nineteenth-century English society, however, is designed to 
accommodate its Celia Brookes, who '"cannot bear notions"' (M30).422 That stated, 
evolutionary variation - "inconvenient indefiniteness" - is unstoppable. Even Celia, who 
has "always worn a yoke," strives for influence; so much so, that the narrator asks 
pointedly, "is there any yoked creature without its private opinions?" (M3,14). In this 
way, dissent, dialogue, and debate, orchestrated by the forces of physiological and 
psychological evolution, are presented as perpetually disrupting the stasis of habit and 
convention, to favour progressively what The Mill on the Floss's narrator encapsulates as 
"that complex, fragmentary, doubt-provoking knowledge which we call truth" (476). 
Although Eliot favoured slow social change in women's roles, she flatly rejected 
"scientific certitude" about the limits of female mental evolution. The narrator of 
Middlemarch, after the manner of Mill and Taylor, declares "sex in mind" assumptions to 
be ridiculous: 
[I]f there were one level of feminine incompetence as strict as the ability 
to count three and no more, the social lot of women might be treated with 
scientific certitude. Meanwhile the indefiniteness remains, and the limits 
of variation are really much wider than any one would imagine from the 
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sameness of women's coiffure and the favourite love-stories in prose and 
verse. (M3-4) 
Despotic custom (of which fashion is the clearest, least socially shocking example) must 
not, the narrator insists, be confused with biological truth. The tendency to conflate 
science and custom in evaluations of female "nature" is soundly satirized. As well, the 
narrator's ironic maxim - "A man is seldom ashamed of feeling that he cannot love a 
woman so well when he sees a certain greatness in her: nature having intended greatness 
for men" (M 365) - is scathingly antiphrastic in the context of Dorothea's display of 
acumen juxtaposed with one of Arthur Brooke's "severe mental scamper[s]" (M24). 
Compellingly, Paxton claims that Middle march "is profoundly shaped" by Eliot's 
feminist assessment of (post-Darwin) arguments for innate female mental inferiority and 
their compensatory role in sexual selection (put forth, for example, by Herbert Spencer) 
(173-5).423 Eliot attacks the notion of female agency in sexual selection as ludicrous in a 
social milieu in which "poverty of choice and meanness of opportunity" govern the 
marital choices of even beautiful and wealthy women, such as Dorothea (Paxton I 73). 
Furthermore, putting Spencerian conclusions about the "lightness of the female mind" in 
the mouth of the mentally flighty Brooke - who believes that "masculine knowledge" is 
"too taxing for a woman" (M 59-60) - effectively diminishes masculinist "scientific 
certitude" about female "nature." 
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5.ix Selfishness in General and Male Egotism in Particular 
The perspective of most characters in Middle march is distorted by the lack of 
empathy that accompanies self-absorbing, habitual thoughts. The chronically self-
advancing and self-preoccupied "mental make" of all Middlemarchers, including 
Dorothea, is declared a universal human trait: "We are all of us born in moral stupidity, 
taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves: Dorothea had early begun to 
emerge from that stupidity," for she comes to realize that Casaubon "had an equivalent 
centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference" 
(M 198). Although the parable of the pier-glass and the candle reca11ed by this analogy is 
introduced to illustrate Rosamond Vincy's superlative selfishness, it also illuminates the 
habitual selfishness of all human beings: "the candle is the egoism of any person now 
absent" (M248). 424 The scratches, "minutely and multitudinously scratched in all 
directions," are instantly arranged into "concentric circles" by the candlelight (M248). 
Such "scratches" are events, and the "exclusive optical selection" (M 248) is analogous to 
the circuitous mental revolutions created by grooves or etchings of habit; they are, at 
once, the contextualizing environmental circumstances of life and the subjective 
simplifications of an individual's habitual mental associations. The metaphor of the pier-
glass (a form of satiric mirror) applies to Dorothea, whose Quixotic and hobby-horsical 
humour is to "regulat[e] life according to notions" (M9). Unlike Rosamond, however, 
Dorothea's "exclusive" mental "selection" or "favourite themes" are not status and 
material luxury, but a philanthropic and spiritual aim: a "higher inward life" (M 31, 21 ). 
Paradoxically, her vanity is selflessness; it is morally redeemed by habitual sympathy: 
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"All her eagerness for acquirement lay within that full current of sympathetic motive in 
which her ideas and impulses were habitually swept along" (M 80). Furthermore, the 
misplacement of Dorothea's innate "Puritan energy" is explicitly impersonal and social in 
origin, for her false estimation of Casaubon' s "mental wealth" is plainly proportional to 
her "great mental need" for knowledge (M 8, 30, 26). The narrator explains that, as 
Dorothea, being human, had not achieved saintly levels of renunciation (an ironic jab at 
the culturally approved "pattern of a lady"), she aspired to be delivered "from her girlish 
subjection to her own ignorance" (M21, 27). The mock epic narration of Dorothea's and 
Casaubon's courtship proves a "realistic" mode of satire, as Dorothea truly regards him 
as a modem-day Locke, a "living Bossuet," and a "modem Augustine" (M23) rolled into 
one. Her elevation of Casaubon's mental acuity is accompanied by extreme self-
deprecation; she regards her own mind as a "twopenny mirror" compared with his "whole 
world" of thought, a "little pool" compared to a lake. Dorothea's hyperbolic evaluation is 
ludicrously logical, an inevitable reductio ad absurdum of her "toy-box" education (M 
23, 79).425 Thus, even Middlemarch's study of female vanity and folly is filtered through 
the overarching anatomy of the subjugation of women. 
The opening chapters of Middle march are a superb Bakhtinian parody of the 
"going opinion" that intelligence is not an admirable or even plausible female trait. 
Importantly, this is not simply "the rural opinion" (M9) of Eliot's fictional towns of 
Freshitt and Tipton; Eliot's satire is directed at England's intellectual elite. The narrator 
declares that Dorothea's "nature [was] altogether ardent, theoretic, and intellectually 
consequent," but, as post-Darwinian social science is religiously committed to female 
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unintellectuality, Dorothea's genius is "alarming" to the community (M26, 9). The 
narrator's ironic maxim likening uncustomary ideas to lunacy is a dystopic and 
Juvenalian gesture: "Sane people did what their neighbours did, so that if any lunatics 
were at large, one might know and avoid them" (M9). Dorothea's act of "throwing 
herself, metaphorically speaking, at Mr Casaubon's feet, and kissing his unfashionable 
shoe-ties as if he were a Protestant Pope" (M 4 7) exposes, with a sense of the 
sacrilegiously bathetic, the consummate vanity of the secular religion of male superiority. 
As J. S. Mill explains: "All the selfish propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-
preference, which exist among mankind, have their source and root in ... the present 
constitution of the relation between men and women" (SW 21: 324 ). The automatic 
superiority that "deeply" "sinks into the immense majority of male minds," Mill suggests, 
is destructive to men's characters: "[i]s it imagined that all this does not pervert the whole 
manner of existence of the man, both as an individual and as a social being?" (SW 21: 
324-5).426 Just as the prospect of being rejected by Dorothea escapes Sir James Chettam's 
imagination, Casaubon, despite his physical inadequacies, is unsurprised to be the 
recipient of Dorothea's love. Middlemarch describes monologic thought in general and 
patriarchal premises in particular, through satiric reflections that anatomize the 
patriarchal image by "correcting it to more and more exactness of relation" (M 154 ). 
Even Middlemarch's study of the great vice of female vanity rests upon an 
anatomy of culturally inculcated misogyny, for Rosamond is a parody of the Victorian 
ideal of womanhood. A blatant "pattern-card of the finishing-school," she adheres 
flawlessly to the womanly social script. Incapable of any other role, she "acted her own 
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character, and so well, that she did not know it to be precisely her own" (M 602, 109). 427 
Like a collection of dehumanized parts, Rosamond's angelic features are represented with 
disturbing atom ism; the turn of her neck, her "infantine blondness," and her flower-blue 
eyes are cliched features that render her an "exquisite ornament" in any drawing room (M 
406, 550). The nature/art binary is harnessed by the narrator to highlight the unnatural 
cultural practices that make Rosamond desirable to men: "Nature had inspired many arts 
in finishing Mrs Lemon's favourite pupil, who by general consent (Fred's excepted) was 
a rare compound of beauty, cleverness, and amiability" (M252). Aptly, as an 
embodiment of patriarchal rather than inherent feminine vanity, Rosamond is constantly 
gazing in the mirror, preening herself in anticipation of her desirable reflection in the 
minds of men. 428 Recalling Caroline Helstone' s condemnation of the poverty of female 
mental associations, the narrator explains Rosamond's thoughts in terms of the social 
psychology of habit:429 
Poor Lydgate! or shall I say, Poor Rosamond! Each lived in a world of 
which the other knew nothing. It had not occurred to Lydgate that he had 
been a subject of eager meditation to Rosamond, who had neither any 
reason for throwing her marriage into distant perspective, nor any 
pathological studies to divert her mind from that ruminating habit, that 
inward repetition of looks, words, and phrases, which makes a large part 
in the lives of most girls. (M 155) 
Rosamond's narrow fixations are the cultural norm. Ironically, her socially inculcated, 
pier-glass habits of thought prevent her (along with "most girls") from sympathizing with 
men. The Ruskinian ideal of the angelic, sympathetic helpmate is shown to be 
systematically precluded by the mental estrangement effected by the gendering of 
domestic and public spheres. As the "Finale" reveals, despite Rosamond's flash of 
spontaneous sympathy for Dorothea, she remains almost inveterately impassible. 
370 
The unnatural stolidity of Rosamond is paradoxically emblematic of the "natural" 
laws of habit. As Paxton notes, Rosamond operates by "inflexible" laws of association.430 
Her selfish fixations are unstoppable: "the circumstance called Rosamond was 
particularly forcible by means of that mild persistence which, as we know, enables a 
white soft living substance to make its way in spite of opposing rock" (M 324 ). Instead of 
an ornamental vine, she is a species of parasitic moss, colonizing weed, or strangling 
ivy.431 As the product of a backfiring experiment in the domestication of species, 
Rosamond is an unnaturally selected, "man-made" organism that disables its creator/host. 
Initially, Lydgate sees Rosamond as a kind of delicate flower in need of transplantation, 
but later he discerns her kinship with the basil plant, which consumes a "murdered man's 
brains" (M 782). An inexorable force of cultura_I cultivation and habit, Rosamond is a 
walking satire on women's social and mental curtailment. 
In radical contrast to Rosamond, Mary Garth possesses an ironic and questioning 
habit of mind that transcends societal conditioning. She shares with the narrator what 
Knoeptlmacher summarizes as a Fieldingesque satiric style that is "human and tolerant" 
(Laughter 177).432 Automatically wary of her own vanity, "Mary was accustomed to think 
rather rigorously of what was probable, and if a belief flattered her vanity she felt warned 
to dismiss it as ridiculous, having early had much exercise in such dismissals" (M 543). 
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Importantly, although she is "inclined to sarcasm and to impulsive sallies," her habitual 
sympathy prevents her from Juvenalian pessimism: "Her shrewdness had a streak of 
satiric bitterness continually renewed and never carried utterly out of sight, except by a 
strong current of gratitude towards [others]" (M 22 7, 104-5). Enacting Eliot's ideal of 
balancing wit and humour, Mary Garth, alongside the narrator, anatomizes human egoism 
in her "study of provincial life." In fact, Horatian satire is her habit: "She sat to-night 
revolving, as she was wont, the scenes of the day, her lips often curling with amusement 
at the oddities to which her fancy added fresh drollery: people were so ridiculous with 
their illusions, carrying their fool's caps unawares" (M295). Yet Mary, though a general 
and genial social critic, is particularly attuned to how men carry their "fool's caps 
unawares." For example, her lifelong affectionate but ironic commentary on Fred Vincy's 
habitual waywardness and semi-dereliction is informed by her outsider's cognizance of 
the inequities of class and gender. She is "unable to repress her sarcasm" (M 131) 
towards the minimal requirements for lazy, well-born curates like Mr Cowse to take a 
degree, while, being a woman, she is forced to become a school teacher in order to help 
pay for her brother's education. In the same spirit of resistance to unmerited masculine 
authority, she mocks Casaubon, proposing that his codicil has "perhaps got mixed up 
with the habits of spiders" (M 562). A Horatian satirist par excellence, Mary's habitual 
sympathy both refines her satire and saves her character from feminist misanthropy.433 
Mrs Cadwallader, a more consistently caustic critic, is also a humourist who 
blends biting wit with good intentions. Her favourite pastime is to tease and test her male 
acquaintances. She scolds Brooke, as has been her "habit of years," with the "friendliest 
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frankness" on many subjects, especially his political ambitions (he blushes with the sting 
of her "prophetic" knowledge that he will make a "fool of himself') (M 56, 49). As well, 
she upbraids him for letting Dorothea marry Casaubon, whose pedantry she mocks with 
high-burlesque epithets such as "our Lowick Cicero," or simply, "Thomas Aquinas" (M 
49, 357). Engaging in whimsical diminution, she speculates that Casaubon's blood is 
composed of commas and parentheses, and that footnotes have run away with his brains; 
however, her boldest objectifying witticism is that his soul is a "'great bladder for dried 
peas to rattle in!"' (M 54 ). Her personal satires against Casaubon do not contradict the 
narrator's mockery of his "cuds of erudition," and the eviscerating pronouncement that 
the scholar's soul is "too languid to thrill out of self-consciousness into passionate 
delight" (M 262). Though stuck in her narrow world of town gossip, Mrs Cadwallader' s 
"clearest chiseled utterance[ s ]" often coincide with those of the omniscient narrator, who 
approves of her "socially uniting" and entertaining satire (M 48). Paralleling the 
"telescopic watch" of the witty narrator, Mrs Cadwallader traverses Middlemarch in her 
pony phaeton, "retain[ing] details with the utmost accuracy, and reproduc[ing] them in an 
excellent pickle of epigrams" (M 55). More than a representative of female egoism, Mrs 
Cadwallader's larger narrative function, like Mary's, is to satirize the particularities of 
masculine egotism. Both characters trouble the Spencerian notion that "[ d]oubt, or 
criticism, or calling-in-question of things that are established" is unlikely among women 
(Study of Sociology 347). Outside of narratorial commentary, Middlemarch's satiric 
criticisms are voiced mainly by female characters. 
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In implicit alliance with Mary Garth and Mrs Cadwallader, the narrator 
investigates the social psychology of male vanity, subverting the dominant view that 
women's minds are more narrowly yoked to habit. Recalling descriptions of the female 
mind by Maudsley and Spencer, Brooke's chaotic mind is prone to lower forms of habit. 
Characterized by a "too rambling habit of mind" (M8), Brooke's erratic, vague trains of 
thought are indicated by his Dickensian signature phrase "'and that kind of thing."' 
Conversationally, Brooke relies on his automatic repertoire of all manner of received 
masculine wisdom. The narrator's satirical analyses of his character expose how elite 
access to "provinces of masculine knowledge" (M 59) encourages the reduction of 
knowledge to a superficial adornment denoting male authority. Ironically, Brooke's quote 
from Virgil concerning the mental flightiness of women - '"Your sex are not thinkers, 
you know - varium et mutabile semper - that kind of thing. You don't know Virgil"' (M 
50)- displays his own unoriginality. His routine depreciation of the female intellect is 
shown to have a damaging effect when Dorothea, while struggling to learn Greek, 
seriously considers the plausibility of women's inherent mental weakness. Overall, 
Brooke's "masculine consciousness" (M365) is devastated by the association, made 
throughout the novel, of foolish male vanity with inherited systems of misogynistic 
thought. 
Sir James Chettam, like Brooke, is characterized in Horatian terms as being 
fundamentally good-natured - a man of "excellent human dough" (M 20). Interested in 
horsemanship over and above intellectual pursuits, he represents the "red-whiskered 
type" (M 15) of conceited gentleman, whose chivalrous treatment of women originates 
from an unstudied and unconscious sense of superiority.434 Offering an antiphrastic 
metaphor from nature, the narrator ironizes James' s egoism, revealing its roots in the 
custom of male intellectual superiority: 
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A man's mind - what there is of it - has always the advantage of being 
masculine, - as the smallest birch-tree is of a higher kind than the most 
soaring palm, - and even his ignorance is of a sounder quality. Sir James 
might not have originated this estimate; but a kind Providence furnishes 
the limpest personality with a little gum or starch in the form of tradition. 
(M20)43s 
Patriarchal structures grant potency to all men, regardless of merit. When Jam es becomes 
Dorothea's brother-in-law and is thus personally invested in her widow's honour, he 
informs her: '"a woman is bound to be cautious and listen to those who know the world 
better than she does"' (M 693). James's quick temper (he is "overmastered by anger" 
upon learning of Dorothea's engagement to Ladislaw) and desire for mastery (he is often 
seen "whip in hand") are depicted as being typical of the masculine "life and habits" of 
his epoch (M765, 52). Initially, he "had no idea that he should ever like to put down" 
Dorothea, but his transformation into the kind of man who "likes to be master" exposes 
misogyny to be a cultural current or habit that, similar to the Greek rivers to which 
Brooke likens female intelligence, "runs underground" (M20, 38, 42). This habit, like the 
narrow prejudice that characterizes Tom Tulliver in The Mill on the Floss, "is at once a 
staff and a baton" ( 4 76). Narrow-minded male characters in Middlemarch (from Brooke 
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to Bulstrode) do little to support the Spencerian (and later Jamesean) hypothesis that the 
male mind runs less on "preappointed trains of thought" than the female mind. 
Reverend Edward Casaubon's misogyny is more consciously refined than 
James's, for he preaches the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas and John Milton and thus 
embraces the patriarchal belief that female minds are lacking in the manly and godly 
quality ofreason; instead, they are characterized by the "play of female fancy" (M 58).436 
Dorothea wishes to help Casaubon just as Milton's daughters famously aided their father. 
Furthermore, in her unwittingly mock-epical estimation, Casaubon is a demigod 
"instructive as Milton's 'affable archangel"' (M22). Casaubon could not be more 
declaratively associated with misogyny; in Paradise Lost, Raphael's theology lessons to 
Adam and Eve include a disquisition on female subservience and intellectual inferiority. 
Casaubon's words to Dorothea are Miltonic: "'The great charm of your sex is its 
capability of an ardent self-sacrificing affection, and herein we see its fitness to round 
and complete the existence of our own"' (M 46). AdolfNaumann's portrait of Edward 
Casaubon, posing as Aquinas staring into a book, while Saint Bonaventure is depicted in 
a state of effulgent enlightenment, further lampoons misogynistic egoism. Naumann's 
words affirm the target: '"I dare say the great scholastic himself would have been 
flattered to have his portrait asked for. Nothing like these starchy doctors for vanity!'" (M 
204).437 In this way, Aquinas is parodied; not only is he rendered as having the facial 
characteristics of Casaubon, but he is accused of the vanity that he himself (and all 
patristic writers) ascribe to the "weaker sex." Eliot delivers an unmistakable jest at the 
376 
expense of both the patriarch himself and intellectual habitude of misogyny that provides 
for educated men like Casaubon "a little gum or starch in the form of tradition."438 
Brooke, Chettam, and Casaubon are imbued with and sustained by social, literary, 
and theological discourses of masculine superiority. Along with Casaubon, Lydgate 
demonstrates Mill and Taylor's assertion that even "cultivated minds" (SW 21 : 269) are 
hostage to this habituated brand of self-idolatry, for he also believes that women exist to 
adorn male achievement. Like Mr Chichely, the vain and "purple-faced bachelo[r]" who 
prefers that a woman '"lays herself out a little more to please us,"' Lydgate, by favouring 
Rosamond over Dorothea, demonstrates that his "spots of commonness lay in the 
complexion of his prejudices" (M 86, 82, 141 ). According to Lydgate, Rosamond is 
"perfectly lovely and accomplished," but Dorothea does not "look at things from the 
proper feminine angle," and is too inquisitive to excel at "wifely functions" (M 87-88), 
whether ornamental or otherwise. As the narrator implies, satire cannot exaggerate the 
irony of this unfortunate preference and the "necessary sequences" of events that it 
precipitates: "Destiny stands by sarcastic with our dramatis personae folded in her hand" 
(M 88). Lydgate chooses his wife with as much conformity to "the established order" as 
he chooses his furniture: 
We may handle even extreme opinions with impunity while our furniture, 
our dinner-giving, and preference for armorial bearings in our own case, 
link us indissolubly with the established order. And Lydgate's tendency 
was not towards extreme opinions: ... he was no radical in relation to 
anything but medical reform and the prosecution of discovery. In the rest 
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of practical life he walked by hereditary habit; half from that personal 
pride and unretlecting egoism which I have already called commonness, 
and half from that nai"vete which belonged to preoccupation with favorite 
ideas. (M 327) 
Bound by "hereditary habit," Lydgate does not question his culture's Miltonic ideal of 
woman - epitomized by Eve's submissive words in Paradise Lost: "God is thy law, thou 
mine; to know no more/ Is woman's happiest knowledge and her praise" (IV 638-9). 
Lydgate's sexism, a form of prejudice "carried in the air, adopted by hearsay, caught in 
through the eye" (Mill 456) - and absorbed from his scientific readings - undercuts his 
professed humanitarianism. In this way, his potentially great mind joins the ranks of Mr 
Chichely, Mr Brooke, Sir James, and Casaubon as a satirical exemplar of delusive male 
vanity in subjugation to the unretlecting despotism of habit.439 It is one of Middlemarch's 
key satirical and rhetorical gestures that Lydgate's zeugmatic "judgment" concerning 
"furniture, or women" (M 141) affirms that he, like the dross of humanity, is largely a 
"bundle of habit. "440 
Throughout Middlemarch, male supremacy is figured as a habituated reliance 
outside of conscious control. Referring to Lydgate's marriage, the narrator observes, "the 
mistake was at work in him like a recognized chronic disease, mingling its uneasy 
importunities with every prospect, and enfeebling every thought" (M 555). Lydgate 
regards addiction to drinking and gambling as the vice of ordinary men; yet the habitual 
view of women that primed his attraction to Rosamond, like the series of events leading 
to his marriage, was "woven like slight clinging hairs into the more substantial web of his 
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thoughts" (M282). Ultimately, his domestic association with Rosamond renders him 
physically and mentally "bruised and shattered" (M 660); "shattered" is the same word 
that is used to describe Raffles's debauched state. Lydgate is as powerless against the 
"creeping paralysis" (M 723) of mind and body as an alcoholic - or any addict, such as 
Joshua Rigg, who is caught in the "iron lattice" of "Cupidity" (M 488). Lydgate's loss of 
self-control is further evidenced by the "fierceness in [his] eyes" (M 612). Obliquely, it is 
suggested that Lydgate is close to using his "powerful tender hand[ s ]" (M 627) to 
subjugate Rosamond physically, but instead his anger is vented in routine misogynistic 
scorn. A bathetic treatise on gout and an early death suffice to render him a parody of his 
former self. And so, through the widespread disease of socially conditioned "masculine" 
desire for mastery over unnaturally enfeebled femininity, the world loses a scientist of 
substantial humanitarian potential. 
Once again, the realist narrator's affiliation with the prophetic and satiric rhetoric 
of sages is apparent. The images of disease and addiction surrounding Lydgate's demise 
not only signal the "satirist's expert medical eye" (to use Barchiesi and Cucchiarelli's 
phrase, 221), but are redolent of Wollstonecraft's warning about the apocalyptic effects 
of enforcing a "womanly limit" on the female mind: "Make them free, and they will 
quickly become wise and virtuous, ... for the improvement must be mutual, or the injustice 
which one half of the human race are obliged to submit to, retorting on their oppressors, 
the virtue of men will be worm-eaten by the insect whom he keeps under his feet" 
(Vindication 175).441 
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Lydgate's "emmet-like" fate warns of the ironic disablement of male achievement 
obtained through degradation of the female sex (Eliot, Mill 272). For Robert Louis 
Stevenson, the pathos of Lydgate's failure moderates the satiric force of Rosamond 
Viney: "My compliments to George Eliot for her Rosamond Viney; the ugly work of 
satire she has transmuted to the ends of art by the companion figure of Lydgate; and the 
satire was much wanted for the education of young men" (38).442 In Middlemarch, 
adherence to customary codes of gender - modeled upon the routine depreciation of the 
female intellect - is presented as a nationally degrading habit. Middlemarch's "sub-acid 
satire" reveals "male and female mortals" (M 67), already besieged by the human folly of 
vanity, caught in a matrix of misogyny through the "iron lattice" of habit. 
Middlemarch and Shirley, like many canonical, "classic realist" Victorian novels, 
are panoramic social satires that target individual and social habitudes for mentally and 
morally denigrating and estranging human beings. They contain more than just 
undercurrents or securely subsidiary elements of satire, a genre or mode steadfastly 
associated in masculinist culture with the comprehensive learning and judgment of men. 
Distinctively, as feminist novelistic satires, they counter the misogynist traditions of 
literary satire, which offer, as Hooley affirms (with reference to ancient formal satire), the 
"explicit patriarchal discourse, of generically empowered male voice, telling things as 
they are" (Roman Satire 41); they gather strategies ofHoratian, Juvenalian, and 
Menippean satire to admonish, anatomize, and amend gendered habits of thought and 
custom. Both texts utilize female internal satirists to inveigh against empathy-eroding and 
intellect-deadening habits of egotism in general, and culturally engendered masculine 
egotism in particular. 
380 
381 
Conclusion 
Dehabituation: The "ugly work" of Victorian Satire 
'Habit a second nature! Habit is ten times nature!,' the Duke of Wellington is said to have 
exclaimed. (William James, Principles of Psychology, 124) 
It is the humor of many heads to extol the days of their forefathers, and declaim against 
the wickedness of times present. Which notwithstanding they cannot handsomely do, 
without the borrowed he1p and satire of times past; condemning the vices of their own 
times, by the expressions of vices in times which they commend, which cannot but argue 
the community of vice in both. Horace, therefore, Juvenal, and Persius, were no prophets, 
although their lines did seem to indicate and point at our times. (Sir Thomas Browne, 
Pseudodoxia Epidemica, Book V, Chapter XLV 414; epigraph for Eliot, Middlemarch) 
In this dissertation, I argue for a significant presence of satire within Victorian 
novels from the 1830s to the 1890s - the very decades in which many influential critics, 
from the ear1y twentieth century to the present day, discern a marked, genera] decline in 
the practice of satire. As early as the eighteenth century, writers valued amiable humour 
over wit and satire; continuing this trend, countless Victorian writers and critics 
attempted (in David Worcester's words) to "pus[h] satire into the dunce's comer" (32). 
Nevertheless, regardless of their theoretical disavowal of satire, many novelists embraced 
in their narrative practices its mild Horatian, philosophical Menippean, and even stringent 
Juvenalian possibilities. Charlotte Bronte's words to Elizabeth Gaskell may be applied to 
many Victorian writers: "'Satirical you are - however; I believe a little more so than you 
think"' (Letters 3: 47). 
Inspired by Athena Vrettos's enterprising work on the prevalence of Victorian 
debates concerning habit and its relevance to psychological realism, I trace the relation of 
culturally embedded discourses on habit to the period's novelistic satire. The 
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preoccupation of satirists with habit is strikingly illuminated by Mikhail Bakhtin's social-
formalist assessment of the novel's steadfast roots in ancient serio-comical literature and 
Menippean satire - a dialogic form that defamiliarizes habit. Cultural systems - "all the 
habitual matrices [ sosedstva] of things and ideas" - are exposed in "the menippea" 
through voracious parody of literary and non-literary genres, and through the "creation of 
... unexpected connections" (Dialogic 169). Or, as Northrop Frye proposes, Menippean 
anatomy breaks up social and intellectual conventions, all the "lumber of stereotypes" 
(Anatomy 233). Furthermore, the notion of habit as a secondary or acquired trait 
complements Frances T. Russell's discernment in Victorian satire of a distinctively 
democratic and scientific emphasis on the role of society in the formation of human vice 
and folly. 
Throughout the previous chapters, I question the ascendant critical notion 
(postulated by Dyer, Palmeri, and others) that satire exists in the mid-nineteenth-century 
novel as a curtailed and subsidiary accompaniment to the character-focused, conciliating 
comic and realist aspects of the novel. Whereas Matz finds more "continuum than 
discordance" between realism and satire in the late Victorian novel, I note that earlier 
Victorian "realist" fiction also evinces this commingling of objectifying satire and 
sympathetic insight. For example, R. H. Hutton, in an 1872 review of Middlemarch, 
proposes that the ethically anatomizing element of Eliot's prose "always runs on in a 
parallel stream with her picture of character" (Carroll 302). The concomitancy of satire 
and realist traditions, both of which are literary expressions invested in (often 
disenchanted) representations of "historically authentic particulars" (Rosenheim 318), 
requires further theorization; this study offers preliminary insights. 
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Taxonomic confusion begins, as Chapter I explains, in the ancient Roman 
definitions of satire (e.g., by Diomedes and Quintilian), and extends to Augustan and 
twenty-first-century assessments. Critics and practitioners alike struggle fruitlessly to 
stabilize the formal elements of satire and to determine if satire is a mode or a genre. Yet 
relative consistency regarding two perennial formal and thematic features of satire is 
discernable: the farraginous appropriation of other genres, and the moral presence of 
critical attack (as Frye clarifies, "denunciation contributes morality to satire" ["Nature" 
80]). It is a convention of satire's critics to acknowledge its protean modal status while 
simultaneously reverting to generic definitions, but satire's informing and informative 
presence in the novel - which constantly undercuts the constraints of "classic realism" -
remains an issue of critical frustration. With discernible exasperation, Jerome Meckier 
asks of the "satirical novel": "Is there such a classification, or must one speak of satire in 
the novel, as if it were an added ingredient instead of an essential part of the recipe?" 
("Satirical Novel" 3). Arguably, Frye and Bakhtin's theories ofMenippean satire create a 
bridge )inking ancient modes and genres of satire to the novel. Bakhtin extols the 
Rabelaisian grotesque as a Menippean form, and in doing so, appears to accommodate 
Horatian (congenial, remedial, and non-atomizing) satire, whereas Frye's linkage of 
satire with tragedy and nihilism suggests the novelistic persistence of the Juvenalian 
mode. I draw upon Bakhtin and Frye to support my thesis that many representative and 
canonical Victorian novels re-accentuate (to use Bakhtin's verb) the ancient mode or 
genre, recuperating Menippean, Horatian, and Juvenalian techniques and themes. As 
Victorian novels affirm, and as Dan Hooley asserts compellingly, "[i]t is plainly 
impossible to mark a closure to the afterlife of [ancient] satire" (Roman Satire 168). 
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Throughout the preceding chapters, I discuss how even popularly recognized and 
self-confessed satirists such as Thackeray and Trollope, together with writers not 
commonly recognized as satiric, such as Gaskell, Eliot, and Bronte, articulate 
ambivalence to strong satire. Though attracted to the moral and rhetorical aspects of 
satire, Victorian novelists were cautious and critical of what they perceived to be its 
unseemly lack of disinterestedness. Not surprisingly, this revealing, hyperbolic mode or 
genre often conflicts with the restrictive moral aesthetics of mid-Victorian realism (as 
articulated by Ruskin, Trollope, Eliot, G. H. Lewes, etc.)- particularly its curative, 
Amoldian commitment to representing "things as they are."443 It is telling that Robert 
Louis Stevenson praises Eliot for transmuting the "ugly work of satire" into art in 
Middlemarch, for if satire receives praise from Victorian literary critics, it is typically for 
its Horatian moderation. The centuries-old Horace/Juvenal antimony is re-articulated, for 
example, by James Hannay, who explains that Horace, "with all his satirical bias," 
remains a "well-balanced," "cheerful humorous man," but "Juvenal has usually a most 
unmistakable intention to lash something and somebody" (35). Horace's sermo 
cotidianus ("everyday talk") (Hooley, Roman Satire 30) could easily pass in the period's 
prose under the rubric of humourous or comic writing. Margaret Oliphant, epitomizing 
this conflation, posits that "the satirist need be no sharper than the humourist and may 
almost fulfill his office lovingly" (Victorian Age 148). Unloving Juvenalian satire, 
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however, was definitively and disparagingly tagged as ''satire." Like the dual Victorian 
discourses of habit, satire was perceived as either a potentially dangerous habit, or, if 
regulated, a beneficial one. 
In Chapter 2, I investigate how the "familiar fact, the power of habit" (Mill, 
Utilitarianism I 0: 238) is a perennial concern to philosophical, scientific, and, later, 
evolutionary theories of individual character formation, and social and ethical practice; 
habit is the crux of association psychology from Aristotle, through Locke and Hartley, to 
Spencer, Lewes, Carpenter, Bain, Mill, and even James. "[D]ebated extensively in 
nineteenth-century psychology" (Vrettos 399), habit foregrounds long-standing divisions 
between the "materialists" and "spiritualists." William James's theory of habit's 
physicality, and its centrality to self-control, productive action, rationality, morality, 
education, and social control, synthesizes and reinstates the ideas of numerous Victorian 
mental scientists. In a bluntly mechanistic analogy for the brain, James states that the 
"ultimate physiological law of habit among the neural elements is what runs the train" 
(Principles 54 7). Despite this mechanistic metaphor (which, being a metaphor, he notes, 
demonstrates his mind's associative flexibility), James holds, along with Carpenter, Mill, 
and others before him, that despite determining forces, men's characters are formed by 
them and notfor them. The dynamic, conscious forces in the human mind oppose the 
rigidity of habit, but require habitual maintenance by the will. Similarly, as writers such 
as Smiles, Grey, and Shirreff were pleased to report, "We cannot lessen [habit's] power, 
though we can bend it to our will" (Grey and Shirreff 75). Control over "habits of 
association" is represented in such popular works as a form of "moral power" (Grey and 
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Shirreff 239). For idealists (such as Carlyle and Wordsworth), for evolutionary 
physiological psychologists (such as Spencer and Lewes), for scientists (such as Darwin 
and Huxley), and also for many novelists, habit is an inbuilt instrument for individual and 
social amelioration. But attending the hopes that Victorian writers place on the 
humanizing habits of free will and free thought, there are many melancholy 
acknowledgments of the power of habit to unhinge individual character, and by 
extension, society at large. Mill, for example, despite his faith in one's freedom to form 
the habit of virtue, and that of thinking for oneself, regrets that automatous acquiescence 
to custom is an all-too-common habit characterizing the heads of state. 
Unsurprisingly, as habit is presented in multiple, interfused Victorian discourses 
as a powerful mechanism of human moral character, habit is an expansive subject for 
satiric novelists.444 Sartor Resartus, Carlyle's profoundly Menippean treatise on the 
wonder-deadening habits of selfishness and materialism, sets the stage for the period's 
satiric encounters with the problem of habit. The novels I discuss in Chapter 3 
demonstrate either Horatian optimism or Juvenalian cynicism with regard to habit's 
powers as a source for good or ill. It is a trajectory best encapsulated by Bulwer-Lytton's 
radical optimism and faith in habits of sympathy in Pelham (1828) and the cynicism 
concerning the assimilating powers of habit in The Coming Race ( 1871 ). Moreover, the 
novels contain varying degrees of engagement with then-contemporary discourses of 
habit - from Gaskell's subtle intimations, to Eliot and Butler's explicit invocation of 
evolutionary physiological psychology. Habit is illuminated, promoted, and critiqued 
with mainly Horatian gentleness through an array of apt metaphors from the bonnets of 
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Cranford's genteel population, to the organic and inorganic metaphors that orchestrate 
Silas Marner's critique of narrow fixations that thwart communal empathy. 
Contrastingly, in The Way of All Flesh and New Grub Street, advanced moral and mental 
habits are represented as renegade virtues within a perversely successful materialist 
culture. Instead of Horatian hopes of amelioration through sympathy, these novels 
resonate with Juvenalian disenchantment and disdain for the victory of "pernicious Cash" 
(Juvenal l.113) and paralyzing cant. 
Dickens's preoccupation with habit is well known, from Frye and J. Hillis Miller 
to Vrettos's historicizing criticism of Dombey and Son. Yet in Chapter 4, I observe that 
Dickens's enduring status as a non-intellectual, together with the contested status of satire 
in the mid-Victorian novel, contribute to the ascendant critical supposition that Dickens is 
not a full-fledged satirist. Although, as his novel's prefaces reveal, Dickens expresses no 
compunction about the validity and utility of satire's role in the novel, there is an 
intransigent critical habit of regarding his novelistic expressions of strong sentiment and 
acerbic satire as being mutually exclusive. Dickens, however, follows ancient and 
Augustan satirical traditions in his novels of the 1850s and 60s, Bleak House, Hard 
Times, and Our Mutual Friend. Each of these novels is a satura in the Juvenalian (and 
often Menippean) vein; their rhetoric is characterized by unrestrained metaphor that 
targets all forms of institutional (social) and individual (psychological) bad habits. 
Furthermore, Dickens's satiric novels reveal his conversance with medical, 
psychological, and economic discourses of habit - and with the Utilitarian reliance upon 
association psychology. From the machines of Coketown (including its Menippean 
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Utilitarianists), through the images of darkness, disease, caged birds (and a habit-blinded 
heroine), to the series of cannibalic feasts and mirroring devices that figure wholesale 
retro gradation in the apocalyptic Our Mutual Friend, Dickens's anatomy of habit is 
boldly Juvenalian. 
Finally, I investigate misogynist theorizations of both satire and habit - two 
subjects that require further study. Rogers and Nussbaum's excavation of the myths that 
structure misogynist satire, from Juvenal to Swift and beyond, provides a template for my 
investigation of Bronte's Shirley. I explore the text's retaliatory satire of anti-feminist 
conventions (both literary and social): misogamy, the myth of the old maid, the "Blue 
Stocking," and inferior Eve. Eliot's Middlemarch also targets misogynist Miltonic and 
scientific traditions of female intellectual inequality. Both novels pose a question that is 
satirically irreverent to both historic and Victorian theories concerning female mental 
inferiority (arguments which decree women's status as a satiric subject and not as a 
satirist): "' [D]o you seriously think all wisdom in the world is lodged in male skulls?"' 
(Bronte, S 328). Eliot's narrator, who, like Horace, avoids the "acid of malevolence" 
(Satire I.3, 101 ), is still, like several of Middlemarch's female characters, satirically 
inclined to expose vanity and selfishness. Female satirists within each text denounce the 
divisive cultural habits (trained masculine egotism and feminine ignorance) that are 
destructive to both sexes. Enveloped in irony, each novel concludes by fulfilling 
masculinist realist expectations, highlighting the fact that "uncustomary opinions" - even 
those expressed by male authors - "receiv[e]" strong censure (Mill, SW21: 279). Once 
again, Dan Hooley's assessment is relevant: "Whatever its politics, satire redraws 
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perspective on the stuff of the world, channels resistance, reservation, second thought. It 
processes and reacts against the larger forces that drive events" (Roman Satire 169). 
Similarly, despite the era's ambivalence to satire, Victorian novelists, dissociating and 
dissenting from the "habitual matrices" (Bakhtin) of their culture, and engaging with 
complex moral discourses of habit, wrote philosophically probing and culturally critical 
Menippean, Horatian, and Juvenalian satire. 
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Endnotes 
1 In "The Nature of Satire" (1954), Frye explains that satire "hardly exists now" as a 
genre: "The word now means a tone or quality of art which we may find in any form." It 
thrives mainly as an "attitude" of criticism ("Nature" 75, Anatomy 310). Kirk 
Freudenburg summarizes this notion: "we think of satire in functional terms, as 
something that satirizes; that is, not a specific form in itself, but an attitude or critical 
operation performed by a work that can inhabit a vast number of forms" ("Roman Satire" 
21 ). David Duff clarifies the concepts of genre, form, and mode as follows: genre is "a 
recurring type or category of text, as defined by structural, thematic and/or functional 
criteria" ("Key Concepts" xiii). Form is "often used synonymously with genre to mean 
simply a type or category of literary work" ("Key Concepts" xii), but is also frequently 
used to refer to structural as opposed to thematic characteristics of a work. Mode also has 
a dual sense: it refers either to a manner of representation (usually the Aristotelian triad: 
narrative, dramatic, and lyrical) or to categories such as tragic or comic, which are 
"thematically specific but non-specific as to literary form or mode of representation" 
("Key Concepts" xv). 
2 In Fictions of Satire, Ronald Paulson explains what he refers to as a "drift" in the 
eighteenth century away from formal satire to the satiric realism of the novels of 
Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne. Satire, he claims, was "domesticated" in the "partly satiric 
works" of the "developing form of the long prose narrative, the novel" (Paulson, Fictions 
222). 
3 Bakhtin and Frye have exerted less influence on recent satire theory in part because 
their theories are nearly as capacious and pliable as satire itself. Bakhtin's theories (of the 
1920s and 1930s) did not influence satire studies in the West until the appearance of the 
English translation of Rabelais and His World in 1968 (Freudenburg, "Intro" 17). Like 
most classics scholars who are less interested in the after-life of ancient satire and 
therefore in its mergence with the novel, Kirk Freudenburg is dismissive of Bakhtin. 
Similarly, Joel C. Relihan, whose interest lies in examining classical examples of the 
Menippean genre, finds that Bakhtin "casts his net" too wide to be useful in establishing 
the classical origins of the genre (6). Both Frye and Bakhtin, according to Relihan, use 
ancient Menippean writers overzealously as "springboards from which to leap into 
modern times" (8). Echoing this view, Howard Weinbrot's 2005 study, Menippean Satire 
Reconsidered: From Antiquity to the Eighteenth Century, finds that Frye and Bakhtin' s 
definitions "allow too many texts at too many times to be Menippean" (296). Daniel 
Hooley, however, while acknowledging that Frye and Bakhtin "apply the term 
'Menippean' to a broad range of works dating from the Renaissance," concludes that 
"species of Menippean, in modified forms, [are found] on up to the present day" (Roman 
Satire 155-156). 
4 The satires of Juvenal and Horace have been contrasted for centuries. The terms 
Horatian (for genial and conciliatory satire) and Juvenalian (for harsh and pessimistic 
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satire) evolved from the debates of grammarians, practicing satirists, and literary critics 
about the relative merits and features of each satirist's work. Post-structuralist critics 
a.dvocate the abandonment of such polarized categories. Fredric V. Bogel, for example, in 
addition to rejecting the fundamental binary of satire (satire vs. satiric object), views the 
"long-lived" opposition between Juvenalian and Horatian modes as merely a strategy to 
contain the "potentially disruptive energies of satiric aggression" (29-30). Similarly, 
Steven E. Jones avoids these "larger-than-history" (9) labels, preferring to evaluate each 
satiric work as self-defined. By contrast, Dyer retains the Horatian and Juvenalian 
dichotomy for its usefulness in evaluating the political orientation of satire. Dyer 
describes Horatian satires as being less political than "intensely political" Juvenalian 
"radical" satires ( 41 ). As Robert C. Elliott notes, the works of Juvenalian satirists, in their 
derisive zeal, often work against the "shoring up" of existing social structures and suggest 
the necessity of radical reform (273). 
5 See, for example, Carolyn Williams's "Parody, Pastiche, and the Play of Genres: The 
Savoy Operas of Gilbert and Sullivan" (2000). Late Victorian utopian satiric novels have 
been surveyed by Ann-Barbara Graff in "'Administrative Nihilism': Evolution, Ethics 
and Victorian Utopian Satire," and by Susan Kahn, in her 1981 dissertation entitled "The 
Intellectual and Aesthetic Evolution of the British Satiric Novel, 1879-1928: A 
Comparative Study of Works by George Meredith, H.G. Wells and Aldous Huxley," 
which examines attitudes towards realism in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century- noting an increased intensity of satiric attack. David Nash's 
"Laughing at the Almighty: Freethinking Lampoon, Satire, and Parody in Victorian 
England" (2000) evaluates periodical satire (focusing on the pictorial), and James G. 
Paradis' s "Satire and Science in Victorian Culture" ( 1997) explores the ways in which 
comic periodicals such as Punch routinely "played with the progressive ideology of 
science by contrasting grand ambition with a meager reductive result" ( 155). As well, 
Alan Richardson explores a hitherto understudied territory: children's literature and 
satire. In terms of verse satire, there have been many studies, particularly of Robert 
Browning and Arthur Hugh Clough. 
6 Russell's list ranges from Peacock and Disraeli, to Meredith and Butler (45-6). She 
acknowledges that Gaskell, Bronte, and Kingsley are "never thought of as satirists," but 
finds them "far from being innocent" of practicing satire ( 48). Her study measures the 
"satiric strain" ( 4 7) (defined as "a union of criticism and humor" [ 5]) in a selection of 
novelists. 
7 Two recent theses have followed Vrettos in linking the period's discourses of habit to 
realist fiction. Shawn O'Toole's 2006 dissertation, "Technologies of the Self: Habit and 
the Victorian Novel," promises to explore "the realist novel within a larger cultural 
debate about the social and psychological effects of habitual behavior, retracing the 
tradition of writing on habit in Victorian philosophy, psychology, and popular advice 
literature" (iv), but his study does not further Vrettos's assessment of this cultural 
context. His analysis of Victorian discourses of habit is little more than a reiteration of 
Vrettos's salient points and specific examples. More recently, Kristie M. Allen's 2008 
dissertation "Second Nature: The Discourse of Habit in Nineteenth-Century British 
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Realist Fiction" (which I was able to access in 2009) contains a more substantial 
assessment of the ways that "realist writers sought to reconceive the relationship between 
social determination and self-improvement" (ii). Allen adds nuanced explorations of 
George Eliot's The Mill on the Floss and Thomas Hardy's The Wood/anders to support 
her claim that "[t]he nineteenth-century realist novel imaginatively responded to the 
assumptions behind and investigations into the discourses of habit that were integral to 
the debates about moral reform, about evolution, about human subjectivity, and about the 
course of human history" (61). Following Vrettos, Allen focuses on the intersections of 
discourses of habit and the genre of the realist novel. 
8 For Bakhtin, although Roman and Menippean satire are the generic roots of the second 
line of the heteroglossic serio-comic novel, they depart from parody's strategy of "the 
laughing word" when their satire is not characterized by ambivalent laughter and positive 
incarnations of the grotesque. 
9 Linda Hutch eon, for example, in Theory of Parody: the Teachings of Twentieth-Century 
Art Forms (1985), claims that "[ s ]atire does not authorize but ridicules the transgression 
of social norms" - it "tends to defend norms" (78-79). 
10 George Eliot, in "The Antigone and its Moral" (1856), defines Sophoclean tragedy as 
the "dramatic collision" between the individual's "elemental tendencies" and established 
social laws and conventions (245). This concept of tragedy is compatible with the social 
criticism found in Juvenalian satire. 
11 Palmeri's central thesis is that "satire did not determine the overall genre of [Victorian] 
narratives": "In the course of the nineteenth century, narrative satire underwent a period 
of eclipse by other forms, but it also experienced a return .... Displaced by other forms, it 
played an almost exclusively a subordinate and episodic role beginning in the 1840s. 
However, by the late 1880s, works again began to appear with the generic features of 
narrative satire predominant" ("Narrative Satire" 361). 
12 Satyr plays were performed after a trilogy of tragedies and often involved travesties of 
heroes and philosophers, and scurrilous subjects (Van Rooy 135). They were comic 
parodies of myths and not bitter or caustic in tone, as the Elizabethans later believed 
(Griffin 11 ). 
13 Quintilian's dictum that satire is wholly Roman is, according to Freudenburg, a rather 
desperate attempt to define an especial Roman literary achievement. Freudenburg argues 
that the quidem ("at least/if nothing else") in the famous statement signals Roman 
cultural insecurity in the realm of literature ("Intro" 2-3). 
14 The iambic poetry of Archilochus (?1h century BCE) is characteristically abusive; 
iambics are a form associated with social criticism (Muecke 35). Two Greek verbs may 
be translated as "to satirize": iambizein and komoidein. The first is associated with 
personally abusive iambics, and the second is associated with the ridiculing aspect of 
comedy (Muecke 34). Satire could be found in Old and New Comedy, Stoic diatribe, and 
fables (Muecke 37-38, Griffin 8-9). 
15 The first volume had varied meter, the second was hexameter, and the third volume 
was in elegiac couplets (Van Rooy 51 ). 
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16 His satire shared with comedy the mockery of character types (greedy courtesans, etc), 
popular moralizing, and political and moral attacks on contemporaries. However, the 
polemical moral focus of Lucilius is also likely inspired by Greek Old Comedy (Van 
Rooy 146). 
17 Frances Muecke claims that satire was seen as a low, "almost.. .prosaic" genre (34). 
Horace's verse satire is "a prose-like means of cataloguing and commenting on his social 
experience" (Barchiesi and Cucchiarelli 217). Furthermore, Horace discussed the genre 
as if it were prose (Van Rooy 65). 
18 However, his six satires advocate the tenets of Stoicism, and in the age of Nero, 
Stoicism had anti-imperial connotations (Cucchiarelli 75). 
19 According to Daniel Hooley, Juvenal's satire is characterized by a "magnitude of 
words" to match the monstrous abundance of Roman vice (Roman Satire 112). He 
observes that scholars tend to characterize Juvenal by his "use of rhetorical questions, 
loci communes (commonplaces) on riches, on contemporary corruption, on fortune, etc., 
dramatic shifts in stylistic level, and exempla," and also his sententiae (aphorisms) and 
overall "big, dramatic effects" (Hooley, Roman Satire 114-115). 
2° For example, Juvenal, Persius, and Horace are found within Conrad of Hirsau's 
Dialogus super auctores ( c. 1140), which introduced important classical authors to 
grammar students (Parsons l 06). The terms satiricus and satura were used widely in 
commentary about poetry, and discussions of satire even extended to vernacular texts 
(107). Satire was generally seen as a didactic, "highly moralized" tool to combat 
immorality (Parsons I 07-8); however, Parsons argues that satire's link with unruly satyrs 
carried forward its rebellious elements throughout the middle ages. Hooley asserts that, 
though "aware of classical prototypes," medieval satirists were "constrained" by a 
"Christian ethical frame"; moreover, Juvenal and Horace were not "invoked as models 
for the vernacular language" (Roman Satire 156-7). 
21 Comparisons of Horace and Juvenal were absorbed into the rhetorical tradition of 
synkrisis (the central trope of which was antithesis): a rhetorical exercise of comparison, 
often between poets such as Virgil and Homer (Martindale 287). 
22 Griffin points out that Kernan' s thesis does not accommodate the satire of John Donne, 
who used the Horatian persona in the early 1590s (11 ). 
23 In The Formal Strain (1969), Weinbrot investigates the qualities of Augustan imitation 
verse satire, stressing the importance of notions of uniformitarianism (the eternal quality 
of human nature) to the ethos of imitation. 
24 Kirk Combe argues that, complementary to Bakhtin's theory of the carnival roots of 
Menippean satire, Dryden was influenced by the experience of Christmas revels at the 
Inns of Court (which derived from the festivals of ancient and medieval Europe) (2). 
25 Dryden openly acknowledges the influence of Renaissance commentators Casaubon, 
Heinsius and Dacier on his formula for formal verse satire. 
26 Catherine Connors observes that Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal all use epic to 
claim social authority (either overtly or subtextually, as in the case of Persius) (144). 
They select a fairly standard range of epic motifs (mainly battle scenes and councils of 
the gods), typically to juxtapose a glorious epic past with contemporary corruption 
(Connors 138). 
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27 Dryden's "Discourse" "set out the ways in which the Roman satirists were to be read 
and adapted right through the eighteenth century"; for example, Alexander Pope's and 
Samuel Johnson's ideas about satire derive from Dryden's typology (Hooley, "Alluding" 
261). 
28 Freudenburg situates Juvenal's writing within the context of Rome's early second 
century. He assesses this period as being characterized by a cultural obsession with the 
traumatic past of the first century (Satires of Rome 231 ). According to Freudenburg, 
Juvenal's satire is anti-Lucilian in that it is retroactive satire - thus, satire that is cowardly 
and "stuck in the graveyard" (Satires of Rome 235). 
29 Boileau (whom Dryden called a living Horace and a Juvenal ["Discourse" 81]) wrote 
between 1658 and 1700 and defined satire in his Art Poetique (1674). He offered a 
balanced view of each of the satirists and aimed to join Horatian and Juvenalian 
techniques - but the weight of borrowing was on the Horatian side (W einbrot, Formal 
Strain 87, 97). 
30 The poem opens with a Juvenalian complaint about bad poets (Weinbrot, Pope 243). 
Dr Arbuthnot is represented as the adversarius who needs to be convinced about the need 
for the "more severe tragic masks of Persius and Juvenal" (Weinbrot, Pope 243). 
31 Carretta's project is to understand why there is little significant satire between 1743 
(the death of Pope) and the advent of Charles Churchill. He concludes that relative 
political stability after Walpole's defeat is one reason, but perhaps a more important 
cause is a philosophical shift from uniformitarianism to historical relativism; this shift 
rendered satiric claims less universal (Carretta 250). 
32 Hazlitt praises Rabelais for his "teeming wit" and good nature without "spleen" - his 
"laughing at the world and enjoying it by turns" ( 446). 
33 This thesis, however, suggests that Lockean associationism altered rather than 
abolished satire by significantly shifting the satiric target from the innate frailties of 
humankind to those that originate in habit. 
34 Dyer adds that the dominance of middle-class ideologies (and a provincial middle class 
shaped "disproportionately" by women [50]), non-conforming denominations, and the 
Evangelical branch of Anglicanism, "all restrained verbal attack and, along with it, 
satire" (139). Frank Palmeri adds the satire-reducing and moderating effect of the 
reduction of the stamp tax on conservative dailies such as the Times or the Morning 
Chronicle, while the radical papers, which had been breeding grounds for radical satire, 
remained at a higher tax level. ("Thackeray" 754). 
35 Dyer alters the traditional Horatian-Juvenalian dichotomy by distinguishing between 
three modes: "Neo-Horatian," "Neo-Juvenalian," and what he terms the "Radical" mode 
- a complex combination of Horatian and Juvenalian elements. 
36 For example, Coleridge engaged in elaborate self-parody in "The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner." See David A. Kent and D.R. Ewen's Romantic Parodies, 1797-1831 (1992). 
As well, Kyle Grimes examines the work of William Hone (1780-1842), a late-romantic 
satirist and publisher, concluding that Hone created a new form of satire ("hacker satire" 
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[Grimes 174]), which was opportunistic transforms satire from a "fundamentally literary 
and conservative genre into the more dialogical form" (Grimes 175). 
37 The essays in her collection (The Victorian Comic Spirit) address the subversive 
function of humour without reference to satire as a generic or even modal consideration. 
38 From Macaulay's 1831 review of John Wilson Crocker' s Life of Samuel Johnson 
(1831 ). 
39 From Macaulay's 1837 review of Basil Montagu's 1825-34 edition of the works of 
Francis Bacon. 
40 Loomis, in an article entitled "Thackeray and the Plight of the Victorian Satirist" 
(1968), argues that "in spite of the existence of some fine contemporary satirists," the 
Victorians "were excessively distrustful of the satiric spirit" ( 1 ). In his discussion of the 
inhospitable critical context in which Thackeray's Vanity Fair was received, he 
highlights a pervasive distrust of satiric intention and effectiveness, and the 
condemnation of ad hominem arguments in the Victorian period, to conclude: "The 
Victorian satirist, even more than the satirists of other periods, had to work against the 
spirit of his times" (6). Palmeri argues that a key reason for the "occlusion of satire was 
the reign ofMudie's, the powerful circulating library" ("Narrative Satire" 371). The 
library and its regime of decency was "among a network of contributing and competing 
pressures" that limited the production of satire (Palmeri, "Narrative Satire" 3 71 ). 
1 Bulwer-Lytton published a well-reviewed metrical translation of The Odes and Epodes 
o[ Horace in 1869. 
4 However, Lamb himself (or Bulwer-Lytton) was not averse to Juvenalian satire. In an 
essay on Hogarth that appeared in Hunt's Reflector (1811 ), he praises Hogarth's "strong 
and masculine Satires" (61 ); he observes that Persius and Juvenal are "perpetually darting 
across the otherwise appalling gloom of their subject- consolatory remembrancers, when 
their pictures of guilty mankind have made us even to despair for our species, that there is 
such a thing as virtue and moral dignity in the world, that her unquenchable spark is not 
utterly out - refreshing admonitions, to which we turn for shelter from the too great heat 
and asperity of the general satire" (72-3). 
43 Letter to Mary Elizabeth Bulteel Ponsonby, 17 October 1877 (Letters 6: 440). Eliot's 
concern is moral: "We may satirise character and qualities in the abstract without injury 
to our moral nature, but persons hardly ever" (letter to Frances Houghton, 4 February 
1849; Letters 1: 3 78). 
44 Abigail Burnham Bloom observes that Carlyle's "humor went beyond the theoretical 
framework he himself had erected" (153). Bloom argues that Carlyle's theories of 
benevolent humour and his concomitant purpose to "change the world" necessitated a 
less "sportive" and more ironic approach. 
45 Chaucer is a humourist and, despite his many virtues, is not one of "the great classics," 
for he lacks "high seriousness" (Arnold, "Study," Works 9: 177). 
46 Arnold acknowledges that Wordsworth and Coleridge also denied Dryden and Pope 
status as poetical classics, yet he observes (in an admonitory, Carlylean observation) that 
these poets find favour with the "young generation, and there are many signs to show that 
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the eighteenth century and its judgments are coming into favour again" ("Study," Works 
9: 178). 
47 
"The grand work of literary genius," Arnold maintains, "is a work of synthesis and 
exposition, not of analysis and discovery; its gift lies in the faculty of being happily 
inspired by a certain intellectual and spiritual atmosphere" ("Function," Works 3: 261 ). In 
short, the "creative" is more appropriate to literature than the "critical power" (Arnold, 
"Function," Works 3: 261). 
48 David Ferrier argues that the reaction against Pope and wit (underway by 1760) was 
underscored by the novel's exploration and elevation of the concept of sensibility (as 
theorized by Shaftesbury and Adam Smith) (xiv). Following Tave and Martin, Ferrier 
supports the idea that the sentimental humour advocated by Dickens and Carlyle was 
replaced by intellectual wit and satiric modes at the end of the century (in the work of 
Butler, Gissing, Wilde, and Shaw) (xv). 
49 O'Gorman argues that this aesthetic admiration facilitated Pope's acceptance in the.fin 
de siecle - epitomized by Aubrey Beardsley's 1896 illustrations to The Rape of the Lock 
("High Priest" 77). 
50 In addition, his lecture "Charity and Humour" (first delivered in 1853) defends the 
national importance of humourists, the "gay and kind week-day preachers" (268) who, 
true to a gentlemanly ideal, promote charitable, Christian sensibilities though humour -
"an irresistible sympathizer" (279). He argues that the wearers of "motley habit, or satiric 
disguise" ("Charity" 277) are large-hearted moralists brimming with compassion and 
love for humanity. Even the uncouth Henry Fielding had a "great hearty sympathy and 
benevolence" ("Charity" 278). 
51 In a letter to James Hannay thanking him for a copy of Satire and Satirists, Thackeray 
admits: "I hate Juvenal, I mean I think him a truculent brute, and I love Horace better 
than you do" (August 1854: Letters 2: 553). 
52 Loomis argues that the lectures are the clearest expression of the Victorian "anti-satiric 
spirit," for "[a]s a critic, if not as a novelist," Thackeray increasingly participated in this 
spirit (14). 
5 Palmeri observes, as Loomis previously noted, that Thackeray's satires in the 1850s 
"render satire more obscure and subordinate" ("Narrative Satire" 367). Loomis argues for 
Thackeray's transition from a professional satirist (in magazine journalism and fiction) to 
a conflicted "realist-satirist" who, "in his attempts to soften his satire," "weaken[ ed] his 
later fiction" (15). 
54 Interestingly, Lewes imagines Thackeray's overall satiric practice as redolent of 
Horace's: "In Thackeray we see many resemblances to Horace; both have outlived their 
illusions and yet look back with fondness on them, so that their laughter is rather sad than 
bitter" (Tillotson and Hawes 107). As well, Lewes holds that, in Pendennis, Thackeray is 
still "above all things a satirist," although he demonstrates a more "generous view of 
humanity" (Ti11otson and Hawes 109). 
55 Except for an unsigned review in The Times (24 August 1875), which commends the 
novel as a faithful portrait of society, typical responses were more like the unsigned 
review in the Spectator (26 June 1875), which accuses the novelist of mistakenly 
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surrounding his characters "with an atmosphere of sordid baseness which prevents 
enjoyment like an effluvium" from which there is "no relief, no pleasantness" (Smalley 
397, 399). The Examiner (August 1875) notes an uncharacteristic lack of genial humour, 
and the Saturday Review (July 1875) accuses Trollope of a style of satire that is 
destructive. Trollope is accused of being an automaton whose "habit of construction" is 
"scarcely voluntary": "Where habit and a ready pen act together, to stay the hand is 
almost a physical impossibility" (Smalley 406). (This is a cruel charge against Trollope, 
for both his Autobiography and novels reveal an obsession with the moral value of habit 
as well as its destructive potential.) 
56 Skilton submits that it was "universally agreed among Trollope's reviewers that there 
should be a distribution of virtues and vices in any novel - that evil must necessarily be 
counterbalanced by goodness" (65). In Skilton's assessment of the literary milieu that 
preferred Trollope's moderate productions (despite accusations of dullness) and 
denounced his more pessimistic works (such as The Way We Live Now and Eustace 
Diamonds [1871 ]), influential critics such Eneas Sweetland Dallas, Richard Holt Hutton, 
G. H. Lewes, and Meredith Townsend, were generally agreed that a work of art should 
not be wholly composed in terms of moral negatives - it required a "moral standard of 
character" (67-8). 
57 Steven Wall concludes that Trollope, in his resilient belief that "on the whole things 
were getting better," was incapable of the "sustained hostility" of satire - even in The 
Way We Live Now (42, 46). Trollope's "magnanimous handicap" prevents him from 
writing the pure satire of Wyndham Lewis or Swift (Wall 46). A. 0. J. Cockshut, 
however, highlighting the fact that "the mid-Victorian period was a time of unusual 
dissociation between creation and criticism," observes in Trollope's novels from 1859 
onwards a "steadily-growing pessimism," despite his anti-Carlylism ( 124, 131 ). 
58 In the May 2 1870 letter to Austin, Trollope rejects Juvenalian or "unmixed satire": "I 
do not believe that such writings have ever done good, or have left other impress than 
that of the cynic disposition, and power, of the writer. I doubt whether Juvenal ever aided 
at all in the suppression of vice; - but Horace, who was not a satyrist by profession, & 
who is playful and even good-natured in his very satyres, did probably teach men to be 
less absurd in their manner of writing [and] speaking ... " (Letters 515). 
59 The OED defines the noun cynic as follows: "l. One of a sect of philosophers in 
ancient Greece, founded by Antisthenes, a pupil of Socrates, who were marked by an 
ostentatious contempt for ease, wealth, and the enjoyments of life; the most famous was 
Diogenes, a pupil of Antisthenes, who carried the principles of the sect to an extreme of 
asceticism. 2. A person disposed to rail or find fault; now usually: One who shows a 
disposition to disbelieve in the sincerity or goodness of human motives and actions, and 
is wont to express this by sneers and sarcasms; a sneering fault-finder." As well, 
Menippius, who is credited as the originator of Menippean satire, was a cynic 
philosopher. Kirk Freudenburg defines a "cynic" as an "aggressively anti-social 
primitivist (lit. 'dog-like') beggar-philosopher in the tradition of Diogenes" (Satires of 
Rome xv). 
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60 Similarly, as Katherine B. Linehan points out, George Eliot feared "forgetting herself' 
in her "penchant for humor and satire" (28). 
61 The word "satire" has evolved past its Roman and Renaissance connotations to become 
"a structural principle or attitude" - what he terms a mythos (which can appear in any 
form of art) (Frye, Anatomy 310). 
62 Hutcheon defines parody as "a form of repetition with ironic critical distance, marking 
difference rather than similarity" (xii). Paradoxically, parody reinforces its subject, even 
while debunking it; thus, the tension "between conservative repetition and revolutionary 
difference is part of the very paradoxical essence of parody" (77). Invested in defining 
parody as a subversive genre, Hutcheon stresses its differences with satire. Satire, "unlike 
parody, is both moral and social in its focus and ameliorative in its intention" (16); she 
supports a view of satire as comic and extramural in its targets ( 49). As well, satire 
generally makes a negative, aggressive statement, while an overt attack would be "self-
destructive" (44) to parody. Importantly, parody involves "authorized transgression," 
whereas satire "does not authorize but ridicules the transgression of social norms" (74, 
78). 
63 Elliott accounts for the frequent disparity between conservative satiric intent and 
revolutionary implications through the function of the satiric trope of synecdoche. The 
representation of the whole by the part is the metaphoric vehicle though which subversive 
criticism spreads from a specific, local target to society at large. It is the "key to the 
satirist's power" (Elliott 273) 
64 Frye argues, for example, that "Dickens's influence is also for us completely radical, 
whatever he himself may have been" ("Nature" 88). 
65 Ethics is defined in the OED as being "the science of morals; the branch of knowledge 
that deals with the principles of human duty or the logic of moral discourse," or "the 
moral principles or system of a particular leader or school of thought." Using the terms 
ethics and morality interchangeably, Richard Norman describes this area of philosophy as 
being "the attempt to arrive at an understanding of human values, of how we ought to 
live, and of what constitutes right conduct" (1). Contemporary philosophers distinguish 
between "substantive" or "normative" ethics and "meta-ethics"; the first examines which 
actions are good, while the other analyses the logic of ethical discourse in determining 
standards of virtue and goodness (1-2). Norman posits that philosophers have always 
combined substantive and meta-ethics (3). The history of ethics and moral philosophy 
reveals a multiplicity of systems which either accept or negate transcendental or 
"substantive" ethics. A "narrow conception of morality" (151 ), Norman posits, defines 
morality as necessarily oppressive and dominated by theological notions of virtuous self-
denial; this notion, he argues, has "a strong hold on the popular consciousness" (152). 
Furthermore, this position, which is common in critics of satire, does not consider the 
variegated nature of moral philosophy. An illustration of this is Meredith's rejection of 
the Puritan superiority of the satirist/"moral agent" ("Essay on Comedy" 445). Meredith 
suggests that the satirist/moralist necessarily promotes transcendent (Christian) moral 
law. Contrastingly, the capacious intellect of the "Comic Spirit" is free of the "priestly 
element" ("Essay on Comedy" 44 7). 
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66 His overarching concern for literary realism leads him to overlook satire - which is 
mentioned only in passing. Gulliver's Travels, for example, is discussed as the sub-genre 
of mock travel literature; even in his discussion of Dickens, he evades the subject of 
satire. 
67 As well, each has been associated with low forms, such as comedy (Auerbach's "low 
mimetic tradition"), and each has required moral defenses to assert its status as art. For 
example, F. R. Leavis, in The Great Tradition, dispenses with satire (with the exception 
of Hard Times) in an effort to dissociate the novel from lowly comedic forms. The 
formalist tradition of novel theory, from Henry James to Leavis and beyond, tends to 
neglect satire. 
68 Recently, Matz argues that the intersections of realism and satire have been "mostly 
ignored in the history of literary criticism," despite the fact that "both modes claim a 
superior knowledge of the real and an exceptional method of representing it" ("Satire" 3, 
35). He notes the exception of John Lawlor's 1955 essay "Radical Satire and the Realistic 
Novel." 
69 As Henry James claims, "[t]he only reason for the existence of a novel is that it does 
attempt to represent real life" ("The Art of Fiction" 5). 
70 Narrative satire, by contrast, firmly opposes two extremes which are never reconciled 
(Palmeri Satire, History 11 ). Palmeri' s conception of satiric method is quite general. In 
his 2007 essay, "Narrative Satire in the Nineteenth Century," he reiterates that unlike 
verse satire or narrative satire, which attacks its object from a single and extreme 
perspective, novelistic satire is more contradictory, and "extreme" "positions" are 
avoided and even parodied (361 ). 
71 Jerome Meckier assesses satire's role in what he terms the mid-Victorian "realism 
wars" (Hidden 8). Meckier argues that canonical Victorian "realists" such as George 
Eliot, Elizabeth Gaskell, and others engaged in "competitive revaluation" of one 
another's fiction, each reading their "version of the truth" as the one that "most closely 
reflects the actual world" (Hidden 3). Dickens, Meckier argues, was the scapegoat of 
choice for those who rejected his bitter satire as "counter-productive" (Hidden 4 ). 
72 For Ermarth, fictional realism reconciles disparate points of view, offering comfort to 
the reader in the form of "[h]armony, unity, centrality" (34). 
73 In opposition to the novel, Bakhtin defines epic as an absolute, finished genre that is 
distant from contemporary reality, due to its focus on a national and heroic past. The epic 
refuses to admit indeterminacy or contemporary reality. It is therefore yoked to official 
thought and language, whereas Bakhtin associates the novel with unofficial thought and 
language (Dialogic 11-20). 
74 Horace's "satirico-ironic" treatment of himself in his satires, Bakhtin observes, 
contributed to the development of the autobiographical form (Dialogic 143). 
75 Bakhtin asserts that the "satires of Varro are even closer to novelistic orchestration of 
meaning," for they parody both scholarly and moralistic speech (Dostoevsky 371 n). 
76 
"Grotesque realism" focuses on the body's orifices and the actions of eating, drinking, 
copulating, and defecating. Images of the "double" body - a body that is linked to the 
world and other human bodies through its protrusions and orifices - abound in this style 
400 
of realism, which, above all, affirms the collective existence of humanity and celebrates 
the cosmic cycles of death and renewal. According to Bakhtin, its criticism and ridicule 
of social ideologies and institutions, like its mockery of the body, is fundamentally 
~roductive. (See Rabelais and his World, 303-67.) 
7 Russell views satire as a mode, yet follows the pattern I discuss in Chapter 1 by 
continuing to discuss satire in generic terms: satire is the "humorous criticism of human 
foibles and faults ... with sufficient art to be accounted as literature" (5). Predating Frye's 
assessment of the boundaries of satire, she refers to the humorous and critical poles of 
satire and finds, for example, a minimum of humour in Juvenal and a minimum of 
criticism in Horace (6). 
78 Hypocrisy, for Russell, is a "ubiquitous habit" targeted by the satirist (29-30). This 
claim likely stems from Henry Fielding's pronouncement that the "only Source of the 
true Ridiculous is (as it appears to me) Affectation," which arises from vanity and 
hypocrisy (Preface to Joseph Andrews 6). 
79 Vrettos is the first, to my knowledge, to do so in any detail. Philip Fisher, in "The 
Failure of Habit" (1973), analyses the twentieth-century rejection of habit in modernist 
fiction (an aesthetic theory inspired by Walter Pater's famous denunciation of habit). 
80 Habit may refer to a mode of attire, such as the dress of a particular profession or rank 
- for example, the monastic habit. The symbolic possibilities of habit as a signifier for 
clothing are explored by many Victorian writers; clothing "provides a particularly 
suitable means of discussing habitual behavior because it is intimately connected to how 
the self presents itself to the world" (Vrettos 407). In the chapters that follow, I observe 
in various novels the psychology of habit inhering in representations of characters' 
clothing. Clothing is particularly significant in relation to satiric criticism of custom and 
habit. The word "fashion" (denoting "prevailing custom, a current usage; esp. one 
characteristic of a particular place or period of time" [OED]), like custom, has nuanced 
associations with habit. 
81 James also includes his work on habit in the lengthy initial chapter of Psychology: 
Briefer Course (1892). 
82 Etymologically, the root verb for hexis is f.xro, which connotes various notions of 
"holding" and "possessing" - either of objects, trained skill, states of being (i.e., wealthy, 
pregnant, old) or the manner in which one conducts oneself (habit of mind) (Liddell and 
Scott). 
83 As Frank M. Turner notes, the Ethics of Aristotle (along with works of Plato) "came to 
the fore from the middle of the nineteenth century onward" (Contesting 318). 
84 According to Alexander Bain, Aristotle "grasped" fundamental associating principles -
similarity, contrariety, and co-adjacency or contiguity - but "gave no detailed exposition 
of them" (MS 91). 
85 Locke was reading Nicolas Malebranche (Recherche de la Verile [1674]), who gave 
the original example of the musician who unconsciously performs his instrument "by the 
habit of exercise" (Wright 113). The musician's facility with an instrument becomes a 
favourite example for writers theorizing habit. 
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86 The Shandian narrator, in a clear parody of the language of Locke, explains that the 
humours react to "the different tracks and trains you put them into; so that when they are 
once set a-going, whether right or wrong ... away they go cluttering like hey-go-mad; and 
by treading the same steps over and over again, they presently make a road of it, as plain 
and as smooth as a garden-walk, which, when they are once used to, the Devil himself 
sometimes shall not be able to drive them off it" (Sterne 1-2). 
87 The "faculty of Perception" is the primary mental faculty involved in the formation of 
ideas: "Ideas we receive by sensation, are often in grown People alter 'd by the Judgment, 
without our taking notice of it"; our judgment is shaped by what we are habitually 
"accustomed to perceive" (Locke 145). 
88 Bain notes that Locke illuminates the role of association in forming "prejudice, 
antipathies, and obstacles to truth," but never creates "any generalized statement of 
associating principles" (MS 91 ). 
89 For Hume, "the idea of cause and effect is deriv'd from experience, which presenting 
us with certain objects constantly conjoin' d with each other, produces such a habit of 
surveying them in that relation, that we cannot without a sensible violence survey them in 
any other" (175). Hume was the "first after Aristotle to attempt a thorough classification 
of the modes of association" (including resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect) 
(Warren 43). 
90 Warren argues that Hume's greater interest, like that of Locke, was epistemological, 
and thus association psychology proper begins with Hartley, from which point on, 
association "assumes the role of a psychological doctrine and school in Great Britain" 
(Warren 15). 
91 William James describes association as "the universally admitted fact, that any 
sequence of mental action which has been frequently repeated tends to perpetuate itself 
so that we find ourselves automatically prompted to think,feel, or do what we have 
before accustomed to think, feel, or do, under like circumstances, without any 
consciously-formed purpose, or anticipation of results" (Principles 116). 
92 Edward S. Reed traces the development of psychology as it transmuted from "moral 
philosophy" in 1815 into the new psychology of the 1890s, while maintaining many of its 
theological underpinnings (3). 
93 With David Ferrier's The Functions of the Brain (1876), psychology, as an 
increasingly professionalized discipline, became a more "substantial presence in the 
culture" (Ry lance 71 ). The first specialist laboratories opened at the end of the 1860s; the 
Physiological Society was founded in March 1876 by G. H. Lewes, and the Journal of 
Physiology commenced publication in 1879; Mind, the first specialized psychology 
journal, was launched in 1876 (Rylance 71-72). 
94 Roger Smith concurs that the word psychology was shaped in the public realm (82-83). 
95 Reid postulates that perception prefigures the sensory mechanics of association (E. 
Reed 29). 
96 Furthermore, Coleridge - "poet, critic, all-round theorist, and conservative 
commentator and ideologian" - rejects associationism (in Biographia Literaria [ 1817]) as 
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a philosophy that depicts the human mind as a mechanical slave to habit and negates the 
~owers of the imagination (Rylance 47, 63). 
7 Bernard Lightman argues that John Tyndall's controversial speech was a key event in 
"the contest between Anglican clergy and scientific naturalists for cultural authority in 
Victorian Britain" - a power struggle which informed the entire spiritualist/materialist 
debate. After the address, Tyndall was labeled a materialist in the periodical press and 
satirized in Punch ("Scientists as Materialists" 201-2, 206). The word materialist accrued 
"unsavory connotations" such as sinful, lower class, atheist, heterodox, and "foreign" 
(Lightman, "Scientist as Materialists" 210). 
98 Henry Maudsley's Physiology and Pathology of the Mind (1867) also denies the 
freedom of the will by placing reflex action as the basic paradigm of the nervous system 
(Danziger 135). 
99 Similarly, Lewes felt that the hypothesis that reflex action is purely mechanical and 
wholly without sensibility was unfounded. The brain, for Lewes, is analogous to the 
"coachman holding the reins and guiding the team" (PLM3 417). 
100 Darwin clarifies: "Every one who believes, as I do, that all the corporeal and mental 
organs (excepting those which are neither advantageous or disadvantageous to the 
possessor) of all beings have been developed through natural selection, or the survival of 
the fittest, together with use or habit, will admit that these organs have been formed so 
that their possessors may compete successfully with other beings, and thus increase in 
number" (Autobiographies 51; my italics). 
101 Butler argues for both design and descent; if heredity is recognized as a mode of 
memory, design is preserved in evolutionary biology (Luck 20). 
102 Instinct, as Lewes defines it, is "lapsed or undiscursive Intelligence" (PLMJ 130); 
although originally instinct is "facultative" (spontaneous), it becomes "fixed" as it is 
transmitted from ancestors who acquired it through adaptation (PLMJ 130). 
103 James proposes that a definition of habit leads to a consideration of the fundamental 
properties of matter. The "laws of Nature" at the atomic level are in essence "immutable 
habits" of action and reaction (Principles 109); yet in the "organic world," he asserts, 
structures are mutable and plastic. 
104 Yet, as I will outline, habit's narrowing function was theorized, rather paradoxically, 
as a key process in the achievement of the "highest reasoning," which, as Spencer 
~roposed, is "one with all the lower forms of human thought" (PP 2: 299). 
05 Tina Young Choi explains that the first law of thermodynamics (as articulated by 
scientists James Prescott Joule, Michael Faraday, and Hermann von Helmholtz in the 
1830s and 1840s) "posited that energy could neither be destroyed nor created but was 
merely transformed from one state to another" (303). Assenting to the current notion that 
scientific and literary discourses "enabled each other's articulation" (302), Choi finds that 
both the first law of conservation, and the second, contradictory law of entropy in 
thermodynamics (the energy in a given system will transform into an unavailable or 
useless state [305]), are grappled with in the Victorian novel; this is particularly observed 
in an aesthetics of closure which enacts a "fretful tension" between conservation and 
entropy (318). In terms of the paradox of habit, the first and second laws of 
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thermodynamics can be coded respectively as good and bad habit. Good habits enhance 
productive, redemptive conservatism; bad ones reinforce what Choi describes as the 
chaotic, entropic "loss of useful energy" (306). 
106 Tursi's dissertation examines the impact of James's view of habit on the work of 
Henry James, Edith Wharton, and W. E. B. du Bois, arguing for "a modernist aesthetic of 
habit" (243), in which self-definition is linked to habit. 
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"[U]niformities," resulting in part from constitution but also from circumstances, seem 
to render human mental activity automatic, but our "own consciousness tells us that there 
is something in our Psychical nature, which is beyond and above this automatic exercise 
of our powers; and that the direction of our thoughts is placed, within certain limits, 
under the control of the Will" (Carpenter 250-1). Our "Will" can "concentrat[e]" our 
"Mental gaze," which, if "habitually exerted in certain directions, will tend to form the 
Character, by establishing a set of acquired habitudes" (Carpenter 26). 
108 Animals, he argues, are devoid of imagination, as their "thoughts will not call up their 
similars, but only their habitual successors" (James, Principles 977). Laughter, as well, is 
a product of association by similarity, specifically "the recognition of certain identities in 
things different" (James, Principles 977). In agreement with Bain, James finds genius and 
success in the arts and science to require "similar association to an extreme degree" 
(Principles 984). 
109 Vrettos, interested in the coexistence of theories of habit and mental fixity with 
theories of mental permeability, observes that James's interest in wandering attention and 
spiritualism led him to "conceptualize the mind in a more profoundly fluid relationship to 
the outside world than his discussions of habit seem to allow" ( 411 ). Similarly, I would 
add, Spencer's notion of habit is more nuanced than James permits, for he too argues that 
higher forms of reasoning involve habits of "excursiveness" and mental "multiformity" 
(PP 2: 534). 
110 In The Emotions and the Will (1859), Bain posits that it is "within possibility to 
implant, and to root up, the most deep-seated of human pleasures and dispositions" (514). 
In one lifetime, however, only one "sea change" is possible, as the "plastic power" has 
limits; only with "adequate initiative" and "unbroken persistence" is it possible for the 
"still small voice of daily duty [to] overpower" indulgences (Emotions 503). 
Interestingly, the moral habits which Bain promotes for cultivation are the ancient 
cardinal virtues of courage, fortitude, and temperance (MS 335). 
111 Habit was an instrumental concept in phrenology, which, Janice Carlisle observes, 
offered the primary mid-Victorian "System of Character" (4). George Combe's popular 
Constitution of Man (1827) is replete with illustrations of the mind-altering effects of 
habit, particularly of assiduous self-culture. In On the Study of Character (1861 ), 
Alexander Bain critiques phrenology and attempts to place the systematic study of 
character more firmly in the domain of natural science (Carlisle 19). 
112 J. S. Mill describes his father's most important and subversive doctrine as the 
"universal Principle of Association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of 
improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind by education" (A 1: 111 ). 
Contrarily, an anonymous article for Tait's Edinburgh Magazine (1857), entitled "Habits 
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and Resolutions," critiques the utilitarian educational trend of "drilling" moral habits into 
the student as being destructive to the individual (Vrettos 403). 
113 Similarly, James Sully notes that "[t]he perfect fixation of habit appears to obliterate 
the highest cortical centres from all but the slightest measure of co-operation in the 
process" (Human Mind 225). 
14 Along with the "the habit of excessive indulgence in music," James insists, "[t]he 
habit of excessive novel-reading and theatre-going will produce true monsters in this 
line" (Principles 129). 
115 James emphasizes productive action: "For this we must make automatic and habitual, 
as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and guard against growing into 
ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague" 
(Principles 126). To counter the "tyrannical influence" of habit, James offers some of 
Bain's maxims: the necessity of strong will in the breaking or making of a habit 
("envelop your resolution with every aid you know," and "Never suffer an exception to 
occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life") (Principles 127). 
116 Smiles asserts that character "cannot be formed without effort"; one needs to exercise 
"constant self-watchfulness, self-discipline, and self-control" (Character 11 ). The 
"energy of will - self-originating force - is the soul of every great character" (Character 
15). 
117 As many (including Bain) note, Mill does not elaborate upon this suggestion of an 
ethological system. Howard C. Warren observes that Mill's work in psychology was 
"fragmentary" (64). 
118 References to Mill in psychology texts became a rhetorical shorthand to invoke 
debates about free-will and determinism. Carpenter identifies Mill as "the most powerful 
advocate of Automatism" (liv), despite Mill's famous rejection of the "analytical habits" 
of Utilitarianism (A 1:142). G. F. Stout points out Mill's contradictory relationship with 
associationism, arguing that although Mill clung to associationism with "all his might" 
(112), he unwittingly "abandoned the doctrine" with his ideas on "Mental Chemistry" in 
A System of Logic (his notion that simple ideas generate, rather than compose, complex 
ideas [111]) (114-115). 
119 Mill's influence resonates in James's assertion: "The hell to be endured hereafter, of 
which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for ourselves in this world by 
habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way" (Principles 130). Furthermore, 
James reiterates that character is "a completely fashioned will" (Principles 130) - a 
f:hrase he ascribes to Mill (who was originally quoting Novalis [SL 8: 843]). 
20 In "Building Character in the British Boy," John Springhall examines the popularity of 
numerous youth societies which, early in the century, promoted habits of Christian 
manliness, and later in the century encouraged patriotic reverence for athletics. 
121 I am certain the ever-appropriating Smiles kept Grey and Shirreffs book in view 
when writing Self-Help- a book which sold 20,000 copies within a year, and which best 
demonstrates the popularity of common-sense (and also masculinist) notions of 
productive habit. 
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122 Sussman identifies mechanization as a "central concern of Victorian intellectual 
prose" (98), in which the machine becomes a symbol for the emotionally stunted nature 
of the age (4). 
123 In Chartism (1839), Carlyle blames.the laissez-faire principles and habits of capitalist 
democracy (which he regards as a "self-cancelling business" [190]) for the fact that 
"[ c ]ash [p ]ayment has become the sole nexus of man to man" (195). This, he insists, 
destroys the protective, sympathetic emotion that should rule the relations of the classes. 
Instead of having a heart, he rages, England has nothing but "a monstrous gangrene 
r:retending to exist there as a heart" (196). 
24 Sussman discerns that "beneath the contradictions and digressions," Ruskin's lengthy 
Modern Painters consistently affirms the "vitalistic, sacramental quality of the natural 
world" (77-78). 
125 The word altruism entered the English vocabulary in 1853 when Lewes published 
Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences (Lane 26). Comte was influenced by ethical 
philosophers such as Shaftesbury, Hume, and Adam Smith to reject the Hobbesean 
assertion of innate selfishness and to stress instead the innateness of moral sympathy 
(Houghton 273). 
126 Mill's experience is analogous to Darwin's realization that scientific habits ironically 
diminished his intellect and "more probably [his] moral character" by weakening his 
emotional nature (Darwin, Autobiographies 85). 
127 Vrettos's discussion of Victorian habit theory addresses fears that sympathetic feeling 
is muted, even short-circuited, by habit. She observes that for Dickens, and many other 
writers on habit, "habit and sympathy are antithetical"; emotions such as empathy, they 
reasoned, are "blunted by repetition" (Vrettos 419, 421 n). In Utilitarianism (1861 ), Mill 
attempts to clarify that the "habitual act of the will" may operate "not in contradiction to 
the general intention prevailing at other times, but in fulfillment of it; as in the case of the 
person of confirmed virtue": "Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion 
of its parent only to come under that of habit" (10: 239). As a result of habit's 
"importance" in imparting "certainty" to "one's feelings and conduct," the "will to do 
right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence" (Mill, 10: 229). The habit of 
sympathy, it seems, is arguably an oxymoronic concept in Victorian psychological 
frameworks; however, my focus is on the habit of sympathy, not as a locus of failed 
emotion, but as a locus of anti-mechanical hope. 
128 Eliot's version of this idea, in Middlemarch, is expressed in the narrator's belief that 
"[ w ]e are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our 
supreme selves" (M 198). Lewes also refers, as if speaking of Eliot's Casaubon, to the 
fact that there are many "shrivelled souls with narrow vision" who would deny this 
(PLMJ 418). 
129 Much of the "Conclusion" was initially featured in Pater's 1868 review, "Poems by 
William Morris." 
130 As an Oxford undergraduate, Pater attended Arnold's lectures as Professor of Poetry. 
131 Culture is defined as "being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to 
know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said 
406 
in the world" (Arnold, Culture 6). This involves perceptions of "right reason" based on a 
balance of Hellenism ("spontaneity of consciousness" and "disinterested free play") and 
Hebraism (duty, strength, earnestness and action) (Arnold, Culture 145-64). 
132 See "Heinrich Heine" (1863) for another articulation of Arnold's hatred of habit. 
Arnold hailed Goethe for the "naturalism" which is "absolutely fatal to all routine 
thinking" ("Heine," Works 3: 110). 
133 Mill credits his wife, Harriet Taylor Mill, as the joint writer of all of his published 
works, at times professing himself to be little more than the interpreter of her original 
thoughts (A I :251 ). 
134 Spencer was initially a political radical, a supporter of Chartism, an anti-colonist, and 
a believer in altruism; later, he avidly supported "free-market liberalism" (Rylance 221-
22). 
135 George Levine, Sally Shuttleworth, Kate Flint, and Lyn Pykett are among the critics 
currently engaged in unearthing the generic multifariousness of the so-called "classic 
realist" Victorian novel. 
136 To support his claim, Dyer examines Thomas Love Peacock's six satirical prose 
narratives (published from 1815-31) and also Benjamin Disraeli's The Voyage of Captain 
Popanilla (1828). Peacock's narratives, he determines, were too intellectual to appeal to 
middle-class readers, and too impartial to appeal to reformers (Dyer 94). Disraeli's text 
was weak and ambivalent in its satire (Dyer 95). Thus, Dyer concludes, "only four years 
after Byron's death satire was becoming a moribund literary mode" (127). 
137 Pollard examines the sporting novels of Robert Smith Surtees (1805-64 ), whom he 
terms a "satirical realist" along with Thackeray and Trollope ("Surtees" 111 ). Beginning 
with Jorrocks 'Jaunts and Jollities (1838), Surtees's trilogy of a Cockney grocer turned 
·country squire, "castigate[s] social climbing, the marriage market, wild young men with 
no sense of values, [and] the decadence of the artistocracy" (Pollard, "Surtees" 114). 
Identifying another satiric sub-genre of the early decades of the period, Leo J. Henkin 
surveys satirical representations of emergent evolutionary theory. He identifies Peacock, 
Disraeli, and Charles Kingsley as writers who attack the "ridiculousness of descending 
from the apes and portray evolution theory as mechanistic, materialistic, or atheistic" (37-
38, 77). 
138 For example, Thackeray's first major serial publication was Catherine: A Story (1839-
40), a parody of the Newgate novel (Wheeler 21). 
139 Just as Professor Teufelsdrockh is both an instrument and a target of satire, his 
"Clothes-Philosophy" is simultaneously a vehicle of satire (a critique of materialistic and 
Mammon-worshiping mentality) and a symbolic method to represent the non-
transcendent aspects of human life. Appropriately Bakhtin, like Carlyle, chooses the 
metaphor of clothing for socio-ideological habits of mind; he declares that "all existing 
clothes are always too tight" (Dialogic 37) for the heroes of serio-comic genres. Clothes 
are the ideal symbol for custom, as they are necessary, changeable, and multi-layered. 
140 Bulwer-Lytton also assumes an informed Church of England reader familiar with its 
Thirty-Nine Articles or its basic religious and theological tenets. 
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141 Lauren Gillingham argues, as does Maria K. Bachman, that silver-fork novels were 
not all simple guidebooks for social-climbing; in particular, Bulwer-Lytton's Pelham was 
political and reformist in its purpose (Gillingham 63-67; Bachman 167-68). 
Acknowledging Pelham's subversive use of fashion, both critics draw upon Ellen Moer' s 
notion of the dandy as a satirist of both his society's social codes (particularly 
masculinity) and himself (Gillingham 79). 
142 Bulwer-Lytton's social study of his nation's customs in England and the English 
advocates, in Benthamite terms, a "moral cure" for the working classes in the form of an 
education that implants "not so much labour, as habits of labour" (123). Richard Cronin 
observes that Carlyle would not have been "impressed" by Pelham's enthusiasm for 
Utilitarianism, which "seemed to him itself simply a commodification of ethics" ( 46-4 7). 
143 Like Gulliver's Travels, The Coming Race is an exemplary Menippean satire that 
engages a plethora of satiric targets. For example, the Darwinian notion of life as a great 
battle to acquire superior structures (and habits) is manipulated in The Coming Race to 
illustrate the sheer bathos of materialist thought. Evolutionary debates are satirized 
overtly when the narrator beholds a portrait of the underworld's version of Darwin's 
moral monkey: a Giant Frog. Arguing that Bulwer-Lytton's novel offers a more complex 
"response to contemporary scientific debates than critics generally assume" (349), Anne-
Julia Zwierlein posits that the text alludes (through the representation of the Vril-yan frog 
progenitor) both to William Paley's ironic, and to G. H. Lewes's more scientific, 
suggestion of a biological kinship between frogs and philosophers. Bulwer-Lytton's 
satire accepts Paley's "teleological idealism" and rejects Lewes's anti-essentialism 
(Zwierlein 356). To add to this loaded frog/philosopher nexus, David Seed notes that 
Bulwer-Lytton would have been aware that in 1870, T. H. Huxley addressed the 
Metaphysical Society on the subject "Has the Frog a Soul?", which expressed his theory 
of conscious automata (xxv). As well, the text satirizes explicitly the contention of radical 
writers such as Wollstonecraft, Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill that women's rights are 
farticularly "essential to the perfect happiness of our human species" (CR 132). 
44 In an oft-cited series of letters to John Forster in March 1870, Bulwer-Lytton clarifies 
that Vril is a distinctly material force: "I did not mean Vril for Mesmerism, but for 
electricity, developed into uses as yet only dimly guessed" (qtd. in Lytton, 466). As I 
discuss in Chapter 2, energy is an evocative word in nineteenth-century mental science, 
and is particularly significant to habit theory. Vril is arguably analogous to the energy of 
habit. Furthermore, Vril-yan craniology reveals a large "organ of adhesiveness" (59). 
"Adhesive constitutions," Bain argues, "require less repetition to achieve the association 
of [a] ... train of ideas" (MS 327). As well, further evoking and satirizing evolutionary 
psychology, Vril-yans have acquired a "visible nerve" (67) in their thumb to conduct vril. 
Not only is the Vril-yan nervous system perfectly hospitable to habit, the energy of habit 
is directed with the aid of a vril staff. 
145 Grateful that his mother had encouraged him to read past the death of Captain Brown, 
Ruskin declares in a letter to Gaskell, "I do not know when I have read a more finished 
little piece of study of human nature (a very great and good thing when it is not spoiled). 
Nor was I ever more sorry to come to a book's end" (21Feb.1865; Letters 36: 479-80). 
146 Gillooly, for example, finds that the women of Cranford, although "targets of 
humorous aggression," are also "clearly figures of narrative affection" (139). 
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147 Yet Cranford has been evaluated generally as a feminist satire of gendered separate 
sph~res. Susan Glass-Fellows describes the novel as a "strong satire" on the patriarchal 
restrictions that rendered women "infantilized, uneducated, and unemployed" (144). 
Charlotte Mitchell illuminates the complex "gendered oppositions" (xii) in the text, 
which, she finds, amount to an argument that neither sex is exempt from "fanaticism and 
rigidity" (xii). In Chapters 5 and 6 of the novel, she argues, "what one might term satire 
of the patriarchy emerges for the first time" (xvi). Similarly, Gillooly observes that 
parental, patriarchal authority is challenged in the text (importantly by Mary Smith and 
Peter Jenkyns, who are both humourists). Humour, she argues, functions psychologically 
as a "defense against the conscious knowledge" of an "assault" on patriarchal 
firescriptions (Gillooly 153). 
48 The matriarchy of Cranford is parodically patriarchal. Habits of "genteel society" (C 
24) provide a vocation for the women: Mary knits; Matty tends to her candles. Such 
ritualistic domestic activities keep the women from focusing on the emptiness of their 
lives. Like children, they require routine to combat the ennui of empty stretches of 
domestic time. Yet despite the text's indictment of the alienating and mentally 
constricting effects of the gendering of private and public spheres, the novel does not 
condone enraged Juvenalian revolt. 
149 Cranford satisfies both Bakhtin's notion of "the Menippea's" "extreme freedom of 
plot" and Frye's understanding of the episodic structure of Menippean satire. Originally 
published in installments in Household Words, Cranford evolved as loosely connected 
sketches. The episodic form of the novel, critics have argued, reinforces its domestic and 
social themes (see Andrew H. Miller). Natalie Kapetanios Meir finds that the novel's 
criticism of social etiquette is undermined by the narrative's formal affinity to the genre 
of the handbook in its use of the iterative mode - codifying social practices through 
refetition (1-2). 
15 Jenny Uglow discusses the general congruity of Gaskell's Unitarian principles with 
associationist traditions of philosophy, highlighting that John Locke's Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (and also David Hartley's Observations on Man) are key texts (5-
6). As well, Uglow enumerates the scientists (biologists, chemists, and physicists - not 
one of whom is a physiological psychologist) who were friends with the Gaskells (559-
60). Yet Gaskell went to hear G. H. Lewes's lectures on speculative philosophy at the 
Athenaeum, and to hear William Carpenter's lectures in the Spring of 1851 (Uglow 218, 
270). See Louise Henson's '"Half Believing, Half Incredulous': Elizabeth Gaskell, 
Superstition and the Victorian Mind." For recent work that focuses on Gaskell's interest 
in contemporary science, see Clare Pettitt's evaluation of "Sylvia's Lovers" and "Cousin 
Phillis" in terms of Gaskell' s ambivalent characterization of scientists, and Anne 
Secord' s assessment of her interest in Manchester's working-class naturalists. 
151 The reference to Tennyson's "Locksley Hall" is symbolically appropriate, for the 
speaker, who expresses frustration with the "social lies that warp us from the living 
truth," hopes to "burst all links of habit" (60, 157). 
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152 Yet in its hermetic removal from the "real" world ofDrumble, Cranford is arguably a 
quotidian netherworld. As well, the narrative includes a parodic journey to hell in the 
form of a trip undertaken "gallantly" by Matty and Miss Pole "two hundred yards" in the 
dark to Mrs Forrester's (C 97). 
153 Barbara Hardy observes of Gaskell: "Hers is, like George Eliot's, a very conservative 
imagination, and these novels combine a realistic report with a modest demand, not for a 
radical redistribution, but for a minimal nourishment for body and soul" (177). Jane 
sgencer observes in Cranford a vision of "gradual and beneficent social change" (86). 
1 4 The Times Literary Supplement, 20 November 1919. 
155 There is a surprising shortage of full-length discussions of satire in Eliot's canon. 
Martin Bidney, however, explores Eliot's satirical treatment of the clergy in "Scenes of 
Clerical Life and Trifles of High-Order Clerical Life: Satirical and Empathetic Humor in 
George Eliot" (1999). One substantial study is Katherine B. Linehan's 1974 dissertation, 
"George Eliot's Use of Comedy and Satire"; Linehan posits that there was a transition 
from "broadly humorous rustic comedy" in her earlier works to a subtle "use of authorial 
irony and social satire" in the later novels (2). Exploring the roots of Eliot's satirical 
indignation and resistance to satire, in the author's "Evangelical ideals" (humility, 
charity, earnestness and selflessness), Linehan argues for Eliot's lifelong oscillation 
between a rejection of satire as a cold-hearted practice, and her acceptance of it as one 
that is truthful and ameliorative. 
156Lane troubles "narrow assumptions about Victorian morality" through an exploration 
of the "cultural prevalence of acute misanthropy" and "nearly insoluble forms" of hatred, 
specifically in canonical Victorian novels allegedly adhering to a doctrine of sympathy 
(xiv-xv). His insight that misanthropy, among other "satirical and antisocial associations" 
(Lane 9), was increasingly pathologized by Victorian writers, complements the 
widespread discordance between Victorian satiric theory and its multivalent practice. For 
a discussion of the "flourishing rancor" (121) in what Lane regards as the superficially 
enacted fellowship ofRaveloans in Silas Marner, see Lane's study of the novel (118-21). 
Within the context of satire, however, it is barely a contradiction in Eliot's narrative that 
its "antisocial strains" (126) are not fully expurgated. 
157 Linehan also refers to Theophrastus Such and the essay on Heinrich Heine as key 
works that reveal Eliot's elevation of sympathetic over intolerant humour (12). 
158 Economist, April 1862 (Carroll 175). 
159 Shuttleworth observes a shift between Adam Bede and Daniel Deronda from the 
narrative embodiment of theories of continuity and unity to those of disruption and 
discontinuity (xii). Vanessa Ryan links then-contemporary theories of unconscious, 
reflexive reasoning to Eliot's fiction, particularly to Mill on the Floss ("Material Mind"). 
In "Fictions of Medical Minds: Victorian Novels and Medical Epistemology," Ryan 
focuses on a comment made by Herbert Spencer in which he credits his seemingly 
effortless intellectual feats to unconscious processes (278); she situates Spencer's 
comment in a positive discourse of habit as energy-saving, and condenses the divergent 
nineteenth-century terms for reflex or habit-based thought into Malcolm Gladwell's 
phrase "thinking without thinking" (279). Numerous articles and full-length studies 
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tackle the subject of Eliot's relationship to Victorian mental and evolutionary science, 
from the earlier work of Levine and Beer, to Michael Davis's George Eliot and 
Nineteenth-Century Psychology: Exploring the Unmapped Country (2006). As well, Hao 
Li, in Memory and History in George Eliot: Transfiguring the Past (2000), investigates 
the influence of both the scientific and the romantic traditions (of Carlyle and 
Wordsworth) (6) upon Eliot's notion of the relations between "personal" memory and 
"communal" memory-a form of memory that "both maintains historical continuity and 
generates from within the need for reform" (2). Lewes's theories of memory and 
consciousness (along with Spencer's theories of moral instinct and evolution), Li argues, 
are "broached and tested in Eliot's novels and stories" (9). 
160 The figure of the miser, as I will elaborate in Chapter 4's discussion of Dickens's Our 
Mutual Friend, is an emblematic figure in Victorian psycho-physiology texts for the 
dehumanizing effects of the habit of loving money as an end in itself rather than as a 
means to moderate material satisfaction and comfort. In his anti-materialist miserdom, 
Silas is atypical of this pathology, for his attraction to money is divorced from 
associations with consumption; instead, the "original ends" of Silas's life (i.e. love and 
community) were not products to be purchased, yet they have been replaced by the coins 
he fastidiously counts and controls. 
161 Although William James has been credited with coining the term "stream of 
consciousness," it appears in the posthumous fifth edition of Problems of Life and Mind 
(1880). The "Preparatory note" by the editor (George Eliot) and the manuscript both 
confirm that the words are Lewes's (Holland 31). The metaphor of water as mind is 
elaborated upon to include "wave, rivulet, and current" (Holland 37). 
162 In Ermarth's study of the novel's metaphors of enclosure, which are counterpointed by 
those of openings and thresholds, she observes a parallel between the "sealed lips" of 
Godfrey and the locked heart and casket of Silas (34-35). Habit, I would add, is the 
primary means of restriction. Habit (figured in one instance as a fence) offers protective 
enclosure: "security more frequently springs from habit than from conviction" (SM 38). 
163 In Phaedrus, Plato figures the soul as a charioteer with two horses, one good (noble, 
temperate, rational) and once bad (intemperate, unreasoning, rash) (Jowett 8). 
164 Similar to the texts I explore in Chapter 5, unhealthy, socially divisive, and 
unproductive habits are associated in Silas Marner with habits of patriarchal privilege 
and masculinity. 
165 A heroine of sympathetic and moral habit, Eppie escapes satiric portraiture (like 
Dickens's Sissy Jupe and Lizzie Hexam). 
166 In this satire, Horace, once in possession of the Sabine farm, proceeds to contrast city 
life unfavourably with country life. 
167 The novel, written sporadically and to near-completion between 1873 and 1884 (Holt 
66-67), was published posthumously in 1903. 
168 Reinforcing the view of Butler as an angry writer, Hastings Jones's biography 
(Memoir, 1915) describes Butler's personality in terms that are antithetical to his 
Edwardian reputation for being an icon of compromise (P. Cohen 69). The Memoir 
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describes Butler as a "dogmatic bigot, an unsociable Ishmaelite, a great hater" (P. Cohen 
70). 
169 Of his own clergyman father, Butler writes, "he never liked me, nor I him" (Holt 3). 
Furthermore, the letter from Christina Pontifex to her son is an exact duplicate of a letter 
from Butler's own mother (Holt 70). 
170 Recently, Shuttleworth declares that the novel is an "experimental" bildungsroman 
that undermines "conventional boundaries of individual identity" ("Evolutionary" 164, 
148). She regards the novel as substantially parodic (a "playful violation of realist form"), 
and she posits that although its subject matter is "tragic," its "form is that of comedy" 
("Evolutionary" 145, 164 ). 
171 Lightman outlines the subversive significance of Butler in his role as a popularizer 
who "resisted the scientific agenda of the scientific naturalists who supported Darwin" 
("Conspiracy" 132). Among the strategies Butler uses are: satire, "evolutionary epic," his 
profound knowledge of theological literature, and a democratizing appeal to the 
intelligence of the general public as a locus of authority (Lightman, "Conspiracy" 119, 
120-9). Butler views the scientific naturalists and specifically the cant of Darwinism as a 
"new form of repressive orthodoxy far worse than the Anglican orthodoxy it had 
ref laced" (Lightman, "Conspiracy" 129). 
17 Shuttleworth notes that the title of the novel suggests the "vanity of all human life in 
the face of death" ("Evolutionary" 140). Aptly, this general theme resonates with 
Juvenal's tenth satire, which was imitated by Samuel Johnson and entitled "The Vanity of 
Human Wishes" (1749). 
173 
Butler condemns Darwin's inconsistent habit theory by insisting that in "Notes on the 
Beagle," Darwin pronounced habit to be "omnipotent and its effects hereditary" (qtd. in 
Butler, Luck 62). Darwin "shilly-shallied" (to use Overton's word for intellectual 
cowardice) until 1882, when he finally "admit[ s ]" that instinct is memory which is 
transmitted though the generations" (Luck 62). Butler argues that Darwin used the term 
"natural selection" rhetorically, as a kind of sleight of hand to "square everything" (Luck 
85); for Butler, deception is the most loathsome vice. 
174 Shuttleworth notes the strong similarities between ideas in Life and Habit and those in 
The Way of All Flesh, particularly with regard to notions of biological inheritance and the 
"oneness of parent and child in memory and experience" ("Evolutionary" 158). Despite 
Butler's Lamarckian notions of human agency in evolution, that novel "seems to be 
weighted down at times by an almost overwhelming sense of biological, psychological 
and cultural determinism" ("Evolutionary" 152) 
175 As Lightman explains, Butler did not, like William Paley, believe in a transcendent 
designer, but argued instead for purposive evolution "without direction from an external 
deity" ("Conspiracy" 126). 
176 In the conclusion of Life and Habit, Butler admits that his friends complain that "they 
can never tell whether I am in jest or earnest," but maintains that he is "in very serious 
earnest," although "sometimes admitting of a humorous side" (305-6). Not surprisingly, 
there has been much interpretive confusion in studies of Erewhon. Butler's idea of 
machines as extra limbs for the human "machinate animal" (Erewhon 223) provides the 
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logic behind the (seemingly satiric) counter-attack to the first Erewhonian Professor. 
Lightman argues that Butler followed Paley's "analogical reasoning" in making a 
machine the model for his own "scheme of vitalistic and teleological 
evolution"("Conspiracy" 127-28), and in this way, "attempted to rescue the nature-as-
machine analogy from the clutches of deterministic and mechanistic evolutionists and to 
bring it back to the meaning that Paley had originally given it" ("Conspiracy" 127-28). 
177 Complementing this ethos of deflation, Shuttleworth describes Butler's "vision of the 
possible consciousness of excrement" in Life and Habit as being "partially serious" 
("Evolutionary" 14 7). 
178 In his 1895 Preface to Jude the Obscure, Hardy asserts that his novel "is an attempt to 
deal unaffectedly with the fret and fever, the derision and disaster" of unfulfilled aims" 
(3). 
179 Ledger clarifies that naturalism "can quintessentially be identified in late nineteenth-
century England with Emile Zola, Gissing, George Moore, and Arthur Morrison" (69). 
This project "was an intensification of mid-century realism, more determinedly 
producing a quasi-photographic, documentary, scientific account of social reality" 
(Ledger 69). 
18° C. J. Francis also observes that Gissing did not "unreservedly" regard himself to be a 
realist. Although he was influenced by the impersonal style of French and Russian 
novelists (Zola and Turgenev), Gissing also followed the more capacious and opinionated 
realism of Dickens (Francis 106). 
181 The editor of Sartor Resartus speculates that the Professor's exposure of ugly truths 
"must have sunk him in the estimation of most readers" (SR 50). In like fashion, 
Gissing's novels, as Coustillas and Partridge observe, "involved him in more or less open 
warfare with publishers, publishers' readers, editors or critics" (1). 
182 Levine, in his recent discussion ofrealism as a necessarily self-conscious and 
"thoroughly literary mode" that paradoxically struggles to portray "things as they are," 
refers to Biffen's completion of Mr Bailey, Grocer as being "a cheat" ("Literary 
Realism" 15, 17). Gissing's deception in permitting Biffen to write "The End" highlights 
the problems ofrealist representation: "how could he ever have reached the end of these 
tedious registrations of the real?" (Levine, "Literary Realism" 17). 
183 The house-fire (started by a drunken tenant) that nearly kills Biffen, like the epidemic 
of house-fires that Juvenal describes (in Satire III), is symbolic of the drunken 
incompetence and random violence that announce the decline of civilization. 
184 This harsh narratorial gesture also functions to parody the Trollopean convention of 
politely investing the implied reader with higher rather than lower standards. Gissing's 
narrator shares more with Shirley's cynical storyteller, who frequently ironizes the 
reader's mediocrity. 
185 Admittedly, Gissing cannot defend Dickens's melodramatic plots, but he insists upon 
Dickens's self-declared status as a realist (for whom a novel was "a very different thing 
than a severe chronicle of actual lives" (Immortal 93-94). In both studies, Gissing 
emphasizes the then-radical nature of Dickens's subject matter despite his fundamental 
middle-class values: "Morally, he would have changed the world; socially, he is a 
thorough conservative" (Immortal 212). Fundamentally, Gissing posits, Dickens 
"distrusted legislation" along with "charitable associations," and believed in reform 
through "private benevolence" (CD 251 ). 
413 
186 Biffen's observation that Dickens is generally accepted by the working classes 
"because of his strength in farce and his melodrama" (NGS 314) corresponds with 
Gissing's own view of"deep-seeing" (CD 106) humour as the secret to Dickens's 
universal appeal. The "rigorous realist" would have rendered characters (like Mrs Gamp) 
worth scorning; Gissing declares, "We reject the photograph; it avails us nothing in art or 
life" (CD 106). Elsewhere, seeming to reject the impartiality of naturalism, he praises 
Dickens's sympathy. Dickens's satire, Gissing argues, is most effective when his 
"indignation" is "subdued" (Immortal 238). As Irving Howe observes, Gissing became 
disaffected with "political movements and philosophies of progress" (xi). Despite 
Gissing's admiration for Dickens's novels, Samuel Vogt Gapp's statement appears to be 
valid: "There was nothing of the humourist in Gissing" (3). 
187 Gissing's interest in physiological psychology, and its theories of habit, is far more 
tangential that that of either Eliot or Butler; yet, as Jenny Bourne Taylor observes, 
Gissing read Theodule Ribot's contribution to "degenerationist discourse," translated in 
1875 as Heredity: A Psychological Study of its Phenomena, Laws, Causes and 
Consequence (Taylor 66). Ribot was a "staunch materialist" who was influenced by mid-
century English physiological psychologists (particularly Lewes and Spencer) (Taylor 
66). 
188 Tintner argues that Satire III (famously imitated by Samuel Johnson in "London" 
[1738]) is updated by Gissing in New Grub Street (1-2). 
189 Alluding to the same perversion of values (and also perhaps to Satire III), Professor 
Teufelsdrockh asks, "'Or how, without Clothes, could we possess the master-organ, 
soul's seat and true pineal gland of the Body Social: I mean, a Purse?"' (SR 50). 
190 Epitomizing the Jamesean notion of social entrapment through habit, Mrs Yule is 
described as being branded for life by her reflexive habits of speech and deportment as a 
member of the London poor. Her attire also signals her humble origins; she is "plainly 
dressed in serviceable grey" (NGS 71 ). 
191 By contrast, Marian Yule's plain clothes signal that issues of money rarely enter into 
her "habits of thought" (NGS 241 ). According to the way of the world in New Grub 
Street, thoughtful and sympathetic Marian is doomed. 
192 Possibly Gissing alludes to William of Occam's axiomatic law of parsimony known as 
"Occam's Razor": "It is useless to do with more what can be done with fewer" (Maurer 
405). This law of methodological parsimony is analogous to habit theory's "lines ofleast 
resistance" (Lewes, PLMJ 132). 
193 
According to Francis, the text demonstrates Schopenhauer's idea that the surrender of 
the will is the only way to survive. Biffen's hopelessly romantic love revives his desiring 
will and thus is the catalyst of his death (Francis 114-15) - a state in which there is 
neither "fear nor hope" (NGS 406). Reardon and Biffen both die uttering the most 
Schopenhaueresque of Shakespeare's lines, testifying that life is a "delusive dream" 
(Francis 113). 
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194 
Jameson refers specifically to the fear of "slipping down the painfully climbed slope 
of class position" (265). 
195 
In a letter to Mrs Frederic Harrison, 21 April 1891, Gissing explains his specifically 
Johnsonian view of Grub Street; it is a place associated with poverty-stricken writers, but 
not necessarily bad writing and "meanness of spirit": "Grub street actually existed in 
London some hundred & fifty years ago. In Pope & his contemporaries the name has 
become synonymous for wretched-authordom" (Letters 289). 
196 Vrettos observes in Dickens "a kind of authorial meta-habit of observing the routines 
of others in order, habitually, to transcribe them into literary form" ( 415). The opening 
lines of the 1867 Preface to Dombey and Son substantiate this pronouncement: "I make 
so bold as to believe that the faculty (or the habit) of correctly observing the characters of 
men, is a rare one. I have not even found, within my experience, that the faculty (or the 
habit) of correctly observing so much as the faces of men, is a general one by any means" 
(4). 
197 George H. Ford concludes that "the tone of his satire became much more obviously 
astringent after 1850" (82). 
198 Vrettos explores the numerous sartorially-inscribed anxieties about class, 
consumption, and identity that punctuate the narrative of Great Expectations. 
199 The myth of Dickens as an instinctive, unconscious artist is imbued with class 
prejudice. Chesterton's assertion is explicit: "The rise of Dickens is like the rising of a 
vast mob," and like the mob, Dickens is "comparatively ignorant" (Victorian 25). (The 
ever paradoxical Chesterton, however, asserted that Dickens "was among other things a 
satirist, a pure satirist," and that "[i]n short the satirist is more purely philosophical than 
the novelist. The satirist may be only an observer; the satirist must be a thinker. He must 
be a thinker, he must be a philosophical thinker" (Chesterton on Dickens 92-93). Dorothy 
Van Ghent explains that Dickens's "intuition alarmingly saw" the deadening effects of 
industrialism (128); H. M. Daleski, amidst a discussion of the intricacies of Dickens's 
novelistic attacks on mid-Victorian England, refers offhandedly to the "limitations of his 
critical intelligence" (l 86). Recently, Andrew Sanders declares: "His grasp of the steadily 
advancing scientific thought of his time probably went no further than that of an 
intelligent general reader" (Charles Dickens 165). Rosemarie Bodenheimer 
acknowledges and redresses the "long history of critical condescension" towards 
Dickens's knowledge (2-8). 
200 In a famous laudatory speech given in 1852, Thackeray emphasizes Dickens's pathos 
over and above his social criticism. He praises Dickens's wholesome, comic gifts to the 
children of England and also to his own daughter, who prized Dickens's Nicholas 
Nickleby above any of her father's novels (Thackeray, "Charity" 284-85). Walter 
Bagehot accuses Dickens of "infantine weakness" (Collins 404), and F. R. Leavis 
determines that the "adult mind doesn't as a rule find in Dickens a challenge to an 
unusual and sustained seriousness" (19). 
201 Bagehot contributed to the derisive gender-encoding of Dickens's literary style 
through his insistence upon the novelist's "deficiency in those masculine faculties ... 
reasoning understanding and firm far-seeing sagacity" (Collins 411 ). 
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202 Jean Ferguson Carr also explores "attempts to contain Dickens's impact by identifying 
him as lower-class, uneducated, and aligned with feminine discourse" (161 ). 
203 In Charles Dickens Revisited (2000), Robert Newsom finds a possible explanation for 
such interpretations in Dickens's ability to present a "anti-intellectual as to give some 
comfort to his readers who are perfectly content to find in him mere fun and 
entertainment and who have never quite reconciled with the later and more obviously 
somber and serious works. He had plenty of such readers in his lifetime and has plenty of 
them even now" (62). 
204 Lyn Pykett observes that the novel's fun is countered by its violent interpolated tales 
(39). Even John Forster felt that the novels after David Copperfield were tainted by a tone 
of bitterness (Goldberg 8). Interestingly, Steven Marcus points out that The Pickwick 
Papers contains subversive social satire, particularly in the scenes of Mr Pickwick's trial 
and period of self-imprisonment; however, he concludes that this is "Dickens's one 
novel, in which wickedness, though it exists, is not a threat" (51 ). 
205 Whipple complained of Dickens's "lack of scientific training in the austere domain of 
social, legal, and political science" and resented the novelist's attempt to "direct the 
public opinion of Great Britain by embodying, in exquisitely satirical characters, rash and 
hasty judgments on the whole government of Great Britain in all its departments, 
le~islative, executive, and judicial" (Collins 328). 
2° From "Modem Novelists, Charles Dickens," Westminster Review, October 1864. 
Typically, Ford argues, such dismissals of Dickens's authority as a social critic were 
politically motivated. For example, Ruskin approves of Hard Times's critique of 
Utilitarianism (which he felt worthy of universal study regarding "social questions") 
(Unto This Last 17: 3 ln). Later, however, when Ruskin feels Dickens to be aligned with 
Macaulay, he pronounces Dickens to be "a leader of the steam-whistle party par 
excellence" and implicates him as an "apostle to the mob" (Letter to Charles Eliot 
Norton, 19 June 1870; Letters 37: 7). 
207 Trevor Blount explores Dickens's interest in the reform of intramural burial-grounds. 
See also Blount's "Dickens's Slum Satire in Bleak House." 
208 Cotsell explains Little Dorrit' s satire on connoisseurship while noting Dickens's 
"deep political awareness" and "deeply saddened sense that the middle class had ceased 
to be progressive" ("Politics and Peeling" 197-98). 
209 Fumeaux's article on Dickens's satire of the Poor Law Bill of 1834 draws upon 
"plagiarist" adaptations of Oliver Twist, like Oliver Twiss (by Pos), published in 1838, in 
order to argue against the view that satire is overcome by the novel's "Newgate" plot. 
Such adaptations reveal the contemporary impact of Dickens's "specific rhetorical 
strategies of political resistance" and the dominant perception of the Poor Law satire as 
"central to" Dickens's novelistic project (Furneaux 222). 
210 Mitchell clarifies Dickens's lifelong anger concerning the methods of the governing 
elite. Specifically, he had contempt for projects such as war (i.e. the Crimean) and 
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overseas philanthropy ("foreign wrongs") that served to mask systematic neglect of the 
English poor (L. Mitchell 234). 
211 The Dickensian and Dickens Quarterly are particularly rich in articles that 
contextualize Dickens's variegated satiric targets: see, for example, Paul Schlicke's 
"Bumble and the Poor Law Satire of Oliver Twist," Lowell L. Blaisdell's "The Origins of 
the Satire in the Watertoast Episode of Martin Chuzzlewit," Kalyan 8. Ray's 
"Nomenclature and Satire in Little Dorrit," and Joel J. Brattin's "'A Mockery So Gross 
and Monstrous': Slavery in Dickens's Manuscript for American Notes." 
212 Hollington's study is anchored in theories of the grotesque that culminate in Bakhtin's 
positive but politicizing theory of"grotesque realism" (a concept discussed in Chapter 1). 
Hollington finds a paradoxical "revitalizing of perception" in Dickens's use of 
dehumanization (43). In terms of traditions of satire, Hollington suggests that there are 
many areas of "overlap between Dickensian themes and the subjects of visual satire" 
(13); for example, Hans Holbein's Dance of Death (1558), with its use of physiognomy 
as an index of character and its association of everyday occupations with death, is 
"ubiquitously present in Dickens's work" (13-14). As well, Hollington observes that 
London is the "principal focus and instigation of Dickens's perception of the grotesque" 
(55). 
213 In Bleak House, Hard Times, and Little Dorrit, Manning asserts, "themes of 
devitalization, mechanization, and devaluation of womanhood - are now central," and to 
treat these books as satire is "to grasp the main stem of each" (l 0 l ). 
214 Essentially, Gissing grapples with what Steven Marcus effectively summarizes as the 
"phenomenon" of Dickens: "a great genius who is also a popular success and a genuine, 
unremitting and impenitent critic of his society" (350). 
215 Welsh concludes, "Dickens was too sentimental to be a thorough-going satirist" 
("Satire" 384). The satirist "should appeal primarily to scorn, secondarily to laughter, and 
only occasionally to sentiment. Dickens was above all a humorist" (Welsh, "Satire" 384). 
216 In Chesterton's discussion of Martin Chuzzlewit, he observes that there are two 
"different" and "even antagonistic strands" (Chesterton on Dickens 99) in Dickensian 
narrative. Similarly, Ronald Paulson observes a "trademark" pairing of the satiric and 
sentimental (Satire 236). 
217 Ultimately though, for Palmeri, "Bleak House may not be predominantly a satire, but 
it is a tragic novel that has been extensively shaped by satire" ("Narrative Satire" 369). 
218 A.E. Dyson finds that Dickens's characters often "transcend[ed] a satiric framework" 
(81); thus, "satire, in its pure form at least, is forced to yield ground" (l 77). Dickens's 
satire, Gissing argues, is most effective when his "indignation" is "subdued" (Immortal 
238). R.H. Hutton, providing another example of this view of Dickens, concludes in his 
1869 review in the Spectator that the "humourist not infrequently swallows up the 
moralist, and his delight in the grand incoherency of human nature often overpowers his 
scorn for falsehood" (Collins 490). 
219 Manning contrasts the satiric with the "novelistic" plots and characters in Dickens's 
narratives, which, she concludes, "may be simultaneously dramatic (or novelistic) and 
rhetorical (satiric counters), or they may move from one mode to the other" (9). "Strange 
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mixture[ s ]" such as Krook and Richard Carstone existing in the same "fictional world" 
reflect a "bifurcation" that is "fundamental to Dickens's satire" (Manning 9). The third-
person narrator is often an "angry satirist," in contrast to characters such as Esther 
Summerson, who are "painfully accepting" (9). Manning proposes that in Little Dorrit 
and Hard Times, the satire is "so bitter" that even the comic moments are satiric ( 40). 
220 Importantly, Manning follows Price's application of Alvin Keman's definition of the 
crowded "satiric scene," in which things and people become confused in Dickens's 
narrative discourse. As well, Manning approves of Cockshut' s argument that Dickens 
imported Augustan mock heroic techniques, but did so inexpertly. 
221 Dickens's association with eighteenth-century novel traditions has become a 
"commonplace in Dickens criticism" (Fludernik 65). Monika Fludernik emphasizes the 
influence of Goldsmith's The Vicar of Wakefield (1766) upon Dickens's "sentimentalist 
mode" (68), and she observes that William Godwin's Caleb Williams likely influenced 
Dickens's social criticism (and possibly his penchant for prison metaphors). In general, 
Dickens shared with Smollett, Defoe, Fielding, and others the use of picaresque, travel-
centred narratives, and eccentric or "splenic" characters; as well, Dickens adopted the 
"satiric mode so common in eighteenth-century fiction" (Fludemik 69). Dickens's novels, 
Andrew Sanders asserts, should be seen "in the mainstream of the tradition of English 
comic fiction" for his work is both "comic and affirmative" ("Dickens" 56). 
222 In the same letter, Dickens mentions that he will keep on the look-out for fire-flies 
when he embarks upon "Horace's journey" from Rome to Maecenas (Letters 4: 323). It is 
also notable that Dickens owned a copy of John Dryden's Satires of Juvenal and Persius 
(Manning 234). Dryden's "Discourse" introduces the satires, and therefore Dickens may 
have been familiar with Dryden's distinctions between Horatian and Juvenalian satire. 
Despite such documentation, the idea that Dickens was a Juvenalian satirist by 
unconscious imitation continues to circulate. Charles Martindale, for example, 
characterizes the introductory Veneering dinner party in Our Mutual Friend as a 
"coruscating" and "Juvenalesque" "version of the satiric dinner-party (cena)" (285); he 
posits that Dickens "may never have read Juvenal - even in translation," but "intuiting" 
classical satiric traditions, absorbed them through other writers (286). 
223 Martin is asked if he knows of an American writer who has '"anatomised our follies as 
a people, and not this or that party; and who has escaped the foulest and most brutal 
slander, the most inveterate hatred and intolerant pursuit"' (MC 237). Americans are so 
intolerant of satire that even '"the most harmless and good-humoured illustrations of our 
vices or defects" have been "expunged, or altered, or explained away, or patched into 
~raise"' (MC 237). 
24 Manning's "satiric vision," which evolves from "Christmassy to dark" (39), is as 
unclear a term as Palmeri's "satiric energies" ("Narrative Satire" 367). 
225 In Appendix B, Manning comprehensively summarizes both the overt and the 
subtextual allusions to Juvenal, Swift, and Pope in Dickens's writing, and restates her 
contradictory thesis: "Although Dickens knew both the classic English satirists and their 
models, he did not see himself as the inheritor of that tradition" (7, 234 ). 
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226 Pykett summarizes her point with the aid of Terry Eagleton's all-encompassing 
characterization of Dickens's texts as "a veritable traffic jam of competing fictional 
modes - Gothic, Romance, moral fable, 'social problem' novel, popular theatre, 'short 
story,' journalism, episodic entertainment - which permits realism no privileged status" 
( qtd. in Pykett 10). The miscellaneity of Dickensian narrative has inspired many critical 
assessments that often argue for satire's subsumption by other modes. For example, 
Steven Marcus discusses Oliver Twist as a "Newgate novel," parable, and homiletic tale 
after the manner of John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress. He determines the first fifty pages 
of the text to be a focused satire on the New Poor Law of 1834 - although the "satirical 
polemic is gradually modulated and is assimilated into the dramatic structure of the 
story" (Marcus 67-68, 58). Though Marcus observes satiric incident and tone, he 
ultimately defines Dickens as a "novelist of comic genius" (299). 
227 E. P. Whipple's distinction is exemplary: "There is no authorized, no accredited way 
of exhibiting character but this, that the dramatist or novelist shall enter into the soul of 
the personage represented, shall sympathize with him sufficiently to know him, and shall 
represent his ... individuality. This sympathy is consistent with the utmost hatred of the 
person described; but characterization becomes satire the moment that antipathy 
supersedes insight and the satirist berates the exterior manifestations of an individuality 
whose interior life he has not diligently explored and interpreted" (Charles Dickens 10 I). 
Critics such as Whipple rejected Dickensian characterization for veering too close to 
what was regarded as the unsympathetic, crass reductivism of satire. George Eliot, for 
example, regarded Dickens's social criticism to be marred by "frequently false 
psychology" ("Natural" 111 ). Eliot's perception of a lack of psychological verisimilitude 
in the novels (which therefore failed in their duty to stir social sympathy) was shared by 
George Henry Lewes; in 1872 (Fortnightly Review), Lewes condemns Dickens's 
characters for being "masks," "mere catchwords," or "wooden horses" that "mov[ e] like 
~ieces of simple mechanism always in one way" (Collins 583). 
28 The programmatic seriousness of the prefaces was not overlooked by critics such as 
Justin McCarthy, who justifies his attack on Dickens's presumption to be a 
"philosopher," "moralist," and "politician," based on the claims made in the prefaces to 
Martin Chuzzlewit, Little Dorrit, and Bleak House (Collins 448n). 
229 Dickens defends the artistic validity of extreme representations of characters in his 
1839 Preface to Nicholas Nickleby (1838-9); he describes the readerly hypocrisy that 
"every day in real life," people are regarded as either bad or virtuous, but the world "will 
seldom admit a very strongly-marked character, either good or bad, in a fictitious 
narrative, to be within the limits of probability" (Nicholas Nickleby 46). 
230 Eagleton's insight is relevant here: "Dickens's grotesque realism is a stylistic 
distortion in the service of truth, a kind of astigmatism which allows us to see more 
accurately" (English Novel 149). 
231 Exposition is public declaration, exposure, expounding, or explaining (OED). 
232 Jerome Meckier also emphasizes the Juvenalian qualities of Dickens's thematic and 
stylistic propensities, particularly in Bleak House: Dickens "belongs to the school of 
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Juvenal, Swift and Rabelais" and makes "use of J uvenalian satire to promote a radical 
f:olitics and encourage reform" (Hidden 36, 27). 
33 Hogarth drew upon iconographic conventions derived from Cesare Ripa's Jconologia 
(1593). Fittingly, Paulson likens Hogarth's sense of corruption with Juvenal's: 
"Corruption for Juvenal is a falling away, decline, or reversal, most generally of the 
Republic into the Empire" ("Pictorial" 298). Hogarth found Juvenal a "richer source" 
(Paulson, "Pictorial" 298) than Horace for a study of the incremental stages of decline 
reflected, for example, in the ironically entitled print series A Harlot's Progress (1732). 
Harry Stone offers a thorough study of the influence of Hogarth's pictorial satire on 
Dickensian images and themes - especially cannibalism (see The Night Side of Dickens: 
Cannibalism, Passion, Necessity, 35-55). Hogarth's engravings (of which Dickens owned 
forty-five) emphasize the societal origins of various vices (Stone 49). 
234 In the serialized novels, each monthly contribution filled a quota of thirty-two pages 
of text, accompanied by two illustrations (the final number exhibited forty-eight pages of 
text and four illustrations), cover design, along with a title page and a frontispiece. 
Dickens's close attention to the productions of his illustrators has been well documented 
(see Butt and Tillotson, Dickens at Work, 15-22). In Bleak House, pervasive darkness and 
recurring textual images of sickness, blindness, and decay are suggested pictorially by the 
dark plates - literally darkening the novel. 
235 Manning concludes that in his "dark" novels, "the whole of society is seen through 
some metaphor of rigidity" (39). 
236 The New Comedy structure involves the clash of two societies, "the obstructing and 
the congenial society" (Frye, "Dickens" 52). Typically, romantic love is thwarted, but the 
congenial society demonstrably dominates through a happy ending - usually some form 
of festivity (Frye, "Dickens" 52, 55). 
237 Frye explains that Dickens made abundant use in his melodramatic plots of the 
"tagged humor" ("Dickens" 58): a character associated with the repetition of certain 
phrases and actions (who is generally an "obstructing humor" ["Dickens" 81 ]). The 
"humor of stock response," Frye argues, is particularly powerful for mocking the going 
opinion; this humour creates "cultural allegories, representatives of the kind of anxiety 
that caricatures an age" ("Dickens" 61 ). Henry Fielding defines a humour as "a violent 
Impulse of the mind, determining it to some one peculiar Point, by which a Man becomes 
ridiculously distinguished form all other men" (Covent Garden Journal 1752, Works 113) 
238 Manning also applies to Dickens's texts Bergson's notion oflaughter arising from the 
"spectacle of something mechanical encrusted on the living," and contrasting radically 
with "life's infinite changefulness" (Manning 36, 39). Bergson asserts: "The comic is that 
side of a person which reveals his likeness to a thing, that aspect of human events which, 
through its peculiar inelasticity, conveys the impression of pure mechanism, of 
automatism, of movement without life. Consequently it expresses an individual or 
collective imperfection which calls for an immediate corrective. This corrective is 
laughter" (Bergson 3 7). 
239 Dickens's analogical habit of asserting continuity between the animate and inanimate 
world was most influentially theorized by Dorothy Van Ghent, who interprets Dickens's 
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characters, not as psychologically limited caricatures, but as expressions of the reification 
of human beings through the processes of industrial capitalism ( 128). Dickens's "device 
of association," she posits, is not typical symbolic illustration, but a "necessary 
metaphysical function in Dickens's universe" (130). 
240 In Dickens's texts, habits, the deterministic propensities of human character, are 
frequently figured in the form of mechanistic metaphors. Paradoxically, habit's 
transformative and beneficial potential, including such principles as confirmed virtue and 
habitual sympathy, capitalize on the concept of free will. Dickens's machine-like 
characters choose freely to be bound by habit. 
241 Vrettos claims that this novel's "self-conscious attention to habit is more pronounced" 
than "in much of his other fiction" ( 416). 
242 Dickens received a snobbish rebuke from Lewes for Krook's spontaneous combustion. 
For a summary of Dickens's trespass into a physiological debate about tissue metabolism, 
see John B. West, "Krook's Death by Spontaneous Combustion and the Controversy 
between Dickens and Lewes: A Physiologist's View." The lack of critical attention given 
to the relation of Dickens's fiction to psychological medicine, which Oberhelman noted 
in 1995, has been corrected; yet, traces of Lewes's view remain. Rick Rylance, for 
example, opens his study with a quotation from Great Expectations, but ultimately 
sidelines Dickens in his survey of contributors to the century's psychology debates. As 
well, Peter Allan Dale offers a Lewes-inflected view of Dickens's psychology (72-73). 
243 Bodenheimer details Dickens's various interests: natural history, medicine and mental 
science, history, and the occult ( 1-19). Furthermore, the fact that Dickens owned a copy 
of Dr. John Bucknill's The Psychology of Shakespeare reveals his interest in the 
intersection of science and literature (Manheim 71-72). See also David Oberhelman ( 10) 
and Leonard Manheim (71-77) for an account of relevant books in Dickens's library in 
1879. 
244 See Taylor and Shuttleworth for a list of articles printed in Household Words on the 
subject of insanity and lunacy reform. Dickens wrote the first of the articles, "Idiots" 
(June 1853), which surveyed improvements in treatments for the insane (397). As well, 
Richard A. Currie argues that articles in the journal reflect Dickens's (and Wilkie 
Collins's) interest in supporting improved treatments in asylums, including moral 
management (18). 
245 In "An Analytic Note" to The Great Tradition (1948), Leavis, though generally not 
inclined to approve of low or comic modes, praises the "satiric irony" of Hard Times, 
particularly its concentration in the first two chapters; here it is not "thrown" in with 
other "modes" of "melodrama, pathos, and humour" in the characteristically "large and 
genial Dickensian way" (Leavis 228). For Leavis, Hard Times exhibits Dickens's "full 
critical vision" (a vision that he has "had little credit for" [228]). Although Leavis 
discusses the text's "ironic method" (230), he favours the generic term "moral fable" to 
satire. In a "moral fable," the "representative significance" of all aspects of the narrative 
is "immediately apparent" to the reader (230). In this exceptional text, Leavis holds, 
Dickens's "ironic humour" is "mature" and "serious" (21 ). 
421 
246 Many critics were disappointed by Dickens's "misunderstanding of trade unionism" 
(House 28). Interestingly, these critics often demonstrate ambivalence to the novel as 
satire. For example, Terry Eagleton resists the text's satiric generalities and lack of 
reformist specificity: Hard Times "exposes [Dickens] to be pretty ignorant of 
industrialism; we never get to know what is produced in Bounderby's factories, and the 
city of Coketown in portrayed in vaguely impressionistic terms" (Novel 143). Eagleton 
regrets that this is a novel that recognizes "what is at stake is a whole industrial-capitalist 
system, yet which can find little to oppose to it but the anarchic spontaneity of a circus" 
(Novel 158). 
247 He further charges Dickens with perverting these truths through the lens of an 
"embittered" state of mind (Collins 317). Uncharacteristically, Dickens did not reply to 
criticisms of Hard Times in a defensive preface. 
248 Sinnett asserts that her nation respects imaginative works and that she is "not aware of 
any such system being in operation anywhere in England" (Collins 305). Paul A. Olson 
argues that Sinnett ignores the legitimacy of Dickens's emphasis on the arguments 
afsainst fancy in Bentham, through James Mill to William Ellis and George Combe (235). 
2 9 Interestingly, Humphry House's assessment of Gradgrind as being not just a 
"burlesque and an exaggeration," but the "only major Dickens character meant to be an 
'intellectual,' underlies his notorious pronouncement that Dickens "did not understand 
enough of any philosophy even to be able to guy it successfully" (23, 24). Eagleton also 
notes that Gradgrind is "in fact the only real intellectual Dickens ever portrays" (Novel 
157). 
250 The enduring critical debate about whether Hard Times is a singularly poor or 
singularly brilliant specimen of a Dickensian novel is coloured by critical resistance 
towards its satire. Recently, for example, Anne Humphreys obviates the formal issue of 
satire: "What disappoints some readers is that, in order to attack this system 
[Utilitarianism], Dickens seems to reduce his characters to types, both limiting the human 
interest and oversimplifying utilitarianism at the same time" (392). Harold Bloom regrets 
its "drab characterizations" and lack of Dickens's distinctively "preternatural 
exuberance" (6). Bloom's collection of critical essays on Hard Times echoes his view 
that the novel "fails as a satire on Utilitarianism, but triumphs frighteningly as a 
representation of the drive beyond the pleasure principle" (10). Frank Palmeri concludes 
that Hard Times's educational satire is not successfully linked to the rest of the novel; 
therefore, he pronounces that the novel is disqualified from being a thoroughgoing satire: 
"the satiric implication that a utilitarian education will lead children to become amoral 
embezzlers may connect the children's education to the principal plot, but it ... strains 
credulity" ("Narrative Satire" 368). 
251 The idea of attaining "full social control" by "employing Associationism" in public 
schools, Olson notes, appears in James Mill's 1818 entry for psychology in the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, in which Associationist principles (simultaneity, succession, 
and habituation) are proposed as the "basis" for a mandatory public education (172). 
252 Embodying Carlyle's pronouncement that we have "machines for Education" ("Signs" 
35), M'Choakumchild is described as being a product, like other pupil-teachers, of mass 
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production, similar to "pianoforte legs" (HT 49). In 1846, the government funded a pupil-
teacher scholarship-based system developed by Utilitarian Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth 
( 1804-77), structured on an ideal of fact-based knowledge (Simpson 25), or what the 
narrator terms "educational cramming" (HT 59). David Paroissien finds Mr 
M'Choakumchild to be Bradley Headstone's "prototype" ("Ideology" 273). 
253 Dickens frequently alludes to the sterility of mechanical habit in terms of Christian 
parables of the seed (Job 4:8, "they that plow iniquity, and sow wickedness, reap the 
same," as well as Matthew 1 :3 and Galatians 6:7, "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall 
he also reap"). Hard Times's ironic book titles, "Sowing," "Reaping," and "Garnering," 
may a]so allude to Carlyle's invocation of the parable in The French Revolution: "The 
harvest is reaped and garnered; yet still we have no bread" (177). 
254 Jennifer Gribble argues that such allusions expose the Utilitarian overwriting of the 
humanitarian teachings of the bible. Chapter One (of Book One), entitled "The One 
Thing Needful," refers to Luke 10:42, in which Mary attends to Jesus's teachings (the 
"one thing needful"), while her sister Martha is "absorbed in practicalities" (Gribble 429). 
As well, the consistent deployment of biblical stories contributes moral scope to the text's 
Juvenalian prophecy of doom. As Daniel Hooley notes, Juvenal is characteristically 
apocalyptic in his tone and in his warnings that Rome is in the last of its days (Roman 
Satire 115). The narrator's interpretation of the statistics announcing the nation's 
prosperity are likely to be the "Writing on the Wall," referring to Daniel's prophecy of 
doom and judgment based on God's words written on the wall at Belshazzar's feast 
(Daniel 5 :24-28). 
255 Assessing Hard Times in terms of prevalent scientific and political discourses, Olson 
debunks the idea that Dickens was ignorant about his satiric targets. The satire, he 
specifies, is not exclusive to Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, but simultaneously 
engages second-generation Utilitarians by "excoriat[ing] [William] Ellis, [George] 
Combe, and the schools they created" (228) (i.e., the Birkbeck-style schools that were 
widespread in the 1820s and 30s, such as Andrew Bell and John Lancaster's monitorial 
schools for working-class children that promoted rote learning and hierarchy [Olson 175-
177]). Olson finds "real-world equivalents" for "large capital in Ellis, the educational 
reformer in Combe and others," and the "experimental teacher" in W. M. Williams (236). 
As well, David Paroissien assesses Dickens's novel as a criticism of mid-century 
educational reformers such as Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth, Richard Dawes, and William 
Ellis, who focused on inculcating habits of industry and thrift in the working poor, and 
who "assimilated" the ideas of Swiss reformer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827). 
Pestalozzi promoted "object lessons" to teach the accurate observation of everyday things 
(Paroissien, "Ideology" 274-78). 
256 Specifically, Dickens parodies Harriet Martineau's Illustrations of Political Economy 
(1832). 
257 For example, John Ramsay McCulloch (1789-1864), a Utilitarian statistician and 
popularizer of political economy, whom Dickens denounced, promoted a habit-based 
theory of social control of the working classes in his The Principles of Political Economy 
(1830). 
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258 Dickens's letter to Charles Knight, 30 December 1854, explains: "My satire is against 
those who see figures and averages, and nothing else - the representatives of the 
wickedest and most enormous vice of this time" (Letters 7: 492). 
259 The highly symbolic nature of Hard Times's characters has been observed by many 
critics. Lionel Stevenson argues that these characters, more than those of Dickens's other 
novels, are designed to be agents of an attack on "the ideological basis of current 
capitalism" (311-12). Ford defines the novel's characters to be "symbolical 
characterizations" (82); Goldberg identifies them as "personifications of Carlylean 
criticism" (79); and Manning asserts that they are "ciphers of ideas to condemn or 
uphold" (133). Steven Wall, in his discussion of satire in Trollope, refers to such 
characters as "creatures ofrhetoric" ( 43). 
260 Goldberg concludes that Hard Times exposes Dickens's "dependence on Carlyle's 
teaching to an extreme extent"- a "tendency" he observes in Dickens's later novels (78): 
"The satires on bureaucratic muddle in Little Dorrit, Philistine money worship in Our 
Mutual Friend, and popular philanthropy in Edwin Drood derive much of their animus as 
well as considerable literary detail from Carlyle's various Pamphlets" (Goldberg 7). It is 
important to note, however, that Dickens was not a blind follower of Carlyle. For 
example, in a letter to John Forster (15 May 1854), he admits that Carlyle's habit of hero 
worship could be excessive: "the extraordinary peculiarity of [Carlyle's] mind always is a 
respect for power when it is exercised by a determined man" (Letters 7: 332). Dickens 
found this penchant to be a "curious distortion" of Carlyle's moral judgment, particularly 
in relation to tyrants. As well, Dickens's request to dedicate Hard Times to Carlyle is not 
phrased to indicate intellectual subservience: "'I know it contains nothing in which you 
do not think with me, for no man knows your books better than I. I want to put in the first 
page of it, that it is inscribed to Thomas Carlyle. May I?'" (Letter from 13 July 1854, 
Letters 7: 367). 
261 Humphreys observes that the text's "didactic" themes are articulated less through 
direct narratorial moral commentary than through "resonant metaphors" (192). 
262 Further indicating Gradgrind's multivalent symbolic status, his children are aptly 
named Malthus, Adam Smith, and Jane. Recently, Hilda Hollis identifies "little Jane" to 
be a satiric reference to Jane Marcet, a successful popularizer of political economy (89). 
263 Josiah Bounderby of Coketown is selfishness (the first principle of laissez-faire 
economics) incarnate. Chronically inflated by conceited lies of self-sufficiency (and 
cliche-ridden boasts), he appears to be on the verge of explosion. Like the industrial-
capitalist system he symbolizes (and like the train that enters Coketown in a "seizure"), 
he dies in a fit. Tom Gradgrind, who follows his father "like a machine" (HT 15), is a 
Bounderby in the making. 
264 From a letter to Miss Davenport Bromley, 30 August 1866 (Froude 280). 
265 Love, he admits, cannot be kept out of the "habits of mind, and habits of life" of 
unreasonable women (HT 131). Other significant Menippean moments are his 
disciplinary ·speeches to his dissentingly imaginative children, his conversations with 
Bounderby, and his final conversation with Bitzer - in the chapter entitled 
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"Philosophical" - in which he is defeated by the "catechism" that "the whole social 
system is a question of self-interest" (383). 
266 Frye determines that Hard Times, "of all Dickens's stories, comes nearest to being ... 
the dystopia," for the "most effective dystopias" reveal a "nightmare world" in which 
"perverse tendencies" (ones that particularly "threaten" the writer's social occupation) 
have "free play" ("Dickens" 67). As well, Joseph Gold observes that the novel is 
Dickens's "nearest approach to Huxley's Brave New World, Orwell's 1984, and 
~articularly Gulliver's Travels in its third and fourth books" (198). 
67 Christopher Lane's term for the key narrative habit of Our Mutual Friend. 
268 Recently, Tamara Ketabgian challenges the straightforward opposition of machines 
and human beings in Victorian anti-mechanical social criticism. Contextualizing Hard 
Times's image of melancholy-mad elephants within "industrial metaphorics common in 
works of medicine, social criticism, and natural history," Ketabgian argues that Dickens's 
novel "explores distinctly mechanical forms of feeling" (672). Her complex argument 
links period studies in reflex action with surprising suggestions of affect in mechanism. 
269 As Mary Simpson notes, the town's architecture is Georgian and therefore strictly 
functional and symmetrical (56). This contrasts with the "Gothic architecture" (HT 14) of 
Sleary's Circus, which invokes, in Ruskinian terms, the individuality and creativity of a 
free population. 
270 In view of Plato's metaphor for the soul as a chariot driver and two horses, one good 
and one bad (like Sleary's "one fixed" and one "rolling eye" [HT 46]), Sleary and the 
Circus Family, who train horses to dance, have clearly given rein to the good horse; 
mechanicals, Louisa explains, have "'[c]rushed [their] better angel into a daemon"' (HT 
289). When Sissy is asked to define the horse, she is figuratively asked to define the 
ineffable human mind and soul. 
271 For J. Hillis Miller, "Dickens dramatizes in strikingly symbolic terms the opposition 
between soul-destroying relation to a utilitarian industrial civilization ... and the 
reciprocal interchange of love." The machinery of the mills and the "horse-riding" are the 
two "dominant," opposing symbols (226-7). 
272 James Harthouse symbolizes the unaccountable force and momentum of sheer habit. 
Unlike Grad grind, who is at least sincere in his misguided application of habit theory, 
Harthouse operates through the passive absorption of current trends. Intentionally, he 
uses the power of habit to seduce Louisa, for he is "in the habit" of visiting her. 
Strategically, he "associate[ s] himself' (HT 238) with her love for her brother. As a 
"Parliament gentleman" from London and aimless "modern gentleman" (of whom there 
are "legions") (HT 197, 238), his character enacts the reflexive ennui and inattention that 
characterize England's mechanical ruling men. "[l]ndifferent and purposeless," more 
than "designedly bad," he prefigures Eugene Wrayburn as an exemplar of amoral habit 
(HT238-9). 
273 Observable also is the text's reliance upon literary devices of repetition: alliteration, 
consonance, and assonance. 
274 For example, Steven Connor's deconstructionist reading explores "important internal 
inconsistencies" ( 126) in the text. The fact that "[ m ]etaphor is repeatedly used to discredit 
metaphor as Dickens mounts a systematic assault on systematic thought" undoes the 
"firm opposition of Fact and Fancy essential to the book" (123). In this way, Connor 
concludes, Hard Times "connives in what it condemns" (121). 
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275 Coketown's library is a monument to the persistence of wonder. Mr Gradgrind is 
incredulous that the exhausted working population reads at all; the narrator explains that 
in an immovable desire for narrative (even rather un-fanciful specimens), "[t]hey took De 
Foe to their bosoms, instead of Euclid, and seemed to be on the whole more comforted by 
Goldsmith than by Cocker" (HT 65-66). 
276 The images of hell also recall, in Pope's Dunciad, the solemn moral victory over 
"ashes and dead carcasses" (Frye "Nature" 55). 
277 Marcus observes that "[i]n Little Dorrit, indeed in all his later writing, the discovery 
of the connections between social and personal disorders becomes Dickens's chief pre-
occupation" (47). Similarly, H. M. Daleski asserts that Bleak House demonstrates that 
"for the first time in Dickens individual attitudes are related to those of organized 
society" (158). The novel is his "first major assault on the England of his day" (Daleski 
167). 
278 Another of Dickens's satire-promoting and perception-fixated pronouncements is 
found in his speech on 7 February 1842: "' [W]e cannot hold in too strong a light of 
disgust and contempt, before the view of others, all meanness, falsehood, cruelty, and 
o.fgpression, of every grade and kind"' (Speeches 24). 
2 9 See also Trevor Blount' s "The Graveyard Satire of Bleak House in the Context of 
1850." 
280 Raymond Williams observes that the traditional rhetorical antimony between the rural 
virtue of the country and the corruptions of the city (from ancient Greek and Roman 
literature onwards) "crysta11ised" in relation to the imperial capital of Rome (especia11y in 
the "savage satires of Juvenal") (46). In Dickens's novel, the customary moral distinction 
between country and city is undermined to suggest a widespread culture of moral 
delinquency; however, with the restoration of Bleak House at the novel's close as a 
sanctuary of rural virtue, the traditional binary is ultimately reinforced. 
281 Dickens was against the Young England Movement and backward-looking ideas of 
reform general1y. One of Bleak House's most singular similes for the unempathetic habits 
confirmed by social insularity is that of a fossilized fly. Lady Dedlock is "so long 
accustomed to suppress emotion, and keep down reality; so long schooled for her own 
purposes, in that destructive school which shuts up the natural feelings of the heart, like 
flies in amber, and spreads one uniform and dreary gloss over the good and bad, the 
feeling and the unfeeling, the sensible and the senseless; she has subdued even her 
wonder until now" (BH 787). 
282 Welsh, who also identifies illness as the "principal symbol" of the satire, notes that the 
"satirical charge of Bleak House is so comprehensive that readers are bound to differ 
about its true symbolic centre" (Redressed 105, 107). 
283 Kate Flint pronounces Bleak House to be the "most obviously dialogic of the novels" 
(Dickens 43). Peter Garrett explores the singularities of the "dialogical" Victorian 
multiplot narrative, emphasizing its "constitutive indeterminacy" and its "dialogue of 
structural principles" (13, 8). 
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284 The reviewer for the Athenaeum (17 September 1853) was appalled at being thrown 
into "some orb where eccentrics, Bedlamites, ill-directed and disproportioned people 
were the only inhabitants" (Collins 276). 
285 Lady Dedlock's demise is charted pictorially through her increasing presence in the 
"dark plates" that palpably convey her engulfment by forces beyond her control. 
Formally, they force the reader/viewer to experience the obliteration of perception. 
286 D. A. Miller identifies Chancery as the text's principal symbol, for its operations, in 
their sheer "unlocalizability," "exceed the architectural" confines of the court (123-4). 
The "topic of the carceral in Dickensian representation" is both a "confined institutional 
space and the space of "liberal society"' (specifically that of the individual and family) 
(D. A. Miller 123-4). 
287 Observing Bleak House's cynicism concerning free will, Q. D. Leavis notes that the 
novel asks a "cut-throat" society "to enquire into the possibilities of goodness in such an 
environment, and whether anything in the nature of free-will is possible for those born 
into it" (174). 
288 Esther's impressions of London are particularly redolent of traditions of urban satire 
that associate the city with underworlds. "Towards London," Esther perceives that "a 
lurid glare overhung the whole dark waste" (BH 450); she associates this light with a 
hellish, "unearthly fire" that gleams on the city's buildings and "wondering inhabitants" 
(BH 450). 
289 Esther, like Horace, is a humble and tentative member of a social circle into which she 
is grateful to have been accepted. Her outsider's perspective, combined with a craving to 
"'understand [things] better"' (BH24), and her overriding ethic of being sympathetic to, 
and wary of superiority over, her fellow human beings, are compatible with the Horatian 
decree of affectionate criticism. Her "brighten[ ed]" perceptions are lovingly satiric (BH 
24). 
290 He does not elaborate upon this intriguing suggestion of agency, except to say that 
Ada, Clare, and Esther "are all in the suit without being spoiled or corrupted by it -
indeed they constitute a domestic retreat into which the institutional, social space of the 
court can be contrasted" (D. A. Miller 126). 
291 Miller, however, does highlight the shrewdness of Esther's comment that it is 
"ridiculous" to speak of the Chancery suit as being "in progress" (D. A. Miller 129). 
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"[B]ecause [Bleak House] is a satire as well as a romance," Welsh argues that there 
"needs to be" a "few signs of redemption" (Redressed 119). Esther's narrative has "the 
shape of new comedy, with its marriage plot," and "[w]hereas comedy achieves a happy 
ending, satire often just leaves off'; thus, in Bleak House (particularly in the last double 
number), "the satire itself can be thought of as a blocking agent that finally gives way" 
(Welsh, Redressed 127). 
293 Carpenter, for example, argues that monomania is potentially circumvented by the will 
to change the patterns of "unconscious cerebration" by routinely diverting one's thoughts 
427 
into "healthful channels" (543, 674). Carpenter holds that human beings are not "mere 
thinking Automata," although he warns, "such thinking Automata do exist" (6, 27). 
294 Rather than a "tabula rasa," Lewes refers to the "sensitive subject" as being "a 
~alimpsest" (P LMJ 149). 
95 By contrast, George Eliot's Daniel Deronda defends the possibility that the will can 
direct habit productively; Grandcourt suffers from "the want of regulated channels for the 
soul to move in - good and sufficient ducts of habit, without which our nature easily 
turns to mere ooze and mud, and at any pressure yields nothing but a spurt or a puddle" 
(132). 
296 Eugene's rejection of the naturalist's custom of comparing human beings to bees is 
not just a lazy dreamer's rant against the cult of earnestness, but is also (as Our Mutual 
Friend is generally) a complaint against habitual and thoughtless enactment of the status 
~uo. 
2 7 In Juvenal's satires, he condemns "the systematic reduction of this feudal concept into 
pure financial huckstering, at all levels" (Green 31 ). Significantly, Green determines 
Juvenal's first programmatic satire, "with its forgers, gigolos, informers, and crooked 
advocates," to be a "threnody on the theme of collapsing social values" (30). 
298 Juvenal observes the prevalence of "retainers whose friendship was bought I With the 
meal-ticket stashed in their wallets" (5.45-46). 
299 Gibbon himself learned from Juvenal; he references Juvenal's satires throughout his 
history of ancient Rome. 
300 As well, the figures from Roman history underline the title in the cover for the 
monthly parts. Boffin is depicted staring intently at the image. 
301 It is also an imitation of Horace's Satire 11.8. 
302 Recently John Reed, resuscitating authorial intentionality, applies information theory 
and its concept of "redundancy" to Dickensian narrative structure and techniques: 
"Dickens has embedded his redundancy not only in characterization and plotting, but in 
his very style, so that literal descriptions and figurative passages blend to convey an ever-
increasing stream of data building to an inescapable message" ("Redundancy" 32). 
Reed's idea that Dickens aimed for enhanced authorial control though a surplus of 
information complements an interpretation of Our Mutual Friend as satire/satura. 
303 This contrasts with the "moderate pursuit of gain, that leaves the mind free to dwell 
upon the pleasures and advantages that money is to bring" (Bain, S&J 398). In Our 
Mutual Friend, the "'dreadful extent"' of Bella's desire for the things that money can buy 
contrasts with her father's comparatively innocent desire for a new suit, and his opinion 
that '"most of us"' (OMF 319) naturally desire nice things. 
304 Jarvie explores the link between Dickens's metonymic representation in Our Mutual 
Friend and the "ubiquitous metonymic processes of capitalism" itself (116), by which 
"'value' moves from commodity to commodity" almost "autonomously," in a "shape-
shifting, opportunistic" way ( 115). Drawing upon theories of metaphor (by Roman 
Jakobson and Paul de Man), Jarvie accepts that "metonymy," more than metaphor, is a 
"relational, unstable figure" - an "opportunistic trope" that generates "links based solely 
on the accident of proximity" (11 7). It functions as a kind of "rhetorical capitalism" 
(121 ). 
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305 Habit, Bain argues, plays a key role in sensual excesses, for merely the "accustomed 
routine of life leads to a craving almost of the nature of Appetite"; the "tendency" or 
"bent" to fulfill the appetite. when the normal "time comes round" creates "uneasiness at 
being restrained" (S&J 254 ). Through habit alone, healthy desires can become 
pathological and "[t]hus we have the alcoholic craving, the craving for animal food, for 
tea, coffee, &c." (S&I 253). Furthermore, Spencer posits that some substances, though 
initially distasteful, are "relished if frequently taken": "long persistence" alone "makes 
[them] pleasurable" (PP 1: 287). In Our Mutual Friend, the British economy, like Lady 
T~pins' s digestive tract, is in a painful and "chronic state of inflammation" ( OMF 618). 
30 The dissolute habits of Lammles's "business" partners epitomize the text's 
interrelation and equivalence of diverse habits of consumption: these men are 
"indefinably loose; and they all ate and drank a great deal; and made bets in eating and 
drinking. They all spoke of sums of money" ( OMF 260). 
307 In Our Mutual Friend, the narrator's diminution of Fascination Fledgby emphasizes 
the bestial urges of avarice: "Why money should be so precious to an Ass too dull and 
mean to exchange it for any other satisfaction, is strange; but there is no animal so sure to 
get laden with it, as the Ass who sees nothing written on the face of the earth and sky but 
the three letters L. S. D. - not Luxury, Sensuality, Dissoluteness, which they often stand 
for, but the three dry letters. Your concentrated Fox is seldom comparable to your 
concentrated Ass in money-breeding" ( OMF 271-72). 
308 Poovey outlines the general financial crisis of 185 8, in which the Bank of England 
withdrew its support from discount houses, the most important of which was Overend, 
Gurney & Co (Making 157-8). A volatile credit market had created the disaster: "The 
mania for profit - combined with legal provisions that encouraged (but did not oversee) 
company formations and credit facilities that generated finance capital vastly in excess of 
gold reserves or even good debts - produced a concentration of financial abuses, which, 
for sheer recklessness and audacity, surpassed even the credit frauds of the 1840s" 
(Poovey, Making 160). Between March 1863 and August 1865, when Dickens was 
writing Our Mutual Friend, much criticism of the speculation mania appeared, including 
a series of essays by Malcolm Ronald Laing Meason (published in All the Year Round) 
on company flotations, the bill-broking system, and international speculation (Poovey, 
Making 160). Fledgby is a bill-broker of the most illegitimate kind. 
309 In the final society dinner, the "Contractor, of five hundred thousand power," is most 
explicit; he suggests that Eugene buy Lizzie with an annuity instead of marrying her: 
'"You speak of that annuity in pounds sterling, but it is in reality so many pounds of 
beefsteaks and so many pints of porter"' that "'are the fuel to that young woman's 
engine"' ( OMF 818). In the labour theory of value, human beings become equivalent to 
the food that they must consume to continue working. 
310 At Podsnap's dinner, the guests are "counted, weighed, and valued like the plate" 
(OMF 143). 
429 
311 Harry Stone explains that the exhuming of bodies to provide illegitimate supplies for 
research relied on criminal traffickers (577n). The notorious murderers William Hare and 
William Burk (who were hanged and publicly dissected in 1829) supplied the demand for 
"dissectible bodies" by committing multiple murders (577n). Catherine Gallagher 
observes that in the "cannibalistic bioeconomy" of Our Mutual Friend, the horror is "not 
that human flesh becomes money, but that money is just a metaphor for human flesh. In 
this respect, the exchange made through the corpse is really not different from any other 
economic exchange, since all value is produced at the expense of life" (94). 
312 The synecdochic matrix that represents her tenuous existence as sheer "exchange 
value" is beyond grotesque, for her character contains no human element: "Whereabout 
in the bonnet and drapery announced by her name, any fragment of the real woman may 
be concealed, is perhaps known to her maid; but you could easily buy all you see of her, 
in Bond Street; or you might scalp her, and peel her, and scrape her, and make two Lady 
Tippinses out of her, and yet not penetrate to the genuine article" ( OMF 118-19). 
313 Her metonymic status as a "hardy old cruiser" who "last touched at the North Pole" 
( OMF 11) further alludes to the cannibalistic impulses of materialists. Michael Cotsell 
notes that this is an allusion to attempts by commissioned cruisers to find the remains of 
Sir John Franklin's Arctic expedition of 1845 (Companion 28). Sir John Rae's 
scandalous claim that the men resorted to cannibalism ("the last resource") was rejected 
by Dickens in Household Words and All the Year Round. His characters in Our Mutual 
Friend, however, are less noble. 
314 Descriptions of Alfred Lammie are cannibalistic. With his violent outbursts and 
sparkling teeth, it is not surprising that he opens a bottle of soda-water as if "wringing the 
neck of some unlucky creature and pouring its blood down his throat" and then "wipe[ s] 
his dripping whiskers in an ogreish way" ( OMF 267). 
315 Since 1829, "mutton" is also a slang term for "prostitute," and Bella, Lizzie, and 
Georgina are all nearly sold into forms of prostitution. As well, in the nineteenth century, 
"the lower down the social scale a person came, the less likely they were to eat meat" 
(Ingham, Brontes 46). The rich are thus emphasized as a carnivorous class. 
316 As well, a series of subsidiary, unsatisfactory dinners, breakfasts, and teas reinforce 
the cannibalism motif of the society dinners. Significantly, Silas celebrates his contract 
with Boffin by devouring a meat pie; Venus and W egg vie against one another over a 
greasy meal of spit-toasted muffins. Gruesomely, Bradley, himself an emblem of habit-
generated appetites, feasts on a thick-crusted meat pie (given to him by Riderhood) after 
murdering Eugene. Evocatively, the pie is rank and filled with "clots of congealed gravy" 
(the uneaten gravy is "put back into what remained of the pie" to satisfy Rogue's 
miserliness) and each man eats from "the blade of his knife" (OMF 705). Augmenting the 
implicit cannibalism of the feast, Bradley cuts his hand and splatters Rogue with his 
blood. These unpleasant meals are juxtaposed by one singularly humble and humane 
repast: "The Feast of the Three Hobgoblins" (OMF 603). At this wholesome feast, Bella, 
John, and Mr Wilfer enjoy bread and milk together after Bella's mercenariness has been 
exorcised. This meal prefigures their fugitive but happy marriage feast. 
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317 John Middleton Murry's title for his fourth chapter in Jonathan Swift: A Critical 
Biography (1954). 
318 Leon Litvack regards the mounds as "an emblem of the negative aspects of the 
Victorian capitalist economy" ( 43 8). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick observes that critics such 
as Monroe Engel, J. Hillis Miller, and Sylvia Manning relentlessly thematize the dust 
mounds in terms of a Freudian interpretation of the psychological link between money 
and human waste (i.e., that it is morally worthless) (179). In Sedgwick's view, the 
mounds have distracted critics from the homosocial and homophobic themes of the novel: 
Our Mutual Friend, she insists, is "the only English novel that everyone says is about 
excrement in order that they might forget that it is about anality" ( 190). 
319 Gallagher discusses mid-Victorian notions of waste as a form of natural capital, such 
as Ruskin's notion (in Unto This Last) of the necessity of converting "illth" (that which is 
ill-making) into wealth. As well, R.H. Horne's 1850 article for Household Words, "Dust; 
or Ugliness Redeemed" ("long recognized as an inspiration for Dickens's novel"), argued 
that dust could fertilize crops and generate new life (Gallagher 107-108). Thus, the 
"remains of consumption" could be reclaimed for production (104). Gallagher's reading 
sucf ports a view of the novel as fundamentally regenerative. 
32 Eliot acknowledges that distortions occur in the mirror of realism that are created by 
authorial subjectivity, but in this "witness-box" (AB 75) version of the honesty trope, her 
narrator lays claim to honest, unromantic percipience. 
321 Vrettos notes that J. Hillis Miller describes Dombey and Son as a novelistic attempt to 
contend with the principle of habit, a "term" that is used to "define the enclosure of 
personality within itself and within the things that it has transformed into a mirror of 
itself' (J. H. Miller 145). 
322 Characteristically, Dickensian narratives personify the natural world and the world of 
objects as also having prevailing humours - like Old Harmon's miserly "tight-clenched 
old bureau, receding atop like a bad and secret forehead" (OMF 184), the "still life" is 
visibly impressed with the habits of the "human life." In Our Mutual Friend, a plethora 
of objects signify characters' mental pathways of least resistance. Venus' s mental 
fixations (his art and loneliness) are figured in the various pinioning devices; Boffin' s 
resiliently charitable but vulnerable mind is signified by his walking stick. In terms of 
malevolent mentalities, Wegg's wooden-leg and the iron-rod (for the daily probing of the 
dust mound) are metonymic analogues for his rigid selfishness. Almost all characters are 
represented in close association with symbolic evidence of their habits of thought. 
32 Most of Our Mutual Friend's characters are represented as being imprisoned within 
their daily habits and are depicted in close association with reflective surfaces. Mr Wilfer 
is stuck behind the window of his "dark, dingy place of captivity," perpetually seated on 
"Rumpty' s perch" ( OMF 605). The entrapment of some characters is signified by the 
transparent or reflective surfaces associated with them, such as love-sick Miss Peecher, 
who always stares out of her narrow windows looking for Bradley, and Georgiana 
Podsnap, who is imprisoned in the world reflected in her father's glossy boots "and in the 
walnut and rosewood tables of the dim drawing-room, and in their swarthy giants of 
looking-glasses" ( OMF 176). 
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"There is no more contemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless 
sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and 
emotion, but who never does a manly concrete deed" (Principles 129). 
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325 Sedgwick concludes: "Eugene's lack of will is enormously more potent than Bradley's 
clenched, entrapping will, simply because the powerful, 'natural' trajectory of this stream 
is eternally toward swelling the exploitive power of ruling-class men over working-class 
women" (187). Eugene's class status is as uncertain as his moral character, for he is a 
university-educated barrister who scorns the bourgeois values of M. R. F. ("my 
respectable father") and is a pseudo-aristocratic hanger-on at Veneering's "Society" 
dinners. Regardless of his indeterminate station, he regards himself as a gentleman and 
Lizzie Hexam as a working-class girl. Our Mutual Friend accommodates Sedgwick's 
theory of the novel's orchestration ofhomosocial and homophobic ideologies. She 
amasses abundant textual evidence for Eugene and Bradley's (and Eugene and 
Mortimer's) homosocial "narcissistic relation" through Lizzie. Upon exposing Bradley's 
class-inflected methods of "sphincter domination" (185), Sedgwick asserts that the 
novel's conclusion supports a "homophobic reinstruction of the bourgeois family" -
Lizzie's reactionary potential, she posits, is subsumed in her final status as Mrs Eugene 
Wraybum (193-4). Through the lens of a satire on habit, however, Lizzie provides a foil 
to the solipsistic and masculinist perceptual habits of each of her suitors. Furthermore, 
Mortimer's love for Eugene is criticized for being narcissistic and rooted in bad habit: in 
the "pernicious assumption of lassitude and indifference which had become his second 
nature, he was strongly attached to his friend" upon whom he had "founded himself' in 
his youth (OMF 284-285). Importantly, it is not Mortimer who interprets Eugene's dying 
wish to marry Lizzie, as Sedgwick argues in support of the homosocial subtext, but Jenny 
Wren - the satirist. 
326 Michael S. Kearns situates Dickens's fiction within the context of the influence of 
associationist philosophy's conceptions of moral transformation. Vrettos, however, 
argues that theories of habit (which grew out of association theory) significantly 
questioned the capacity for "moral transformation" that "Kearns celebrates"; similarly, 
Dickens's novels tend to trouble notions of moral reformation (Vrettos 421-22n). Allen's 
chapter on Dombey and Son joins Vrettos in concluding that the "governing idea of the 
novel is an analysis of habit," and that Dickens's characters are "nearly powerless to 
change their habits" (72, 89). 
327 Van Ghent's words to describe Becky Sharp's emblematic status in Vanity Fair as 
materialism incarnate (152). 
328 Manning also refers to Boffin' s gently satiric manner, Lavinia Wilfer' s bitter running 
commentary on her mother, and Eugene's witty cynicism (213). The narrator's first-
person outbursts against the "impossible" cant of "prosperity" ( OMF 503) and the 
atrocities of the Poor Law, are kept to a minimum, whereas direct satire is comparatively 
abundant in Bleak House. 
329 The demon from Alain-Rene Lesage's Le Diable boiteux (1707). Garrett notes 
Dickens's idea of utilizing Asmodeus's power in both his fiction and his journal 
Household Words, but ridding him of "aggressive malice" (34). 
330 The word trick is associated with habit. In one of its many meanings, a trick is a 
"particular habit, way, or mode of acting; a characteristic quality, trait, practice, or 
432 
custom (Usually, a bad or unpleasant habit)" (OED). Lewes refers to irresistible "tricks of 
thought and act" as "minor habits" (P LM3 54 ). 
331 Her real name, Fanny Cleaver, Sedgwick argues, "hints at aggression - specifically, at 
rape, and perhaps homosexual rape" (180). She explains that Fanny is a name with 
homosexual connotations; for example, Pope applies it Lord Hervey. For Sedgwick, this 
homophobically-charged name is of greater thematic resonance than her new appellation. 
332 The following chapters from Book IV are all presented from Jenny's viewpoint: 
Chapter VIII, "A Few Grains of Pepper"; Chapter IX, "Two Places Vacated"; Chapter X, 
"The Doll's Dressmaker Discovers a Word"; and Chapter XI, "Effect is given to the 
Doll's Dressmaker's Discovery." 
333 Satire is often associated with seasoning. Anthony Trollope, for example, complains 
that truth is obscured in strong satire, "as the eater loses the flavour of his meat through 
the multiplied uses of sautes and pepper" (Letters 516). 
334 E. P. Whipple, in his 1877 introduction to Our Mutual Friend, betrays some 
bafflement at its blend of satire and pathos. He describes its characters and incidents as 
being "almost as unreal as anything in the Arabian Nights," but then proceeds to praise 
the delineation of Bradley Headstone for its "great power of psychological observation 
and analysis" (xiii, xxv). Furthermore, Whipple's enthusiasm for Jenny Wren's visionary, 
rather than satiric, qualities, affirms his general critical emphasis on Dickens's pathos-
eliciting imagination over and above his social criticism: "this small, queer, deformed, 
bright-brained, good-hearted specimen of maiden humanity is really deserving of a 
prominent rank among the creations of the poets and romancers of the century" 
(Introduction xxvi). 
335 Erik Gunderson affirms that Roman satire implicitly idealizes the hegemony of a non-
feminized Rome, in opposition to the vile, castrated, feminized bodies of the corrupt 
(226, 228). Gunderson notes that for Juvenal, "we" means exclusively "us men" (236). 
Yet, when satire, a "masculine" coded genre, is itself criticized for its excesses and 
ambiguities, it is often figured, not only as satyr (unruly goat-like male creature), but as 
feminine. For example, Joseph Addison imagined satire as a woman with a dagger behind 
her back. This tradition continues in satire criticism through Gilbert High et' s figuration 
of satire as a female muse, who is a "mercurial" and "elusive" "mistress" (243-4 ), and 
Kirk Freudenberg's intriguing personification of satire as a woman "who has been forced 
to sit on her hands and keep silent" (Satires of Rome 212). 
336 Although there is a vast body of criticism interlinking gender, feminism, and the 
Victorian novel that accounts for certain "sub-genres" such as Gothic and sensation 
fiction (Pykett and others), satire's generic and modal contributions stand in need of 
continued evaluation. Susan Glass Fellows's 1996 dissertation explores novels by Emily 
Eden, Elizabeth Gaskell, Mary Elizabeth Braddon, and Rhoda Broughton. Andres 
Guillermo Lopez, in his 1992 dissertation, "Exposing Vice and Vicious Characters: Anne 
Bronte's Satiric Art in Agnes Grey and The Tenant of Wild/ell Hall," and in his article 
"Wildfell Hall as Satire: Bronte's Domestic Vanity Fair," examines the novels of Anne 
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Bronte in relation to satire. He regards satire as a general form of moral criticism, and 
describes The Tenant of Wildfell Hall as a fervently moral satire anatomizing domestic 
injustice. Monica Cohen aligns Margaret Oliphant's novels with satiric and parodic 
strategies such as "aphorisitic discourse" (103), arguing that Oliphant's novels have been 
neglected because of their social critique. 
337 Critics of satire who address the question of gender and genre frequently attempt to 
identify the features of "female" and "male" traditions. For example, Steven Leon Gilbert 
argues that women's satire has different "motives, forms, and goals" than conventional 
male satire (3). 
338 Tori] Moi notes that there are a "plura]ity of feminist criticisms," ranging from the 
"New Feminist gynocritic" works of the 1970s, through the post-structuralist, Marxist, 
Foucauldian, and historicist approaches of the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond (104). For the 
purposes of this chapter, although I accept that women have participated in oppressive 
cultural practices, and that men have been too "ensnared in the contradictions that 
characterize[e] [gender] ideology to be charged with being simple oppressors" (Poovey, 
Uneven 22), I wish to emphasize the dominance of masculinist political, legis1ative, 
social, religious, and literary power in the Victorian period. As Poovey observes, "as long 
as difference was articulated on gender, men and women were subject to different kinds 
of ideological constraint. Because they were positioned as nonexistent, women at 
midcentury did not have institutionally recognized power, no matter how much moral 
influence they could wield" (Uneven 23). An acknowledgement of the cultural 
dominance of patriarchal ideology is compatible with a view of ideology as incomplete 
and contradictory. 
339 From the ancient philosophy of Aristotle through to the medieval periods, "male and 
female were contrasted and asymmetrical1y valued as intellect/body, active/passive, 
rational/irrational, reason/emotion, ... order/disorder" (Bynum 257). Gillooly observes 
that "in Western culture, at any rate, the early Greek construction of the feminine has 
Eroved to be alarmingly resilient" (xxii). 
4° From "Of the Characters of Women: An Epistle to a Lady" (1735). 
341 Suggestively, the OED links satire with a definition of misogyny through a quotation 
from the 1821 New Monthly Magazine: "The sentiment has been re-echoed by every 
misogynistic satirist." 
342 Rogers notes that "naked expressions of misogyny have rarely been considered 
acceptable," yet the "insidious belittlement which replaced them [particularly in the 
nineteenth century] was hardly less destructive" (K. Rogers 277, 188). Rogers concludes 
that misogyny is rooted in what she terms "patriarchal feeling": the "wish to keep women 
subject to men" (K. Rogers 272). 
343 
"Hatred or opposition of marriage." (OED) 
344 These "myths," Nussbaum claims, "repeat themselves throughout the history of 
misogyny, particularly in the Augustan period" (Brink 19). 
345 Generally, classical scholars concede that Juvenal's satire is "a diatribe against 
women," and that, as Daniel Hooley argues, "[t]argeting women is a perennial reflex for 
expressing" the "angst" of a conservative Roman unsettled by changing times: "Upstarts, 
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new-moneyed outsiders, women, foreigners, Greeks and Jews -these are bogeys of the 
reactionary mind, complacent in his traditional privilege, jealous of position, resentful of 
change and displacement" (Roman Satire 116-1 7). 
346 See Susan Gubar, "The Female Monster in Augustan Satire." 
347 Post-Nussbaum, feminist criticism of satire focuses upon the re-discovery of female 
satirists, across various genres. For example, Laurie Finke explores the writings of 
medieval women; Mihoko Suzuki examines how Margaret Cavendish's plays satirize 
misogynist satire. Carol Virginia Pohli's dissertation, "The Feminization of Wit: Satire 
by British Women Writers, 1660-1800" (1994 ), describes satire as more of a "prominent 
feature" than a genre in the work of female playwrights, novelists, and poets, who use 
satire's "ambiguities and transgressions of logic to convey dissatisfaction with women's 
social opportunities and with prevailing ideas about women's nature" (272). Claudia 
Kairoff surveys what she observes to be the Horatian-themed satires by numerous 
eighteenth-century writers, noting that "women's poetic satires diminished when newer 
modes predominated" (285). Dale Spender and Valerie Rumbold have also written 
extensively about women's satire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
348 Dissertations on the subject of women and satire that wrestle with questions of the 
gender and genre question tend to cite Lorraine York's brief 1996 article "Satire: The No-
Woman's Land of Literary Modes," which identifies Margaret Atwood as a feminist 
satirist who writes in a mode associated with specifically masculine aggression. York 
concludes: "Satire does seem, in the minds of many readers, to be associated with 
unacceptable forms of female deportment, noncompliance, critique of sexual relations, 
barbed invective" ( 48). 
349 Fellows also notes the absence of a definition of feminist satire and marvels at a lack 
of commentary on the subject (3). 
350 Lipovski-Helal argues that satirical strategies in the works of Rebecca West, Amy 
Lowell, Virginia Woolf, and Dorothy Parker tend, unlike the men's satire of the period, 
to deconstruct "pervasive cultural misogyny" (20). She observes that there is no existing 
book-length study of women's satire, and in late 2009, her observation remains correct. 
351 Gilbert Highet promotes the cliche that women are averse to satire: "very few of them 
have ever written, or even enjoyed satire, although they have often been its victims" 
(235). As well, James Sutherland defines the satirist as a "man of the world" who has a 
"toughness of fibre" (69). More recently, Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe posit that 
the fact that feminist critics refer more often to "women's humour," "impl[ies] that satire 
is indeed gendered" ( 11-12). Furthermore, Charles A. Knight self-consciously restricts 
the scope of his study to canonical male writers (7-8), arguing that satire is "more-or-less 
a masculine genre" because of the "relative silence of women as satirists" and their use of 
satire predominantly as a mode (either in plays such as Aphra Behn' s, or in novels by 
Burney, Edgeworth, and Austen) (Knight 7). 
352 Stephen H. Browne argues that women's public address was considered "an affront to 
conventions of cultural discourse" (20). The learned female "was becoming a caricature 
in the popular mind," and women's speech was portrayed as the "perversion of social 
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order"; it was denounced as being meaningless, excessive, disruptive, or false (Browne 
21, 23, 25). 
353 Similarly, Steven Leon Gilbert observes that "a majority of the leading women writers 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries wrote satire in some form, including 
Elizabeth lnchbald, Anna Laetitia Barbauld, Jane Austen, Mary Robinson, Hannah More, 
and possibly even Felicia Hemans", and although they wrote in "a wide variety of forums 
and genres," the genre of choice for many was the novel (2, 6). 
354 The consensus that the novel offered a particularly viable forum for women's satire 
reawakens discussions of satire's vexed generic status; for example, Palmeri contends 
that the nineteenth century witnessed the "metamorphosis" of satire into the sentimental 
novel (Satire, History 228). 
355 Steven E. Jones notes that in the late eighteenth century, the intellectual women of 
salon culture (the Blue Stockings in England, and the Della Cruscans in Italy) were a 
"perceived threat" to the masculine territory of wit and ridicule ( 140-41 ). The London 
Blue Stocking Club, centred in the salon of Elizabeth Montagu and Elizabeth Vesey 
would later include Hannah More, Ann Yearsley, Fanny Burney, Mary Hays, and Mary 
Wollstonecraft. Female writers outside this circle were "soon being identified as 
bluestockings," and eventually the type included "all women of progressive intellectual 
ambitions, radical or liberal women in particular" (Jones 143-45). 
356 He observes that satire "gendered itself male" (6) - a phrase that reveals a hesitation to 
ascribe satire's "maleness" to patriarchal ideologies. Instead, he quotes female satirists 
who stated their resistance to and biases against satire, implying that women writers are 
complicit in the moribund path of satire post-Byron (Dyer 150). 
357 As Katharine Rogers explains, female moral authority was constantly delimited by 
overriding assumptions of female bodily and mental insufficiently. As Mill observes, 
ideas of female moral superiority are an "empty compliment" which "must provoke a 
bitter smile" (SW 21: 320). 
358 Several important studies explore the relationship of feminism to comedy and humour; 
for example, Audrey Bilger's Laughing Feminism: Subversive Comedy in Frances 
Burney, Maria Edgeworth, and Jane Austen "investigate[s] the intersection of feminism 
and comedy" (9). 
359 From a review of John Leech's pictures; Quarterly Review, December 1854. 
360 Bilger, referring to the gendered comic theory of the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, observes that the discouragement of women's wit was a manifestation of the 
head/heart dichotomy. 
361 Patricia Ingham cogently summarizes this ideal of the "Angel in the House": 
"Women's function in society was constructed as biologically determined and the 
construction of proper femininity was predicated upon an ideal, domesticated middle-
class wife, far less rational than a man but intuitive, emotional, and with a natural 
maternal instinct" (Bronte 51 ). 
362 Mill declares ideas of sex-based inequality to be "the most intense and most deeply-
rooted of those which gather round and protect old institutions and custom, that we need 
not wonder to find them as yet less undermined and loosened than any of the rest by the 
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progress of the great modern spiritual and social transition" (SW 21: 261 ). Russett 
explains that post-Darwin, "a human hierarchy of excellence was needed more than ever. 
Women and the lesser races served to buffer Victorian gentlemen from a too-threatening 
intimacy with the brutes" (14). 
363 Rachel Malane suggests that Herbert Cowell's 1874 question is central to the "Woman 
Question" debates: "Is there such a thing as sex in mind; and, if so, what mental 
characteristics correlate the differences in sex?" ( qtd. in Malane vii). 
364 For Darwin, women "excel" in "intuition, rapid perception, and ... imitation," whereas 
men's "intellectual powers" attain a "higher eminence" in "all fields of human study" 
(Descent 629). Women, with their "maternal instincts," have a "mental disposition" that 
is "less selfish" (Descent 629). The "present inequality between the sexes," he posits, 
cannot be significantly altered through education because of women's fundamental lack 
of competitive, "robust virtues" (631 ). Darwin, unlike Spencer, did not explicitly argue 
that women were more habit-based thinkers, but his arguments for their lesser 
intelligence renders this observation about habit suggestive: "There seems to exist some 
relation between a low degree of intelligence and a strong tendency to the formation of 
fixed, though not inherited habits; for a sagacious physician remarked to me, persons who 
are slightly imbecile tend to act in everything by routine or habit" (Descent 89). 
365 Spencer clarifies that the greater excursiveness of the superior (implicitly masculine) 
mind results in greater originality ("the highest intellectual faculty") (PP 2: 534). 
366 In "Psychology of the Sexes" (Popular Science Monthly, 1872; later incorporated into 
The Study of Sociology, 1873), Spencer reasserted an earlier theory presented in his 
Principles of Biology (1867), that women's intellectual development upon puberty was 
disrupted by the conservation of energy required for reproduction. Spencer also held 
women to be less intellectually and emotionally capable of justice (Paxton 171). 
367 Previously, in "Sex in Mind and in Education" ( 1874), Maudsley insists (following 
Spencer) that women's physiological functions (geared to maternity) necessarily limit 
their "mental culture" ( 468). 
368 Interestingly, Bain and Carpenter contributed less overtly in their key texts to a theory 
of women's greater susceptibility to habit. Bain, however, discussing Mill's The 
Subjection of Women, refutes the "mental equality of the sexes": "[Mill] grants that 
women are physically inferior, but seems to think that this does not affect their mental 
powers. He never takes account of the fact, that the large diversion of force for the 
procreative function must give some general inferiority in all things where that does not 
come in, unless women are made on the whole much stronger than men" (Mill 131 ). 
369 A man's "brain would be more persistent in the line first taken; it would have more 
difficulty in changing from one mode of action to another, but, in the one thing it was 
doing, it could go on longer without loss of power or sense of fatigue. And do we not find 
that the things in which men most excel women are those which require most plodding 
and long hammering at a single thought, while women do best what must be done 
rapidly?" (Mill, SW 21: 311-12). This point irked Darwin, who then proffered it in the 
Descent of Man as evidence against Mill's argument for gendered equality. Prefiguring 
James' s ideal of the productive forcefulness of masculine habit, Darwin suggested that 
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masculine mental "ascendancy" is largely due to a greater capacity for patience, and for 
energetic perseverance (capacities that he tentatively posits are the foundation of 
".fcenius") (Descent 630n). 
3 ° Critics who assail Bronte for her High Tory partisanship frequently ignore the gender 
politics of the text. For example, Terry Eagleton's influential Marxist argument 
concerning the novel's socio-political conservatism is, by his own admission, "pre-
feminist" (Myths xiv). Recently, Philip Rogers, who explores Bronte's "gradualist 
paternalism" and support for the anti-Chartist Duke of Wellington, cites the narrative's 
approval of Mrs Pryor (a strident Tory) as evidence ofBronte's own arch-Toryism (165). 
In doing so, he ignores the condemnation of Mrs Pryor' s unsympathetic assertion of the 
"great Gulf' between William Farren's "caste" and her own; Caroline rebukes her: '"you 
do not know him'" (S 446). Criticism stressing Bronte's tendency towards conservative 
p.olitical views tends to obviate the text's dizzying dialogism. 
71 Although Hutcheon's theory of postmodern parody, which separates satire from 
parody - defining parody as a mode that ironizes representation and not extramural 
events and morality- is not strictly relevant to Bronte's Shirley, her notion that parody is 
complicit in its criticism is relevant. Elizabeth Langland, for example, evaluates Louis 
Moore and Shirley Keeldar's dynamics of "masculine" mastery and "feminine" 
subordination within the context of parody and mimicry - strategies in which "the 
woman deliberately assumes the feminine style and posture assigned to her within ... 
discourse in order to uncover the mechanisms by which it exploits her" (Luce Irigaray, 
~d. in Langland 5). 
3 2 For~ade's article in Revue des deux mondes (l 5 November 1849) was described by 
Bronte as the "best critique yet" (Allott 142). 
373 Bronte attended and critiqued four of Thackeray's lectures on the eighteenth-century 
humourists (l 851 ). Fielding's personal vices and excesses, in her opinion, were not 
sufficiently reprimanded by Thackeray. Moreover, Bronte was also critical of 
Thackeray's representation of women; responding to Henry Esmond, she concludes, "as 
usual - he is unjust to women -quite unjust" (letter to George Smith, 14 February 1842, 
Letters 3: 18). Thackeray's private criticisms of Bronte affirm her pronouncement. His 
letter (l l March 1853) to Lucy Baxter concerning Villette epitomizes the "sex in mind" 
assumptions about female intellectual limitation that saturated the literary milieu at mid-
century: "The good of Villette in my opinion Miss is a very fine style; and a remarkable 
happy way (w. few female authors possess) of carrying a metaphor logically through to 
its conclusion -And it amuses me to read the author's naive confession of being in love 
with 2 men at the same time; and her readiness to fall in love any time. The poor little 
woman of genius!" (Letters 1: 547). 
374 A contemporary critic, in "Thackeray and Currer Bell" (Oxford and Cambridge 
Magazine, June 1856), notes that the same aversion to hypocrisy and the valuing of 
appearances forms the "prevailing undercurrent of their works"; "[b ]oth satirize the 
existing features of society" (Allott 315-17). Interestingly, in a letter to W. S. Williams, 
Bronte asserts that the "doors of knowledge" to the "very deepest political and social 
truths" are shut to her, but open to "such writers as Dickens and Thackeray"; she, 
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however, must "grope [her] way in the dark and come to uncertain conclusions unaided 
and alone" (8 January 1848; Letters 2: 782). 
375 Boumelha observes that Shirley is Bronte's social panoramic or Thackerayan novel 
(78). Langland also notes that Vanity Fair is a "key precursor text," because Shirley 
"absorbs and transforms" Thackeray's "key passages of narrative commentary on the 
ideology of womanhood" (5). · 
376 Tellingly, she advises in a letter to Elizabeth Gaskell (22 May 1852) that Thackeray 
should learn from Gaskell "how to be satirical without being exquisitely bitter" (Letters 
3: 47). 
377 Letter to W. S. Williams, 14 August 1848 (Letters 2: 782). 
378 Gilbert and Gubar note the text's illustrations of the "inextricable link between sexual 
discrimination and mercantile capitalism" (3 75). Sally Shuttleworth also affirms that the 
economic dilemma of an overstocked market, and the class antagonisms stemming from 
technological invention and the Com Laws, parallel the gendered problem of the surplus 
of marriageable women and the lack of female vocation. The novel's preoccupation with 
Caroline's psychical states also demonstrates that "circulating economies of 
psychological and social life are directly interwoven" (Shuttleworth, Bronte 183). 
79 Argyle finds it fitting that the "male narrators of the historical romance and the 
comedy of manners" reveal that historical and social forces must curb the female 
protagonists (754). By contrast, the "psychological romance" mode challenges the 
"naturalness of the political, social, and psychological assumptions which the two "male 
modes" champion (749-50). In this way, Argyle masculinizes the satiric strains of the 
novel. 
380 The Chartist agitation of the 1840s, Eagleton argues, is transfigured into the Luddite 
context of 1812-13: "Chartism is the unspoken subject of Shirley" (Myths 45). 
381 Bronte's contemporaries who had hoped to repeat the experience of a "sleepless 
night" reading Jane Eyre and marrying "Mr. Rochester about four in the morning," were 
disappointed by Shirley's intellectually taxing historical content. The reviewer for The 
Times (7 December 1848) resented characters who "do nothing but talk"; referring to 
Rose Yorke, the reviewer insists: "the dialectics of the precocious 12 year old would do 
honour to John Stuart Mill himself' (Allott 151, 149). Uniquely, the critic for the 
Examiner permitted Bronte the intellectuality of a satirist: "Keen, intellectual analysis is 
her forte," for Shirley is a novel in which the "intellectual is predominant and supreme" 
(Allott 126-27). 
382 Helstone's misogyny, rooted in the scorn of female intelligence, is explicit: "At heart 
he could not abide sense in women: he liked to see them as silly, as light-headed, as vain, 
as open to ridicule as possible; because they were then in reality what he held them to be 
- inferior toys to play with, to amuse a vacant hour and to be thrown away" (S 115). The 
narrator's assessment of the murderous misogyny of the institution of marriage is 
unsparingly Juvenalian: "the second Mrs. Helstone, inversing the natural order of insect 
existence, would have fluttered through the honeymoon a bright, admired butterfly, and 
crawled the rest of her days a sordid, trampled worm" (S 117). This arresting metaphor 
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may be an allusion to Wollstonecraft's description of women as the "insect whom [men] 
keep under [their] feet" (17 5) 
383 Hortense hopes that the inculcation of "feminine" habits will reform Caroline's "ill-
regulated mind": '"I will give her a system, a method of thought, a set of opinions; I will 
~ive her the perfect control and guidance over her feelings"' (S 68). 
84 Bronte's larger target is selfishness, for Puseyism was a "crisis" that required "good-
natured ridicule" more than the weaponry of "bitter satire" (Letter to George Smith, 3 
December 1850; Letters 2: 782). 
385 Shirley satirizes inflexible habitudes of thought as being dangerous to both the 
individual and society; however, as Bronte's text engages less explicitly with scientific 
discourses of habit than Middle march does, my discussion focuses on the novel's satirical 
defamiliarization of gendered habits/customs. In Shirley, although inherited mental 
disposition is emphasized (for example, Robert Gerard Moore is described as a 
bullheaded tradesman by blood), habits of thought are represented as being alterable. 
Bronte accepts both the heritability of habit and the importance of choice in the 
propagation of one's mental habits. Her letter to W. S. Williams (5 November, 1848) 
expresses her belief in the power of the will to shape character: "it is our duty to the end, 
to strive after the perfection we revere, and to contend against the weakness and errors we 
disapprove, and whether our besetting sin be of temper or habit, we should never submit 
to be its slave, never cease to struggle against its bad influence: thus we may avoid 
degradation, and even secure - perhaps a very gradual - but a certain improvement" 
(Letters 2: 782). Furthermore, as Shuttleworth demonstrates, Bronte's knowledge of 
phrenology suffuses her novels. Phrenological discourses of self-improvement appealed 
to Bronte, who admired George Combe's Constitution of Man (1828), a key 
phrenological text that emphasized the role of the will in the alteration of natural faculties 
(Shuttleworth, Bronte 53-65). Notably, the language of habit permeates Combe's study; 
habit is represented as a force that, along with education, establishes the moral and 
mental character of the individual, which continues through hereditary decent. 
386 The advice of Bronte's publisher to remove "Levitical," or at least to lessen the 
harshness of its ironies (as well as those of the last chapter), is imbued with implicit 
censure of satire. Williams's concerns proved accurate. The reviewer for the Atlas (31 
October 1849) resents the "extraordinarily unreal and repulsive" curates, pronouncing the 
chapter to be "very coarse - very irreverential"; in fact, he posits that satirical 
improprieties tarnish the novel as a whole (Allott 121 ). Similarly, the Daily News (31 
October 1849) determines the curates to be "monstrosities" (Allott 118). Williams's 
advice to remove the novel's satirical preface, "Note to the Quarterly," also reflects a 
cultural resistance to satire. In a letter to Williams (31 August 1849), she argues that her 
preface should be "fearlessly" printed, pleading that it contains "the lightest satire" 
(Letters 2: 782). The preface includes not only a general satire on status quo moralism, 
but a blatant attack on Elizabeth Rigby - whose notoriously searing review of Jane Eyre 
in the Quarterly Review (1848) contains implications that female-authored satire is 
unacceptable. Rigby argues that Jane Eyre is inferior to Vanity Fair. Its heroine (and 
implicitly its author) is an "uninteresting, sententious, and pedantic thing; with no 
ex.r,erience of the world" (Allott 107). 
38 From the Spectator, 1849 (Allott 131 ). 
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388 Tim Dolin accurately observes that Shirley anticipates "partly combatively and partly 
defensively its own critical reception" (201 ). 
389 Although he bars women from first-rate achievements in higher forms of literature 
(prefiguring both Darwin and Ro manes), he concedes that a mental aptitude for minutiae 
renders their success in the novel unsurprising, as it is a form dedicated to observation 
rather than intellectual abstraction. In a letter to Elizabeth Gaskell, Lewes recalls that he 
had asserted that "in the highest efforts of intellect women have not equaled men," but 
that this was not meant to be disrespectful or offensive "on the personal" or "general 
~round" (Allott 330). 
90 Lewes reviewed Jane Eyre favourably, but proceeded to warn Bronte to stay within 
the realm of personal experience in her next novel - advice from which she clearly 
dissented. Hence, he disliked her explicit and forthrightly critical engagement with 
politics, religion, and history in Shirley, concluding that (a little like Shirley's reproof of 
Mr Sympson) it "passes all permission" (Allott 166). Bronte was appalled by Lewes's 
review: "after I had said earnestly that I wished critics would judge me as an author, not a 
woman, you so roughly - I even thought so cruelly - handled the question of sex" 
(Letters 2: 782). 
391 Interestingly, an unsigned review of Jane Eyre in the Christian Remembrancer (April 
1848) approved of the novel's "unfeminine" satire: "There is an intimate acquaintance 
with the worst parts of human nature, a practiced sagacity in discovering the latent ulcer, 
and a ruthless rigour in exposing it, which must commend our admiration, but are almost 
startling in one of the softer sex" (Allott 89). 
392 Noticing the philosophical and satiric pronouncements that saturate Shirley, the 
reviewer for the Critic (15 November 1849) implicitly categorized the novel as a 
masculine satire: "In almost every page of Shirley, there are scattered ... the utterances of 
a reflective mind, which almost assume the shape of aphorisms. These are so unlike the 
usual productions of a lady, they are so comprehensive in their views, so terse in their 
expression, that ... we should have received them as conclusive testimony to the 
masculine gender of Currer Bell" (Allott 141 ). 
393 Eagleton disregards the intellectuality of the friendship by categorizing it as being 
"latently sexual"; Shirley, he argues, provides for Caroline a "kind of sexual surrogate" 
(Myths 58). 
394 Bronte's epithet for Thackeray in a letter to William Smith Williams, 11 December 
184 7 (Letters 1: 627). 
395 By means of a perplexing disquisition on bitterness, the narrator attempts to distance 
Caroline from aggressive satire. In the famously acerbic discussion of the social double 
standards of unrequited love, which consign a "lover feminine" to a mental life ofhalf-
bitterness, the narrator ponders: "Half-bitter! Is that wrong? No - it should be bitter: 
bitterness is strength - it is a tonic"; "if energy remains, it will be rather a dangerous 
energy - deadly when confronted with injustice" (S I 05, 106). "Puir Mary Lee" is given 
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as an example, for the ballad's heroine, far from remaining stoically silent, curses Robin-
a-Ree. Yet, demonstrating the text's ambivalent attitude towards invective, the narrator 
insists that "what bitterness [Caroline's] mind distilled should and would be poured on 
her own head" (S 107). 
396 This passage conforms to the satiric and prophetic rhetoric that, according to George 
P. Landow, characterizes the Victorian "sagistic" tradition (of Arnold, Ruskin, and 
Carlyle). The sage interprets the "signs of the times," and offers "an attack upon the 
audience (or those in authority), a warning and a visionary promise" (22-24). 
397 The episode in which Shirley (pistols in hand) provides greater protection to Caroline 
than either He I stone or Robert parodies the myth of the Amazon; for rather than being 
"unsexed" by their temporary escape from their martial ignorance and inaction, they are 
liberated. 
398 Shirley's pronouncement incisively satirizes the literary double standard of her day. 
She proposes to prove her point by writing a "magazine article some day" on the subject 
of male writers' false estimation of women, knowing all too well that it '"will never be 
inserted: it will be "declined with thanks," and left for me at the publisher's"' (S 352). 
399 It is the feminized (marginal and sympathetic) Henry Sympson whom the narrator 
suggests will actually, through Shirley and Louis's aid, transgress his family's 
materialism to become a poet. 
400 Milton met with ubiquitous mid-Victorian approval. For example, Matthew Arnold 
asserts: "Milton is of all our gifted men the best lesson, the most salutary influence" 
("Milton," Works 11: 330). 
401 Eve is represented by Milton as being intellectually inferior to Adam: she is "[t]oo 
much of ornament, in outward show I Elaborate, of inward less exact. I For well I 
understand in the prime end I Of nature her th'inferior, in the mind ... " (Paradise Lost 
VIII, 538-41 ). 
402 Arguably, Shirley's cryptic devoir (lovingly memorized by Moore) is a mythic 
portrayal of the first marriage that is not only anti-misogamist, but also a parodic satire of 
misogynistic creation myths. Shirley designs a myth of origin for Eve as a female orphan 
named Eva who unites with Genius to become "La Premiere Femme Savante": the first 
learned woman or "blue-stocking." Although it appears that she is conventionally 
represented as "the heart" and "Humanity," Eva's intel1igence is emphasized; her 
forehead "shines an expanse fair and ample" (a possible echo of Adam's "fair large front" 
[Paradise Lost IV, 300]) and her spirit is alive with "the flame of her intelligence" (S 
487). It is she who drinks from the cup offered by Genius (the Adam figure). 
Allegorically, the symbolic marriage of Genius and Eva undermines the traditional 
gendered binary of head/heart, to create the exemplary woman in whom intellect is 
merged with sympathetic sentiment. Interpreted in light of Shirley's complaint against 
exclusively male-authored mythology, her devoir amends the myth of human origins; 
accordingly, Milton is not named as the authoritative poet of sacred history: "'Who shall, 
of these things, write the chronicle?"' (S 490). Similarly, Lucasta Miller asserts that 
Shirley's allegory is a creation myth for female creative genius (175). Gilbert and Gubar, 
however, interpret the devoir non-parodically as an illustration of Shirley's (and 
Bronte's) inevitable capitulation to convention (394). 
442 
403 This is not the first example of Caroline's feminist biblical hermeneutics; she rejects 
Lucretia and "Solomon's virtuous women" as female role models, favouring Lydia - an 
agriculturalist and a manager. She recalls Proverbs 31 :25: "[Lydia] opened her mouth 
with wisdom; in her tongue was the law of kindness" (S 392) 
404 Shirley's alternating Horatian and Juvenalian tendencies are reflected in its conflicting 
assessments of human nature. Robert, observing the Horatian golden mean, contends that 
'"human nature is human nature everywhere, ... and that in every specimen of human 
nature that breathes, vice and virtue are ever found blended, in smaller or greater 
proportions, and that the proportion is not determined by station"' (S 60). Yet Juvenalian 
cynicism and elitism is observable in William Farren's words: "'Human natur', taking it 
i' th' lump, is naught but selfishness. It is but excessive few ... that being in a different 
sphere, can understand t'one t' other, and be friends wi'out slavishness o' one hand, or 
£ride o' t' other"' (S 326). 
05 Barker declares that Bronte "lacked the courage of her convictions and ended her book 
in the conventional manner" (603). Yolanda Padilla, however, argues that Shirley 
"undermines her submission" to Louis simply through the rebellious act of marrying a 
social inferior (and also by controlling the terms of their engagement) (13). 
406 From an unsigned review of Jane Eyre in the Christian Remembrancer, April 1848 
(Allott 90). 
407 In "The Melancholy of Middlemarch" (Spectator, 1 June 1872), Hutton regrets that 
Eliot "likes jeering at human evil": "She sees narrowness so oppressive to her that she is 
constantly laughing a scornful laugh over it, and despairing of any better euthanasia for it 
than its extinction. And all this makes her bitter. She clings to the nobler course, but she 
cannot repress discordant cries at the disorder of the universe and the weakness of the 
painfully struggling principle of good. She is a melancholy teacher, - melancholy 
because sceptical; and her melancholy scepticism is too apt to degenerate into scorn" 
(Carroll 301-2). Hutton argues that Eliot overindulges in morally anatomizing her "own 
creations." Censoriously, yet astutely, he notes that Eliot "has a speculative philosophy of 
character that always runs on in a parallel stream with her picture of character" (Carroll 
302). 
408 Similarly, The Fortnightly Review (19 January 1873) noted the "blending of the 
author's bitterness with her profound tenderness" (Carroll 337). 
409 Eliot claims that her portraits of the Dempsters and their town are authentic; in fact, 
she asserts that the "real town" was more "vicious than [her] Milby; the real Dempster 
was far more disgusting than [hers]," and Janet's fate was far more sad (Letters 2: 513). 
410 Meckier regards Eliot's "benevolent version" of Darwinism as being essentially anti-
satiric. Alluding to her assessment of Dickens's novels as being too caricatural and 
pessimistic, Meckier posits that Eliot (particularly in her reaction to Bleak House) was 
"trying to stave off the modern satirical vision" (Hidden 274). 
411 Letter to Lewes, 18 January 1848 (Letters 2: 782). 
443 
412 Katherine Linehan explores what she declares to be the lack of "critical analysis of the 
role which humor plays in [Eliot's] novels," concluding that Eliot's satire "is marked by a 
peculiar mixture of sympathy and unsparing acuity" (1, 49). John Holloway calls Eliot a 
"sage-novelist" (114 ), and Victorian sagistic rhetoric is generically linked to ancient 
"biblical, oratorical, and satirical" traditions (Landow 22) - traditions that are historically 
masculinist. 
413 Levine argues against critics (such as Catherine Belsey) for whom realism is "a 
predominantly conservative form" that "largely confirm[s] the patterns of the world we 
seem to know" ("Literary Realism" 9). 
414 For example, her 1856 essay "Silly Lady Novelists" "snaps with irony and anger, 
qualities that George Eliot could not and did not entirely eliminate from her great 
fictions" (Levine, "George Eliot" 4 ). Levine references her harsh criticism in 
"Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming" (1855). Linehan also refers to Eliot's Westminster 
Review essays of the mid-l 850s as works in which Eliot does not temper her satiric 
inclinations with the "loving laughter" that characterizes her novelistic use of satire (65). 
415 Letter to R.H. Hutton, 8 August 1863 (Letters 4: 502). 
416 Henry James notes that Eliot wished to "recommend herself to a scientific audience" 
and that "Middlemarch is too often an echo of Messrs. Darwin and Huxley" (unsigned 
review, Galaxy, March 1873; Carroll 353). 
417 Varouxakis discusses Mill's often-overlooked notion of national character (arising 
from his comparisons between the French and the English), noting that in Mill's 
"Vindication of the French Revolution of 1848," he argues that constitutions cannot 
establish institutions "alien from, or too much in advance of, the condition of the public 
mind" (qtd. in Varouxakis 382). Eliot regards Mill as "amongst the world's vanguard" 
(Letter to John Chapman, 24 July 1852; Letters 2: 515). 
418 Letter to Barbara Leigh-Smith Bodichon, 5 December 1859, after reading Darwin's 
Origin (Letters 3: 475). I also find Eliot's reference to the "ministerial crisis" of the 
1850s illuminating; she wishes for "some solid, philosophical Conservative to take the 
reins - one who knows the true functions of stability in human affairs" (Letters 5: 495). 
419 Letter to John Austin, 13 April 1847 (13: 713). The assertion by Middlemarch's 
narrator regarding human insensitivity to tragedy through inurement to what is "usual" 
invokes the idea of the homeostasis of habit in the general population - and its survival 
function: "we do not expect people to be deeply moved by what is not unusual. That 
element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not yet wrought itself into 
the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear much of it. If 
we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the 
grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the 
other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity" 
(M 182). 
420 As Kate Flint observes, readers past and present have "grappled with" Eliot's 
persistent creation of heroines who do not (as she herself did) transgress "Victorian 
convention" ("Gender" 150-60). Flint argues that Eliot's narratives "contain little by way 
of solutions, and a great deal that looks like expediency and compromise: hers is no 
utopian radicalism," but "continuity in English life" ("Gender" 1 79). 
444 
421 Will Ladislaw, like Dorothea (and also prefiguring Daniel Deronda), is habitually 
sympathetic (he has a "troop" of small children whom he takes on excursions). With 
empathy and mental flexibility, Will counters the rigidity of others: "[he] entered into 
every one's feelings, and could take the pressure of their thought instead of urging his 
own with iron resistance" (M 467). Throughout Middlemarch, iron is a key metaphor for 
negative, solipsistic, and inflexible habits of thought. 
422 Eliot tempered the indignant tone of her original ending by omitting the accusation 
that society "smiled on" the marriage of Dorothea to Casaubon. Instead, the attack on 
women's education is obliquely acknowledged in the revised ending as the female lot of 
"struggling amidst the conditions of an imperfect social state" (M784). Yet an ominous 
reference to "sadder sacrifice[ s ]" (M 785) than those made by Dorothea sustains the 
elegiac tone of the "Prelude." Furthermore, Brady argues that Eliot's letter to Sara 
Hennell cues the irony of the "Finale": "'Expect to be immensely disappointed with the 
close of Middlemarch. But look back to the Prelude"' (qtd. in Brady 173). 
423 Paxton argues that Eliot's writings articulate "feminist resistance" to Spencer's 
notions of biological determinism and sexual selection - particularly the "vehement 
antifeminism" of his later works (5, 15-16). Eliot jests in 1874 that she observes "the 
selection of conceited gentlemen" (Letters 6: 440). 
424 Paxton observes that Herbert Spencer is the "eminent philosopher among my friends" 
(M 248) to whom the narrator credits the "pier-glass" metaphor; Spencer used this 
analogy to clarify his theory of the fallibility of scientists and their susceptibility to "class 
reasoning" and a priori prejudice (Paxton 174). 
425 Brooke's chastisement of Dorothea for being ignorant of "that never-explained 
science" (M 17) of political economy dramatically calls attention to the absurd logic upon 
which men base their predominance over women. 
426 Virginia Woolf will later assess this phenomenon of false potency through the 
metaphor of the mirror: "Women have served all these centuries as looking glasses 
possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its 
natural size" (Room 45). The mirror image is necessary "because it charges the vitality; it 
stimulates the nervous system. Take it away and man may die, like the drug fiend 
deprived of his cocaine" (Woolf, Room 46-47). Possibly, Woolf was inspired in her 
choice of metaphor by George Meredith's The Egoist. Laetitia Dale, who, in her "habit of 
wholly subservient sweetness," is described as Sir Willoughby Patterne's "mirro[r] for 
life, and far more constant than the glass" (Egoist 267, 134 ). Meredith's novel anatomizes 
masculine egoism for its reliance on tradition and the female habitude of worshipful 
submission. Patterne, as his name signals, is a Menippean mouthpiece for masculinist 
"~atterns" and habits of thought. 
4 7 R.H. Hutton finds Rosamond to be a victim of Eliot's "malicious moral anatomy" 
(Carroll 304), but Rosamond's moral failings are depicted as being, by and large, 
habituated and socially created. 
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428 Brady adds that Rosamond, through her materialism, also satirizes middle-class and 
~enteel aspirations (167). 
29 Kate Flint observes: "The catastrophe of Lydgate and Rosamond's marriage" lies in 
their adherence to the "doctrine of separate spheres" ("Gender" 154 ). 
430 Paxton argues that the story of Lydgate and Rosamond is a "cautionary tale" regarding 
the fallacy of sexual selection (174-77). 
431 This theme is reinforced by James's offering of a Maltese dog, which Celia adores, 
but which Dorothea rejects for being unnatural and "parasitic" (M 28). 
432 He emphasizes the novel's links to the "school of Fielding": its "ironic method," "self-
inclusive ironies," and its narrator who resembles the "mock-heroic jester of the English 
comic novel" (Laughter 177, 179). 
433 Kristin Brady interprets Mary's future as the subject of "extensive ironic comment," 
for Mary achieves marital happiness based upon self-denying devotion to Fred's career, 
and "[l]ike her mother, ... she [gives] up even the voice of caustic comment" (172). As 
well, Mary becomes the mother of three sons and, in fact, celebrates her lack of 
daughters. Most disturbing is her reinforcement of Plutarch's patriarchal traditions in her 
"Stories of Great Men" (Brady 165-168). Brady also notes the obtrusive and 
"unmitigated frustration of Letty" in the "Finale" (172). 
434 Frances Theresa Russell notes glancingly that, in addition to George Eliot, George 
Meredith considered "foolish young men" (239) to be a type to satirize. By the 1870s, 
"Meredith was able to satirize masculine desire to stave off the threatened feminism," but 
for "half our novelists the 'women question' as such did not exist" (Russell 184, 187). 
435 James's thoughts are a satiric amplification of Mill's description of male entitlement: 
"Think what it is to a boy, to grow up to manhood with the belief that without any merit 
or any exertion of his own, though he may be the most frivolous and empty or the most 
ignorant and stolid of mankind, by the mere fact of being born a male he is by right the 
superior of all and everyone of an entire half of the human race: including probably some 
whose real superiority to himself he has daily or hourly occasion to feel" (SW 21: 324). 
436 
"Fancy," Adam informs Eve in Book IV of Paradise Lost, is one of the "lesser 
faculties" that "serve Reason as chief' (101-2); it is directly related to the senses. 
437 One of the text's key ironies is that Dorothea's passion is part of what makes her 
intellect superior to Casaubon's. We are told that if she had written a book, it would have 
been written in passionate sympathy "at once rational and ardent" (M 80). Appropriately, 
as Casaubon's passions are "droughty regions" (M 58), he is associated with the 
scholastic tradition of Aquinas, whereas Dorothea is associated with the affective 
mlstical tradition through Sts. Theresa, Clara, Catherine, and Dorothea. 
43 Henry James, betraying his dislike of strong satire, compliments Eliot for the 
"admirably sustained grayness of tone" with which she renders Casaubon; for James, 
"[t]o depict hollow pretentiousness and mouldy egotism with so little of narrow sarcasm 
and so much of philosophic sympathy, is to be a rare moralist as well as a rare story-
teller" (Carroll 368). Certainly, Middlemarch's narrator pities Casaubon. Yet, in addition 
to the narrator's own mockery of the frigid scholar, Celia and Mrs Cadwallader treat him 
with corrosive sarcasm. Even Dorothea must struggle against a "violent shock of 
446 
repulsion" towards him when she learns of the codicil, the "last injurious assertion of his 
power" (M 461, 464). Arguably, Casaubon's misogyny adds a more monstrous dimension 
to his human egotism - rendering him a suitable target for personal satire. 
439 In Middlemarch, great minds and "coarse" ones, such as Bulstrode's, are alike 
represented as being subject to the laws of habit: "Before changing his course, 
[Bulstrode] always needed to shape his motives and bring them into accordance with his 
habitual standard" (M 123). 
44° Flint also points to the general importance of the psychology of habit in Middlemarch, 
arguing that the text explores how "assumptions about gender roles" become part of an 
"individual's automatic mental reflexes" ("Gender" I 64 ). 
441 Forebodingly, Farebrother, referring to Lydgate, tells Dorothea that "'character is not 
cut in marble - it is not something solid and unalterable. It is something living and 
changing, and may become diseased as our bodies do"' (M 692). Recalling John 
Dryden's comparison between the satirist and the "physician" who "prescribes harsh 
remedies to an inveterate disease" (122), Eliot's view of satire as being fundamentally 
reformative is suggested obliquely by Dorothea's reply to Farebrother: "'Then it may be 
rescued and healed"' (M 692). 
442 Implicitly for Stevenson, Lydgate's greater awareness of his errors mediates the 
Juvenalian satire on Rosamond's character. 
443 As this is, ironically, also the perennial goal of satire (Frye figures satire as the 
"children of the light" engaged in battle with "the Philistine giant" [Anatomy 236]), 
resistance to satire as a literary habit of bygone ages, and a seemingly inappropriate 
vehicle for the promotion of sympathy, was routinely revoked. 
444 Luci Ii us (the founder of Roman satire) positioned himself as "being an enemy and an 
opponent of bad men and habits - a champion on the other hand of good men and habits" 
(Rudd 13). 
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